A Critical Assessment of the Texas Military Department

Chapter 1: The Militia

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Acronyms

ABCT	Armored Brigade Combat Team
AC	Active Component
ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
ADRP	Army Doctrine Reference Publication
ARFORGEN	Army Force Generation
ARNG	Army National Guard
AT	Annual Training
ATAG	Assistant to the Adjutant General
ATRA	American Tax-payer Refund Act
AVF	All-Volunteer Force
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
CDU	Critical Dual Use
COTS	Commercial off the Shelf
CS	Combat Support
CSS	Combat Service and Support
CTC	Combat Training Center
DSCA	Defense Support to Civil Authority
EOH	Equipment on Hand
ESFSRAC	End Strength and Force Structure Regional Advisory Council
FDU	Force Design Update
FM	Field Manual
FSA	Force Structure Allowance
GAO	Government Accountability Office
HLD	Home Land Defense
IDT	Inactive Duty Training
JRTC	Joint Readiness Training Center
KPUP	Key Personnel Upgrade Program
MATES	Maneuver Area Training and Equipment Site
LIN	Line Item Number

MOS	Military Occupational Skill
MRC	Medical Readiness Code
MTOE	Modified Table of Organizational Equipment
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NGREA	National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation
NTC	National Training Center
PLDC	Primary Leadership Development Course
RA	Regular Army
RC	Reserve Component
RTI	Regional Training Institute
SBCT	Stryker Brigade Combat Team
SRF	Selected Reserve Force
SRM	Sustainable Readiness Model
TAA	Total Army Analysis
TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowances
TMC	Troop Medical Clinic
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USAWC	United States Army War College
USERRA	Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act
UTES	Unit Training and Equipment Site

Introduction

The growing role of the National Guard and Reserve has evolved significantly since the 9/11 attacks. It has demonstrated resilience and dedication through extensive deployments abroad and domestic emergency responses. With over 1,000,000 international deployments to regions like Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, the Balkans, Guantanamo Bay, and the Sinai, the National Guard's involvement in international military engagements showcases the breadth and scale of their operations (National Guard Bureau, 2022). Here at home, the Guard has served at the forefront of nearly 400 natural disasters and emergency incidents throughout the United States in 2023 alone, showcasing its versatility in handling everything from wildfires and hurricanes to hazardous materials (Smith, 2023). Moreover, their expanding role in cybersecurity and space operations signifies a strategic shift to meet modern security challenges (National Guard Bureau, 2022).

The Department of Defense (DoD) has increasingly relied on the National Guard for global contingency operations due to diverse threats, fiscal challenges, and the cost-effectiveness of reserve components. DoD officials expect the National Guard to provide a broad spectrum of capabilities, including warfighting, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and post-conflict operations (Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 2008). This shift represents a significant departure from the historical conception of the National Guard, transforming it from a force primarily designed for infrequent federal use to an interdependent, well-equipped force deployed in predictable overseas rotations while maintaining readiness for domestic emergencies.

The Texas National Guard has experienced an intensified pace and complexity of missions over the past four years, balancing domestic duties with international obligations. This operational strain has resulted in a diversion of resources and focus from state-level responsibilities. The Guard's exhaustive engagement in operations—ranging from pandemic relief efforts and civil unrest response to wildfire suppression and border security (Operation Lone Star)—has highlighted the critical need for sustainable solutions (Government Accountability Office, 2023).

The cause of this diversion lies in the DoD's increased reliance on the National Guard for federal missions, coupled with the Guard's dual-status nature under Titles 10 and 32 of the United States Code (*Torres v. Texas Department of Public Safety*, 2022). The effect is a diminished capacity to fulfill state-level obligations, as personnel, equipment, and resources are increasingly allocated to federal priorities. This situation has created a tension between the Guard's state and federal roles, potentially compromising its ability to respond effectively to state emergencies and long-term security needs (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2007).

To address these challenges, this paper proposes reconstituting the Texas State Guard into a traditional militia framework. This approach aims to bolster state homeland security and defense capabilities, thereby allowing the Texas National Guard to focus on fulfilling its national operational reserve duties. The proposed solution offers a financially and operationally viable alternative to mitigate the dual-status challenges currently burdening the Texas National Guard.

This analysis will explore the legal, historical, and contemporary dynamics governing the National Guard's utilization, with a specific focus on the Texas National Guard. By examining the cause-and-effect relationship between increased federal obligations and diminished state-level capabilities, this paper seeks to provide a comprehensive understanding of the current challenges and propose a path forward that balances both state and federal needs.

The Militia: Constitutional Foundations

Josiah Quincy II, a prominent figure in the Boston Sons of Liberty, a paramilitary organization fighting for independence during the Revolutionary War, eloquently captured the essence of the militia in early American society, stating

> No free government was ever founded, or preserved its liberty, without uniting the characters of the citizen and the soldier in those destined for the defense of a free state…such are a well-regulated militia, composed of the freeholders, citizens and husbandmen, who take up arms to preserve their property, as individuals, and their rights as freedmen. (Quincy, 1774)

This profound statement forms the foundation for this exploration into the militia's pivotal role in the constitutional framework and its dynamic evolution over time.

Constitutional and Legal Framework of the U.S. Militia

The allocation of military power was a central and contentious issue during the founding of the United States. Both Federalists and Anti-Federalists shared concerns that a permanent standing army could lead to tyranny. However, the Founders also recognized the need for a robust national defense to protect the young nation.

To address this dilemma, the Constitution contains five key passages that directly address the creation and maintenance of a military force for the United States.

Article I, Section 8 includes three crucial clauses: the "armies clause," granting Congress the power to raise and support armies with a two-year appropriation limit; the "calling forth clause," allowing Congress to summon the militia to execute the laws of the Union, insurrection suppression, and invasion repulsion; and the "militia clause," empowering Congress to organize, arm, and discipline the militia while reserving officer appointment and training authority to the states (U.S. Constitution, art. I, § 8).

Article II, Section 2 contains the “Commander in Chief clause,” designating the President as the supreme Commander in Chief of the Army, Navy, and state militias when called into federal service. Article IV, Section 4 includes the “guarantee clause,” obligating the United States to protect states against invasion and domestic violence, and guaranteeing to every state in this Union a republican form of government (U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 2; art. IV, § 4).

These provisions established two primary sources for building and expanding the military: a standing Regular Army raised and supported by Congress, and state militias that could be called into federal service. This dual system carefully balanced power between the President and Congress, as well as between the federal government and the states (Kohn, 1975, pp. 42-44).

The Framers recognized that the Regular Army alone would be insufficient to fight a major war, necessitating additional means to raise forces. However, the Constitution did not specify how this should be accomplished, leading to various interpretations ranging from direct recruitment into the Regular Army to reliance on state militias (Weigley, 1967, p. 87).

Following the constitutional debates, the Framers issued a series of amendments to reinforce the balance of power between state and federal governments and safeguard individual liberties. The Second Amendment addressed the rights of militia and the bearing of arms, sparking ongoing scholarly debate about its interpretation and implications for military organization (Cornell, 2006, pp. 11-13; Lofgren, 1976).

This constitutional framework was designed to provide for national defense while simultaneously safeguarding against the potential misuse of military power. It allows for the maintenance of state-controlled militias that can be unified under federal command, when necessary, thus addressing both the need for defense and the fear of tyranny.

The U.S. Constitution grants Congress comprehensive authority over the militia. Article I, Section 8, Clauses 15 and 16, known as the "militia clauses," empower Congress to organize, arm, and discipline the militia and govern its deployment in service to the nation (U.S. Const. art. I, Section 8, cls. 15-16). Similarly, the Texas Constitution mandates the Legislature to organize and discipline the state militia, ensuring alignment with federal laws (Tex. Const. art. XVI, Section 46).

The Constitutional framework of the United States provides for a militia system granting both the federal and state authorities significant powers. This arrangement has fueled debates, particularly about the federal government's ability to activate state militias, such as the Texas National Guard, in the absence of

a formal war declaration by Congress. Congress's sole authority to declare war, often referred to as the War Powers Clause (U.S. Const. art. I, Section 8, cl. 11), has been bypassed in recent decades, allowing for military actions under Authorizations for Use of Military Force (AUMFs) without formal declarations. This shift has raised constitutional questions about the proper process for engaging in significant military conflicts (Blumrosen & Blumrosen, 2012).

Congressional authority to define the extent of presidential actions has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in several comprehensive rulings. In *Bas v. Tingy* and *Talbot v. Seeman*, the Court held that Congress possesses the power to delineate the boundaries of hostile engagements (*Bas v. Tingy,* 1800; *Talbot v. Seeman*, 1801).

The debate surrounding the National Guard's role as the constitutional militia revolves around varying interpretations of the militia's historical definition and the impact of the Dick Act of 1903. George Mason, a Virginia delegate to the Constitutional Convention and a strong advocate for the Bill of Rights, is frequently cited by both sides of the argument. Mason famously stated, "I ask, sir, what is the militia? It is the whole people, except for few public officials" (Mason, 1788).

Congress has upheld the beliefs of the Constitution's Framers, who were strong supporters of individual gun ownership and its protection under the Second Amendment (Uviller & Merkel, 2002). Many of the Framers also emphasized the importance of individual firearm ownership in maintaining a well-regulated militia, fearing the potential destruction of the general militia (Halbrook, 1985; Ostrom, 1991).

The Dick Act of 1903 marked a significant turning point in the organization of the militia, establishing the National Guard and distinguishing between the "organized militia" and the "unorganized militia" (Margis, 2016; Ansell, 1917). The organized militia, now known as the National Guard, became a structured, federally supported force, while the unorganized militia comprised the general population not formally integrated into the National Guard (Blum, 2006).

This act signified a substantial transformation, integrating state militias into a more federally coordinated system and creating a dual-role force that served both state and national interests (Margis, 2016). Subsequent legislation, such as the National Defense Act of 1933, further evolved the National Guard into a critical component of the U.S. military force, blurring the lines between state and federal military responsibilities and challenging the National Guard's traditional, state-centric identity (Blum, 2006).

The National Guard serves dual state and federal roles, outlined In Titles 10 and 32 of the United States Code, reflecting a nuanced balance of authority. The historical evolution of federal control over the National Guard, particularly post-9/11, underscores its significance in national defense and homeland security (Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2008).

Title 10 of the United States Code defines the U.S. militia and distinguishes between the organized militia (National Guard and Naval Militia) and the unorganized militia (10 U.S.C. § 311). This classification affects militia members' legal status and activation, delineating their responsibilities under federal and state jurisdictions.

The Constitution's allocation of powers to Congress and the president in militia deployment reflects a structured approach to military governance. Article I, Section 8 empowers Congress to call forth the militia. In contrast, Article II, Section 2 establishes the president's role as commander in chief, guiding the operational command of the militia once deployed (U.S. Const. art. 1§ 8; U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1). Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants the legislative body, not the executive, the authority to initiate warfare. James Madison reflected on this provision, highlighting its wisdom by emphasizing the

assignment of the decision for war to the legislature rather than the executive branch, “In no part of the constitution is more wisdom to be found than in the clause which confides the question of war or peace to the legislature, and not to the executive” (Madison, 1793; U.S. Const. art. 1§ 8, cl. 11).

The framers of the Constitution deliberately deviated from the British monarchical system, in which the monarch had the power to declare war. This change was made to prevent hasty decisions that could negatively impact citizens and to ensure that the American populace had a say in such significant matters through their representatives in Congress.

Madison further observed that, historically, executives tend to have a greater inclination towards warfare. Therefore, the Constitution intentionally places the power to declare war with the legislative branch, a deliberate decision to involve a body more representative of the people’s will. As Madison noted, “The constitution supposes, what the History of all Governments demonstrates, that the Executive is the branch of power most interested in war, and most prone to it. It has accordingly, with studied care, vested the question of war in the Legislature” (Madison, 1798).

The War Powers Resolution of 1973 delineates the procedural framework for military deployment, emphasizing Congress's role in declaring war and the president's limited powers to initiate combat actions without legislative consent. This legislation balances executive military authority with legislative oversight (War Powers Resolution, 1973). Despite enacting the War Powers Act, there has been ongoing contention between the executive and legislative branches over the appropriate allocation of military authority since 1973. Presidents have frequently contended that the War Powers Act oversteps constitutional boundaries by unduly restricting the executive branch’s powers (Ebright, 2022).

The concept of dual enlistment, stemming from amendments to the National Defense Act of 1933, blurs the lines between the state National Guard and the federal military, raising constitutional questions regarding militia deployment and federal authority (*Dukakis v. US Dept. of Defense*, 1988).

The Montgomery Amendment, was enacted as § 522 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, also limits state governors' power to withhold consent for National Guard overseas training, reflecting ongoing state-federal tensions and the constitutional balance of military powers (Public Law 99-661, 1986).

The U.S. Constitution and subsequent congressional acts establish a complex legal framework for the militia, balancing state and federal responsibilities. The National Guard's dual status, influenced by historical, legal, and practical considerations, plays a pivotal role in national defense and reflects the intricate nature of military governance in the United States.

Judicial Interpretations and Legislative Actions

In *United States v. Miller*, the Supreme Court explained that “the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense” (*United States v. Miller*, 1939). In District of *Columbia et al. v. Heller*, the supreme court affirmed this definition, stating that it “comports with founding-era sources” (*District of Columbia v. Heller*, 2008). The historical evidence aligns with this interpretation, as the first congress passed a law "command[ing] that every able-bodied male citizen between the ages of 18 and 45 be enrolled in the militia and equip himself with appropriate weaponry" (*Jones v. Bonta,* 2022, quoting *Perpich v. Department of Defense,* 1990) .

The division of the citizenry into the "organized militia" and the "unorganized militia" is established under the Militia Act of 1903, also known as the Dick Act (Parker, 1903). The "organized militia" comprises the National Guard and the Naval Militia. In contrast, the "unorganized militia" includes all

able-bodied males between the ages of 17 and 45 who are not members of the National Guard or Naval Militia (10 U.S.C. Chapter 12).

The U.S. Supreme Court's decision, particularly in *District of Columbia v. Heller*, clarifies that the Second Amendment's right to bear arms pertains individually to all Americans, linking the concept of "the people" to the broader national community. This interpretation aligns with other constitutional references to "the people" as inclusive of the entire populace, irrespective of militia membership (*District of Columbia v. Heller*, 2008). The Court's interpretation was supported by an earlier ruling in *United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez*, which considered the meaning of "the people" in the Fourth Amendment (1990). Furthermore, historical legislation mandated that able-bodied male citizens equip themselves for militia service, reinforcing the individual's role in collective defense (*United States v. Miller*, 1939; *Jones v. Bonta*, 2022).

The Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution places the militia at the heart of the nation's security, declaring that "a well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed" (U.S. Constitution, art. II). The term "well-regulated" in the context of the Second Amendment has historical and legal interpretations. Originally, the adjective "well-regulated" meant nothing more than the imposition of proper discipline and training (Johnson, 1785; Rawle, 1829). Historically, "well-regulated" signifies a disciplined and trained citizenry, reflecting the Founding Fathers' intent to establish a practical, self-armed militia for the common defense (National Archives, n.d.). This constitutional framing underscores the significance and relevance of the militia in our nation's history and present.

Historical interpretations of "well-regulated" imply that the militia should be organized, disciplined, and equipped to serve effectively, but not regulated by extensive governmental restrictions. The debates between Federalists and Anti-Federalists at the time the Constitution was framed also reflect this understanding, focusing on the balance of power between federal and state governments and the rights of individuals to bear arms (*District of Columbia v. Heller*, 2008).

The Militia in State Context: The Case of Texas

The evolution of the militia concept is notably illustrated in Texas. The Texas Militia descends from the Texian Militia, established by Stephen F. Austin in 1823 to protect the Old Three Hundred in the Colony of Texas (Johnson, 1914). Following the Texas Revolution, the Republic of Texas authorized the creation of the Texas Militia, Texas Army, and Texas Navy in the Constitution on September 5, 1836 (Tex. Const. art. II, § 6, 1836).

In Texas, the current statutory definitions in the Texas Government Code Section 431 are as follows: "Militia" is defined as the state military forces and the reserve militia, and "reserve militia" means the persons liable to serve, but not serving, in the state military forces (Texas Government Code § 431.001). The Texas Militia consists of the Texas Army National Guard, Texas Air National Guard, and Texas State Guard, all administered by the Texas Military Department under the command of the Texas Adjutant General (Texas Military Department, 2022, p.1)

The Constitutional Militia: Mischaracterizations

The term militia has been misconstrued to become synonymous with militant, far-right extremism. The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) characterizes the militia "by their obsession with FTX's (field training exercises), guns, uniforms typically resembling those worn in the armed forces and a warped interpretation of the Second Amendment. Antigovernment militia groups engage in firearm training and

maintain internal hierarchical command structures" (Southern Poverty Law Center, n.d.). Jonathan Greenblatt, CEO and National Director of the Anti-Defamation League, testified before the House Homeland Security Committee on February 2, 2022, claiming that "[t]he militia movement is a right-wing anti-government extremist movement that formed in 1993-94, primarily in reaction to federal gun control measures and to deadly standoffs between civilians and federal agents. Much of the movement focuses on paramilitary activities" (Greenblatt, 2022, p. 4). The Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) claims that "far-right terrorists—including militia extremists and white supremacists—pose the greatest domestic terror threat in the United States" (CSIS, 2021).

Across the country there is a trend of legislative efforts clearly aimed at regulating the "militia movement" or paramilitary activities at both state and federal levels. For instance, in January 2024, U.S. Senator Ed Markey and Congressman Jamie Raskin introduced the Preventing Private Paramilitary Activity Act, which aims to prohibit certain conduct involving private paramilitary organizations (S. 3589, 2024). The bill defines a "Private Military Organization" as "any group of 3 or more persons associating under a command structure for the purpose of functioning in public or training to function in public as a combat, combat support, law enforcement, or security services unit" (S. 3589, 2024).

In early 2024, Maine's House of Representatives passed a bill, LD 2130, aimed at banning paramilitary training camps (LD 2130a, 2024). The bill was enacted by the House by a single vote and a six-vote margin in the Senate, prohibiting groups of two or more people assembling to train with weapons with the intention to cause civil disorder (LD 2130b, 2024). These laws were said to prevent groups from organizing and training in a manner that is intended to cause civil disorder or that mimics military or law enforcement activities without proper authorization.

The characterizations of militia groups and their broad depictions by organizations like the SPLC, ADL, and CSIS fail to recognize important distinctions and the constitutional foundations of the militia concept. These organizations tend to conflate all militia activities with anti-government extremism, ignoring the historical and legal context surrounding the Second Amendment's reference to a "well-regulated Militia" (U.S. Const. amend. II, cl. 1).

The recent state and federal level legislative efforts to ban paramilitary training and private military organizations risk infringing upon this core constitutional principle. While aimed at preventing civil unrest, such measures inadvertently criminalize law-abiding citizens assembling and training as part of a well-regulated militia, a right enshrined in the Second Amendment.

Modern Implications and the National Guard

The Texas National Guard strives for the dual nature of the militia concept, serving both state and federal functions (*Abbott v. Biden*, 2023). This duality is reflected in members' dual enlistments and oaths, allowing the National Guard to fulfill both state responsibilities and federal directives. This structure continues the militia's legacy within contemporary defense and security frameworks, as affirmed in Perpich v. Department of Defense (*Perpich v. Department of Defense,* 1990).

The militia concept, as envisioned by the Founding Fathers and enshrined in the Second Amendment, remains a cornerstone of American constitutional law. It represents the integration of civilian and military roles in safeguarding national liberty, a principle that continues to shape understanding of collective defense and individual rights in the United States.

Active Duty: The Role of the National Guard

Active duty refers to full-time service within the U.S. military forces. Under Title 10 of the U.S. Code, the president can "federalize" National Guard units, transitioning them to active duty either in their reserve status or as federalized militia (Army National Guard, 2006, p. 3). This activation shifts their command from state governors to the president, aligning them with federal directives. However, such activation is subject to the Posse Comitatus Act, which generally prohibits using the National Guard for domestic law enforcement without specific constitutional or congressional authorization (18 U.S.C. § 1385).

Reserve Component Duty Statuses

Members of the Reserve Components, including the National Guard and Reserves, can serve in multiple duty statuses, each with distinct pay, benefits, and legal authorities:

1. There are currently 32 separate duty statuses for Reserve Component members.
2. Each status has unique rules for pay, benefits, medical coverage, and retirement point accrual.
3. This contrasts with active duty service members, who generally serve under a single, uniform status with consistent benefits.
4. These multiple statuses evolved over time through various laws and policies, often created to:
    - Track costs associated with reserve forces
    - Distinguish between federal and state control (for National Guard)
    - Differentiate types of training and operational support. (Reserve Forces Policy Board, 2020, p. 76)

This complex system of statuses reflects the multifaceted role of Reserve Components in the U.S. military structure.

Title 10 of the U.S. Code outlines various circumstances under which National Guard members can be called into federal service:

10 U.S.C. Section 12301(a) - Full Mobilization: During a congressionally declared war or national emergency, or when otherwise authorized by law, Section 12301(a) of Title 10 U.S.C. grants the Service Secretaries the power to involuntarily activate any reserve component member under their jurisdiction. This provision places no limit on the number of reservists that can be ordered to active duty and allows mobilized reservists to remain on active duty for the entire duration of the war or emergency, plus an additional six months.

10 U.S.C. Section 12301(d) - Voluntary Order to Active Duty: This section allows National Guard members to voluntarily agree to active duty at any time, provided they have the consent of their state's governor. It enables flexible activation when individual members are willing to serve. For example, in 2020, some National Guard members volunteered for active duty under 12301(d) to assist with COVID-19 response efforts in hard-hit areas outside their home state.

10 U.S.C. Section 12302 – Partial Mobilization: During a presidentially-declared national emergency, the secretary of the relevant military department can order any National Guard unit or member to active duty for a maximum of 24 straight months. This allows for a substantial but time-limited mobilization to address crises. For example, President George H.W. Bush utilized this authority to mobilize reservists during the latter stages of the 1991 Persian Gulf War when the Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC) authority proved insufficient to activate the required number of reservists. Similarly, President George W.

Bush invoked this authority in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Congressional Research Service, 2021, p. 15).

10 U.S.C. Section 12304 – Presidential Selected Reserve Call Up: This section empowers the president to authorize service secretaries to activate any National Guard unit or member for up to 365 days when needed to support active duty forces or operational missions. It provides a means for the president to reinforce military capabilities for specific needs. For example, President William J. Clinton ordered a Presidential Reserve Call-up on February 24, 1998, activating reservists under Title 10, Section 12304 of the United States Code, with the first reservists entering active duty on March 1, 1998. The low-intensity conflict with Iraq escalated to a high-intensity conflict on March 20, 2003, with the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. On May 1, 2003, all low-intensity conflict operations, such as Operation Northern Watch and Operation Southern Watch, were incorporated into Operation Iraqi Freedom. Since then, reservists involuntarily activated for Iraq-related operations have been called to active duty under the post-September 11, 2001, Partial Mobilization authority (Congressional Research Service, 2021, p. 16).

10 U.S.C. Section 251 – Federal Aid to State Governors: Under 10 USC 251 (formerly 10 USC 331), upon request from a state's legislature or governor, the president can deploy federal military forces or federalize the National Guard to suppress an insurrection against that state's government. This authority is part of the Insurrection Act, which provides exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act's general prohibition on using federal military forces for domestic law enforcement.

A notable example occurred during the 1992 Los Angeles riots. President George H.W. Bush invoked the Insurrection Act, including the authority granted by then 10 USC 332, to federalize the California National Guard and deploy federal troops to help restore order (Exec. Order No. 12804, 1992). The widespread unrest was deemed to be impeding the execution of federal law and threatening public safety.

It is important to note that:

1. The president must first issue a proclamation ordering those causing the disturbance to disperse before using military force under this act.
2. This authority allows for the use of both federalized National Guard and regular federal military forces.
3. The 1992 LA riots response also involved the deployment of active-duty military personnel from the 7th Infantry Division and Marines from Camp Pendleton, in addition to the federalized National Guard.

10 U.S.C. Section 252 – Use of Militia and Armed Forces to Enforce Federal Authority: Under 10 USC 252 (formerly 10 USC 332), when the president determines that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or rebellions make it impracticable to enforce federal laws through ordinary judicial proceedings, he can deploy federal military forces or federalize state National Guard units to enforce those laws or suppress the rebellion. This authority is part of the Insurrection Act, which provides exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act's general prohibition on using federal military for domestic law enforcement.

This provision provides broader authority than 10 USC 251 (formerly 331), as it doesn't require a request from a state and can be invoked to enforce federal law generally, not just to protect a state against domestic violence.

A notable example occurred in 1957 during the Little Rock Crisis. President Dwight D. Eisenhower issued Executive Order 10730, which federalized the Arkansas National Guard and deployed 1,000 U.S.

Army paratroopers from the 101st Airborne Division to Little Rock. This action was taken to enforce federal court orders for school desegregation and to maintain order, after Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus had used the Arkansas National Guard to prevent African American students from attending Little Rock Central High School (Exec. Order No. 10730, 1957).

10 U.S.C. Section 253 – Interference with State and Federal Law: Under 10 USC 253 (formerly 10 USC 333), the president is authorized to use the militia, armed forces, or any other means deemed necessary to suppress insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy in any state. This authority can be invoked when such actions hinder the execution of federal or state laws; deprive people of their Constitutional rights, privileges, immunities, or protections; and when state authorities are unable, fail, or refuse to protect those rights.

This provision is part of the Insurrection Act and provides an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act's restrictions on using federal military for domestic law enforcement.

A notable example of its use occurred in 1962 during the integration of the University of Mississippi. President John F. Kennedy invoked this authority to address civil rights issues and overcome state resistance to federal court orders. Specifically:

1. Kennedy issued Proclamation 3497, ordering those obstructing justice to cease and desist (Kennedy, 1962).
2. When the obstruction continued, he issued Executive Order 11053, authorizing the Secretary of Defense to call up military forces as necessary (Exec. Order, 11053, 1962).
3. This allowed for the federalization of the Mississippi National Guard and the deployment of federal troops to ensure compliance with court-ordered desegregation and maintain order during the enrollment of James Meredith, the first African American student admitted to the university.

It's important to note that this provision allows the president to act without a specific request from a state, unlike 10 USC 251 (formerly 331). It provides broad authority to protect constitutional rights and enforce federal law when state authorities are unwilling or unable to do so.

10 U.S.C. Section 12406 – Air and Army National Guard: 10 USC Section 12406 provides the President with the authority to call the Air and Army National Guard into federal service under specific circumstances. These include invasion, rebellion, and inability to execute federal laws with regular forces.

A historical precedent for this type of mobilization occurred in 1916, though it predates the current statute. President Woodrow Wilson used similar authority granted by the National Defense Act of 1916 (University of Michigan Libraries, 1916) to activate the National Guard for service along the U.S.-Mexico border (Boehm, 2013). Specifically:

1. The National Defense Act of 1916 empowered the President to federalize the entire National Guard, expanding beyond the border states whose Guards had already been activated by their respective governors.
2. This activation was in response to border raids led by Pancho Villa and the broader Mexican Revolution, which threatened U.S. border security.
3. The mobilization included the Texas National Guard and units from other states, marking the first time the National Guard was called into federal service as a distinct component of the U.S. Army.

It's important to note that while this 1916 action serves as a historical example of federalizing the National Guard, it occurred under different legal authorities than the current 10 USC 12406. The National Defense Act of 1916 was a pivotal piece of legislation that significantly shaped the modern role of the National Guard in national defense and its dual state-federal nature. This mobilization was a crucial step in the evolution of the National Guard, transforming it from a primarily state-controlled militia to an integral part of the federal military structure, while still maintaining its state responsibilities.

Title 32 of the U.S. Code permits state governors to activate National Guard members for full-time homeland defense duties, with federal approval and funding:

32 U.S.C. Section 502(f) – National Guard Training and Other Duty: This section of the U.S. Code provides authority for National Guard members to perform training or other duty beyond their standard drill periods and annual training. It allows for:

1. Flexible activation of National Guard units for various operations, often related to domestic crises or support missions.
2. Governors to utilize Guard capabilities while receiving federal funding and support.
3. Guard members to remain under state control (Title 32 status) rather than being federalized.

A notable example of its use occurred during Operation Jump Start (2006-2008). In response to concerns about illegal immigration and drug trafficking, President George W. Bush authorized the deployment of National Guard troops to support the U.S. Border Patrol (The White House, 2006). Governors of border states, including California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas, used 32 USC Section 502(f) to activate their Guard units for this mission. This activation allowed Guard members to support federal law enforcement while remaining under state control, avoiding potential conflicts with the Posse Comitatus Act.

It's important to note that 32 USC 502(f) is distinct from full federalization under Title 10. It provides a middle ground where Guard members can perform extended duties with federal funding but remain under state command, making it a valuable tool for domestic support operations.

32 U.S.C. Sections 901 & 902 – Homeland Defense Activities. These sections, added to Title 32 in 2004, provide specific authority for National Guard homeland defense activities:

1. Section 901 defines "homeland defense activity" as an activity undertaken for the military protection of U.S. territory or domestic population from a threat or aggression, or to provide assistance to civil authorities in responding to certain emergencies.
2. Section 902 authorizes the Secretary of Defense to provide funds to a state governor for National Guard units to conduct homeland defense activities that the Secretary determines necessary and appropriate.

Key points:

- These sections create a specific funding mechanism for certain homeland defense missions performed by the National Guard while remaining under state control (Title 32 status).
- They do not provide general activation authority for governors.
- The creation of Sections 901 and 902 in 2004 was part of broader efforts to clarify and enhance homeland defense capabilities following the attacks.

TEXAS MILITARY FORCES

Texas Constitutional Authority

The Texas Constitution, in Article IV, Section 7, explicitly provides for the establishment and governance of state military forces. It grants the governor the authority to call forth the militia to execute state laws, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions. This provision lays the constitutional groundwork for the Texas military forces (TXMF), emphasizing the state's duty and responsibility to maintain a ready and responsive military force.

Article IV, Section 7 of the Texas Constitution provides as follows: "He shall be Commander-in-Chief of the military forces of the State, except when they are called into actual service of the United States. He shall have power to call forth the militia to execute the laws of the State, to suppress insurrections, and to repel invasions."

Clause 1 of the current Texas Constitution has remained unchanged since it was adopted on February 15, 1876. Unlike the first clause, Clause 2 was amended in 1999. Before being amended in 1999, the original version of Clause 2 read, "He shall have power to call forth the militia to execute the laws of the State, to suppress insurrections, repel invasions, and protect the frontier from hostile incursions by Indians or other predatory bands" (Texas Law, n.d.-b).

The operation, organization, and management of the TXSG are detailed in state legislation, providing a statutory foundation for its functioning.

Texas Government Code (Title 4, Subtitle C)

Under Title 4, Subtitle C of the Texas Government Code provides the legal foundation for the Texas military forces which includes. This section of the code:

- Defines the structure, responsibilities, and operational parameters of each military force
- Establishes the chain of command and organizational hierarchy
- Outlines the specific roles and duties of military force service members
- Sets forth the legal authority under which the military forces operate

This statutory framework is essential for the proper functioning and governance. It ensures that the organization operates in compliance with state laws and regulations, while also providing the necessary flexibility to respond to state emergencies and support civil authorities. The code's provisions enable the TXMF to integrate within Texas's broader emergency management and homeland security infrastructure, working alongside other state agencies. By clearly delineating TXMF's responsibilities and limitations, the Texas Government Code seeks to prevent conflicts of authority and ensures accountability in the guard's operations.

Texas Military Code, Texas Government Code Chapter 437

Chapter 437 of the Texas Government Code, known as the Texas Military Code, serves as the principal legal framework governing the Texas Military Forces (TXMF) (Texas Military Code, Texas Government Code Chapter 437). This legislation delineates the organizational structure, operational procedures, and administrative oversight for all state military entities, including the Texas State Guard (TXSG). Key provisions of the code encompass:

1. Oversight of state military operations.
2. Guidelines for personnel management.
3. Integration of state defense forces into Texas's public safety and emergency response systems.

The Texas Military Code ensures that the TXSG and other components of the TXMF operate in adherence to state and federal legal requirements. It provides a robust legal basis for organizing, training, and deploying these forces to fulfill their responsibilities within the state of Texas.

The Governor's Authority and the Role of Local Officials

Governor's Command

The Texas governor's authority over state military forces represents a critical aspect of Texas's security and emergency response infrastructure. Rooted in detailed constitutional and statutory provisions, this authority reflects a carefully crafted balance between state and federal powers. As commander-in-chief of state military forces, the governor plays a pivotal role in ensuring Texas's readiness to address a wide range of potential crises, from natural disasters to civil disturbances.

The Texas Constitution, specifically Article IV, Section 7, establishes the governor as the commander-in-chief of the state's military forces, except when they are called into actual service of the United States (Texas Constitution). This provision closely mirrors Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution, which designates the President as commander-in-chief of federal forces (U.S. Constitution, art. II).

A significant distinction lies in Article IV, Section 7, Clause 2 of the Texas Constitution, which empowers the governor to call forth the militia to execute state laws, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions (Texas Government Code, §§ 431.071(a), 431.111). This authority parallels that granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 15 of the U.S. Constitution but places it directly in the hands of the state executive (U.S. Constitution).

In the case Abbott v. Biden, the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the dual nature of the National Guard (*Abbott v. Biden*, 2023). The court emphasized that the National Guard operates under state control unless called into federal service, highlighting the balance of power between state and federal authorities. The ruling reaffirmed that the National Guard is considered the modern militia reserved to the states by the First and Second Militia Clauses of the Constitution. This decision underscores the importance of the National Guard in both state and federal contexts, maintaining its dual role and the respective authorities of state governors and the federal government (*Abbott v. Biden*, 2023).

As the chief executive officer of Texas, the governor is charged with faithfully executing state laws, a responsibility that often necessitates the mobilization of the Texas National Guard. The governor's chain of command extends through the Adjutant General of Texas, who heads the Texas Military Department (Texas Government Code, § 437.001(2), 437.003(a)).

The Texas Military Department houses the Texas National Guard, comprising both the Texas Army National Guard and the Texas Air National Guard (Texas Government Code, § 437.001(13)-(15)). This structure ensures a comprehensive state military organization capable of responding to various state-level emergencies and supporting federal missions when required.

Members of the Texas National Guard occupy a unique position, swearing allegiance to both the state governor and the U.S. President (32 U.S.C. §§ 304, 312). This dual commitment reflects the hybrid state-

federal nature of the National Guard, as noted in Holdiness v. Stroud (*Holdiness v. Stroud,* 1987). The U.S. Supreme Court, in Perpich v. Department of Defense, further clarified this duality, describing National Guard members as simultaneously enlisted in both state and federal components (*Perpich v. Department of Defense,* 1990).

Specifically, all individuals who enlist in a State National Guard unit concurrently enlist in the National Guard of the United States, which serves as a reserve component of the federal military (*Perpich v. Department of Defense,* 1990; 10 U.S.C. § 12107; 32 U.S.C. § 102). This dual enlistment structure allows for seamless transition between state and federal service, depending on the nature of the mission and the authority activating the Guard.

The distinction between federal and state service is crucial in understanding the governor's authority. When not federalized, the governor retains command over the state's National Guard forces (Army National Guard, 2006, p. 4). Federal statutes reinforce this separation, explicitly excluding National Guard duty from the definition of federal "active duty" (10 U.S.C. § 101(d)(1), (5); 32 U.S.C. § 101(12), (19)).

Moreover, 10 U.S.C. § 12401 explicitly states that Guardsmen are "not in active Federal service except when ordered thereto under law." When ordered to active federal duty, a Guardsman is temporarily relieved from state National Guard duty until released from federal service (32 U.S.C. § 325(a)(1)). This provision ensures clear lines of authority and prevents conflicts between state and federal missions.

When federalized, Texas National Guard units can be deployed for national defense missions, overseas contingency operations, or to support other states during large-scale emergencies through interstate compacts.

The governor's authority to rapidly mobilize these forces allows for immediate response to state-level crises, complementing federal resources when necessary (Texas Government Code, § 437.001(13)-(15)). This flexibility is crucial in addressing the unique and often time-sensitive needs of Texas's diverse geography and population.

The complex structure of the Texas Military Forces, including their dual state-federal nature, provides a flexible and robust system capable of addressing diverse challenges. This arrangement underscores the importance of state-level military organization within the broader context of national defense and emergency management, ensuring that Texas can effectively respond to crises while also contributing to national security objectives when called upon.

Local Officials' Involvement

The Role of Texas Government Code Section 431.112 in Local Emergency Response and request for Military Assistance

Texas Government Code Section 431.112, enacted in 1987 was part of a broader legislative effort to enhance public safety and emergency response capabilities by empowering local authorities to request immediate military assistance from state forces in urgent situations.

The inclusion of Section 431.112 in the 1987 bill can be understood within the context of heightened awareness during the 1980s regarding effective mechanisms to address potential nuclear threats, emergencies, including riots, natural disasters, and other situations requiring immediate intervention. The

bill aimed to provide a legal framework for local authorities to quickly mobilize state military resources when necessary (Texas Government Code, § 431.112).

The Texas Government Code Chapter 431, which contains Section 431.112, was enacted alongside Chapter 418 on Emergency Management by the 70th Texas Legislature, effective September 1, 1987 (Texas Government Code § 418). This comprehensive legislative act established key provisions related to emergency management and the state militia, defining the roles and responsibilities of various authorities in emergency situations.

The implementation of Texas Government Code § 431.112 has several potential impacts on communities:

Enhanced Public Safety: By allowing local authorities to request military assistance promptly, the law helps ensure that violent disturbances can be quickly controlled, reducing the risk of harm to residents and property.

Rapid Response: In situations where time is critical, this provision enables faster deployment of military resources, which can be crucial in preventing escalation and maintaining order.

Community Trust: Effective and timely intervention in emergencies can build trust between the community and local authorities, as residents see that their safety is a priority.

Legal Clarity: The law provides clear guidelines on the process for requesting military assistance, ensuring that local officials understand their authority and responsibilities in emergency situations.

Relationship to Other Emergency Management Provisions

Section 431.112 operates in conjunction with other emergency management provisions established by the same legislative act. For instance, Chapter 418 of the Texas Government Code defines the governor's responsibilities in meeting dangers presented by disasters and grants the governor authority to issue executive orders, proclamations, and regulations with the force of law during emergencies (Texas Government Code § 418).

The complementary nature of Chapters 418 and 431 creates a comprehensive framework for emergency response in Texas. While Chapter 418 focuses on overall emergency management structure and gubernatorial powers, Chapter 431 addresses the specific use of state military forces, including the provision for local authorities to request assistance as outlined in Section 431.112.

Texas Government Code Section 431.112 represents a critical component of the state's emergency response capabilities. By empowering local authorities to act swiftly in the face of imminent threats to public safety, this provision ensures that communities across Texas have access to necessary resources for maintaining order and protecting citizens.

A Constitutional Analysis

State defense forces (SDFs) become critical when National Guard units are federally deployed. The national homeland security strategy designates states and localities as primarily responsible for emergency services in the event of a terrorist attack (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2002).

Post-9/11, the outline for a domestic emergency response hierarchy was notably addressed in the Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5), issued by President George W. Bush on February 28, 2003 (Bush, 2003). This directive established the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and outlined a coordinated response structure starting with local first responders, followed by the National

Guard (under the control of state governors), and then, if necessary, the activation of federal military reserves and active components.

Here is a summary of the response hierarchy as outlined in various post-9/11 policies and directives:

1. **Local First Responders**: The initial response to emergencies starts at the local level with police, fire departments, emergency medical services, and other local agencies.
2. **National Guard**: If the situation escalates beyond the capabilities of local first responders, state governors can activate the National Guard to provide additional support.
3. **Federal Military Reserves and Active Components**: If the emergency requires resources beyond what the National Guard can provide, the federal government can deploy military reserves and active-duty military personnel.

These steps ensure a scalable response that begins at the local level and escalates as needed, allowing for an effective and coordinated approach to handling domestic emergencies.

The Dual Status of the National Guard

Title 32, Section 101, delineates the organization of the Army and Air National Guard, suggesting a dual status due to state appointment of officers, federal recognition, and federal subsidization of expenses related to arming, equipping, and organizing a unit (32 U.S.C. § 101). Conversely, Section 109, "Maintenance of Other Troops," authorizes states to organize and maintain defense forces that cannot be called, ordered, or drafted into the armed forces (32 U.S.C. 32, § 109).

State defense forces, also referred to as State Guards or Home Guards, offer states an additional resource when their National Guard units are deployed elsewhere. These forces cannot be conscripted into the federal armed forces and do not allow active National Guard or reserve members to join (32 U.S.C. § 109).

As of 2024, there are currently 23 active state defense forces and 5 active naval militias. Additionally, all the other states are federally authorized to establish such forces, however they have yet to do so (Council of State Governments Southern Office, 2024). State defense forces primarily exhibit military characteristics, supporting statewide military efforts and providing emergency response and civil support services. While they fulfill diverse roles, their engagement in direct law enforcement activities is uncommon and depends on state-specific authorizations, focusing more on supplementing National Guard capabilities during domestic emergencies and state-directed missions (Carafano & Zuckerman, 2010).

Florida's state guard (Florida State Guard, n.d.-a), known as the Florida State Defense Force (FSDF), stands out as an exception to the typical command structure. While most state defense forces fall under the state's adjutant general (National Guard Bureau, 2024), the Florida State Defense Force (FSDF), now known as the Florida State Guard (FSG), operates independently under the direct authority of the governor (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 251). This arrangement dates back to World War II, when the Florida Defense Force (FDF) was created in 1941 by the Florida Legislature and Governor Spessard Holland as a temporary replacement for the Florida National Guard, which had been federalized for wartime service (Palm Beach County History Online, 2010). Each county could establish its own FDF unit if at least 50 qualified men signed up, between the ages 18 to 63. The FDF was intended to fulfill the state's defense needs during the National Guard's deployment.

In mid-1943 the Florida Defense Force was renamed the Florida State Guard, which was disbanded in 1947 after the Florida National Guard returned to state service. However, it was reactivated in June 2022 by Governor Ron DeSantis as the Florida State Guard. The FSG's commanding officer reports directly to the governor, allowing for an autonomous chain of command outside the typical military hierarchy (Florida Senate, 2022). This structure underscores Florida's emphasis on maintaining a traditional militia, a state-controlled force dedicated to state missions and emergencies, independent of federal oversight or the National Guard command.

Today, the Florida State Guard is a state-supported volunteer force with capabilities in land-based, maritime, and aviation operations (Florida State Guard, n.d.-b).

The National Guard Bureau (NGB) maintains a structured relationship with state defense forces as outlined in the Chief of the National Guard Bureau Instruction (CNGBI) 5500.01A, revised in March 2024 (National Guard Bureau, 2024). According to this document, the NGB establishes the policy and responsibilities for the interaction between the NGB and state defense forces, ensuring that SDFs are integrated into state response operations alongside the National Guard (National Guard Bureau, 2024). The NGB views state defense forces as essential state entities, particularly in civil support operations, and provides guidelines for their interaction without the use of federal funds or resources. The instruction also stipulates that state defense forces uniforms must be distinct from those of the U.S. Armed Forces to avoid confusion. This policy reflects the NGB's clearly defined relationship with state defense forces, emphasizing their critical role in state-level emergency response while maintaining compliance with federal regulations (National Guard Bureau, 2024).

Distinction Between State Active Duty and Federal Activation

After discussing the present-day operational structures and legal contexts of the Milita, with a focus on the Texas National and State Guard, we shift our attention to a historical examination. This analysis will focus on the development of America's militia from its inception during the colonial era, through its intricate ties with the regular U.S. Army, to the establishment and growth of the Texas National Guard. Understanding this history is crucial to grasping the complex interplay of state and federal authority and the influence of various interest groups that have defined the militia's contribution to national security. While not comprehensive, this exploration seeks to shed light on pivotal events and debates that reveal the evolving nature of the militia and its current role in the discourse surrounding the U.S. military and constitutional law. We will scrutinize the strategic, political, and legal arguments that support the revitalization and advancement of state militias in harmony with the original intentions of the nation's founders and the core values of democratic rule.

The Colonial Militia: Origins, Transformation, and the Roots of the National Guard

The idea of the "citizen soldier," where every able-bodied man is responsible for defending his homeland, can be traced back to ancient times and the Anglo-American tradition (Purcell, 1981). This concept laid the foundation for developing America's militia system, which has evolved from its colonial origins to the establishment and growth of the modern National Guard.

The first American colonial militia regiments were organized on December 13, 1636, in the Massachusetts Bay colony, where the general court ordered three permanent regiments (Palmer, 1941, p. 19; Millett & Maslowski, 1984, p. 10). These regiments were responsible for protecting the population and executing limited offensive actions, as the colonies lacked a centralized governmental system to manage their defense actively (Todd, 1941a, p. 75; Palmer, 1941, p. 18).

However, the colonial militia systems were not uniform across the regions. The distinct societal dynamics of each colony shaped their respective militia structures in response to specific threats. The New England colonies, for example, faced persistent threats from the French and Indigenous tribes, particularly the Algonquian and Abenaki tribes, and maintained a relatively strong militia throughout the colonial period (Taylor, 2001, p. 188, 290; Shy, 1980, pp. 5-6; Lepore, 1998, p. 7; Peckham, 1964, p. 8). In contrast, the Virginia militia "almost ceased to exist for about a half-century" due to a lack of a real threat within the colony's boundaries (Shy, 1980, p. 6).

The introduction of long-distance, sustained campaign warfare during the Seven Years' War (also known as the French and Indian War) challenged the colonial militia's founding purpose of local self-defense. The European powers in the New World brought in small professional armies augmented by volunteer colonists or drafted quotas from the militia (Shy, 1980, p. 7; Millett & Maslowski, 1984, p. 10; Palmer, 1941, p. 19). The success of these military expeditions was largely dependent on the inherent martial skill of the colonial augmentees, with the New England colonies maintaining a relatively proficient militia while Virginia struggled to enlist capable volunteers or draft "vagabonds" into service (Shy, 1980, p. 7; Anderson, 2000, pp. 96-109).

During this period, the emergence of specialized "volunteer units," such as the New Jersey Blues under the command of Peter Schuyler, represented a significant development in the evolution of the colonial militia (Mahon, 1983, p. 18; Todd, 1941a, pp. 75-76). These volunteer units, which had the financial means to uniform and arm themselves, are considered the "true forebears" of the modern National Guard (Stentiford, 2002, p. 9; Mahon, 1983, pp. 18, 260; Todd, 1941a, p. 74).

As tensions grew between the colonies and the British Crown, the concept of the "Minute Men" emerged, with the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts requesting that a fourth of the colony's standing militia be prepared "to march at a moment's notice" (Smith, 1976, p. 463; Lancaster, 2001, p. 81; Smith, 1976, p. 459; Todd, 1941a, p. 76). This category of ready-to-mobilize militia represented the final evolution of the colonial North American militia, the last remnant of the original English system.

The colonial militia's legacy has continued to shape the development of the National Guard, with its role in the nation's defense and constitutional landscape still debated today. This comprehensive historical analysis provides valuable insights into the colonial militia's origins, transformations, and enduring influence, laying the foundation for understanding the complex dynamics that have defined its contribution to American national security.

REVOLUTIONARY WAR

The Colonial Militia's Dual Role in the American Revolution

The colonial militia model was the template for American participation in the Continental Army during the Revolutionary War. However, the militia's performance and the relationship between these volunteer forces and the regular army were complex and evolved throughout the conflict. This section examines the critical transformational period for the militia between 1776 and 1787, exploring their dual roles as complementary and competitive forces to the Continental Army.

At the beginning of the American Revolutionary War in 1775, General George Washington took command of the Continental Army, which initially consisted of approximately 22,000 New England militiamen (Wright, 1983, p. 21). Washington's prior experience with militia forces during the French and Indian War had familiarized him with their capabilities and limitations (Library of Congress, n.d.-b). While recognizing the militia's value, Washington was also acutely aware of their significant drawbacks.

These included a reluctance to serve in extended campaigns far from their homes and farms, as well as a lack of military discipline and proficiency when compared to professional European armies (Library of Congress, n.d.-b). These factors would shape Washington's approach to utilizing and reforming the militia throughout the war.

The limitations of the militia became apparent during Washington's early attempts to employ them against British regulars in Boston. In a July 1775 letter to John Hancock, the president of the Continental Congress, Washington expressed his concern about "the difficulty of introducing discipline and subordination into an army while we have the enemy in view" (Library of Congress, n.d.-b). These challenges led Washington to conclude that a professional standing army was essential for the success of the revolution. In response to Washington's assessment, the Continental Congress established the Continental Army in 1775 (Doubler, 2001, p. 46). This decision marked a significant shift in the American approach to military organization during the Revolutionary War.

Despite the creation of the Continental Army, the militia continued to play two significant roles throughout the Revolutionary War. First, they provided forces to defend, attack, and employ partisan activities against the British and Hessian troops (Doubler, 2001, p. 53). Their experience with frontier hunting and knowledge of the wilderness proved invaluable, particularly in the "Forage Wars" in New Jersey, where militia forces successfully disrupted British foraging efforts (College Sidekick, n.d.). Second, the militia played a vital role in "controlling the allegiance of the populations scattered throughout the colonies," serving as a crucial counterweight to potential Loyalist sentiments (Doubler, 2001, p. 53).

While modern historians have agreed and disagreed with Washington's assessment of the militia's performance, one scholar offers an interesting analysis of their often-overlooked contributions. Walter Millis argues that "it was the militia which presented the greatest single impediment to Britain's only practicable weapon, that of counterrevolution" (Millis, 1956, pp. 34-35). Though the militia may have been "less than ideal combat troops," disrupting British operations and maintaining control of the local populations were crucial to the revolutionary cause (Millis, 1956, pp. 34-35).

The complex and evolving relationship between the militia and the Continental Army is a testament to the challenges faced during the transformation of America's military institutions. While the militia's shortcomings led to the creation of the regular army, their unique capabilities and roles ultimately complemented the Continental forces, even as they sometimes competed for resources and prestige. This dynamic underscores the pivotal and multifaceted contributions of the colonial militia to the American Revolution. Their legacy continues to shape the development of American military institutions to this day.

WASHINGTON'S PEACE ESTABLISHMENT & THE CONSTITUTION

Washington's Sentiments and the Militia Clauses of the U.S. Constitution

In the aftermath of the American Revolution, General George Washington articulated his vision for the new nation's defense establishment in a document titled "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment," written on May 1, 1783. This document outlined Washington's views on the necessary components for a peace establishment in the United States, including a regular standing force, a well-organized militia, arsenals, and military academies (Washington, 1783). Washington's "Sentiments" laid the groundwork for the constitutional debates over the militia's role and the federal government's military powers (Washington, 1783).

Washington's document outlined five fundamental pillars of national defense. The second pillar called for "A well-organized Militia; upon a Plan that will pervade all the States, and introduce similarity in their

Establishment, Maneuvers, Exercise and Arms" (Washington, 1783). This reflected his frustration with the lack of standardization and poor quality among the militia units provided to him during the Revolutionary War, as well as his understanding that the militia tradition was a vital "Bulwark of our Liberties and independence" (Washington, 1783; Palmer, 1941, p. 7).

In developing his "Sentiments," Washington consulted with his top generals, including Generals Hand, Heath, Huntington, Knox, R. Putnam, and Steuben (Palmer, 1941, p. 6). In his book *America in Arms: The Experience of the United States with Military Organization*, John McAuley Palmer notes that "the most striking thing about them is their unanimity as to the military needs of the United States. …they all recommended that the militia should be given uniform organization and effective training throughout the states" (Palmer, 1941, p. 7). This consensus among Washington's experienced officers reflected the broader lessons learned during the war about the importance of a well-regulated militia for national defense.

The "Sentiments" and the ideas they represented sparked lively debates within the Continental Congress in the years leading up to the Constitutional Convention. The Anti-Federalists—advocates of state sovereignty—argued against creating a strong, centralized federal army, and instead favored the militia as a counterbalance to potential government tyranny (Huntington, 1957, p. 167; Doubler, 2001, p. 66). In contrast, the Federalists pushed for establishing a standing federal army to protect the nation's frontiers and interests (Doubler, 2001, p. 66).

The final provisions in the U.S. Constitution represented a compromise between these competing visions. Article I, Section 8 granted Congress the authority "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia" and "the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress" (U.S. Const. art. 1, Section 8, cl. 16). This clause gave the federal government control over the militia, while Article I, Section 8, Clause 12 provided for the "raising and supporting Armies" (U.S. Const. art. 1, Section 8, cl. 12).

The framers sought to balance the need for a centralized national defense with the democratic principle of a citizen-based militia, as articulated in Washington's "Sentiments." This compromise represented the Founding Fathers' desire to prevent the tyranny of a standing army while still maintaining the capacity for adequate national security (Huntington, 1957, p. 167; Doubler, 2001, p. 66). George Washington recognized the widespread concern among Americans about maintaining large military forces during peacetime. He noted, "a large standing army in time of Peace hath ever been considered dangerous to the liberties of a Country" (Washington, 1783/1938, p. 380).

Washington's vision found within his written document "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment," and the subsequent debates over the militia's role during the Constitutional Convention laid the foundation for the complex and evolving relationship between federal and state authority over the nation's military forces. The militia clauses of the Constitution continue to shape civil-military relations and the development of American national security institutions to this day.

The Militia Act of 1792 and the Transformation of the Citizen-Soldier

In the formative years of the United States, the balance between a federal standing army and state-controlled militia forces was a subject of intense political debate. The Militia Act of 1792, passed by the Second Congress and signed into law by President George Washington on May 8, 1792, marked a significant turning point in the evolution of the American military system (Library of Congress, n.d.-a). This section examines the act's historical context, key provisions, and its enduring impact on the relationship between the federal government, the states, and the citizen-soldier.

The origins of the militia debate can be traced back to the American Revolution when the Continental Army, state militias, and local safety committees played pivotal roles in the fight for independence. This historical backdrop set the stage for the post-war deliberations of the Constitution's framers, who grappled with the question of providing for the common defense while guarding against the potential for military tyranny. The Constitution's militia clauses, found in Article I, Section 8, sought to balance these competing concerns by granting Congress the power to organize, arm, and discipline the militia while reserving to the states the authority to appoint officers and train the militia according to congressional guidelines.

Initially, the Republic struggled to maintain even the smallest Regular Army and could barely cope with threats posed by Native Americans and internal rebellions, let alone the risk of invasion by foreign powers. In 1789, the new American government committed to rebuilding the nation's forces from virtually nothing to a small Regular Army consisting of an eight-company regiment of infantry and a four-company battalion of artillery (Gentile et al., 2020, p. 20). This raised the overall authorized personnel of the Regular Army to 840 men, although by 1789 only 672 men filled its ranks (Weigley, 1967, p. 89).

In the early 1790s, a series of military setbacks on the frontier underscored the limitations of the existing military structure. The disastrous defeat of General Josiah Harmar's forces, by Native American forces in the Ohio Country, highlighted the need for reform (Doubler, 2001, p. 70). In 1791, Native American tribes decisively defeated a combined force of 350 Regular Army troops and 1,100 militiamen during a series of deadly engagements known as St. Clair's Defeat, or the Battle of the Wabash, in the Northwestern Territory of Ohio. In the last of these deadly clashes, a detachment of approximately 60 Regulars and 300 militiamen were cut off from the larger force and attacked, causing the majority of the militiamen to flee and leading to the virtual annihilation of the remaining Regular troops (Kohn, 1975, pp. 115-116).

These defeats prompted Congress to increase the size of the authorized force. By 1792, Congress had raised its commitment to five regiments of infantry with cavalry and artillery support, roughly 5,000 men. General Anthony Wayne led this force to victory at the battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794 (Prucha, 1969, pp. 28-38; Jacobs, 1947; Stone, 2009; Mahon, 1950; Gaff, 2004).

Recognizing the need for reform, Secretary of War Henry Knox submitted a comprehensive plan to President Washington, who then forwarded the plan, on January 20, 1790, to Congress, calling for a more centralized and professionalized militia system (Annals of Congress, 1834a). Knox's proposal included provisions for federal funding of arms and equipment, standardized training and discipline, and a system of fines for non-compliance (Coakley, 1996, pp. 25-29). Knox's plan called for tiered militias, with some tiers trained to a higher standard than others. Under Knox's plan, the militias would be armed and equipped at the expense of the federal government, whereas previously it had been solely up to the militiamen themselves or the states to fund and maintain their militias (O'Sullivan & Meckler, 1974, pp. 28-36).

As a result of these competing pressures, the Militia Act of 1792 emerged as a compromise measure, reflecting the ongoing tensions between federal and state power in the early republic (Mount Vernon Ladies' Association, n.d.) The act's key provisions included:

1. Universal enrollment: All free, able-bodied white male citizens between 18 and 45 must enroll in their state militia and provide their arms and equipment.

2. State control: The act reaffirmed the states' authority to appoint officers and supervise militia training, subject to federal standards.

3. Federal authority: The president was granted the power to call forth the militia to execute federal laws, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.

4. Penalties: The act established fines for individuals who failed to report for militia duty or provide the required arms and equipment.

However, the act turned out to be substantially weaker than Knox had wanted and was seen as a step backward (Annals of Congress, 1834b). As historian Richard Kohn remarked:

> The calls for reform which began in 1783 and culminated in the act of 1792 revealed that many Americans sensed the inability of state institutions, poorly coordinated, badly disciplined, and casually armed to meet the needs of the New Republic. . .. The act looked backward to colonial times, to a simpler military environment, to localism in defense when citizens could provide security by defending themselves. . .. (Kohn, 1975, p. 137)

The Act lacked provisions to compel state adherence to its requirements for raising, training, and equipping their militias. The 1792 Uniform Militia Act also failed to establish a connection between the militias and the Regular Army or define their relationship. Although the Constitution theoretically linked the two, it did not provide practical guidance on how to achieve this connection. The Act did not designate state militias as reserve forces for the Army. Instead, throughout the 19th century, an informal system emerged to expand the Army during wartime. This system involved both the states and the federal government calling for volunteers, with states providing both volunteers and compulsory militiamen (Cunliffe, 1968; Millis, 1966; Upton, 1903; Herrera, 2015; Kohn, 1975).

Concurrent with the Militia Act, Congress passed the Calling Forth Act on May 2, 1792, which provided the President with the authority to call forth the militia of the several states to suppress insurrections, repel invasions, and enforce the laws of the land (Mount Vernon Ladies' Association, n.d.). This act marked a significant departure from the militia envisioned by the Constitution, as it vested more authority in the President to respond quickly to internal crises.

The Calling Forth Act of 1792 marked a significant shift in military authority. While the Constitution initially granted Congress the sole power to "provide for calling forth the militia," this new law extended that authority to the President. It allowed the President to summon state militias to quell insurrections, repel invasions, and enforce laws. However, Congress implemented certain safeguards, including the requirement for a judicial certificate from a local magistrate or state official before the President could deploy militias to address internal state issues beyond local government control (Engdahl, 1971; Coakley, 1989).

This judicial certificate provision was particularly important given that Congress only met seasonally during this period. It provided a mechanism for executive action when Congress was not in session. However, the President's authority was not absolute; he could only act in response to local officials' requests when dealing with internal unrest and law enforcement. Notably, the Act granted the President unrestricted power to call upon state militias in response to foreign invasions. This delegation of power represented a significant departure from the Framers' original intent, which placed the authority for "calling forth the militia" solely with Congress.

The Whiskey Rebellion of 1794 further exposed the weaknesses of the militia system. On August 7, Washington drew upon the 1792 Uniform Militia Act to mobilize 13,000 militiamen to quell the uprising. The militias performed well below expectations, with widespread incidents of desertion and cowardice (American History Central, n.d.)

The federal government's difficulty in responding to civil unrest led Congress to reconsider the balance of power. Consequently, the February 1795 Calling Forth Act removed some of the 1792 Act's restrictions, most notably the judicial certificate requirement. This change allowed the President to directly "call forth" militias to suppress civil disturbances (Rouland & Fearer, 2020). This shift deviated from the Framers' original vision, which saw local militias as the primary tool for handling domestic issues, with the Regular Army reserved for frontier service and, alongside mobilized militias, for repelling foreign invasions (Weigley, 1967, pp. 86-89).

By 1795, Congress seemed to be moving away from this distinction. In 1799, it temporarily authorized President John Adams to use federal regulars alongside militias for domestic issues. The Insurrection Act of 1807 made this expansion of presidential authority permanent, effectively abandoning the Constitution's original delineation of militia and Regular Army roles (Vladeck, 2004, pp. 157-166).

The Insurrection Act of 1807 granted the President authority to employ "such part of the land or naval force of the United States as shall be judged necessary" in cases of insurrection or obstruction of laws (Gentile et al., 2019, p. 26). This gave the President, not Congress, full authority to deploy both militias and Regular Army forces for internal challenges.

Despite these changes, Congress had yet to establish a formal legal relationship between the militias and the Regular Army or define a process for expanding the Army during wartime or national emergencies. It would take over a century before a comprehensive military policy, as we know it today in Title 10 of the U.S. Code, would be established (10 U.S.C., n.d.).

In summary, the Militia Act of 1792 and subsequent legislation represented critical junctures in the evolution of the American militia system, reflecting the ongoing tensions and compromises between federal and state authorities in the early republic. These acts laid the groundwork for the complex interplay between state militias and federal forces that would shape American military policy for generations to come.

The Militia in the War of 1812: Challenges, Triumphs, and Transformations

The War of 1812 marked a critical juncture for the American militia system, as the young nation's reliance on citizen soldiers was tested against the formidable British Empire. This section provides an in-depth examination of the militia's role in the conflict, detailing the political and military challenges faced by the Madison administration, the varied performance of militia units on the battlefields, and the war's lasting impact on the evolution of the U.S. military establishment.

As tensions between the United States and Britain escalated in the early 1810s, President James Madison and his cabinet grappled with how to prepare for a potential conflict. The U.S. Army, with a mere 7,000 men in 1812, was woefully understaffed and ill-equipped to take on the British juggernaut (Hickey, 1989, p. 73). Consequently, the administration turned to the state militias to bolster the nation's defenses.

However, opinions within Madison's cabinet were divided on the militia's reliability and effectiveness. Secretary of War William Eustis initially championed using militia, believing that "the great body of the people" would rally to the nation's defense (Skeen, 1981, p. 6). In contrast, Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin cautioned against overreliance on the militia, arguing that they were "an inefficient & expensive force" (Stagg, 1983, p. 189).

The militia's performance was decidedly mixed as the war commenced with the U.S. declaration of war on June 18, 1812. In the conflict's early months, militia units suffered embarrassing defeats and setbacks.

In August 1812, General William Hull's force, comprised mainly of Ohio and Michigan militia, surrendered Fort Detroit to a smaller British and Native American force without firing a shot (Gilpin, 1958, p. 132). Similarly, in October 1812, the British routed a hastily assembled militia force under General Stephen Van Rensselaer at the Battle of Queenston Heights (Latimer, 2007, p. 40).

These early failures were attributed to various factors, including poor training, inadequate supplies, and a lack of discipline among the militia ranks. Many militia units, drawn from the ranks of farmers, artisans, and laborers, lacked their regular army counterparts' professional training and conditioning. Moreover, the system of short-term enlistments, typically ranging from three to six months, made it challenging to maintain unit cohesion and effectiveness over extended campaigns (Mahon, 1983, p. 73).

However, as the war progressed, there were notable instances of militia success and heroism. In March 1814, a force of Kentucky and Tennessee militia, under the command of General Andrew Jackson, decisively defeated the Creek Red Sticks at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend, breaking the power of the Native American confederacy in the Southeast (Remini, 2001, p. 62). Later, in January 1815, Jackson's diverse force, comprised of U.S. regulars, state militia, free black men, and Choctaw warriors, inflicted a crushing defeat on the British at the Battle of New Orleans, securing a resounding victory for the United States in the waning days of the war (Remini, 2001, p. 122).

The militia's mixed record during the War of 1812 had far-reaching implications for the development of the U.S. military establishment. In the war's aftermath, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun emerged as a vocal critic of the militia system, arguing that the nation needed a larger, more professional standing army. In an 1820 report to Congress, Calhoun asserted that the militia was “too expensive and inefficient,” and that the U.S. required a regular force of at least 10,000 men to ensure its security (Weigley, 1967, p. 144).

Calhoun's arguments reflected a growing sentiment among military reformers that the nation could no longer rely solely on citizen-soldiers to meet its defense needs. The war had exposed the limitations of the militia system, particularly regarding training, discipline, and the ability to sustain extended campaigns far from home. Moreover, the conflict highlighted the importance of a well-organized and equipped professional force capable of rapidly responding to threats and projecting power beyond the nation's borders.

However, efforts to reform and strengthen the militia system persisted in the decades following the War of 1812. In 1826, Secretary of War James Barbour's comprehensive review of the militia led to proposals for standardizing training and equipment, increasing federal support, and capping the militia's size at 400,000 men (Mahon, 1983, p. 81). While these recommendations were not fully implemented, they reflected an ongoing desire to improve the efficiency and reliability of the citizen-soldier model.

The legacy of the War of 1812 for the militia was complex and multifaceted. On one hand, the conflict exposed the system's weaknesses and limitations, leading to calls for a more professionalized military establishment. On the other hand, the war showcased the potential of well-led and motivated citizen-soldiers to rise to the occasion and defend their communities and the nation.

In the following decades, the United States continued to grapple with the proper balance between regular and citizen forces and the respective roles of the federal government and the states in organizing and supporting the militia. The lessons of the War of 1812 would inform these ongoing debates, shaping the evolution of the U.S. military and the nation's understanding of the rights and obligations of citizenship.

The Texas Militia: A History from Anglo Settlement to Statehood

The development of the Texas militia from the early 19th century to the Civil War era was shaped by a complex interplay of political, social, and military factors. This section examines the key events, personalities, and legal frameworks that defined the militia's role in Texas's tumultuous history during this period.

The origins of the Texas militia can be traced to the 1823 decree by Mexican Emperor Agustín de Iturbide, which authorized Stephen F. Austin, the founder of the first Anglo-American colony in Texas, to organize the settlers into a body of the national militia (Gammel, 1898a, p. 6). This early militia, primarily tasked with maintaining order and defending against Native American raids, was led by Austin and his lieutenants, James Bowie and William B. Travis (Purcell, 1981).

As tensions between the Anglo colonists and the Mexican government escalated in the early 1830s, the militia took on a more pronounced political role. In 1832, the Anahuac Disturbances saw militia forces (led by John Austin and William B. Travis) successfully expel Mexican troops from the region in response to new tariffs and the imprisonment of William B. Travis and Patrick Jack (Henson, 2020). This event marked a growing assertiveness among Texas colonists and a willingness to use the militia to defend their interests.

Also in the early 1830s, Mexico's constitutional government faced a severe crisis as General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna seized power. In 1834, Santa Anna abolished the constitution and declared himself the de facto leader of both the Mexican Government and the Army (Heidler & Heidler, 2006, pp. 34-35). This autocratic move sparked widespread resistance, with numerous Mexican states openly challenging the new dictator by 1835 (Christensen & Christensen, 2006, p. 23).

With its significant Anglo and Tejano population, the Mexican province of Texas responded to Santa Anna's actions with an outright revolt. Texan forces launched a full-scale assault on Mexican military installations in the region, capturing the settlements of Gonzales and Goliad. The outbreak of the Texas Revolution in October 1835 transformed the militia into a vital instrument of the independence movement. On October 2, the Battle of Gonzales saw Texas militia forces, under the command of John Henry Moore and George M. Collinsworth, successfully resist Mexican attempts to seize a cannon, marking the first shots of the revolution (Hardin, 2001). In a significant victory in December 1835, the small Anglo and Tejano volunteer army captured Santa Anna's brother-in-law and his entire command at San Antonio de Bexar (Christensen & Christensen, 2006, p. 23).

Emboldened by their success, the Texans issued the Declaration of Causes for Taking up Arms Against Mexico and began organizing a new government. In the following months, the Consultation, a provisional government formed by Texas rebels, passed the Plan and Powers of the Provisional Government of Texas on November 13, which declared that “every able-bodied man over sixteen and under fifty years of age shall be subject to military duty” (Gammel, 1898a, pp. 911-912). On November 16, 1835, Henry Smith, who was serving as the provisional governor, sent an urgent message to the Legislative Council. In his communication, Smith strongly emphasized the need for immediate action to establish a well-organized and effective militia (Milner, 1979, p. 10).

This brazen act infuriated Santa Anna, prompting him to march northward with an army of 6,000 men. Overconfident in his impending victory, Santa Anna boasted to European dignitaries in Mexico City that if the US Government were found to be assisting the Texans, “he would continue the march of his army to Washington and place upon its Capital the Mexican Flag” (Callcott, 1936, pp. 125-126).

Santa Anna's approach to the conflict was brutal and uncompromising. He declared to his soldiers, “The foreigners who waged war against the Mexican nation have violated all laws and do not deserve

consideration. No quarter will be given them. . .. They have audaciously declared a war of extermination to the Mexicans and should be treated in the same manner" (Christensen & Christensen, 2006, p. 25).

True to his word, Santa Anna led his army on a grueling 1,000-mile march north in the middle of winter. Arriving in San Antonio on February 23, 1836, he laid siege to the Alamo, a former Catholic mission. At the Alamo in February-March 1836, a small force of Texas militiamen—including notable figures like James Bowie, William B. Travis, and Davy Crockett—held out against a much larger Mexican army for 13 days before being overrun (Nofi, 1994, pp. 107-108; Todish et al., 1998).

The violence continued when, 21 days later, approximately 333 Texans who had been captured near Goliad on March 20 were brutally executed on Santa Anna's orders (Winders, 2002, pp. 23-24). These acts of cruelty, particularly the massacres at the Alamo and Goliad, would have far-reaching consequences, galvanizing support for the Texan cause and setting the stage for further conflict between Mexico and the emerging Republic of Texas.

The defense of the Alamo and the subsequent Texas Revolution attracted volunteers from various parts of the United States, not just Texas. This diverse group of defenders included notable figures like David Crockett from Tennessee and Jim Bowie from Kentucky (The Alamo, n.d.). Their involvement was largely driven by ideological alignment with the Texian cause, which many Americans viewed as a struggle for liberty and independence against Mexican tyranny.

A pivotal moment in rallying support for the Texian cause came on February 24, 1836, when William B. Travis, commander of the Alamo garrison, penned his famous "Victory or Death" letter. Addressed "To the People of Texas & All Americans in the World," this passionate plea for aid encapsulated the spirit of the revolution and the dire situation at the Alamo. Travis wrote:

> I am besieged, by a thousand or more of the Mexicans under Santa Anna - I have sustained a continual Bombardment & cannonade for 24 hours & have not lost a man... I shall never surrender or retreat. Then, I call on you in the name of Liberty, of patriotism & everything dear to the American character, to come to our aid, with all dispatch. (Travis, 1836)

This letter, with its stirring appeal to liberty and patriotism, resonated deeply with Americans beyond Texas, further motivating volunteers from other states to join the fight. It exemplified the ideological underpinnings of the conflict and helped frame the Texas Revolution as a continuation of the American struggle for independence and self-governance.

General Sam Houston, who would later lead the Texian forces to victory, exemplified this inter-state involvement. Houston had strong ties to Tennessee and leveraged his military experience and political connections from his time there in organizing and leading the Texian Army (Hardin, 1956). The involvement of figures like Houston underscores how personal connections and the opportunity for land and wealth in Texas motivated many non-Texans to join the fight.

The sacrifice of the Alamo's defenders, who held out for 13 days against Santa Anna's forces despite being vastly outnumbered, became a powerful symbol. Along with the Goliad massacre, it served as a rallying cry for the Texian cause, encapsulated in the famous "Remember the Alamo!" battle cry (San Jacinto Museum and Battlefield, n.d.).

The Battle of San Jacinto on April 21, 1836, saw Texas forces under General Sam Houston (which included a significant militia contingent) decisively defeat the Mexican army and capture General Antonio López de Santa Anna, effectively securing Texas independence (Hardin, 1994). Houston's

strategic retreat, known as the “Runaway Scrape,” culminated in this decisive battle, where his forces defeated Santa Anna's army in just 18 minutes (San Jacinto Museum and Battlefield, n.d.).

Upon the establishment of the Republic of Texas, the militia was formally recognized in the 1836 Constitution, which granted the president of Texas the power “to call forth the militia to execute the laws of the nation, to suppress insurrections, and to repel invasions” (Texas Law, 1836, art. II, sec. 6). The First Congress of Texas passed the Militia Act of 1836 on December 6, which declared that “every free able-bodied male citizen of this republic, resident therein, who is or shall be… seventeen…and under the age of fifty years shall…be enrolled in the militia” (Gammel, 1898a, p. 1114). Here is a rewritten version for clarity:

> The early years of the Republic of Texas saw the militia remain poorly organized and underfunded, despite legislative efforts to improve its structure. The Militia Act of 1837 divided the militia into four brigades, while the Militia Act of 1840 granted ten-year charters of incorporation to volunteer units such as the Milam Guards and the Travis Guards (Purcell, 1981). However, these measures proved insufficient to address the militia's fundamental weaknesses.

Texas's admission to statehood in 1845 marked a shift in the militia's role. The U.S. Army took over primary responsibility for frontier defense, while the Texas Rangers emerged as a professional force specializing in law enforcement and conflicts with Native American tribes (Procter, 2023). In response to these changes, the Texas Legislature passed the Militia Act of 1846, organizing the state militia into five divisions and two brigades (Olson, 1976).

Despite this reorganization, the militia remained largely inactive in the years following the Mexican-American War. The presence of federal troops and the specialized role of the Texas Rangers reduced the immediate need for a robust state militia, contributing to its continued state of disorganization and limited activity (Olson, 1976).

The Mexican-American War (1846-1848) saw the Texas militia once again called into action. On May 2, 1846 Governor James P. Henderson issued a call for volunteers to supplement the U.S. Army forces under General Zachary Taylor (Cutrer, 1952). Texas militiamen participated in key war battles, including the Battle of Monterrey in September 1846 and the Battle of Buena Vista in February 1847 (Hardin, 1994).

Governor Hardin R. Runnels spearheaded efforts to revitalize the militia in the late 1850s, pushing for increased funding and improved organization (Olson, 1976). The Militia Act of 1858 authorized the formation of volunteer companies and provided for annual musters and inspections (Gammel, 1898b, pp. 1144-1149). However, these reforms were short-lived, as the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861 saw the Texas militia absorbed into the Confederate war effort (Texas Historical Commission, 2013).

The history of the Texas militia from Anglo settlement to statehood is a story of adaptation, struggle, and transformation. From its origins as a tool of frontier defense to its pivotal role in the Texas Revolution and the Mexican-American War, the militia played a significant part in shaping Texas's destiny. However, inadequate funding, disorganization, and a lack of support often hampered the militia's effectiveness, reflecting the broader challenges of building stable military institutions in a rapidly changing and politically contentious environment.

By shedding light on the complex, and often overlooked history of the Texas militia, this section contributes to a deeper understanding of the role of citizen soldiers in the political, social, and military transformation of the United States during this pivotal period.

The Texas Militia in the Civil War: Adaptation, Challenges, and Legacy

The American Civil War marked a pivotal moment in the history of the militia system, as the demands of the conflict led to significant changes in the organization, recruitment, and deployment of these citizen-soldier forces. In Texas, the militia underwent a complex transformation during this period, shaped by the state's unique political, economic, and social conditions. This section argues that the Texas militia played a crucial yet often overlooked role in the Civil War, adapting to the challenges of frontier defense, coastal protection, and internal security while reflecting the broader tensions and limitations of the Confederate war effort.

The Antebellum Militia System

To understand the changes in the Texas militia during the Civil War, it is essential to examine the state of the militia system during this time referred to as the Antebellum period. By the 1850s, the volunteer militia had become firmly established in many states, offering a more professional and well-trained alternative to the traditional conscription-based militia. These volunteer units, often called the "uniformed militia," drew their membership and support from the upper echelons of society, with wealthy individuals providing funding, equipment, and leadership (Hummel, 2001, p. 63).

In Texas, the antebellum militia system was shaped by the state's unique frontier conditions and its history of independence and annexation. The Texas Revolution of 1836 and the subsequent years of the Republic of Texas fostered a strong tradition of citizen soldiery and local defense (Barr, 1990, pp. 6-7). However, by the late 1850s, the Texas militia was poorly organized and underfunded, with limited state support and a reliance on local volunteer companies (Wooster, 1999, p. 87).

Secession and Mobilization

The election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860 and the ensuing secession crisis marked a turning point for the Texas militia. As the state moved towards secession, local leaders scrambled to mobilize and organize the militia for the defense of Texas and the nascent Confederacy. In January 1861, the Secession Convention established a Committee of Public Safety to oversee military preparations, including the division of the state into military districts and the call for volunteer companies (Barr, 1990, p. 29).

The early months of 1861 saw a flurry of militia activity in Texas, as existing volunteer companies were mustered into state service and new units were formed. The state Legislature reconvened in March 1861 to regulate and support this mobilization, passing a series of laws that reorganized the militia system and provided for the appointment of officers and the provisioning of troops (Gammel, 1898c, pp. 1303-1307). However, this initial burst of enthusiasm was tempered by the realities of long-term service, as many volunteers initially resisted the idea of extended enlistments or deployment outside of their local communities (Walker, 1997, p. 19).

Frontier Defense and Coastal Protection

One of the primary challenges facing the Texas militia during the Civil War was the defense of the state's vast frontier against Indian raids and Union incursions. With the regular Confederate forces deployed mainly in the eastern theater of the war, the task of protecting the frontier fell to the state troops and local volunteer companies. In 1861, the state Legislature authorized the creation of a frontier regiment, known as the Texas Mounted Rifles, to patrol the western borders and respond to Indian threats (Wooster, 1999, p. 88).

However, the effectiveness of these frontier units was hampered by a range of factors, including a lack of resources, inadequate training, and the inherent difficulties of campaigning in the vast and rugged terrain

of West Texas. Many frontier companies were poorly equipped and supplied, relying on local support and foraging to sustain themselves in the field (Barr, 1990, p. 58). Moreover, the Indian tribes of Texas, including the Comanche and Kiowa, proved to be formidable adversaries, employing highly mobile and elusive tactics that frustrated the efforts of the militia forces (Dunlay, 1982, pp. 203-204).

In addition to the frontier threat, the Texas militia was called upon to defend the state's extensive coastline against Union naval incursions and potential amphibious assaults. Galveston and Sabine Pass port cities were particularly vulnerable to attack, as they served as vital centers of trade and supply for the Confederate war effort. In response, the state authorities organized a system of coastal defenses, including artillery batteries, fortifications, and amphibious units known as the "Horse Marines" (Cotham, 1998, pp. 91-92).

The effectiveness of these coastal defenses was tested in the Battle of Galveston in October 1862, when a Union naval force attempted to seize control of the city. The Texas militia, under the command of Colonel Joseph J. Cook, played a critical role in repelling the attack, using a combination of artillery fire and small boat operations to harass and disorient the Union vessels (Cotham, 1998, pp. 126-128). Although the battle was ultimately inconclusive, it demonstrated the potential of the Texas militia to adapt to the unique challenges of coastal warfare.

Internal Security and Conscription

In addition to its external defense responsibilities, the Texas militia was tasked with maintaining internal security and enforcing conscription laws within the state. As the war progressed and the Confederacy's manpower needs grew more acute, the Davis administration implemented a series of conscription acts that sought to compel military service from all able-bodied white men of military age (Moore, 1924, pp. 12-13).

In Texas, the enforcement of these conscription laws fell largely to the state militia, which was charged with identifying and apprehending draft evaders and deserters. This role placed the militia in a difficult position, as many of its members were reluctant to serve beyond their local communities or enforce unpopular policies on their neighbors and kin (Barr, 1990, p. 136). Moreover, the militia's conscription efforts were often met with resistance and evasion, as many Texans sought to avoid military service through various legal and extralegal means (Walker, 1997, pp. 97-98).

The militia's internal security role also extended to suppressing Union loyalists and dissidents within the state. Although Texas was overwhelmingly pro-Confederate, there were pockets of Unionist sentiment, particularly in the German American communities of the Hill Country and the border regions with Mexico (Marten, 1990, pp. 85-86). The Texas Militia, often in collaboration with local vigilante groups, was involved in several raids and crackdowns on suspected Union sympathizers, including the infamous Nueces massacre of August 1862, in which a group of German Texans attempting to flee to Mexico were attacked and killed by Confederate irregulars (Kamphoefner & Helbich, 2006, pp. 84-85).

Decline and Reconstruction

As the Civil War entered its final stages, the Texas militia system began to unravel under the strain of desertion, defeatism, and material shortages. Many militia units simply melted away as their members returned home to protect their families and property from the ravages of the war (Wooster, 1999, p. 91). The Texas government, faced with the collapse of the Confederacy and the impending Union occupation, made a belated effort to reorganize the militia in the spring of 1865. Still, these measures came too late to significantly affect the course of the war (Marten, 1990, p. 183).

In the aftermath of the Confederate surrender, the Texas militia was effectively disbanded as the state came under Union military occupation. The Reconstruction Acts of 1867 prohibited the organization of militia forces in the former Confederate states, and the Texas Militia was not formally reconstituted until the end of Reconstruction in the 1870s (Brager, 2007, p. 4-5). However, the legacy of the Civil War experience would continue to shape the development of the Texas military establishment in the decades that followed, as the state grappled with the challenges of frontier defense, internal security, and the evolving relationship between state and federal authority.

The history of the Texas militia during the Civil War reflects the complex and often contradictory nature of the Confederate war effort and the unique challenges faced by the state in defending its borders and maintaining internal order. While the militia played a vital role in the early stages of mobilization and the defense of the frontier and coast, its effectiveness was increasingly hampered by issues of desertion, dissent, and material shortages as the war progressed.

Ultimately, the Texas Militia's Civil War experience offers a valuable case study of the challenges and limitations of the citizen-soldier model in the context of a significant national conflict. It underscores the enduring significance of the militia system in the military and political development of the American states, even as the nature of warfare and the relationship between state and federal power continued to evolve in the post-Civil War era.

The Texas Militia in the Post-Civil War Era: Adaptation, Challenges, and Transformation

In the aftermath of the American Civil War, the Texas militia underwent significant change and adaptation as it navigated the challenges of Reconstruction, frontier defense, and the evolving relationship between state and national military institutions. This section argues that the development of the Texas militia in the post-Civil War era was shaped by a complex interplay of political, social, and military factors, as the state sought to rebuild its military capabilities while also responding to broader national debates over the role and structure of state militias. Through a detailed examination of critical legislative acts, organizational reforms, and leadership figures, this study aims to comprehensively analyze the Texas militia's transformation and its contribution to the ongoing evolution of American military policy.

The National Context: Upton's Critique and the Militia Debate

The post-Civil War era saw a significant shift in the national debate over the role and effectiveness of state militias. General Emory Upton, a Union veteran and military theorist who argued for a more centralized and professionalized military establishment, was one of the most influential voices in this debate. In his seminal works, "The Armies of Asia and Europe" (1878) and "The Military Policy of the United States" (1904), Upton critiqued the reliance on state militias, arguing that they had proven to be ineffective and unreliable during the Civil War (Upton, 1878, p. 253; Upton, 1904, pp. 14-15). Upton's views reflected a growing sentiment among military reformers that the nation needed a stronger, more modernized standing army to meet the challenges of an increasingly complex and interconnected world (Ambrose, 1964, p. 171).

However, Upton's critique of the militia system was not universally accepted. Many Americans, particularly in the South and West, continued to view state militias as an essential bulwark of republican government and a check on the power of the federal military. The Burnside Commission, established by Congress in 1878 to review the nation's military policy, ultimately rejected Upton's recommendations for a more centralized army, instead reaffirming the importance of the citizen-soldier tradition and the role of state militias (Palmer, 1941, pp. 108-109).

Reconstruction and the Reestablishment

In the aftermath of the American Civil War, the United States entered a period of Reconstruction marked by efforts to rebuild the war-torn nation and address the issues that had led to the conflict (Foner, 2019, pp. 120-125). As the Reconstruction Era unfolded, the federal government sought to enforce federal laws and maintain order using federal troops (Wiecek, 2019, pp. 35-40). This use of the military for domestic law enforcement purposes, however, was met with opposition from Southern Democrats who argued that it violated the Constitution and interfered with states' rights to govern themselves and maintain their own militias (Hammond, 1997, p. 953; Wiecek, 2019, pp. 35-40; Mahon, 1983, pp. 50-55; U.S. Const. amend. II; U.S. Const. amend. X; U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 15-16).

In response to this opposition, Representative J. Proctor Knott, a Democrat from Kentucky, introduced the Posse Comitatus Act in 1878 (Matthews, 2006, p. 32-33; Hammond, 1997, p. 953). The act, which was passed as a rider to an Army appropriations bill, prohibited the use of the United States Army (and later, the United States Air Force) to enforce domestic policies within the country. This act was established to prevent the military from interfering in civilian affairs, ensuring that law enforcement remains a civilian responsibility, except in cases expressly authorized by the Constitution or an Act of Congress (18 U.S.C. § 1385).

The legal foundation for the Posse Comitatus Act can be traced back to the U.S. Constitution (Engdahl, 1971, pp. 210-215), which establishes a system of federalism and separation of powers between the federal government and the states (U.S. Const. art. IV, sec. 4; U.S. Const. amend. X). The Posse Comitatus Act ensures that the federal military remains subservient to civilian authority and does not usurp the role of state militias in domestic law enforcement (Matthews, 2006, pp. 42-43; Hammond, 1997, p. 964; Dunlap, 2018, pp. 180-185).

While the Posse Comitatus Act has been subject to various interpretations and exceptions (Center for Law and Military Operations, 2024), it remains a vital bulwark against the unchecked expansion of federal military power within the domestic sphere to prevent the military from being used as a tool of political oppression (Dunlap, 2018, pp. 190-195; Brinkerhoff, 2020, p. 960; Felicetti & Luce, 2019, pp. 150-155).

The courts have provided limited direct guidance on what the Army may or may not do in relation to civil law enforcement under the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA). Instead, most interpretations and restrictions stem from Department of Defense (DoD) policies and internal guidance designed to align with the PCA's intent while clarifying boundaries for military involvement in domestic operations (Center for Law and Military Operations, 2024; Elsea, 2018, Hammond, 1997, pp. 961-962). Historically, the Army and other branches have sought clarity from DoD directives rather than from court rulings to guide their actions in supporting civil authorities without violating the PCA.

These DoD guidelines have provided the Army with a degree of legal "cover," allowing military leaders to avoid missions that could blur lines between military and law enforcement functions (Elsea, 2018). Many officers have considered domestic law enforcement assignments complex and potentially damaging to career progression, and the PCA provides a justification to decline assignments that could blur the military's role or expose it to liability. One DoD official noted that "the PCA was not a barrier preventing a military response to a genuine threat, but rather a bureaucratic reason not to do something perceived as less than a genuine threat (Matthews, 2006, p. 43)."

While U.S. v. Red Feather (1975) helped clarify aspects of the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), particularly by distinguishing between direct and indirect support by the military in law enforcement, it did not address the full scope of the PCA's application threat (Matthews, 2006, pp. 43-44). In Red Feather, the court specified that the PCA barred direct military actions such as arrest and search but allowed for indirect assistance like information sharing. However, subsequent legislation in the 1980s began to blur the lines between the military and domestic law enforcement (Meadows, 2004, p. 6).

In 1981, Congress passed the Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1982, established some explicit "Safe Harbors" of permissible activity (Falicetti & Luce, 2019, p. 152; Elsea, 2018, pp. 42-43). This Act allowed military resources to be used in drug interdiction efforts, permitting the Department of Defense (DoD) to support law enforcement by providing expertise, training, assistance, equipment and information as well as restrictions on the use of that authority (Meadows, 2004, p. 6; Elsea, 2018, p. 43). The Authorization Act did not change the Posse Comitatus Act or impose any limitations beyond those in found within the Posse Comitatus Act.

In April 1982, the DoD issued Directive 5525.5, which clarified the PCA's application and extended PCA-like restrictions to the Navy and Marine Corps as a policy measure rather than a statutory requirement. (Meadows, 2004, p. 6; Felicetti & Luce, 2019, p. 153-154).

The Department of Defense's 1982 implementing regulations for the Posse Comitatus Act fundamentally altered the Act's scope and application, often in ways that contradicted congressional intent. While Congress aimed to facilitate greater cooperation between military and civilian law enforcement through the 1982 Authorization Act, the DOD's regulations instead created broader restrictions. The regulations expanded the Act's prohibitions, extended its geographical reach, and applied its restrictions to branches not originally covered, such as the Navy and Marine Corps. They also transformed specific, limited restrictions into comprehensive prohibitions against military involvement in law enforcement activities (Felicetti & Luce, 2019, p. 153-159).

These regulatory interpretations had lasting implications as courts began treating the DOD's administrative policies as essentially part of the Act itself. Rather than distinguishing between statutory requirements and administrative policy, courts—particularly the Ninth Circuit—deferred to the DOD's more restrictive framework. This judicial deference effectively codified the DOD's cautious approach, creating a legal landscape where administrative regulations, rather than congressional intent or the original statute, became the primary reference point for determining the boundaries of military involvement in civilian law enforcement. The result was a more restrictive and complex framework than Congress had intended, with lasting effects on military-civilian law enforcement cooperation (Felicetti & Luce, 2019, p. 153-159).

Reconstruction and the Reestablishment of the Texas Militia

In Texas, the early years of Reconstruction saw a dramatic transformation of the state militia under the leadership of Republican Governor Edmund J. Davis. Due to financial constraints and subsequent reductions in personnel, the United States Army's capacity to protect the frontier, staff coastal defense fortifications, and enforce laws in the post-Civil War Southern states was significantly diminished. Consequently, in July 1870, Congress authorized the Southern states to reestablish militia groups to

assume some of these responsibilities. With the end of the Reconstruction era, the prohibition on the formation, equipping, and mobilization of militias was lifted, allowing the ex-Confederate states to reorganize their military forces (U.S. Army Center of Military History, n.d.).

On June 24, 1870, Governor Edmund Davis signed the Militia Bill, technically before militia rights were restored to Texas. which reorganized the state's military forces into three branches: the State Police, the State Guard, and the Reserve Militia (Gammel, 1898d, pp. 190-202). The act provided that

> In time of war, rebellion, insurrection, invasion, resistance of civil process, breach of the peace or imminent danger thereof, the Governor shall have full power to order into active service the military forces of this state. . .. It shall be the duty of the Governor, and he is hereby authorized, whenever in his opinion the enforcement of the law of this State is obstructed, within any county or counties, by combinations of lawless men too strong for the control of the civil authorities, to declare such county or counties under martial law, and to suspend the laws therein until the Legislature shall convene, and to take such action as may be deemed necessary. (Gammel, 1898d, p. 190)

By the end of 1870, the adjutant general's report to the Governor highlighted the enrollment of approximately 90,000 men in the Reserve Militia, with an additional 3,500 Texans joining the State Guard. Remarkably, fewer than one hundred individuals opted to bypass service by paying the associated fee (Davidson, 1871, p. 5). These forces were intended to support local law enforcement and the state police, particularly when civil authorities were overwhelmed, prompting the deployment of militia units in a warlike stance to uphold the governor's martial law proclamations (Brager, 2007, p. 6).

In 1873, state legislators excluded the militia force from the list of state agencies receiving appropriations. The following year, lawmakers again neglected to allocate funds for the organization. Consequently, the militia had no weapons until the federal government provided over one thousand cavalry guns to support the Texas militiamen (Steele, 1874, p. 3). However, from its inception, Texas had a state police force known as the Texas Rangers, which had statewide jurisdiction. This distinguished Texas from other states that relied on county officials for law enforcement and called upon a militia for statewide law enforcement when necessary (Webb, 1935, p. 21).

The Post-Reconstruction Militia: Reorganization and Leadership

The end of Reconstruction in Texas marked a significant shift in the role and structure of the state militia. In 1874, newly elected Democratic Governor Richard Coke signed legislation disbanding the State Police and reorganizing the militia into a single force known as the Texas Volunteer Guard (Gammel, 1898e, pp. 284-285). Under the leadership of Adjutant General William Steele, a former Confederate officer, the Texas Volunteer Guard underwent a process of professionalization and standardization in the late 1870s and early 1880s.

Steele, who served as adjutant general from 1874 to 1879, was a crucial figure in the post-Reconstruction transformation of the Texas militia. He implemented a series of reforms to improve the training, discipline, and organization of the state's military forces. Steele established a system of annual training camps, where militia companies from across the state would gather to practice drills and receive instruction from regular army officers (Purcell, 1981). He also worked to standardize the uniforms, equipment, and regulations of the Texas Volunteer Guard, bringing the state's militia more in line with national standards.

One of Steele's most significant initiatives was the creation of the Frontier Battalion in 1874. Following the end of reconstruction, the reduced number of U.S. Army troops in Texas necessitated that the state assume its own defense, especially along its frontier. This need led to the creation of the Frontier Battalion on April 10, 1874, as a division of the Texas Rangers. This unit functioned as a permanent, statewide law enforcement agency, structured in a military manner with units such as squads, platoons, and companies. The battalion's primary duties were to conduct continuous patrols along the frontier and the border with Mexico and to protect the citizens from border incursions. After 1874, the Frontier Battalion concentrated on resolving conflicts with Native Americans and Mexicans along the border and capturing outlaws, allowing the militia to return to its conventional duties (Raine, 1925, pp. 183-193).

Adjutant General William H. King played a crucial role in the reform and professionalization of the Texas Volunteer Guard. Following the foundation laid by his predecessor, General William Steele, who significantly reorganized the militia post-Reconstruction (Texas Military Forces Museum, n.d.-b), King advanced these efforts by promoting the 1879 Militia Law of Texas. This law established a more structured and hierarchical organization within the Texas Volunteer Guard, forming units into regiments and brigades (Olson, 1976).

One notable development under King's administration was the constitution and organization of the 1st and 2nd Regiments of Infantry, Texas Volunteer Guard, on April 6, 1880. These regiments were created from pre-existing companies in southern Texas, representing the early formations that would eventually lead to the creation of the 36th Division (Brager, 2007, p. 8). For instance, Company A of the First Regiment was famously known as the Houston Light Guard.

Moreover, the Militia Law of Texas in 1879 mandated regular inspections and reporting for militia units, which significantly enhanced their readiness and accountability (Texas Adjutant General's Department, 1879). This increased the efficiency and effectiveness of the Texas Volunteer Guard, helping it transition into a more professional military organization.

These reforms were crucial in the development of the Texas Volunteer Guard, setting the stage for its evolution into the present-day Texas National Guard.

Challenges and Controversies in the Late 19th Century Texas Militia

Despite the efforts of Steele, King, and other militia leaders to professionalize and modernize the Texas Volunteer Guard, the state's military forces continued to face various challenges and controversies in the late 19th century. One of the most persistent issues was the lack of adequate funding and support from the state government (Milner, 1979, pp. 19-21). While the Militia Act of 1879 had established a framework for the organization and training of the militia, the Texas Legislature often failed to appropriate sufficient funds for salaries, equipment, and supplies (King, 1884, p.4). As a result, many militia companies struggled to maintain a high level of readiness and were forced to rely on private donations and fundraising efforts to support their activities.

Despite initial hesitance from the legislative body, the growing interest in the state's military force led to the reorganization of the Texas Volunteer Guard on October 15, 1886. This revamped structure comprised five regiments of white infantry, one battalion of black infantry, a cavalry regiment, and an artillery battalion. In 1891, William H. Mabry assumed the role of adjutant general, and the following year, he advocated creating a permanent training site near the state's capital, which materialized as Camp Mabry.

Camp Mabry, established in 1892, is one of the oldest active military installations in Texas, located in Austin. It serves as the headquarters for the Texas Military Department, Texas Military Forces, and the

Texas Military Forces Museum (Smyrl, 1976). The camp was named after Brigadier General Woodford H. Mabry, who was the Adjutant General of Texas at the time of its founding (Milner, 1979, p. 21; Mabry, 1892, p. 5). Initially, the Texas Volunteer Guard, the precursor to the Texas National Guard, held annual training sessions wherever landowners or towns were willing to sponsor them. Recognizing the need for a permanent training camp, Adjutant General Mabry and other officials formed a committee in 1891 to identify a suitable location (Texas Military Department, 2021). Austin was selected, and a citizens' committee raised private donations to purchase the land, which was then deeded to the state as a permanent military camp (Smyrl, 1976).

The establishment of Camp Mabry was significantly influenced by the state's initial refusal to provide the necessary funds. In the early 1890s, the Texas Legislature did not allocate funds for the creation of a permanent military training facility, which led to the formation of the Citizens' Encampment Committee in Austin (Texas Military Department, 2021). This committee, led by prominent attorney and state legislator John L. Peeler, collected subscriptions and raised private donations to purchase the land for the camp. The community's efforts were crucial in overcoming the state's reluctance to fund the project, highlighting the importance of local support and volunteerism in the camp's establishment (Texas Military Department, 2021).

The refusal of the Texas Legislature to fund Camp Mabry underscores the challenges faced by Texas Military Forces in securing state support during that period. Despite the lack of state funding, the citizens of Austin demonstrated a strong commitment to supporting their local military forces. This grassroots effort not only provided the necessary resources to establish the camp but also fostered a sense of community and civic responsibility (Texas Military Department, 2021).

By 1894, the state's military force boasted 3,000 officers and enlisted men across 64 local units. However, this figure decreased to approximately 2,500 personnel in 48 units by 1896 (King, 1886; Mabry, 1892).

The Texas Militia and the Spanish-American War: A Turning Point in American Military Policy

The Spanish-American War of 1898 marked a significant turning point in the history of the American militia system, as the rapid mobilization and deployment of state volunteer units to support the regular Army raised new questions about the effectiveness, organization, and control of these citizen-soldier forces. This section argues that the experiences of the Texas militia during the conflict—both in terms of its preparedness and performance—reflect the broader challenges and debates surrounding the role of state military forces in an increasingly centralized and professionalized national defense establishment. By examining the specific contributions and limitations of Texas units and the larger national context of military reform efforts, this study aims to shed new light on the complex and contested legacy of the militia in the era of American imperial expansion.

The State of the Texas Militia on the Eve of War

In the years leading up to the Spanish-American War, the Texas Volunteer Guard underwent a gradual process of professionalization and improvement, albeit one that was hindered by limited state support and resources. As one historian noted,

> Given a minimum of state support, it revealed widespread soldierly talents which require only proper training and incentive to produce a sound military organization as distinguished from a collection of clubs having merely the outward appearance of some military skills. (Nelson, 1962, p. 45)

This assessment suggests that while the Texas militia possessed a degree of both potential and enthusiasm, it lacked the consistent funding, training, and organization necessary to function as a fully effective military force.

Other scholars have taken a more critical view of the Texas militia's capabilities and relevance in the late 19th century. Allan Robert Purcell, in his doctoral dissertation on the history of the Texas militia, argued that "from 1835 to 1903 [the militia] was superfluous to the survival and prosperity of the state and its citizens" (Purcell, 1981). While this assessment may overlook the militia's contributions to law enforcement and domestic order, it underscores the limited role that state forces played in the major military conflicts of the period, such as the Mexican-American War and the Civil War, which were primarily fought by regular troops and volunteer units raised outside the formal militia structure.

The National Context: Military Reform and the Role of the Militia

The Spanish-American War took place against a backdrop of growing national debate over the structure and effectiveness of the American military establishment, particularly in light of the country's expanding global interests and ambitions. In the years following the Civil War, several influential military leaders and theorists, such as Emory Upton, called for a centralized and professionalized armed force, one that would rely less on the traditional system of state militias and volunteer regiments (Weigley, 1967, p. 271).

However, these reform efforts faced significant political and institutional obstacles, as many Americans remained deeply attached to the idea of the citizen-soldier and the role of the states in national defense. The National Guard Association of the United States, founded in 1878, emerged as a powerful lobby group that sought to protect the interests of the state militias and secure greater federal support and recognition for these units (National Guard Association of the United States, n.d.; Hill, 1964, pp. 26-29). In 1887, Congress passed the Militia Act, which provided a clear definition of the organized militia for the first time, established a regular system of federal inspections and support, and authorized the president to call up state units for national service (Mahon, 1983, p. 139).

Despite these legislative and organizational reforms, the fundamental question of balancing state and federal control over the militia and effectively integrating these units into the national military structure remained unresolved on the eve of the Spanish-American War.

The Texas Militia in the Spanish-American War: Mobilization and Service

At the eve of the war with Spain, the United States Regular Army was poorly prepared for conflict. Numbering only about 28,000 men, the army was largely dispersed across western frontier outposts (Kreidberg & Henry, 1955, pp. 149-150). The state militias, which would play a crucial role in the war effort, were also in a questionable state.

When the United States declared war on Spain on April 25, 1898, the Texas Volunteer Guard and militia units across the country responded with a surge of patriotic enthusiasm and a rush to volunteer for federal service. However, due to the legal and organizational constraints of the militia system, these state units could not be directly mustered into the U.S. Army as intact formations. Instead, individual members had to volunteer and be reformed into new federal regiments, which often disrupted the state forces' existing command structures and unit cohesion (Cosmas, 1971, pp. 84-86).

President William McKinley requested that the States provide 125,000 men for overseas service during the Spanish-American War. Like the Civil War, the federal government relied on the Governors to

organize volunteer regiments. Additional calls for troops increased the number of volunteers to 182,687 (Friedel, 1962, pp. 19-26; Hill, 1962, pp.154-158; Adjutant General of the Army, 1899).

In Texas, four infantry regiments and one cavalry regiment were eventually formed from the ranks of the state militia and other volunteers: the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Texas Volunteer Infantry and the First Texas Volunteer Cavalry (Texas State Historical Association, n.d.). Of these units, only the First Texas Infantry, under the command of Colonel Woodford H. Mabry, who had resigned his post as state adjutant general to lead the regiment, would see active service in the war zone, being sent to Cuba as part of the U.S. occupation force in December 1898 (Brager, 2007, p. 12).

The First Texas Infantry's brief tour of duty in Cuba was marked more by the ravages of disease than by theaters during the war, the Texans suffered heavily from malaria, yellow fever, and other illnesses that quickly sapped their strength and morale (Doubler, 2001, p. 117). When the regiment returned to Galveston in March 1899 to be mustered out of federal service, it had lost several members to disease, including Colonel Mabry himself (Purcell, 1981).

The Philippine Campaign: A Catalyst for U.S. Military Reform

The Philippine Campaign of 1898-1902 served as a critical juncture in American military history, exposing significant weaknesses in the U.S. Army's mobilization and organizational structures while simultaneously demonstrating the potential of a new model for citizen-soldier forces.

The U.S. acquisition of the Philippines following the Spanish-American War in 1898 precipitated an insurgency that lasted from 1899 to 1902, with sporadic fighting continuing for several years after that (Encyclopædia Britannica, n.d.; Naval History and Heritage Command, n.d.). This conflict, known as the Philippine-American War, required multiple rotations of Regular and volunteer troops, revealing significant limitations in the existing military system's ability to sustain a long-term occupation and counterinsurgency campaign (Boot, 2002; Linn, 2000). The initial deployment to the Philippines mirrored the organizational challenges encountered in the Cuban theater, highlighting the Army's lack of prewar planning and preparation (Anderson, 1901, pp. 655-656).

Brigadier General Thomas Anderson, commander of the first U.S. Army expeditionary force to the Philippines, vividly illustrated the severe equipment shortages and understaffing that plagued the initial expedition. His force, which departed on May 25, 1898, "sailed for the Philippines without a single field gun, horse, mule, wagon, or cart" (Lerwill, 1954; Linn, 2000, p. 12; Silbey, 2007, pp. 42-43). This lack of essential equipment and personnel underscored the Army's unpreparedness for overseas operations and had significant implications for the force's operational capabilities.

Despite these challenges, by July 29, 1898, seven convoys had transported 13,000 volunteers and 2,000 Regular troops to the Philippines, organized as the VIII Corps (Hill, 1962, pp. 162-185; Stewart, 2005, p. 354). The attack on Manila on August 13 involved a mix of the Navy, Regular Army and volunteer units, including four companies of Regular artillery, three volunteer artillery units, parts of three Regular infantry regiments, and portions of eight National Guard infantry regiments (Doubler, 2001, p. 120; Greene, 1898-1899, pp. 785-791, 915-936). This diverse composition of forces highlighted the Army's reliance on a combination of professional and citizen-soldiers to meet its manpower needs.

As the need for additional manpower in the Philippines persisted, President McKinley authorized the creation of supplemental volunteer regiments, known as the U.S. Volunteers. Unlike traditional militia units or special volunteer regiments like the Roughriders, these new units were mustered in the states but led by officers appointed by the President rather than state governors (Cosmas, 1971, p. 13). This novel

approach to organizing citizen-soldiers proved highly effective and represented a significant departure from previous mobilization practices.

The U.S. Volunteers were recruited, trained, and deployed in approximately four months, demonstrating to Regular Army officers that an effective non-National Guard citizen force could be rapidly mobilized. At 35,000 troops, the U.S. Volunteers became the largest component of American forces in the Philippines between fall 1899 and spring 1901, playing a crucial role in regional counterinsurgency campaigns (Lerwill, 1954, p. 153; Linn, 2000, pp. 9-12). Their success challenged traditional assumptions about the time required to prepare citizen-soldiers for combat.

President McKinley's decision to staff these regiments with experienced company-grade officers, senior noncommissioned officers, and recent West Point graduates, rather than Civil War veterans, represented a significant departure from traditional practices. This merit-based approach to leadership selection contributed to the overall effectiveness of the U.S. Volunteer units (Ramsey, 2007, p. 19). It also set a precedent for future military reforms focused on professionalization and meritocracy.

The Philippine War demonstrated two critical aspects of U.S. military manpower mobilization. First, it proved that the United States could rapidly create an effective volunteer force without significant National Guard participation. Second, the ease with which Congress accepted the U.S. Volunteers system indicated that, at the turn of the century, there was no clear adherence to a militia-army “traditional military policy” for wartime manpower provision. These lessons would have far-reaching implications for future military planning and organization.

The role of naval forces in supporting the Army's operations was also crucial. The U.S. Navy provided transportation, logistical support, and offshore fire support during the campaign (Naval History and Heritage Command, n.d.). This joint operation between the Army and Navy foreshadowed the importance of inter-service cooperation in future conflicts.

It's important to note that the Filipino perspective and resistance played a significant role in shaping the conflict. The Philippine-American War was not merely a one-sided affair but a complex struggle involving determined Filipino insurgents fighting for independence (U.S. Department of State, n.d.). This aspect of the conflict provided valuable lessons in counterinsurgency warfare that would influence future U.S. military doctrine.

General Anderson's assessment of the U.S. mobilization effort as “too slow for either offensive or defensive war against a first-class power” echoed the broader critique of American military preparedness following the Spanish-American War and Philippine insurgency (Anderson, 1901, pp. 655-656).

Key problems included unsanitary and disease-prone mobilization camps, major transportation delays at rail yards and ports, and controversies over the quality of food rations provided to troops. A subsequent presidential investigation concluded that these issues primarily resulted from ineffective leadership and bureaucratic inefficiencies rather than deliberate misconduct. The commission's findings led to recommendations for comprehensive reforms within the War Department, highlighting the need for modernization of military administration and logistics (Millet and Maslowski, 1984, pp. 285-286).

In summary, the Philippine Campaign exposed the intrinsic difficulties of an Army expansion policy that relied on states to form trained, equipped, and ready volunteer units. It also demonstrated the potential of a federally organized volunteer force as an alternative to traditional National Guard units. These lessons would prove instrumental in shaping subsequent military reforms, including the Militia Act of 1903, which sought to standardize and professionalize the National Guard under increased federal oversight.

The experiences gained during the Philippine Campaign thus played a crucial role in modernizing the U.S. military structure and preparing it for the challenges of the 20th century, particularly in areas of force mobilization, joint operations, and counterinsurgency warfare.

The Texas Militia and the Transformation of the National Guard, 1900-1917: A Crucible of Military Federalism

The early 20th century marked a pivotal period of transformation for the National Guard, as it evolved from a loosely organized state militia system into a more standardized federal reserve force. This transformation was driven by a combination of political, military, and international factors that reshaped the role and structure of the National Guard between 1900 and 1916, fundamentally altering the relationship between state military forces and the federal government.

The Roots of Reform: The Texas Militia in the Early 20th Century

At the dawn of the 20th century, the militia system in Texas and other states faced significant challenges. Funding was severely limited, with the Texas State Legislature appropriating only $5,000 for the militia for the six months ending August 1, 1901 (Milner, 1979, p. 24). Unlike some other states, Texas provided no funds for summer training camps, transportation to exercises, armory leases, active duty pay, or drill attendance compensation (Scurry, 1902, pp. 6-10).

Local militia units varied widely in quality and organization. The formation of local militia units during this period was largely a grassroots effort. Groups of young men desiring to form a unit applied to the state Adjutant-General for permission to organize a company. Former non-commissioned officers or enlisted men who had served in the regular army or other militia units often acted as officers of these new organizations. The essential requirements centered on obtaining means to rent an armory and gathering enough young men interested in joining the local militia (Milner, 1979, p. 24).

The federal government began to take a more active role in supporting state militias during this period. In 1900, it allocated $1,000,000 for arms and equipment nationwide, with Texas receiving $32,000 worth of materials (Records of the Adjutant-General's Office, 1900). This federal support, while welcome, still proved insufficient to address the systemic challenges facing the militia system.

The lack of state funding hindered the Texas Volunteer Guard's ability to respond to civil activations in 1901 and 1902. Despite several units being activated, the state did not provide enough funds to cover the costs. Consequently, the Adjutant-General had to ask the governor to request an additional $1,992 from the legislature to reimburse the units (Milner, 1979, p. 25).

Financial constraints also affected infrastructure. The state did not allocate funds to purchase land for the Texas Guard headquarters. To address this, a group of Austin citizens sought permission to charge gate fees for one day of the 1902 encampment and to stage sham battles for paying guests. The proceeds were intended to buy additional land for the state militia camp (Scurry, 1902, pp. 6, 7, 11, 35).

The Dick Act of 1903: A Turning Point in National Guard History

The United States military faced significant challenges in adapting to its emerging role as a global power. Central to this transformation was the evolution of the National Guard from a loosely organized state militia system into a more standardized federal reserve force. This process, driven by Secretary of War

Elihu Root and culminating in the Dick Act of 1903, fundamentally reshaped the relationship between state military forces and the federal government.

Elihu Root, appointed as Secretary of War by President McKinley in 1899, emerged as a pivotal figure in this transformation. Despite initial skepticism about a lawyer leading the War Department, Root quickly demonstrated his reformist vision and administrative acumen (Jessup, 1938, p. 217). He assembled a team of knowledgeable advisers, including Brigadier General Carter, who became his trusted confidant in pushing for military reforms (Weigley, 1967).

Root's reform agenda was heavily influenced by the writings of Emory Upton, whose work "The Military Policy of the United States" Root considered his "chief reliance" (Jessup, 1938, pp. 242-243). Upton's pragmatic, history-based approach resonated with Root, who circulated Upton's writings widely within the War Department. However, Root was not merely a proxy for Upton's ideas; he developed his own reform agenda tailored to the political and military realities of the time (Fitzpatrick, 2017, pp. 245-246).

Root recognized that militia reform was crucial to building a more powerful and reliable Army. He sought to revive proposals first circulated by earlier professionals like George Washington and Henry Knox, who had advocated for standardizing training requirements across state militias (Zeigler et al., 2020, p. 19). However, Root faced two significant obstacles: the need for training programs flexible enough to accommodate Guardsmen's civilian obligations, and the challenge of compelling states to maintain high-quality militia units while increasing federal funding (Colby, 1959, p. 29).

The Spanish-American War had highlighted the National Guard's potential as well as its limitations. Militia volunteers had formed the bulk of forces sent to Puerto Rico and the Philippines and were crucial in suppressing the Filipino insurrection. However, they had also endured poor conditions, inadequate equipment, and organizational challenges during mobilization (Hill, 1964, pp. 179-180).

In the war's aftermath, militiamen across the country hastily reconstituted their units, often without direction from the War Department. By 1903, the total strength of the militia organized in the forty-five states stood at 116,542 officers and men, all serving without promise of federal pay (Hill, 1964, pp. 184-186).

Root's reforms and the National Guard Association's lobbying efforts set the stage for landmark legislation. As Root argued in a speech to the National Guard Association in 1902, “The problem which we have to solve is to develop a system under which the regular army and the militia shall be welded into a homogeneous body, all conforming to the same standards of discipline, all using the same arms, equipment, and supplies, all susceptible of immediate effective combination in time of war” (Root, 1902, p. 261).

The Militia Act of 1903, commonly known as the Dick Act after its champion Congressman Charles Dick of Ohio, repealed the antiquated Militia Act of 1792 and established the modern National Guard. The Act divided the militia into two classes: the Organized Militia (National Guard) and the Reserve Militia (Dick Act, H.R. 11654, 1903). The Dick Act brought significant reforms to the National Guard and state militias. Here is a summary of the key provisions:

1. Designating all state organized militias collectively as the “National Guard.”

    - This sought to eliminate variations in state militia names (e.g., Texas Volunteer Guard) in favor of standardized terms like "National Guard," which paradoxically emphasized a more federal character for these state forces
2. Requiring Guardsmen to attend an annual five-day drill at a state camp and 24 drills at home armories.
    - Every company, troop, and battery in the organized militia, unless excused by the governor, participates in practice marches or attends a camp of instruction for at least five consecutive days annually. Additionally, units had to assemble for drill and instruction or target practice at least 24 times per year at their respective armories or designated locations. The Act also required each unit to undergo an annual inspection by either a militia officer or a Regular Army officer.
3. Authorizing National Guard officers to attend Army service schools.
    - This allowed Guardsmen to receive training and education on par with Regular Army officers.
4. Allowing Regular Army instructors at National Guard training camps upon governors' requests.
    - Governors could request Regular Army instructors to help train National Guard units, ensuring consistent and high-quality training.
5. Expanding the National Guard's maximum federal active service obligations to nine months.
    - The Act initially set a maximum limit of nine months for the National Guard's federal service, a provision later amended by the Militia Act of 1908, which gave the President the authority to determine the length of federal service.
6. Clarifying that Guardsmen could be subject to court-martial for offenses committed while in federal service.
    - National Guard members were made subject to the same military laws and regulations, including court-martial, as Regular Army soldiers when in federal service.
7. Mandating that the National Guard conform to the Regular Army's organization in exchange for federal funds.
- To receive federal funding, the National Guard had to be organized similarly to the Regular Army, ensuring compatibility and readiness for integration (Parker, 1903).

This "24-5" training regimen was influenced by the British militia system, which appealed to Americans more than the rigid systems of other European countries (Goodenough & Dalton, 1893, p. 484). Root believed this approach would balance the need for professional, standardized training with concern for Guardsmen's civilian obligations (Root, 1916, pp. 142-144).

The Dick Act marked a significant step forward in U.S. military policy, setting the National Guard on the path to a dual role organized under both the militia and armies clauses of the Constitution. Root viewed it as a necessary first step to improving operational capability, addressing the long-standing issue of an "unworkable" and "obsolete set of militia laws" that had plagued the country for over a century (U.S. Senate, 1902).

However, the Act had limitations. It did not resolve constitutional restrictions on using Guardsmen in federal service overseas, as it recognized the National Guard as the organized militia identified in the militia clauses, which explicitly limited the militia's purpose when federalized (Zeigler et al., 2020, p. 23). Additionally, the Act failed to specify how to integrate the various state militias into a unified Army, neglecting to include provisions on unit consolidation, training standards, and facilities (Shaw, 1966).

Despite these shortcomings, the Dick Act of 1903 marked the birth of the modern National Guard (Cantor, 1969, pp. 370-373). It significantly increased federal support and oversight of the Guard, while maintaining its connection to the states. This transformation laid the groundwork for the National Guard's expanded role in 20th-century American military operations and set the stage for further refinements in subsequent legislation.

The Impact of the Dick Act: Transforming the National Guard and Debating Military Reform (1903-1916)

The Dick Act brought immediate and substantial changes to the National Guard's funding and organization. Federal appropriations for the Guard increased dramatically, rising from an annual $1 million in 1900 to $4 million by 1908 (Cooper, 1997, pp. 109-111). This nearly tenfold increase in just a decade represented a significant shift in federal support, especially considering that the U.S. government had expended only $22 million on the militia during the entire 19th century (Cooper, 1997, p. 111).

The increased federal funding led to improvements in weapons, equipment, and facilities for Guard units. Perhaps most visibly, it sparked an armory construction boom across much of the country. States like Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut launched ambitious building programs to comply with new federal guidelines for storing arms and equipment (Cooper, 1997, pp. 135-136). This construction boom not only improved the Guard's infrastructure but also changed the nature of the armories themselves (Everett, 1994, pp. 14-26).

The Dick Act also mandated joint exercises between the National Guard and the Regular Army, which began in 1904. These maneuvers represented a significant shift for Guard units, transitioning them “from semiprivate organizations based on fellowship and recreation to public institutions dedicated to training and military preparedness” (Nenninger, 1986, p. 220). By 1912, over 125,000 Guardsmen and Regulars participated in combined annual encampments (Nenninger, 1986, p. 220). These joint exercises provided valuable experience for both Guard and Regular officers in leading and supporting large troop formations, while also fostering increased cooperation between the two components.

However, the implementation of the Dick Act was not without challenges. Many state Guard units viewed efforts to impose consistent standards and eligibility requirements as an intrusive federal intervention that undermined their autonomy (Kaufman, 2002). The New York Evening Post, for example, criticized the provision requiring state troops mustered into federal service to undergo a medical examination, arguing it would decrease the force by at least one-fifth, potentially losing “perhaps the best part of the force—young business men of slightly defective eyesight or chest measurement, perfectly capable of serving the State well” (Zeigler et al., 2020, p. 26).

The transformation of the Guard also sparked debates about the broader issues of military preparedness and the role of citizen soldiers in national defense. Regular Army officers often viewed the Guard with skepticism. Captain Alfred W. Bjornstad, writing in the Journal of the Military Service Institution in 1908, argued for a larger standing army and criticized the militia system's perceived inefficiencies. He contended that the federal government's inability to compel the formation of proper units, impose standardized efficiency, or know the size of the force that would answer a call-up were significant obstacles to developing an effective second line of defense (Zeigler et al., 2020, p. 26-27; Bjornstad, 1908).

These debates often revealed a deep divide between professional military officers and the American public regarding military preparedness. Lieutenant Colonel James S. Pettit's prize-winning essay in the 1905 Military Service Institution competition exemplified this divide. Pettit argued that the American system of government was fundamentally incompatible with maintaining a disciplined army, criticizing what he saw as corrupt congressional practices and an uninformed public (Zeigler et al., 2020, p. 29). His views, while applauded by some military professionals, drew sharp criticism from publications like the New York Times, which cautioned that such perspectives were “extreme and even dangerous” (Zeigler et al., 2020).

Despite these challenges and debates, the Dick Act and subsequent reforms continued to shape the National Guard's development. The Guard expanded its role in coastal defense, with 126 Coast Artillery companies manning fortifications along the East, West, and Gulf coasts by 1912. The Guard also took an early interest in aviation, with New York activating the 1st Aero Company in 1915 (Gross, 1985, pp. 1-2).

1908: Expanding the Guard's Role and Creating the Medical Reserve Corps

In 1908, two key pieces of legislation significantly impacted the National Guard and Army Reserve. First, on May 27th, Congress passed an amendment to the Dick Act that expanded the Guard's potential for federal service. The act removed the nine-month limit on federal callups and allowed the National Guard to serve “either within or without the territory of the United States” (Dick Act, H.R. 11654, 1903). It also stipulated that the National Guard would be called to federal duty before any volunteer units were raised (Gentile et al., 2019).

However, questions remained about the constitutionality of overseas deployment for the Guard given its status under the militia clauses (Cooper, 1997, p. 114). Regular Army hardliners continued to advocate for a purely federal reserve force instead of relying on the National Guard with its dual state-federal allegiances (Mahon, 1983, p. 142).

The second key 1908 law, passed on April 23rd, created the Army Medical Reserve Corps under the “raise and support armies” clause of the Constitution (Gentile et al., 2017, p. 31). This marked the origins of today's U.S. Army Reserve as a federal reserve independent of the state's National Guards (Crossland & Currie, 1984, pp. 12-18). The Medical Reserve Corps grew rapidly, with over 1,000 members by 1910, and Reserve doctors began routinely backing up Regular Army medical personnel by 1913 (Crossland & Currie, 1984, pp. 17-19).

National Guard advocates were wary of the Medical Reserve Corps potentially supplanting the Guard as the Army's preferred reserve force. With the 1908 acts highlighting the ongoing debate between a state-based or purely federal reserve, the National Guard Association (NGA) worked to codify further the Guard's role (Hill, 1964, p. 205).

The 1908 acts also necessitated a dedicated War Department office to oversee National Guard matters. In February 1908, the Division of Militia Affairs (DMA) was formed, with LTC Erasmus Weaver as its first chief (Hill, 1964, pp. 209-210). The DMA, the predecessor to today's National Guard Bureau, centralized the administrative duties related to the Guard's “armament, equipment, discipline and organization” that had previously been spread across multiple Army bureaus (Doubler, 2001, p. 134).

However, organizing the Guard into standardized divisions proved difficult. The DMA established 12 multi-state districts to form divisions, but a lack of central authority and the states' reluctance to raise expensive artillery and cavalry units hampered progress. Only New York and Pennsylvania, with individual control of their districts, made real headway by 1912 (Doubler, 2001, p. 136)

During this period, the Army also began a major realignment of its peacetime structure to better prepare for war. Smaller posts were consolidated, and the division replaced the regiment as the main tactical unit. Proposed in 1910, the first divisions mixing Regular Army and National Guard units were scrapped within two years in favor of all Regular divisions thought to be more ready and deployable (Weigley, 1967, pp. 333-334)

The Army's 1912 plan, “The Organization of the Land Forces of the United States,” was groundbreaking. It outlined a three-tiered force with Regular divisions for immediate deployment, Guard divisions as reinforcements, and additional volunteer divisions as further backup. However, creating the envisioned 16 Guard combat divisions presented major challenges due to interstate coordination issues and limited state resources (Zeigler et al., 2020, p. 44).

Lingering doubts about the Guard's overseas deployability under the militia clauses led War Department planners to advocate for an expansive federal reserve. The 1915 “Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States,” known as the Continental Army Plan, called for a 500,000-man Army including 379,000 federal reservists (War Department, 1915, pp. 133-135). It relegated the roughly 129,000 Guardsmen to strictly domestic duties and sought to repeal provisions requiring the Guard's call-up before federal volunteers (War Department, 1915, pp. 133-135).

Many Guardsmen saw the plan as a transparent attempt to marginalize their role using increased federal funding as a “cynical buy-off” (Hill, 1964, p. 220). With U.S. Attorney General George Wickersham's 1912 opinion reiterating constitutional restrictions on overseas Guard deployments, the Continental Army Plan signaled a low point in early 20th-century Army-Guard relations. Attorney General Wickersham's 1912 decision dealt a severe blow to the National Guard's role as a federal reserve force. He ruled that the 1908 Militia Act provisions allowing overseas Guard deployments were unconstitutional. Wickersham declared that the Guard could not serve abroad as occupying forces unless “under conditions short of actual warfare” (Cooper, 1997, p.114). His decision prohibited the federal government from sending State Guard troops overseas. The War Department viewed the ruling as destroying the Guard's viability as a reliable wartime reserve (Hill, 1964, p. 205).

In response, the NGA and the new Association of the Adjutants General worked to counter the plan and codify the Guard's status through favorable legislation (Hill, 1964, pp.327-329; Jacobs, 1978, pp. 1-5). The growing Preparedness Movement, which emphasized military training, physical fitness, and strengthening the Army Reserve, presented both an opportunity and challenge for the National Guard (Finnegan, 1974; Weigley, 1967, pp. 342-344).

Preparedness advocates like Leonard Wood doubted the Guard's reliability and readiness compared to a federal reserve. Wood's student summer training camps in 1915-1916 attracted thousands of attendees and spread Preparedness ideals nationwide, laying the groundwork for ROTC (Clifford, 2014, pp. 11-12, 58; Weigley, 1967, pp. 342-344). However, wary of universal military training supplanting their role, National Guard supporters reached a tenuous truce with the movement to avoid opposing it outright if its efforts didn't undermine the Guard.

A noteworthy 1912 proposal came from Capt. John McAuley Palmer in his War Department-commissioned report titled “Organization of the Land Forces of the United States”. Palmer envisioned a small Regular Army for an immediate response, backed by a larger “army of national citizen soldiers” from the National Guard as the second line, with further volunteer divisions raised as needed (Zeigler et al., 2020, p. 44).

Presuming later developments, Palmer felt parts of the Guard could be brought under greater federal oversight through financial incentives without infringing on state powers (Zeigler et al., 2020, p. 45). However, opposition from both Uptonian-minded Regular officers and states' rights-focused Guard advocates, compounded by AG Wickersham's opinion casting further doubt on the Guard's overseas employability, prevented Palmer's proposal from gaining traction at the time (House, 1982, pp. 12-13).

In summary, the years 1908-1916 saw ongoing friction between the Army's desire for a reliable, federally controlled reserve and the National Guard's determination to remain the nation's primary wartime backup. With unresolved fundamental questions, this period set the stage for further consequential legislation, including the National Defense Act of 1916 and subsequent amendments, that would more fully define the Guard's role in the U.S. military establishment. The debates and developments during 1908-1916, pitting the visions of Regular Army reformers against Guard advocates, reflected the difficulties and compromises inherent in shaping an effective and politically viable early 20th-century U.S. Army reserve structure.

The Texas National Guard's Transformation and Challenges

During this period, the Texas National Guard underwent significant changes and faced numerous challenges as it strived to meet federal standards and secure adequate funding. In 1905, the Texas legislature passed House Bill 480, which restructured the state militia into reserve and active components, with the latter designated as the Texas National Guard (Tex. H.J., 29th Leg., R.S., 1905). The reorganization required the reappointment of all officers and the reenlistment of all enlisted men, leading to some member apathy and attrition (Tex. H.J., 29th Leg., R.S., 1905).

In 1907, the War Department introduced new requirements for National Guard regiments, mandating 12 companies per regiment with a minimum of 58 enlisted men per company by January 21, 1908 (Newton, 1908, pp. 4-6). Due to insufficient personnel and equipment, the Texas Adjutant-General issued orders to reduce the state's militia from a division to a brigade (Newton, 1908, pp. 4-6, 117-121). The state legislature's meager appropriations of $5,000 annually for 1907-1908 barely covered a quarter of the Guard's expenses, placing a heavy burden on officers and discouraging enlistments (Newton, 1908, pp. 3-5).

The 1908 Militia Act amendment required state Guards to conform to Regular Army standards within two years (Gentile et al., 2019, p. 36) By 1909, Adjutant-General Newton reported that the Texas Guard had met these requirements, including being fully armed, uniformed, and equipped for field service (Newton, 1910, p. 4). However, the organization continued to struggle with insufficient funding. Local supporters, such as the Citizens Encampment Committee of Austin, helped expand the Guard's facilities by raising funds and acquiring land, which was supplemented by some state and federal contributions (Milner, 1979, p. 33).

In 1911-1912, the Texas Legislature slightly increased allocations to $10,000 for armory rents and expenses, but the Adjutant-General maintained that this amount was inadequate and requested an increase to $20,000 annually (Hutchings, 1913, pp. 6-7). During this period, Regular Army officers conducted inspections to assess the Texas Guard's compliance with federal regulations and its overall efficiency (Hutchings, 1913, p. 5). Texas National Guard officers also took advantage of opportunities to attend Army service schools for professional development (Hutchings, 1913, pp. 4-5).

By 1912, federal militia funding had grown significantly, with the U.S. Congress appropriating over four million dollars for the several states' militias, of which Texas received $107,363.80 (Riker, 1957, p. 123). However, Congress failed to pass a military bill that would have provided drill and camp pay for National Guard members (Riker, 1957, p. 75). The Adjutant-General warned that many Guardsmen were losing interest in the militia without this compensation (Hutchings, 1913, p. 6).

In summary, the Texas National Guard made significant strides in meeting federal standards and modernizing its force. However, the organization faced numerous obstacles, including membership challenges, structural changes, and persistent financial constraints. Inconsistent and insufficient state and federal support hindered the Texas National Guard's progress and readiness during this transformative period, despite the efforts of local advocates and the gradual increase in federal funding.

The National Defense Act of 1916 and the Mexican Border Crisis

In the early 20th century, the U.S. National Guard faced a series of challenges and transformative events, particularly in relation to the Mexican Border Crisis of 1915-1916. This period was marked by a confrontation between the Regular Army and the National Guard, as well as the ongoing Mexican Revolution, which spilled over into the United States and necessitated military intervention.

Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison's Continental Army Plan, which aimed to create a federal reserve force, largely ignored the National Guard and was met with opposition from various groups, including the National Guard itself. Garrison's plan was designed to destroy the National Guard, according to Representative Isaac Sherwood, who advocated for reducing the Regular Army and improving the National Guard instead (Milner, 1979, p. 36-38).

Garrison testified before the House Military Affairs Committee, stating that federalizing the National Guard would not solve the nation's military problems and that the militia would need to expand significantly to provide an adequate defense. Former Secretary of War Elihu Root also expressed doubts about the effectiveness of the National Guard, given its divided loyalties between state governors and the federal government (Milner, 1979, p. 40).

As this debate unfolded, tensions along the Mexican border escalated due to the ongoing Mexican Revolution. Pancho Villa's raid on Columbus, New Mexico, on March 9, 1916, which resulted in the deaths of American citizens and the kidnapping of Maude Wright, prompted a U.S. military response (Mason, 1970, p. 24). President Woodrow Wilson ordered General John J. Pershing to lead a punitive expedition into Mexico to pursue Villa and his forces (Milner, 1979, pp 47-48)..

Before the Mexican Border Crisis, the War Department authorized a school for all Texas National Guard Infantry officers and selected sergeants at Camp Mabry in May 1916 (Milner, 1979, p. 49). Rumors circulated that the Texas Guard would be activated for duty on the Mexico border, and on May 9, 1916,

the governor ordered the mobilization of the entire Texas National Guard. The school was immediately disbanded, and the soldiers were ordered to report to their home stations. Within three days, over 3,700 Texas Guardsmen assembled at Fort Sam Houston (Milner, 1979, pp. 50-51).

The Mexican Border Crisis prompted Congressional action, leading to the passage of the National Defense Act of 1916, which President Wilson signed into law on June 3, 1916. The National Defense Act of 1916 had far-reaching consequences for both the National Guard and the Regular Army. It created a federal reserve, required Guardsmen to swear oaths to both state and federal governments, allowed for the deployment of the Guard overseas, and increased federal oversight and training requirements (Mahon, 1983, pp. 148-149; Stentiford, 2002, pp. 17-20; Todd, 1941, pp. 165-166).

The Act also established a tiered military structure, with the National Guard serving as the second line of defense behind the Regular Army (Mahon, 1983, p. 148; Stentiford, 2002, p. 20). It also established the National Guard as first-line responders during national emergencies (National Guard Bureau Historical Services, 2016). Under the Act, the National Guard received an annual budget, and soldiers were paid for monthly drills and annual training (Doubler, 2001, p. 140). The increased federal control and standardization transformed the National Guard into a force more closely resembling the Regular Army (Donnelly, 2019, p. 1).

The National Defense Act (NDA) act sought to also improve the nation's ability to mobilize a large army and meet the demands of modern warfare. Although the act did not fully prepare the nation for its forthcoming role in World War I, it created a path for the federalization of the National Guard and provided the authorities for increasing standards, discipline, and readiness of the Guard when called into federal service (National Guard Bureau Historical Services, 2016).

The NDA defined the Army of the United States as consisting of the “Regular Army, the Volunteer Army, the Officers' Reserve Corps, the Enlisted Reserve Corps, the National Guard while in the service of the United States, and such other land forces as are now or may hereafter be authorized by law” (National Defense Act, H.R. 12766, 1916) It mandated that Guard units be organized on the model of the Regular Army and authorized the President to establish and maintain the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) at civil education institutions (National Defense Act, H.R. 12766, 1916, Section 54)

For the National Guard, the NDA represented two important victories. First, it recognized the Guard's status as part of the Army when federalized and streamlined the procedures for federalizing the Guard during war. Second, it circumvented lingering constitutional proscriptions by allowing Guardsmen to be drafted into the Army as individuals and simultaneously discharged from the militia (Weigley, 1967, pp. 344-350). By using the armies clause and the term “drafted” rather than “called,” the act resolved the issue of overseas service (Weigley, 1967, pp. 344-350).

The NDA also renamed the Militia Affairs Division as the Militia Bureau, directly supervised by the Secretary of War, and authorized up to two Guard officers to serve in the office for the first time (National Defense Act, H.R. 12766, 1916). For the National Guard, which had long pushed for similar reforms, the changes seemed to institutionalize its independence within the War Department (Nenninger, 1986, p. 226).

Despite the positive features of the NDA, many preparedness advocates were unsatisfied. The act did not resolve the tension between the War Department and the National Guard, and detractors called for more

dramatic reforms, including the imposition of universal military training (Holley, 1982, p. 247; Lee, 1940, p. 28; Root, 1916, p. 488).

Just fifteen days after President Wilson signed the NDA into law, it received its first test during the Mexican Border Crisis. In response to Pancho Villa's raid on Columbus, New Mexico, Wilson ordered the mobilization of the National Guard from Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico on May 9, 1916 (Barnes, 2016, pp. 66-72; Report on the Mobilization of the Organized Militia and National Guard of the (National Defense Act, 1920; Zeigler et al., 2020, p. 59)

Initially, 75,000 Guardsmen were called up, with plans to organize them into ten divisions (National Guard Bureau Historical Services, 2016). The mobilization faced challenges due to the new regulatory requirements and the ongoing implementation of the National Defense Act (Kreidberg & Henry, 1955, p. 218).

By July 1916, over 100,000 federalized Guardsmen were stationed along the border from Brownsville, Texas, to Yuma, Arizona (Scott, 1928, pp. 522-523). The presence of the National Guard served as a deterrent to Mexican aggression, with General Hugh Lennox Scott noting that talk of capturing San Antonio ceased once the Guardsmen appeared in significant numbers (Scott, 1928, pp. 522-523).

The Regular Army found itself relying on the National Guard for necessary manpower (Mason, 1970, p. 84). With most Regular Army forces serving in distant locations, the National Guard provided the bulk of the troops available for the Mexican Border Crisis (Mason, 1970, p. 84).

The crisis revealed continued shortcomings in the National Guard's mobilization process. Regular Army inspectors found many Guardsmen unfit for duty, with more than 10,000 discharged for failing physical evaluations and 10 percent failing to report for service (Doubler, 2001, p. 142). The Guard's force structure was heavily weighted toward infantry units, while horse-mounted cavalry units were in high demand (War Department, Militia Bureau, 1916, pp. 92-93). Moreover, mobilization suffered from a lack of coordination between the Department of War and the states (Harris & Sadler, 2015).

Critics of the National Guard also published articles questioning the efficiency of the activated citizen-soldiers (Sherwood & Painter, 1919, pp. 2018-2019). However, these critics failed to acknowledge the progress made in the eight years since Congress had directed the Regular Army to bring the National Guard to a state of semi-readiness, or to propose alternative means of rapidly raising such a large force (Sherwood & Painter, 1919, pp. 2018-2019).

In summary, the Mexican Border Crisis of 1915-1916 and the National Defense Act of 1916 marked a critical turning point for the U.S. National Guard. The Act transformed the Guard into a more professional and federally integrated force, while the Border Crisis demonstrated the Guard's essential role in national defense. Despite facing challenges and criticism, the National Guard's mobilization and presence along the Mexican border proved crucial in deterring further aggression and maintaining stability in the region. The experience gained during this period would prove invaluable as the United States prepared to enter World War I, with the National Guard poised to play a significant role in the conflict.

America Goes to War: The National Guard's Role in World War I

When World War I erupted in Europe in 1914, President Woodrow Wilson declared American neutrality and urged the nation to remain impartial (Wilson, 1914). Despite this stance, the United States found itself increasingly drawn into the conflict as the war dragged on. Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare, which resulted in the sinking of the Lusitania in 1915 and the deaths of 128 Americans, sparked outrage and increased pressure on Wilson to intervene (Jones, 2001, p. 73). Tensions further escalated with the interception of the Zimmermann Telegram in 1917, revealing Germany's attempts to form an alliance with Mexico against the United States (Coffman, 1986, pp. 8-9).

Preparedness advocates sought to leverage public fear and anxiety about the war to achieve long-term military policy reforms (Kennedy, 1980, p. 30). They made the case that a larger military would deter aggression against America and provide insurance against war (Woodward, 2014, pp. 21-22. As the war continued and U.S. interests came under attack, these advocates grew increasingly alarmed by the steadfast commitment to neutrality

On April 6, 1917, following Germany's resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare and the revelation of the Zimmermann Telegram, Congress declared war on Germany at President Wilson's request (Link, 1979; Herring, 2008, pp. 378-435). This decision necessitated a rapid expansion of the U.S. Army, which was woefully unprepared for the scale of the conflict. Military planners determined that the Army needed to grow to at least 1.5 million men, but voluntary enlistments proved insufficient to meet this goal (Coffman, 1986, pp. 8-9, 42-43).

Mobilizing the Nation: The Selective Service Act and the National Guard

With the declaration of war, the United States faced the daunting task of rapidly expanding its military forces. Voluntary enlistments proved insufficient to meet the manpower demands, prompting Congress to pass the Selective Service Act on May 18, 1917 (Chambers, 1987, Chapters 5-6; Hill, 1964, p. 258). This legislation authorized the nation's first national draft, allowing the conscription of both civilians and the entire National Guard for the duration of the emergency (Zeigler et al., 2020, pp. 66-67). The act required nearly all men aged 21 to 30 to register for conscription, resulting in the drafting of approximately 2.8 million men by the war's end (Kreidberg & Henry, 1955, pp. 235-240; Weigley, 1967, p. 354).

On August 5, 1917, President Wilson exercised his authority under the Selective Service Act and drafted the entire National Guard into federal service as individuals. This action removed the Guardsmen from state control and ensured their eligibility for overseas deployment, addressing concerns raised by previous judicial rulings (Zeigler et al., 2020, p. 70).

The federalization of the National Guard was preceded by a surge in voluntary enrollment, as recruiters promoted the Guard as an appealing alternative to conscription, promising the opportunity to serve alongside friends and family (Mahon, 1983, pp. 154-157; Cooper, 1997, p. 168). Between April and July 1917, the Guard nearly doubled in size, recruiting approximately 200,000 new soldiers (Mahon, 1983, pp. 154-157; Cooper, 1997, p. 168).

Once federalized, the National Guard underwent significant reorganization and restructuring to meet the demands of modern warfare. The War Department increased the number of Guard divisions from 12 to 16 and revised the Guard's organizational and numbering scheme to support the divisional structure adopted by General John Pershing, the commander of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF). The drafted Guardsmen comprised approximately 40% of the American Expeditionary Force's combat strength (Doubler, 2001, p. 154; Powers, 2017).

The National Defense Act of 1916 had designated the National Guard as the nation's second line of defense, granting it dual status as both a state and federal force. Consequently, Guardsmen were required to swear oaths of allegiance to both their state and the federal government, while retaining their unit designations and lineage (Stentiford, 2002, p. 14).

The War Department's efforts to build a unified force included the assignment of Regular Army officers to Guard units, the infusion of draftees to bring units to full strength, and the removal of distinctive state or National Guard markings in favor of Regular Army insignia (Coffman, 1998, pp. 61-62; Thompson, 1918). Despite these measures, the National Guard strove to retain its distinctive character derived from state and local roots, albeit with mixed results (Mahon, 1983, pp. 154-157).

The federalization of the National Guard left many states without adequate forces to handle domestic emergencies. To address this issue, state governors organized replacement units, known as State Guards or Home Guards, which were authorized under the National Defense Act of 1916 (Stentiford, 2002, pp. 23, 51). These units, composed of retired or prior service personnel and those ineligible for federal service, provided a calming presence and assisted with local contingencies (Stentiford, 2002, p. 51). By the war's end, approximately 27 states had created State Guard units, representing an additional 79,000 soldiers for strictly state duty (Stentiford, 2002, p. 51).

Training and Reorganization: The 36th Division and Camp Bowie

The Texas National Guard's experience during World War I exemplified the challenges and transformations faced by Guard units across the nation. As Texas Guardsmen returned from border duty on the Mexican border, they were met with the prospect of additional federal service (Millis, 1956, pp. 229-233).

As the mobilization process unfolded, the War Department faced the challenge of housing and training the rapidly expanding force. In Texas, the lack of suitable training facilities led to the construction of Camp Bowie near Fort Worth (Tyler & Saunders, 1973, p. 168). The camp, completed on August 21, 1917, served as a training ground for both the Texas National Guard and conscripted soldiers from Texas and Oklahoma (Chastaine, 1920, p. 7).

The mobilization process brought significant changes to the National Guard, including reorganizations and a new nationally integrated designation system. The Texas and Oklahoma National Guard units were combined to form the 36th Infantry Division, with the Army prohibiting the inclusion of state names in the new divisional titles (White, 1984, pp. 6-7). Under the command of General E. Saint John Greble, the 36th Division began to take shape at Camp Bowie, with various Texas and Oklahoma National Guard units merging to form new regiments (Milner, 1979, p. 60)

The 36th Division in France: Combat and Casualties

In July 1918, the 36th Division, consisting of approximately 28,000 men, minus the 143rd Infantry, departed for France, where it would join the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) (Luis-Watson, 2018; Texas Military Forces Museum, n.d.-a; Chastaine, 1920, p. 28). Upon arriving in France, the division underwent further training before being sent to the front lines.

The 36th Division’s baptism by fire came during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive in the fall of 1918. On October 8, the division’s 71st Brigade, composed of the 141st and 142nd Infantry Regiments, played a crucial role in the Battle of St. Etienne. During this engagement, Corporal Samuel M. Sampler and Corporal Harold L. Turner of the 142nd Infantry Regiment earned Medals of Honor for their bravery. Corporal Sampler single-handedly charged a German machine gun nest, silencing it with hand grenades,

killing two enemy soldiers, and capturing 28 others (Congressional Medal of Honor Society, n.d.-a). Corporal Turner, after his platoon had suffered heavy casualties, led a small group forward through intense enemy fire, ultimately capturing a machine gun emplacement and taking 50 German prisoners (Congressional Medal of Honor Society, n.d.-b).

Over the next three weeks, the 36th Division would face some of the most intense fighting of the war. On October 10, the entire division engaged in combat, relieving the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division and advancing thirteen miles against heavy German resistance before being relieved on October 28-29 (Dawson, 2001; Olson, 1976.) The 36th Division's accomplishments during this period were significant, liberating several villages and towns, capturing over 800 German prisoners, and seizing valuable German artillery pieces and machine guns. Members of the division were awarded two Congressional Medals of Honor, thirty Distinguished Service Crosses, and nearly one hundred and thirty Croix de Guerres (Chastaine, 1920, p. 184; Hanson, n.d., p. 175; Skaggs, n.d., p. 139). The French government recognized the division's contributions by erecting a memorial on the Blanc Mont ridge, equating the 36th's efforts with those of the 2nd Division in liberating the area (Stallings, 1963, p. 289). However, these achievements came at a heavy cost, with the division suffering over 2,500 casualties (Olson, 1976).

The Beginnings of the Texas Air National Guard

The origins of the Texas Air National Guard can be traced back to the establishment of the 111th Aero Squadron on August 14, 1917, as part of the World War I United States Army Air Service (Lone Star Flight Museum, n.d.). The squadron, based at Kelly Field in San Antonio, was one of the first aviation units formed during the war. Although the 111th Aero Squadron did not see combat during World War I, its formation marked the beginning of Texas's contribution to military aviation. The squadron was demobilized after the 1918 Armistice with Germany, but its legacy would lay the groundwork for the future development of the Texas Air National Guard.

The Legacy of World War I: Federalization and the National Guard

The Guard's rapid mobilization and deployment filled the critical gap between the initial commitment of Regular Army forces and the arrival of fully trained draftees (Mahon, 1983, pp. 159-160; Hill, 1964, pp. 285-284). However, this increased federalization came at the cost of reduced state control and weakened local ties.

Despite the hardships and sacrifices endured by Guardsmen during the war, their performance vindicated the years of reform and improvement since the Dick Act of 1903. As Colonel John H. Parker, commander of the 102nd Infantry Regiment, 26th Division, observed, “The American militiaman, when he is properly led, is the finest soldier who ever wore shoe leather” (Haskell, 2017).

The experiences of World War I set the stage for the National Guard's continued evolution as a critical component of the U.S. military. The lessons learned during this conflict would shape the Guard's development in the interwar years and its response to future national emergencies, including World War II.

The Interwar Years: The National Guard's Evolution and Challenges (1920-1939)

The Army Reorganization Act of 1920 transformed U.S. military policy and redefined the National Guard's relationship with the Army. This comprehensive legislation emerged as a compromise between competing interests and built upon the 1916 National Defense Act, addressing critical training, planning, and organizational deficiencies exposed during World War I. The act established a new structure for the

Army of the United States, comprising three components: the Regular Army, the National Guard (when in federal service), and the newly created Organized Reserves, which included both Officers' and Enlisted Reserve Corps (Zeigler et al., 2020, pp. 87-89).

The legislation largely favored the National Guard, demonstrating the significant influence of the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) as a lobbying force (Holley, 1982). It upheld the principle of relying on civilian soldiers during wartime and ensured that the Regular Army's peacetime strength would not exceed that of the National Guard. Importantly, the act designated the National Guard as the primary reserve component to be activated during national emergencies.

However, the act contained one significant provision that concerned Guard leadership: it established a dual status for the National Guard. When federalized, the Guard would function as part of the U.S. Army, but otherwise, it would serve under state control as organized militia. Guard officials worried this arrangement would allow the Regular Army and War Department to circumvent the National Guard during non-federal service by developing their own reserve force (Todd, 1941, p. 170).

The Challenge of Fiscal Restraint

In the years following the passage of the 1920 act, both the Regular Army and the National Guard faced significant challenges due to limited congressional appropriations and widespread antimilitary sentiment (Ferrell, 1957, pp. 84-106; Ferrell, 1952; Braeman, 1982). The War Department considered two schemes for the Army's reorganization: reducing the number of Regular Army divisions while maintaining the National Guard at close to full strength, or retaining the Regular Army's nine divisions but slashing end strength across all three components (Palmer, 1930).

Ultimately, the War Department chose to implement parts of both schemes, retaining the Regular Army's nine divisions in skeletonized form at the expense of Regular Army trainers for the National Guard and Organized Reserve divisions (Palmer, 1930, p. 368). This decision weakened the readiness of all three components and hampered the National Guard's ability to maintain its units at authorized levels (Weigley, 1967, p. 401).

The National Guard's Drive for Dual Status

Despite these challenges, the National Guard made significant strides during the interwar years. It expanded its physical infrastructure, established a more visible presence in American communities, and benefited from an influx of federal funds that replaced dwindling state appropriations. The Guard also established powerful local and national ties to influential community organizations and resumed officer training at Fort Leavenworth (Zeigler et al., 2020, p. 97).

The Guard’s ambiguous constitutional status and its relationship with the Army remained a concern. At its 1926 annual convention, the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) focused on amending the 1920 act to make the National Guard a permanent reserve component of the Army while maintaining its links to the states through the militia clause (H.R. 5645, 1933).

These efforts culminated in the passage of the National Guard Act of 1933, which created a new reserve component defined as the National Guard of the United States, distinct from the existing National Guard of the states and territories. The act stipulated that the Army of the United States would consist of the Regular Army, the National Guard of the United States, the National Guard while in the service of the United States, the Officers’ Reserve Corps, the Organized Reserves, and the Enlisted Reserve Corps (Tencza et al., 2020, p. 3).

The 1933 act afforded the Guard precisely what it sought: dual allegiance to the states and the federal government. It established the National Guard as a permanent reserve component of the Army while maintaining its links to the states through the militia clause, thereby joining the two clauses in law (*Abbott v. Biden*, 2022).

The Texas National Guard's Experience

The Texas National Guard's experience during the interwar years exemplified the challenges and transformations faced by Guard units across the nation. Following World War I, many states, including Texas, did not immediately re-form their National Guard units due to limited funding and ongoing reform debates in Washington (Doubler, 2001, p. 165). However, the passage of the National Defense Act of 1920 removed ambiguity regarding the Guard's future, leading to a recruiting boom (Doubler, 2001, p. 167).

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the Texas National Guard continued to grow and improve, despite the pacifism that existed elsewhere in the nation (Krenek, 1982, pp. 1-3; Milner, 1979, p. 78). The Great Depression proved to be a boon for the Guard, as the drill pay and income provided by service attracted many unemployed citizens (Leuchtenburg, 1959, p. 104; Franklin, 1963, p. 74).

In January 1920, the Texas Militia received authorization from the War Department to change from an infantry division to the First Cavalry Division. However, by November of the same year, the War Department decided to convert the Texas National Guard back into an infantry division, designated as the 36th Infantry Division (Milner 1979, p. 80)

The Texas National Guard also benefited from increased federal funding and regulations during this period (Krenek, 1982, p. 39). By 1935, Texas was fourth in the country in terms of federal expenditures on state Guards and had received approval for an Air Squadron from the War Department (Krenek, 1982, p. 39).

The interwar years marked a period of significant change and challenge for the National Guard. The Army Reorganization Act of 1920 and the National Guard Act of 1933 reshaped the Guard's role within the U.S. military establishment, establishing it as a permanent reserve component of the Army while maintaining its dual allegiance to the states and the federal government.

As the world edged closer to another global conflict in the late 1930s, the National Guard stood ready to fulfill its role as a critical component of the U.S. Army. The lessons learned and the progress made during the interwar years would prove invaluable as the nation prepared to face the challenges of World War II.

The National Guard's Mobilization and Service in World War II (1939-1945)

As the world edged closer to war in the late 1930s, the United States began to prepare for the possibility of military intervention. President Franklin D. Roosevelt recognized the need for military intervention in Europe and declared a national emergency on September 8, 1939, increasing the authorized strength of the National Guard by 43,000 to 235,000, with a focus on expanding the eighteen infantry divisions (National Guard Bureau, 1941). The number of annual armory drills rose from 48 to 60, and summer encampments extended from 15 to 21 days. From June 1939 to June 1940, the Guard recruited nearly 40,000 additional men, reaching a peacetime record of 242,402 soldiers by the summer of 1940 (Kreidberg & Henry, 1955, p. 555).

The American war machine started to mobilize two years before the country's official entry into World War II, with Congress repealing the ban on the sale of materiel to nations at war in 1939 (Harrison, 1988,

p. 172). This decision provided a much-needed boost to the U.S. munitions industry and allowed the Army to equip its soldiers with more modern equipment (Kreidberg & Henry, 1955, pp. 654-666; Stewart, 2010, pp. 82-83).

Mobilizing the National Guard

On August 27, 1940, Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing President Franklin D. Roosevelt to order "all members and units of any or all reserve components of the Army of the United States . . . and retired personnel of the Regular Army, with or without their consent" to active duty for 12 consecutive months (Tencza et al., 2020, p. 5).

Four days later, Roosevelt signed Executive Order 8530, calling out the first increment of National Guard personnel, comprising some 63,000 Guardsmen, as part of a wider mobilization in anticipation of American entry into World War II (Weigley, 1967, p. 427; Sligh, 1992, p. 126). The entire mobilization process comprised of twenty-five increments over thirteen months with the last call-up occurring on October 6, 1941 (Doubler, 2001, p. 174).

This activation was made possible by the National Defense Act of 1933, which integrated the National Guard into the U.S. Army and removed the requirement for presidential approval from state governors to mobilize Guard units. The act maintained some state control by preserving unit identities and guaranteeing the Guards' return to state service after hostilities ended (Krenek, n.d., p. 55).

Challenges and Deficiencies

The mobilization process revealed several deficiencies within the National Guard. Many officers, regardless of component, were either physically unfit or poorly trained for combat leadership (Tencza et al., 2020, p. 6) The National Guard Bureau estimated that 20 percent of Guard staff and division officers were not qualified for their positions, partly due to insufficient training (Gabel, 1992, p. 16). These problems led to changes in Guard standards, with the National Guard Bureau revising its regulations by 1944 to require "high professional standards, physical standards comparable to those of the Regular Army, definite age and tenure-in-grade restrictions. . . (Tencza et al., 2020, p. 6)."

As a result of these deficiencies, many Regular Army and National Guard officers were relieved of command during the mobilization period (Watson, 1991, pp. 245-246). This process generated resentment among some National Guard officers, who believed that the relief or reassignment of longstanding regimental and division commanders was motivated by a lack of Regular Army respect for the Guard (Hill, 1964).

Training and Deployment

Despite the challenges faced during mobilization, the National Guard played a crucial role in the creation of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), comprising 40 percent of its divisions (Venzon, 2012, p. 404). Guard units underwent rigorous training and reorganization to meet the demands of modern warfare before deploying overseas (Weigley, 1967, pp. 430-434; Stewart, 2010, p. 74).

The mobilization of the 36th Infantry Division exemplified the broader transformation of National Guard units into the regular U.S. Army structure during World War II's preliminary phase. Prior to November 1940, the division operated primarily under Texas state jurisdiction; however, the increasing probability of American involvement in the European conflict necessitated its integration into the federal military structure (Wooster, 1976). This transition required substantial organizational restructuring and training modifications to align with U.S. Army doctrine and operational standards.

For the Texas National Guard, mobilization orders directed units to report to the newly constructed Camp Bowie near Brownwood, Texas. The 36th Infantry Division, comprising 12,500 men, was ordered to mobilize on November 25, 1940 (Wooster, 1976). As units prepared for activation, they continued recruiting to reach full strength before "M-day." Many young men joined to serve alongside friends, recognizing the likelihood of U.S. involvement in the growing global conflict (Milner, 19.

In the Pacific Theater, National Guard units were among the first to engage the enemy. On December 7, 1941, the Hawaii National Guard's 298th and 299th Infantry, along with California's 251st Coast Artillery, participated in the defense of Oahu during the attack on Pearl Harbor (Doubler, 2001, pp. 177-178). National Guard units also played a vital role in the early stages of the war in the Philippines, with the 200th Coast Artillery from New Mexico, the 192nd Tank Battalion (composed of units from Wisconsin, Illinois, Ohio, and Kentucky), and the 194th Tank Battalion (consisting of companies from Minnesota and California) fighting valiantly against the Japanese invasion (Olson, 1976).

National Guard divisions played a pivotal role in major campaigns of World War II's European Theater of Operations (ETO), which extended beyond Europe to include North Africa and the Mediterranean (U.S. Army, 2020). These units were at the forefront of significant operations, including Operation Torch in North Africa (1942-1943), Operation Husky in Sicily (1943), the Italian Campaign (1943-1945), and Operation Overlord in France (1944). Guard units, such as the 34th "Red Bull," 36th "Texas," and 45th "Thunderbird" Infantry Divisions, distinguished themselves in combat, enduring heavy casualties and earning numerous accolades (Doubler, 2001, p. 180).

Other notable Guard units, like the 29th Infantry Division, also made significant contributions, particularly during the D-Day landings. The 442nd Infantry Regiment, composed of Japanese-American soldiers and attached to the 34th Infantry Division, became the most decorated unit of its size in U.S. military history. Throughout these campaigns, National Guard divisions demonstrated remarkable resilience and combat effectiveness, playing a crucial role in the Allied victory in Europe (McManus, 2004).

The State Guard Act and Home Front Defense

Anticipating the absence of National Guard units due to federal mobilization, President Roosevelt signed the State Guard Act on October 21, 1940. This legislation, more comprehensive than the 1917 Home Guard Act, authorized states to organize replacement forces for federalized National Guard units. It clarified the constitutionality of such forces and allowed access to federal supplies and equipment when available (Inspector General, Department of Defense, 2014, p. 31).

The act established a command structure with the National Guard Bureau serving as the strategic headquarters, while state Adjutant Generals maintained operational and tactical control of State Guard units (Stentiford, 2002, p. 92). The National Guard Bureau supervised state guard forces, ensuring they followed the same rules and regulations as the National Guard, including courts-martial and punishments (Schmelzer, 2019). Though largely autonomous, State Defense forces were subject to periodic federal inspections to ensure proper maintenance of facilities and equipment.

In 1941, the Texas Legislature passed the Texas Defense Guard Act (HB 45) and Governor O'Daniel signed the bill on February 10 of that same year (HB 45, 1941).The Texas Defense Guard was organized similarly to the National Guard, with units stationed throughout the state. However, unlike the National Guard, it was a purely state-controlled force, independent of federal authority, and composed entirely of volunteers who were not subject to federal mobilization. Many of these volunteers were men who were

either too old or otherwise ineligible for federal military service but still eager to serve their state and country (Stentiford, 2002, p. 92; Stein, 1984, p. 4).

The Texas Defense Guard grew rapidly. The strategy for the state guard involved setting up battalions throughout Texas. Towns or counties that wanted a unit had to apply, with local organizations like city councils and veterans' groups explaining the strategic importance of their location and providing an incident command structure. By 1942, 50 battalions had been established. Enlistments soared to 17,497 in the first year, leading to increased training to 150 hours in 1942 (Schmelzer, 2019). In contrast, around the same time, only 11,633 individuals joined the National Guard (Schmelzer, 2019).

The primary mission of the Texas Defense Guard was to provide homeland defense and security during the war years. This included guarding critical infrastructure, such as bridges, power plants, and oil refineries, as well as assisting local law enforcement in maintaining order (Stentiford, 2002, p. 92). The Defense Guard also played a crucial role in responding to natural disasters and other emergencies within the state.

The Texas Defense Guard faced its first major test during the Houston Gulf Coast Hurricane on September 22-23, 1941. Over 500 guardsmen performed a variety of critical tasks, including rescuing victims, preventing looting, directing traffic, providing first aid, and assisting local authorities. The Guard's radio division maintained the only communication along the Texas coast throughout the storm, providing crucial weather updates and coordinating response efforts (Schmelzer, 2019).

The Texas Defense Guard continued to evolve and expand its capabilities throughout the war. In 1943, the organization was officially renamed the Texas State Guard, reflecting its permanent status as a state-controlled military force (Schmelzer, 2019). The State Guard also focused on enhancing its members' skills through specialized training in areas such as military police work, first aid, and chemical warfare defense (Stentiford, 2002, p. 92).

The creation of the Texas Defense Guard, later renamed the Texas State Guard, highlights the importance of maintaining a state-controlled military force capable of providing homeland defense and emergency response in the absence of the federalized National Guard. The rapid growth and expansion of the Defense Guard during the war years demonstrate the readiness and commitment of Texas citizens to serve their state and country.

The 36th Infantry Division in World War II: From Mobilization to Combat

The journey of the 36th Infantry Division from mobilization to combat during World War II was marked by extensive training, numerous relocations, and prolonged anticipation for overseas deployment. This section examines the division's experiences from 1941 to 1943, highlighting the challenges faced by National Guard units as they integrated into the regular Army and prepared for combat.

Leadership Changes and Reorganization

On September 13, 1941, as the 36th Division participated in Louisiana maneuvers, the War Department implemented a significant leadership change. Brigadier General Fred L. Walker, a former guardsman turned regular army officer, received orders to assume command of the Texas Division (Walker, 1969, p. 1). This decision reflected the Army's conclusion, similar to that reached in 1918, that regular army officers should lead troops in combat (Olson, 1976).

Walker's appointment was met with initial resistance from the outgoing National Guard commander, Brigadier General Claude V. Birkhead, who warned that Walker would not be welcomed (Walker, 1969, p.

10). However, contrary to Birkhead's prediction, most division members recognized the potential benefits of improved leadership, particularly in terms of lives saved in combat (Walker, 1969, p. 15).

Despite pressure from Major General George V. Strong, the Eighth Corps commander, to replace all National Guard officers, Walker opted for a more measured approach. He retained competent officers regardless of their background, emphasizing merit over the source of commission (Milner, 1979, p. 134; Walker, 1969, p. 17). This decision helped maintain continuity and morale within the division.

In November 1941, the 36th Division underwent a significant reorganization, transitioning from a square division of four infantry regiments to a triangular division of three infantry regiments. This restructuring resulted in the 144th Infantry Regiment being distributed among other units and the 131st Field Artillery Battalion being dispatched to the South Pacific (Milner, 1979, p. 135).

Training and Relocations

The 36th Division's wartime journey involved numerous relocations and training exercises. During 1941 exercises in Texas and Louisiana, soldiers were issued obsolete weapons and used driveshaft cowlings from abandoned trucks, mounted them on axles with wheels, and called them improvised weapons anti-tank guns. Artillery practice was also limited due to ammunition shortages. Some units did not receive rifles until they embarked for the Pacific theater (Milner, 1979, pp. 130-131).

On February 14, 1942, the division began a massive motor march from Camp Bowie, Texas, to Camp Blanding, Florida. This move, involving over 2,000 vehicles divided into six sections, presented significant logistical challenges. Adverse weather conditions in east Texas resulted in nearly 400 vehicles becoming stuck in mud, requiring innovative solutions to keep the convoy moving (Peek, 1945, p. 10).

At Camp Blanding, the division received over 4,000 new soldiers, primarily from the northern United States. General Walker gave these recruits a brief review of Texas history and encouraged them to adopt the Texas spirit (Walker, 1969, p. 87). The division underwent its first amphibious training at this location, learning new techniques for stream crossing, swimming with full field equipment, and engaging in exercises with live ammunition (Peek, 1945, p. 12).

Despite hopes for an early overseas deployment, the 36th Division was instead sent to North Carolina for additional maneuvers in July 1942. These exercises culminated in a significant operation on the Pee Dee River, after which the Eighth Corps commander told the men, “This is your last dry run. The next time you will face a real enemy” (Peek, 1945, p. 12).

Following the North Carolina maneuvers, the division moved to Camp Edwards, Massachusetts, in August 1942. Here, they participated in landing exercises at Martha's Vineyard, further honing their amphibious warfare skills (Walker, 1969, p. 116). The harsh New England winter presented new challenges for the Texan troops, impacting their training effectiveness (Walker, 1969, p. 125).

Mounting Frustrations and Morale Challenges

As other divisions mobilized after the 36th received overseas orders, frustration grew among the Texas troops. General Walker himself questioned in his journal, “I wonder if we are ever going overseas?” (Walker, 1969, p. 133). The prolonged training and repeated postponements of overseas deployment began to affect morale. Incidents of fighting and misconduct among troops on leave in Boston highlighted these growing tensions (Walker, 1969, p. 142).

By January 1943, the division had received its fifth postponement for overseas deployment. Walker expressed concern about troop morale as continued training and marching seemed to further frustrate the

men (Walker, 1969, pp. 150-151). February brought yet another postponement, leading Walker to note in his journal, “We may never move from here” (Walker, 1969, p. 151).

Final Preparations and Deployment

The turning point came in early March 1943 when Walker received orders to prepare for an overseas assignment. On April 1, 1943, the 36th Division began boarding ships in New York Harbor, echoing their predecessors' departure for World War I from the same port 25 years earlier (Peek, 1945, p. 12).

The division sailed on April 2, 1943, as part of a convoy of 21 ships with naval escorts. After a journey marked by seasickness and cramped conditions, the 36th Division arrived in Oran, French Morocco, on April 13, 1943 (Walker, 1969, p. 188). The following months involved further movements within North Africa, including stays near Magenta, Arzew, and the Marmora cork forest near Rabat (Walker, 1969, pp. 189, 197).

Throughout the summer of 1943, elements of the division engaged in various assignments, including guarding and transporting prisoners of war, and participating in additional amphibious training. In August, the division conducted “Operation Cowpuncher,” their final exercise before the assault on Italy (Peek, 1945, p. 14).

On September 5, 1943, nearly three years after mobilization, the 36th Division departed Oran harbor for the invasion of Italy. As the ships steamed towards Bizerte to join the rest of the convoy, officers distributed orders and maps, revealing that the division would land on Salerno beaches near Paestum on September 9 (Walker, 1969, p. 228; Peek, 1945, pp. 14-15).

In September 1943, as the detached Texas artillerymen endured captivity under the Japanese, the main body of the 36th Division prepared for the invasion of Italy. Landing at Salerno on September 9, the Texans faced fierce German resistance (Dawson, 1976). In a display of state pride and defiance, soldiers reportedly advanced under a large Texas flag bearing the words of William B. Travis from the Alamo: “I shall never surrender or retreat. VICTORY OR DEATH!” (McDugal, 1966, p. xii).

The Italian campaign proved costly for the 36th Division, with only half of the original Texans remaining by war's end. Despite heavy losses, the division participated in the capture of Rome and was selected for Operation Anvil-Dragoon, the invasion of southern France.

After assisting the 34th Infantry Division in the attack on Cassino and fighting defensively along the Gari River, the 36th Division entered Rome on June 5, 1944. They then pushed north, encountering sharp resistance at Magliano, but reached Piombino on June 26. Later, on August 15, 1944, the 36th Division made another amphibious assault landing in southern France as part of Operation Anvil-Dragoon, which contributed significantly to the Allied advance The 36th's performance in liberating French towns earned them recognition, with the town of Die renaming its main street “Avenue De La Division Du Texas” (Dryden, 2008, p. 60).

During the German offensive in December 1944, known as the Battle of the Bulge, the 36th Infantry Division maintained its defensive position and launched counterattacks by the end of the month. As Allied forces pushed into Germany in 1945, the division advanced through the Rhineland and ultimately reached the Bavarian Alps by the war's conclusion (Wooster, 1976).

One of the most significant actions of the 36th Infantry Division occurred on April 30, 1945, when it overran several Kaufering subcamps, part of the larger Dachau concentration camp complex (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, n.d.). This operation was part of a broader mission, where one of the

division's attached battalions was tasked with locating and securing all concentration camps in the vicinity of Hurlach, near Landsberg (Milner, 1975). The liberation of these camps exposed the division's soldiers to the horrific realities of the Holocaust, contributing to the broader Allied effort to document and address Nazi atrocities.

In recognition of their role in liberating concentration camps, the 36th Infantry Division was officially designated as a liberating unit by both the U.S. Army's Center of Military History and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in 1995 (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, n.d.). This acknowledgment underscores the division's contribution not only to the military defeat of Nazi Germany but also to the liberation of Holocaust survivors and the exposure of Nazi crimes.

The high casualty rates and influx of replacements dramatically altered the composition of the 36th Division. By the time of the assault on Velletri, only 10% to 20% of the division consisted of native Texans, down from about 50% at the start of the war (Dixon, 1944). Despite this demographic shift, the division maintained its Texan identity and spirit throughout the conflict.

The Lost Battalion and the Sacrifices of Texas Guardsmen

In the months leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack, the U.S. military had begun bolstering its defenses in the Pacific. Three National Guard units, comprising troops from seven states, arrived in the Philippines to reinforce the island's defenses. The largest of these was New Mexico's 200th Coast Artillery, a unit of 1,800 men (Doubler, 2001, p. 178).

Additionally, the Army had consolidated tank companies from various Guard divisions into composite tank battalions during the 1940 mobilization. Two of these units, the 192nd Tank Battalion (with troops from Wisconsin, Illinois, Ohio, and Kentucky) and the 194th Tank Battalion (comprising companies from Minnesota and California, along with some Missouri Guardsmen), were deployed to add crucial firepower to the Philippine defenses (Stanton, 1984, p. 299, 467).

The Texas National Guard's "Lost Battalion"

One of the most tragic and heroic stories of the Texas militias' involvement in World War II is that of the Texas National Guard's 2nd Battalion, 131st Field Artillery Regiment, known as the “Lost Battalion.”

Less than a year after the mobilization of the Texas National Guard, the federal government separated this battalion from the 36th Division and ordered it to the Philippines, making these Guardsmen among the first American soldiers sent overseas in World War II. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the 2-131st Field Artillery was aboard a ship west of Hawaii. Initially, the War Department ordered the convoy carrying the battalion to return. However, President Franklin D. Roosevelt countermanded this order, instructing the convoy to proceed. This decision would have far-reaching consequences for the Texas Guardsmen (Doubler, 2001, p. 178; Milner, 1979, p.149).

The Siege of Bataan and Corregidor

As Japanese forces invaded the Philippines, American and Filipino defenders were pushed back onto the Bataan Peninsula and the island fortress of Corregidor. Cut off from supplies and reinforcements, these forces, including the National Guard units, held out for four months. Throughout this desperate defense, Guard units fought stubbornly against overwhelming odds (National WWII Museum, n.d.).

The defenders, who came to be known as the "Battling Bastards of Bataan," finally surrendered on April 9, 1942, after their supplies were exhausted. What followed was the infamous Bataan Death March,

during which the prisoners, including the Texas National Guardsmen, endured unimaginable hardships. Those who survived the march faced over three years of brutal captivity in Japanese prisoner of war camps (Olson, 1976).

They were used as slave labor throughout Japan and Southeast Asia, including in the construction of the notorious Burma-Siam railroad. The toll on the battalion was severe: 163 Guardsmen died in captivity before the survivors were finally liberated at the war's end. The unit's fate remained unknown to the outside world for three years, earning them the moniker “Lost Battalion.” This name encapsulated not only their physical isolation but also the uncertainty and anguish experienced by their families and fellow soldiers back home (Doubler, 2001, p. 178).

The Evolution of the Texas Air National Guard

The official inception date of the Texas Air National Guard wasn’t recognized until September 18, 1947, coinciding with the creation of the United States Air Force as an independent branch of the U.S. military, under the National Security Act (National Security Act, 1947). This date marks the formal establishment of TXANG as a distinct entity.

Before the official establishment of the TXANG, aviation units within the Texas National Guard were integral to the war effort. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the 111th Squadron relocated from Texas to its new training base at Daniel Field in Georgia, before quickly deploying overseas with the 68th Observation Group.

Among the first observation squadrons to leave the United States were the 111th (from Texas), the 122nd (from Louisiana), and the 154th (from Arkansas). These units sailed to the Mediterranean as part of the 68th Observation Group and participated in the North African invasion. On July 7, 1943, the 111th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron commenced combat missions for the Seventh Army’s invasion of Sicily, utilizing P-51 Mustang aircraft. Following the Sicily campaign, the squadron provided reconnaissance and naval gunfire spotting for the Fifth Army’s invasion of Italy (Texas Military Forces Museum, n.d.-b).

Over 23 months of combat operations, the 111th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron executed 7,284 combat sorties, supporting four invasions and contributing to a fifth. During these missions, squadron pilots downed 43 enemy aircraft while aiding ground forces with reconnaissance and long-range artillery spotting.

Texas as a Training Hub

During World War II, Texas played a pivotal role in training new pilots and aircrews for the rapidly expanding U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF). Numerous training bases throughout the state, such as Sheppard Field (now Sheppard Air Force Base) and Pampa Airfield, provided primary and advanced flight instruction to thousands of aspiring pilots. Sheppard Field, for example, trained glider mechanics and B-29 Superfortress flight engineers, while Pampa Airfield trained over 6,000 aviation cadets and 3,500 mechanics in just three years (Texas State Library and Archives Commission, n.d.).

Post-War Transformation

The transformation of National Guard aviation units into the Air National Guard was driven by post-war planning and political maneuvering. Initially, the War Department did not favor a strong role for the National Guard in the post-war Air Force. The Air National Guard suffered inadequate funding, obsolete equipment, and the need for extensive training and reorganization to meet the operational standards of the

active duty Air Force. However, political pressure ensured the Guard's inclusion as the primary reserve force (Gross, 1985, pp. 7-56).

The National Guard in Transition: Post-World War II to the Korean War Era

Following World War II, the National Guard began the process of reestablishing itself within the states. Due to the extended service during the war, all enlistments had expired, and soldiers received military discharges from the Regular Army. Many war veterans quickly filled the ranks of the newly reformed National Guard units, facilitating a rapid transition back to state control (Doubler, 2003, p. 163).

The War Department, in collaboration with National Guard leadership, worked to define the future role of the Guard. This effort culminated in an October 1945 directive that specified the Guard's purpose, mission, and force structure. Importantly, the directive designated the National Guard as "an integral part and a first line Reserve component" of the military (Doubler, 2003, p. 195). The directive also authorized a Guard strength of 425,000 and empowered the National Guard Bureau to distribute force structure among states based on population.

National Security Act of 1947

Following World War II, the United States recognized the need for a more coordinated and efficient national security structure to address the emerging geopolitical landscape, particularly the onset of the Cold War. President Harry S. Truman proposed the legislation to Congress on February 26, 1947, to address these needs. The bill was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on February 28, 1947, and in the Senate on March 3, 1947, with Senator Chan Gurney sponsoring it. The act was signed into law by President Truman on July 26, 1947. President Truman also signed Executive Order 9877 on the same day he signed the National Security Act. This executive order assigned the primary functions and responsibilities of the armed forces (Executive Order No. 9877, 1947).

Provisions of the Act

The National Security Act of 1947 introduced several key changes to the U.S. government's military and intelligence structures (National Security Act, 1947):

1. **Creation of the National Military Establishment (NME)**: The act merged the Department of the Army (formerly the Department of War), the Department of the Navy, and the newly established Department of the Air Force into the NME. This was later renamed the Department of Defense (DoD) in 1949 (U.S. Department of Defense, 2022).

2. **Secretary of Defense**: The act created the position of Secretary of Defense to oversee the NME, providing a unified command structure for the military services. Initially, the Secretary's powers were limited, but these were expanded in the 1949 amendments to the act (U.S. Department of Defense, 2022).

3. **Protection of Existing Services:** While unifying the armed forces, the act also protected the Marine Corps as an independent service under the Department of the Navy. This ensured that specialized capabilities were maintained.

4. **Establishment of the United States Air Force**: The act formally established the United States Air Force as an independent service branch, separating it from the Army Air Forces.

5. **National Security Council (NSC)**: The act established the NSC to coordinate national security policy. The NSC included the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense,

and other key officials. The NSC's role was to advise the President on national security and foreign policies.

6. **Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**: The act created the CIA, which evolved from the World War II-era Office of Strategic Services. The CIA was tasked with gathering and analyzing intelligence to assist in national security decisions. The Director of Central Intelligence was appointed to oversee the CIA and coordinate intelligence activities across various government agencies.
7. **Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)**: The act established the JCS to provide military advice to the President. The JCS included the highest-ranking military officers from each service branch.

Impact and Significance

The National Security Act of 1947 had profound and lasting effects on the U.S. national security framework:

- **Unified Command Structure**: By consolidating the military services under the Department of Defense, the act aimed to eliminate redundancy and improve coordination and efficiency in military operations.
- **Enhanced Intelligence Capabilities**: The establishment of the CIA and the coordination of intelligence activities under the Director of Central Intelligence significantly enhanced the U.S. government's ability to gather and analyze intelligence, which was crucial during the Cold War.
- **Strategic Policy Coordination**: The creation of the NSC provided a formal mechanism for the President to receive coordinated advice on national security matters, integrating input from various departments and agencies
- **Civilian Oversight**: The act strengthened civilian control over the military by creating the Secretary of Defense position and establishing the NSC, ensuring that military policy remained under democratic control

The Universal Military Training Debate

One of the most contentious issues in post-war military policy was the proposal for Universal Military Training (UMT). Brigadier General John McAuley Palmer, a key advocate for UMT, argued that it was essential for creating a civilian-based Army reserve, which he viewed as crucial for national defense and in line with American political culture (Palmer, 1946).

However, the National Guard Association, led by Major General Ellard Walsh, expressed concerns about how UMT might affect the Guard's status and recruitment. Walsh stated,

> The National Guard has not always been in complete accord with the measures proposed for the establishment of a system of universal military training for the reason that such measures were defective in that they failed to protect the interests of the National Guard and assure a continuation of the present status of the National Guard as a component of the Army of the United States and as a first line of defense thereof. (Tencza et al., 2020, p. 46)

The debate over UMT reflected broader questions about the nature of modern warfare in the atomic age and the continued relevance of a mass mobilization model. Despite initial public support, enthusiasm for UMT waned in the years following the war, partly due to shifting public sentiment and persistent opposition from groups like the National Guard Association (Hill, 1964, p. 494).

The Gray Board and Organizational Challenges

In November 1947, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal established the Committee on Civilian Components, known as the Gray Board, to study the organization of the armed forces' civilian components. The board's June 1948 report highlighted significant challenges in the National Guard's dual federal-state structure, noting that it produced "a constant turmoil of bickering, recrimination, factionalism and stalemate" (U.S. Department of Defense, 1948, p. 12).

The Gray Board's most controversial recommendation was to merge the National Guard and the Organized Reserve Corps into a single, federally controlled organization, effectively abolishing the Guard's dual constitutional role. This proposal met with fierce resistance from the National Guard and its allies. Major General Walsh denounced the report, stating, "The States and the National Guard will condemn this report as it should be condemned. We have too much faith in the Congress to swallow such drivel" (Tencza et al., 2020, p. 51).

The political influence of the National Guard Association and congressional reluctance to challenge state authorities ultimately led to the shelving of the Gray Board's recommendations. President Truman, recognizing the political sensitivity of the issue, tabled the report indefinitely (Rearden, 1984, pp. 105-106).

The Selective Service Act of 1948

In response to the failure of UMT and the Gray Board's recommendations, Congress passed the Selective Service Act of 1948 also known as the Elston Act. This act required all men ages 18 to 26 to register for potential military service and gave the President authority to induct individuals for up to 21 months of training and service, "whether or not a state of war exists" (Military Selective Service Act, H.R. 6401, 1948).

Importantly, the act exempted current members of the National Guard and Organized Reserves from induction for training and service, though not from registration. It also provided exemptions for men who joined these components before reaching 18 and a half years of age. While not providing the robust force envisioned by UMT advocates, the Selective Service Act of 1948 offered a compromise solution that avoided the cultural and political controversies associated with UMT (Tencza et al., 2020, pp 52-53).

The National Guard: From Korea to the Cold War, 1950-1960

The sudden outbreak of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula on June 25, 1950, caught the United States unprepared, as the nation had significantly downsized its military forces following World War II. The initial American response relied heavily on underprepared regular forces, exemplified by the defeat of Task Force Smith (Doubler, 2001, p. 201). Task Force Smith, composed of undertrained and underequipped soldiers, was quickly overwhelmed by North Korean forces, highlighting the unpreparedness of the U.S. military at the onset of the Korean War.

Under Public Law 81-599, President Truman had the authority to order units and individual members of the Organized Reserve Corps and National Guard into active federal service (Kapp, 2000, p. 2). As the situation in Korea worsened, President Truman announced a partial mobilization of the National Guard and Reserves on July 19, 1950, for a period of 21 months (Hill, 1964, p. 506).

The mobilization process began on July 31, 1950 (Giusti, 1951, p. 10). By the summer of 1951, nearly 110,000 Army National Guard (ARNG) soldiers in 1,457 units were on active duty (Doubler, 2001, p. 202). The Texas National Guard's contribution included four Army units (three medical units and one

army band) totaling 137 guardsmen, and eight Air National Guard units, including the 136th Fighter Group (Olson, 1976).

The Chinese intervention in late 1950 escalated the conflict, leading President Truman to declare a national emergency on December 15, 1950. This development altered the expectation that Guard units would not be deployed overseas (Doubler, 2001, p. 202)

Impact of Limited War and Rotation Policies

The Korean War represented a new paradigm of limited conflict under the shadow of nuclear deterrence. Instead of full mobilization, the military adopted a personnel rotation policy using regulars, guardsmen, reservists, and draftees as individual replacements. This approach aimed to avoid combat exhaustion and spread the burden of fighting among all available manpower (Trauschweizer, 2008, 58-70).

However, this policy had significant implications for the National Guard. Many units lost over half of their experienced officers and enlisted leaders to rapid deployment in Korea. This wholesale stripping of units challenged morale among guardsmen who had expected to serve with men from their own communities. It also led to training evaluators declaring stripped units unready for combat, much to the chagrin of senior ARNG leaders (Doubler, 2001, p. 201)

The mobilization also severely depleted the Guard's resources. The ARNG surrendered substantial equipment to units headed for Korea, including 748 tanks, 5,595 tactical vehicles, and 95 light aircraft. This transfer resulted in the Guard possessing only 46 percent of its authorized equipment, significantly impacting its training capabilities (Doubler, 2001, p. 201).

By the war's end in July 1953, 138,600 Army Guardsmen organized into 1,698 units of company or detachment size—approximately 33 percent of the ARNG—had been mobilized. The last ARNG units were released from active duty in February 1956 (Doubler, 2001, p. 206)

The Texas Air National Guard in the Korean War

The Texas Air National Guard played a significant role in the Korean War, with several units mobilized for federal service between October 1950 and July 1952. These units included the 136th Fighter Group (later redesignated as the 136th Fighter-Bomber Wing), the 111th Fighter Squadron (later renamed the 111th Fighter-Bomber Squadron), and the 182nd Fighter Squadron (later known as the 182nd Fighter-Bomber Squadron) (Ball, 2010; Olsen, 1976).

The mobilization of the Texas Air National Guard units marked a significant transition as they shifted from the propeller-driven P-51 aircraft to the more advanced F-84 jets. From July 1951 to July 1952, these units executed combat missions from bases in Japan and Korea, with the 182d Fighter-Bomber Squadron achieving the first aerial victory in the Korean War attributed to a National Guard unit (National Guard Bureau, n.d.).

The 136th Fighter-Bomber Wing, one of the first Air National Guard units called into action, relocated to Japan in May 1951 and soon entered combat in the Korean War, flying the F-84E Thunderjet (National Guard Bureau, n.d.). The involvement of the Texas Air National Guard in the Korean War underscored the growing importance of air power in modern warfare and the critical role of the Air National Guard in supporting the United States' military operations.

Post-Korea Developments and Reorganization

The Korean War and the early Cold War period saw notable legislative acts and organizational reforms that shaped the evolution of the National Guard and the Texas militias. The Korean War exposed several deficiencies in the mobilization process and the overall readiness of the reserve components, including the National Guard. These deficiencies prompted the passage of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 and its subsequent amendments in 1955, which sought to address these issues and enhance the effectiveness of the reserve forces.

One of the primary deficiencies identified during the Korean War mobilization was the lack of a standardized and efficient process for activating and deploying reserve units. The mobilization process was often cumbersome and time-consuming, leading to delays in deploying units to the front lines

The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 was a significant piece of legislation that addressed critical issues in the U.S. military reserve system revealed during the Korean War (Weigley, 1967, p. 530; Crossland & Currie, 1984, pp. 100-101; Public Law 82-476, 1952).

The key provisions and impacts of the act included:

1. **Establishment of reserve categories:** The act created three distinct categories of reserve forces—Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and retired Reserve—each with different mobilization liabilities (10 U.S.C. §10141).
2. **Ready Reserve strength:** It authorized a strength of 1.5 million personnel for the ready reserve, which included the entire National Guard.
3. **Presidential mobilization power:** The act allowed the president to mobilize the ready reserve in a declared national emergency.
4. **Volunteer active duty:** Individual reservists and National Guard members could volunteer for active duty, enabling their use in routine peacetime operations without full mobilization.
5. **Training days:** The act authorized Reserve Forces to have twenty-four inactive duty training days annually and up to seventeen days of active duty training.
6. **Reorganization of reserve components:** It renamed the Organized Reserves into the United States Army Reserve (USAR), eliminating the Officer's Reserve Corps and Enlisted Reserve Corps.

On August 9, 1955, the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 and the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 were amended to enhance the reserve components' structure and operational readiness (Public Law 305, 1955; Eisenhower, 1955). The amendment, known as the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 made several significant changes:

1. **Increase Ready Reserve strength:** The authorized strength of the Ready Reserve was raised from 1.5 million to 2.9 million members.
2. **Enhance training requirements:** New mandatory training obligations were established for Ready Reserve members, requiring them to participate in at least 48 scheduled drills or training periods annually, plus up to 17 days of active duty training.
3. **Extend service commitment:** The Act allowed the choice of either a six-year enlistment broken down into two years active duty, three years Ready Reserve, and one-year Standby Reserve (known as Section 261), or an eight-year enlistment with six months active duty training and seven and a half years in the Ready Reserve (known as Section 262).

4. **Training requirements**: New training requirements were established, mandating Ready Reserve members to participate in at least 48 scheduled drills or training periods annually, and up to 17 days of active duty training
5. **Composition of Federal Reserves**: The act provided statutory means to ensure Federal Reserves would be composed of prior-trained personnel on a planned basis.
6. **Presidential emergency powers**: The amendments allowed the President to order up to 1 million Ready Reservists in a declared emergency.

President Eisenhower expressed his concerns on how the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 addressed training: "I am, however, concerned by the failure of the bill to afford the same guarantees of prior training for the National Guard as it has done for the Reserves" (Eisenhower, 1955).

An important reform that affected the Texas Army National Guard was the introduction of centralized basic training for all soldiers in 1955. Before this change, National Guard units had to devote most of their drill time to training recruits, limiting their ability to focus on unit-level training and readiness (Stewart, 2005, p. 262). The legislation passed in 1955 required guardsmen and reservists to attend basic training on active Army installations, enabling National Guard units to allocate more time to individual and collective training. This reform marked a crucial step in the professionalization and standardization of the National Guard (Doubler, 2001, p. 207).

Additionally, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau authorized longer drill periods, allowing units to conduct eight-hour sessions on a single day. By 1958, 16% of the ARNG drilled on weekends, giving rise to the term "weekend warriors". With more training time available, the Army shifted the ARNG's focus to unit-level training, starting at squad level and progressing to larger formations. This change allowed for more comprehensive and effective preparation for potential deployments (Doubler, 2001, p. 208).

In 1956, Congress established two key legislative frameworks to govern military forces. Title 10 of the U.S. Code was created to encompass all laws related to federal military forces, including the Regular Army, full-time Army National Guard (ARNG) soldiers in federal status, and Guardsmen activated during national emergencies (10 U.S.C, n.d.).

Concurrently, Title 32 was enacted to consolidate laws governing the National Guard in state service, covering areas such as organization, personnel, and training (32 U.S.C., n.d.). Since then, these two titles have delineated the distinct federal and state responsibilities in national defense, with Title 10 focusing on active duty forces and Title 32 on state-level National Guard operations (Absher, 2022).

In 1958, the National Guard Bureau was officially designated as a joint bureau of the Army and Air Force, reflecting the growing integration of the National Guard into the overall military structure (Departments of the Army, Department of the Air Force, 2001, p. 2). This organizational change facilitated better coordination and communication between the National Guard and the active duty forces.

The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 and its subsequent amendments in 1955 played a crucial role in addressing the deficiencies exposed during the Korean War mobilization and enhancing the overall readiness and professionalism of the reserve components, including the National Guard. By restructuring the reserve system, establishing a more standardized mobilization process, and introducing centralized training, these legislative efforts set the stage for a more effective and efficient reserve force that could better support the nation's military needs in the face of evolving global challenges.

Adapting to Cold War Strategies

The late 1950s saw significant changes in U.S. military strategy, particularly regarding nuclear warfare. The Army's adoption of tactical nuclear weapons led to a major reorganization. The "Pentomic" division structure adopted by the U.S. Army was in response to the nuclear threat during the 1950s. The concept was designed to make divisions more flexible and capable of operating independently in the chaotic environment expected on a nuclear battlefield. Army planners believed that, in such a setting, traditional linear tactics would be impractical, and divisions would need the ability to quickly adapt and respond to attacks from multiple directions (Doubler, 2001, p. 212)..

The structure emphasized the “rule of five,” organizing units into smaller, more versatile groups. Each Pentomic division consisted of five “battle groups,” which were themselves composed of five companies, and each company contained five platoons. This arrangement replaced the traditional regimental structure with "battle groups" that were larger than a battalion but smaller than a regiment, giving each division greater autonomy and flexibility in dispersed, non-linear combat (Williams, 2022).

The active Army began converting its infantry and airborne divisions to this pentomic organization in 1956-1957. The ARNG followed the active Army in reorganizing its divisions into the “pentomic” structure, designed for greater flexibility on a nuclear battlefield. By October 1959, the Guard had completed the reorganization of its 21 infantry and six armored divisions (Doubler, 2001, p. 212).

Major General William Harrison, then president of the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS), expressed the Guard's eagerness to align its structure with that of the Regular Army. The Army National Guard wanted its units reorganized in a way that would allow them to better complement active-duty forces, demonstrating the Guard's commitment to maintaining interoperability and readiness (Tencza et al., 2020, p. 81)

This sentiment was communicated publicly by Harrison in September 1958, “The Army National Guard has been anxious, in fact, we urged long ago that our units be reorganized into the type of units necessary to complement our active Army.” He emphasized that the Guard needed to avoid delays in implementing the Pentomic reorganization, which had been designed to better meet the demands of modern combat, particularly in a nuclear context (Tencza et al., 2020, p. 81-82).

The ARNG developed training plans to support possible deployment timelines. A pentomic division battle group was estimated to be combat-ready after a 36-week training program, including post-mobilization field exercises. This focus on rapid readiness reflected the Guard's evolving role in national defense strategy (Doubler, 2001, p. 213).

In 1959, the ARNG incorporated Special Forces units as part of its force structure, which reflected the growing strategic emphasis on unconventional warfare amid Cold War tensions. This initiative led to the establishment of ARNG Special Forces detachments across several states, and by mid-1960, 1,000 SF Guardsmen were operational in five states (U.S. Army Special Operations Command, n.d.; Doubler, 2001, p. 212).

Also, for the first time, ARNG units received critical missions in support of overseas theaters. Some units were assigned to the Army's Strategic Reserve Force (STRAF), while others formed a priority, army-sized force available for overseas service. This assignment of specific missions marked a significant shift in the Guard's role within the broader U.S. military structure (Doubler, 2001, p. 212-213).

As the Cold War intensified, the Guard adapted to new strategic realities, including the potential for nuclear warfare and rapid overseas deployment. These changes set the stage for the Guard's evolving role

in national defense strategy in the coming decades, solidifying its position as a crucial component of America's military forces.

The Texas State Guard During the Korean War and the Berlin Crisis

During the Korean War and the Berlin Crisis, the Texas State Guard stood ready to assist civil authorities and maintain order within the state, allowing the Texas Army National Guard and the Texas Air National Guard to focus on their federal missions. Although the Texas State Guard was not directly involved in these conflicts, its presence and readiness supported the state's emergency response capabilities.

On April 16, 1947, a devastating explosion occurred in the Port of Texas City, triggering a series of fires and additional explosions that caused widespread damage and loss of life. The Texas State Guard, still active at the time, played a crucial role in responding to the disaster. State Guard units were mobilized to assist local authorities in search and rescue operations, provide medical aid, and maintain order in the affected areas (Wilkes, 1976). The Texas State Guard's prompt and effective response to the Texas City Disaster highlighted the importance of having a state-controlled military force capable of responding to domestic emergencies.

Despite the Texas State Guard's successful response to the Texas City Disaster, the unit was disbanded on August 28, 1947, as indicated by the Adjutant General of Texas General Order No. 21 (Wilkes, 1976). The disbandment occurred primarily due to the expiration of the federal legislation that authorized state guards' existence during World War II. With the return of the National Guard units to state control following the war, the need for a separate state guard was deemed less pressing, leading to the decision to inactivate the Texas State Guard.

However, the absence of a state-controlled military force was felt keenly, particularly as Cold War tensions escalated and the potential for domestic emergencies remained high. Recognizing the need for a state military force to support civil authorities and respond to crises, the Texas Legislature reauthorized the creation of the Texas State Guard Reserve Corps on January 26, 1948, through Adjutant General of Texas General Order No. 4 (Texas State Guard, n.d.). This reauthorization allowed for establishing a state military force that could operate independently of the federally controlled National Guard, ensuring that Texas had the necessary resources to address domestic challenges.

The statutory language authorizing state self-defense forces varied through the mid-1950s. Throughout this period, the War Department was empowered to set standards for the training and organization of these state forces. This federal regulation mechanism was removed in 1955, but states' authority to form these defense units remained in place (Chesney & Vladeck, 2024).

In 1955, the U.S. Congress reauthorized state defense forces (H.R. 7289, 1955). However, contrary to initial assumptions, this reauthorization did not immediately lead to changes in the Texas State Guard. The Texas State Guard Reserve Corps, established by the Texas Legislature in 1947, continued to operate until 1965 (Wilkes, 1976).

During the 1961 Berlin Wall crisis, several Texas National Guard units, including the 49th Armored Division, were federalized for a year. This activation left 71 armories unoccupied. To manage these facilities, the Texas State Guard Reserve Corps (TSGRC) activated 513 personnel, forming 71 Security Units. These TSGRC members maintained the armories until August 1962, when they returned to their regular reserve status (Wilkes, 1976).

It was not until August 30, 1965, that the Texas Legislature, through statutes enacted by the 59th Texas Legislature, abolished the Texas State Guard Reserve Corps and reestablished the Texas State Guard (Wilkes, 1976). This reorganization reflected the state's ongoing commitment to maintaining a military force capable of supporting civil authorities during times of crisis, particularly when the National Guard was mobilized for federal service.

The Air National Guard's Transformation: 1953-1960

The Eisenhower administration marked a pivotal era for the Air National Guard (ANG), characterized by significant growth, modernization, and closer integration with the active-duty Air Force. From 1953 to 1960, the ANG underwent a remarkable transformation, shedding its negative image from the late 1940s and emerging as a well-prepared first-line combat reserve force (Weigley, 1971, p. 383).

Under the leadership of Generals Ricks and Wilson in the National Guard Bureau's Air Force Division, the ANG experienced substantial growth. By 1960, its personnel strength had reached 71,000, an increase of 26,272 over pre-Korean War levels. The number of technicians expanded from 5,814 to 13,200, reflecting both the growth and the increasing technological complexity of equipment. Financial support also grew significantly, with Air Guard appropriations more than doubling from $114.69 million in Fiscal Year 1950 to $233.44 million in Fiscal Year 1960 (Goldberg, 1955, pp. 9-10).

The ANG's operational capabilities expanded considerably during this period. The number of flying squadrons increased from 84 to 92, with missions diversifying beyond air defense to include tactical fighter and reconnaissance, troop carrier and heavy airlift, and aeromedical evacuation. By 1960, all fighter aircraft in the ANG inventory were jet-powered, with some units equipped with advanced century series fighters like the F-100 and F-104, as well as the all-weather, nuclear-capable F-89J fighter interceptor (Futrell, 1961, pp. 71-72).

A significant development during this period was the ANG's participation in the air defense runway alert program. Initiated in 1953 as a limited experiment with two squadrons, by 1960, twenty-two ANG fighter interceptor squadrons were involved in this highly successful program. This operational integration demonstrated the ANG's growing capabilities and created an environment within the Air Force that was amenable to allocating more resources and responsibilities to the Guard (Hill, 1964, p. 535).

The Air Force's approach to the ANG also evolved during this period. Abandoning efforts to eliminate the state character of the Air Guard, the Air Force discovered that the ANG was increasingly responsive to its requirements. New leadership in the National Guard Bureau convinced states of the long-term advantages of allowing their Air Guard units to function as Air Force reserves rather than as state air forces. This shift in perspective led to increased levels of federal support and supervision, enhancing the ANG's performance and reinforcing its role as a reserve force with a distinctive state character (Gross, 1985, p. 92).

The adoption of the gaining command concept in 1960 marked a significant milestone in the ANG's integration into the Air Force's operational structure. This concept, approved by the Secretary of the Air Force on February 2, 1960, and formally endorsed by the Chief of Staff two days later, transferred responsibility for supervising the training and inspection of reserve programs from the Continental Air Command (CONAC) to the major commands that would employ them in emergencies. This functional approach provided a major incentive for Air Force commanders to train and equip reserve forces to operational standards (Gross, 1985, P. 119).

The implementation of the gaining command concept led to closer ties between the Tactical Air Command and the thirty-six ANG flying squadrons assigned to it in 1960. These units began participating more frequently in firepower demonstrations, reconnaissance missions, and joint Army-Air Force exercises. Although the ANG's air defense mission was reduced in terms of total numbers, the quality of its participation improved. By June 1960, its fighter-interceptor force had been streamlined to forty squadrons, down from sixty-nine squadrons assigned to the Air Defense Command in 1958 (Gross, 1985, P. 119)..

Throughout this period, the ANG leadership demonstrated foresight by encouraging mission diversification and greater peacetime support of the Air Force. This strategy was driven by the anticipation of diminished future requirements for manned fighter aircraft. By pushing for a broader range of missions and eliminating ties with CONAC, ANG leaders correctly foresaw that diversification would make the Air Guard less vulnerable to future program shifts.

The Berlin Crisis and National Guard Mobilization: A Test of Readiness and Adaptability

In 1961, Soviet Chairman Nikita Khrushchev renewed demands for Western forces to withdraw from West Berlin, threatening to revoke the postwar agreement allowing Western access to the city. The situation escalated throughout the summer, culminating in the construction of the Berlin Wall in August (Doubler, 2001, p. 217) . In response to this provocation, President John F. Kennedy authorized the call-up of up to 250,000 members of the Ready Reserve in July 1961 (Kaplan et al., 2006, pp. 67-70).

Kennedy's decision to seek congressional approval for the mobilization aligned with his strategy of Flexible Response. This approach aimed to signal American resolve while applying escalating pressure on the Soviets. The mobilization was part of a broader effort to augment American troops in Berlin with additional ground and air units (Doubler, 2001, p. 218).

Mobilization and Deployment

The mobilization plan initially called for four Army National Guard divisions to serve as Strategic Reserve backfills. Ultimately, about 250 reserve component units were activated, including 84 National Guard and 166 Army Reserve units (Taylor, 1962). Among these was the Texas Army National Guard's 49th Armored Division, comprising 9,684 soldiers, which was stationed at Fort Polk, Louisiana, from October 1961 to August 1962 (Martin, n.d.).

The mobilization revealed persistent issues from previous call-ups. Many units were intentionally kept below 50% strength during peacetime, and nearly a third of the personnel were unqualified for their positions. This necessitated a drastically abbreviated 13-week training plan for mobilized units, including three weeks to integrate filler personnel (Crossland and Currie, 1984, p. 97)

Challenges and Outcomes

The mobilization exposed several significant challenges:

1. Readiness levels: The 32nd Division was at only 69% of its wartime strength, while the 49th (Texas) was at 62%, requiring substantial augmentation with fillers (Eliot, 1962, p. 40).
2. Equipment shortages: Many units lacked the necessary equipment for sustained combat operations.
3. Training deficiencies: The compressed training timeline highlighted the need for more comprehensive peacetime preparation.

Despite these challenges, the mobilization achieved its primary goal: demonstrating to the Soviet Union and U.S. allies America's commitment to defending Berlin (Dean, 1991). By the summer of 1962, the Soviets had backed down on their Berlin demands, and Kennedy ordered the federalized Guard and Reserve units to demobilize and return home (Grathwol & Moorhus, 1999).

The Texas Army National Guard played a significant role in this mobilization, with four units totaling nearly 10,000 guardsmen called to active duty. The most substantial of these units was the 49th Armored Division, which consisted of 9,684 soldiers (Martin, n.d.). Stationed at Fort Polk, Louisiana, from October 1961 to August 1962, the 49th Armored Division stood ready to defend American interests during heightened geopolitical uncertainty (Martin, n.d.).

Policy Implications and Reforms

The Berlin Crisis of 1961-62 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 indeed played a substantial role in influencing McNamara's military reorganization efforts. President John F. Kennedy had already tasked McNamara with modernizing the U.S. military, specifically shifting from a focus on nuclear arms to conventional capabilities, which would support flexible responses and rapid deployments rather than relying solely on nuclear deterrence (Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, n.d.).

McNamara’s changes reflected a desire for improved tactical mobility and non-nuclear firepower, aiming to make reserve forces and other branches more deployable and versatile. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the U.S. military reached DEFCON 2—the highest readiness level short of war—which underscored the importance of a modernized military capable of responding flexibly in nuclear and conventional theaters. These events reinforced McNamara’s emphasis on efficiency and adaptability, which included controversial decisions to consolidate forces, reduce reliance on certain nuclear weapons, and increase cost-effectiveness, often through the use of his new Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) (National Security Archive, 2021).

McNamara used the challenges revealed by the mobilization to justify pushing for comprehensive reorganization. He aimed to:

1. Align Army force structure with actual planning scenarios and assigned missions.
2. Eliminate units without clear wartime roles.
3. Compress National Guard and Army Reserve force structure to increase manning levels of remaining units.
4. Enhance the responsiveness and readiness of reserve component units.
5. Reduce delays between mobilization and combat deployment.

These objectives led to McNamara's controversial 1964 proposal to merge the Army Reserve into the National Guard. While the National Guard Association supported this plan, it faced strong opposition from the Army Reserve and Congress (Tencza et al., 2020, p. 98).

Long-term Impact and Restructuring

Although McNamara's merger plan was ultimately rejected, he succeeded in implementing significant changes to the reserve components' structure. By 1967, the Army Reserve had been reduced to training and support units with only three combat brigades. The Army National Guard's force structure was

compressed from 27 divisions to eight, with eliminated divisions converted into single brigades (Stewart, 2010, p. 279).

This restructuring was completed in 1969, establishing a force structure that largely persists today. Many current Army National Guard brigade combat teams retain distinctive patches derived from the division headquarters eliminated during this reorganization.

The Air National Guard in the Berlin Crisis: Successes and Challenges

The ANG's mobilization for the Berlin Crisis was initially hailed as a success. A total of 21,067 air guardsmen were called to active duty, with less than one percent lost due to personal hardship or other reasons—a significant improvement from the Korean War's loss rate of up to ten percent. The majority of units were mobilized on October 1, 1961, including eighteen tactical fighter squadrons, four tactical reconnaissance squadrons, six air transport squadrons, and one tactical control group. Three additional fighter squadrons were mobilized on November 1 (Air National Guard, n.d.).

The overseas deployment, known as Operation Stair Step, was particularly impressive. Eight fighter squadrons deployed to Europe in late October and early November, flying 216 aircraft without a single accident. Three squadrons of F-104s with sixty aircraft were airlifted to Europe in late November. All units were in place overseas within one month of their mobilization, a stark contrast to the seven-month deployment period during the Korean War (Air National Guard, n.d.).

Public Praise and Initial Reactions

The ANG's rapid deployment garnered significant public praise. General Lauris Norstad, the U.S. commander in Europe, commended the "outstanding performance of the Air National Guard squadrons in crossing the Atlantic and taking over their bases in Germany and France and then participating almost immediately in defense tasks." General LeMay, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, emphasized the readiness and dependability of the mobilized ANG units. Secretary of Defense McNamara highlighted the significance of the recall, stating that it demonstrated "the strength, the will, and the firmness of purpose" of the United States. This public praise underscored the perceived success of the ANG's mobilization and deployment (Gross, 1985, pp. 133-136).

Challenges Revealed

Despite the public accolades, the Berlin mobilization exposed several significant challenges within the Air Force and its reserve programs. Many of these issues stemmed from the U.S. military's focus on nuclear deterrence rather than conventional warfare in Europe. Secretary McNamara's review of Berlin contingency plans in May 1961 revealed that most were predicated on the early use of nuclear weapons, leaving the Air Force ill-prepared for sustained conventional combat operations (Cantwell, 1997, pp. 177-179).

Equipment and operational readiness emerged as major concerns. Air Guard units were found to be inadequately equipped for sustained combat operations, with unit equipment authorizations falling short of Tactical Air Command requirements. The three F-104 squadrons airlifted to Europe in November faced repeated groundings due to maintenance and air safety issues during the first six months of 1962. The 17th Air Force observed that the arriving ANG units "were not manned, trained, or equipped to assume full base operational and maintenance responsibilities" This limited operational capability necessitated extensive modification and training before the Guard units could attain substantial effectiveness in Europe (Gates, 1985, p. 137).

Post-Crisis Assessment and Reforms

As ANG units returned to the U.S. and demobilized in the summer of 1962, the Air Force conducted a critical assessment of their performance. The U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) concluded that the ANG deployment had required a major diversion of effort and resources. Due to the extensive modifications and training required, USAFE did not consider the Guard to be potentially effective in the opening stages of a general war, though it acknowledged their potential usefulness in limited actions (Gross, 1985, p. 138).

In response to these challenges, the Air Force and the National Guard Bureau initiated several reforms. In May 1962, General Sweeney, Tactical Air Command Commander, directed the development of a comprehensive program to enhance the ANG's operational capabilities. Air Guard units were reorganized in 1962-63 to match the manning requirements of their gaining commands, allowing for more flexible mobilization in future contingencies (Gross, 1985, pp. 140-141).

The Air Force also began incorporating ANG units into plans for limited wars and cold war contingencies. This closer integration led to improved cooperation between the ANG and the Air Force's gaining commands, as noted by the Chief of the National Guard Bureau in the annual report for FY 1962 (Gross, 1985, p. 138).

The Berlin Crisis of 1961-62 served as a crucial test for the Air National Guard, revealing both its strengths and weaknesses. While the rapid mobilization and deployment were lauded as successes, the crisis exposed significant challenges in equipment, training, and operational readiness. The experience led to important reforms and closer integration between the ANG and the active-duty Air Force, setting the stage for improved performance in future contingencies. This episode highlights the ongoing evolution of the ANG's role in national defense during the Cold War era (Gross, 1985, pp. 143).

The Role and Transformation of Texas Militias During the Vietnam War Era

The Vietnam War marked a critical turning point in the history of the United States military, as it brought about fundamental changes in the use of the draft, the mobilization of reserve components, and the overall structure of the armed forces. This section explores the role and transformation of the Texas militias—specifically the Texas Army National Guard, the Texas Air National Guard, and the Texas State Guard—during the Vietnam War era. By examining the limited involvement of these militias in the conflict, the broader changes in U.S. military policy, and the reorganization of the Army's reserve components, there is developed a comprehensive understanding of the complex dynamics that shaped the Texas militias during this period. While the Texas militias played a limited role in the Vietnam War, the conflict and its aftermath had significant implications for their structure, organization, and future roles in the nation's military strategy.

The Limited Involvement of Texas Militias in the Vietnam War

The United States' involvement in Vietnam began as early as 1950, with the deployment of military advisors to support the French war effort in Indochina (Stewart, 2005, p. 305). As the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam increased throughout the early 1960s, President Lyndon B. Johnson decided to deploy additional combat units, announcing plans to increase American military strength in the country to 175,000 by the end of 1965 (Stewart, 2005, p. 305).

Despite this escalation, there was little desire at the executive level to utilize the National Guard to support the conflict. President Johnson viewed the war as limited in duration and scope and was

concerned about maintaining public support for the war effort (Correll, 2011). Additionally, the president feared that mobilizing the National Guard would signal intentions to the Soviet Union and China, potentially influencing their direct intervention in the war (Harris, 2004, p. 5).

The Department of Defense, however, disagreed with the president's assessment and recommended calling upon the reserves for additional trained manpower. As a compromise, the Department announced the creation of the Selected Reserve Force (SRF) in September 1965, which was a 150,000-man composite force of Army National Guard and Army Reserve units that received increased funding and training for potential deployment to Vietnam (Doubler, 2001, p. 223). Despite these preparations, the SRF was never deployed, and the program was terminated in 1969 due to budget constraints (Doubler, 2001, p. 223).

Throughout the Vietnam War, the National Guard was seen by many draft-eligible American men and their families as a means to avoid the draft, with enlistments growing as the conflict escalated (RAND 2020c, p. 122). Only 22,786 Army National Guard soldiers were mobilized as individual fillers or in small units during the entire war (Stuckey & Pistorius, 1985, p. 26). This limited involvement marked a significant departure from the historical use of the militia, National Guard, and Reserves in every major U.S. war prior to Vietnam.

The Reorganization of the Texas Army National Guard

In the aftermath of the Berlin mobilization and the Vietnam War, the Texas Army National Guard underwent considerable structural changes. By 1968, the reorganization had resulted in the loss of both the 36th Infantry and 49th Armored divisions, leading to the formation of three separate brigades: the 36th Infantry Brigade, the 72nd Mechanized Infantry Brigade, and the 71st Airborne Brigade (Scribner, n.d.). These changes reflected a broader strategic shift in the military's approach to reserve forces, emphasizing flexibility and specialized capabilities.

The Vietnam War and the Evolution of U.S. Military Policy: A Turning Point for the National Guard and Reserves

As the United States gradually escalated its involvement in Vietnam during the mid-1960s, the need for additional ground forces became apparent. In June 1965, General William Westmoreland, commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, requested more American troops following several defeats of South Vietnamese forces by communist North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces. In response, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara recommended to President Lyndon Johnson a substantial increase in the American troop commitment, proposing to raise the number from 75,000 to 175,000 by the end of the year (Crossland & Currie, 1984, p. 75; Johnson, 1971, p.145).

Despite the Joint Chiefs of Staff's concurrence with McNamara's proposal, which included mobilizing 235,000 members of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, President Johnson made the controversial decision not to activate reserve forces for the Vietnam engagement. This decision was influenced by several factors, including concerns about imposing too great a burden on the American public and fears that a call-up might communicate excessive aggression to Russia and China, potentially risking a wider war as had occurred in Korea (Crossland & Currie, 1984, p. 194).

The Draft and Its Consequences

Instead of mobilizing the National Guard and Reserves, Johnson opted to rely on a limited draft and large numbers of volunteers to expand the Army. This decision had far-reaching consequences for both the

military and American society. Monthly draft calls doubled from 17,000 to 35,000 as the Army progressively increased its force in Vietnam (Drea, 2011, pp. 261-262; Crossland & Currie, 1984, p. 75).

The expanding draft led to significant social unrest, particularly on college campuses across America. The selective nature of the draft system also raised questions of fairness. A 1967 study by the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service found that between a quarter and a third of draftees were ineligible due to educational deferments or physical deficiencies (Drea, 2011, p. 272).

To meet the growing manpower needs, the Department of Defense implemented several measures:

1. Elimination of deferments for married men in 1965.
2. Lowering of mental standards in 1965 and again in 1966.
3. Implementation of Project 100,000, which aimed to accept 100,000 men annually who did not meet previous fitness and mental standards (Tencza et al., 2020, pp. 108-109).

These policies disproportionately affected certain segments of society, with draftees more likely to be assigned to hazardous combat roles. By 1967, 57% of Army battle deaths were draftees, up from 28% in 1965 (Griffith, 1997, pp. 11, 18).

The National Guard and Reserve During Vietnam

The limited use of National Guard and Reserve forces during Vietnam had significant implications for these components and their public perception. Only a very small portion of these forces was deployed to Vietnam, with just 19,874 personnel out of the more than 2.7 million Americans who served in the conflict coming from these components (Stewart, 210, p. 284).

This limited mobilization led to the perception of the National Guard and Reserves as "havens" for those seeking to avoid active military service. The Guard's willingness to accept large numbers of volunteers with no prior military experience exacerbated this perception, until training constraints forced them to cease the practice in 1967 (Tencza et al., 2020, p. 122).

The 1968 call-up, prompted by the Tet Offensive and other international tensions, revealed significant readiness issues within the reserve components. Many units fell short of training and equipment standards, with 49% of personnel only partially trained or qualified for their assigned positions, and 17% totally unqualified (Binkin & Kaufmann, 1989, p. 57).

Civil Disturbances and the Kent State Incident

During this period, the National Guard also found itself increasingly involved in managing civil disturbances related to racial tensions and opposition to the Vietnam War. The most notorious incident occurred on May 4, 1970, at Kent State University, where Ohio Army National Guardsmen fired into a crowd of unarmed student demonstrators, killing four and wounding nine. This event severely damaged the Guard's reputation and highlighted deficiencies in training for civil disorder situations (Scranton, 1970, p. 282-289).

The Move Towards an All-Volunteer Force

The challenges and controversies surrounding the draft during the Vietnam War ultimately led to a reevaluation of the conscription system. In 1969, President Richard Nixon commissioned the Gates Commission to examine the feasibility of an all-volunteer force. The commission's report, released in

February 1970, recommended abandoning conscription and transitioning to an all-volunteer military (Gates, 1970, p. 175).

This recommendation was met with mixed reactions, including opposition from some military leaders and the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS). However, the mounting public pressure against the draft and the perceived inequities in the system ultimately led to its phasing out in the early 1970s (Tencza et al., 2020, p. 121).

The Gates Commission challenged traditional arguments against an all-volunteer force. In its assessment, mandatory military service through conscription actually undermined public trust in government by forcing individuals into service without regard for their personal abilities or preferences (Gates, 1970, p. 14).

While the commission did not specifically examine reserve force recruitment, it concluded that a fully volunteer military, despite slightly higher costs compared to an all-conscript force, would be more economically efficient than the contemporary mixed system of draftees and volunteers. The commission also highlighted how many high-quality personnel were already choosing military careers despite the draft system, suggesting that an all-volunteer force would enhance military prestige and dignity (Gates, 1970, p. 19). Though these findings did not immediately end conscription, they provided intellectual support for the reduced draft calls that continued through 1970.

In summary, The Vietnam War era marked a significant shift in U.S. military policy, particularly concerning the use of National Guard and Reserve forces. The decision not to fully mobilize these components had far-reaching consequences, including straining the Regular Army's training infrastructure, creating a perception of the Guard as a haven for draft-dodgers, and ultimately contributing to the abolition of the draft. The limited use of the Guard and Reserves during Vietnam also led to a loss of combat experience within these components, concentrating wartime expertise primarily within the Regular Army's officer corps. This experience gap would take years to address and influenced military planning in subsequent decades (Tencza et al., 2020, pp. 122-124).

The Texas Army National Guard During the Vietnam War Era

During the Vietnam War, the federal government's mobilization of National Guard units was limited. According to the Texas State Historical Association (2021), no Texas Air National Guard units were activated for the conflict. However, the Air National Guard did mobilize 9,343 members nationwide. The Army National Guard's involvement was similarly restricted. In May 1968, only 12,234 Army National Guardsmen were mobilized across the country (National Guard Educational Foundation, 2023). Texas's contribution to this mobilization was minimal, with only one small Army National Guard unit of 124 members receiving the federal call (Olson, 1976). This limited deployment of National Guard forces during the Vietnam War starkly contrasts their more extensive involvement in later conflicts.

Conclusion

This comprehensive study of the Texas militias, from their constitutional origins to their transformative experiences in the Vietnam War era, has sought to illuminate the complex dynamics governing the utilization of the National Guard and the State Guard in the contemporary context. By tracing the historical evolution of these forces, with a particular focus on the Texas National Guard, this section has

demonstrated the need to critically reassess the National Guard's operational demands and legal standing in light of the intensified pace and complexity of its missions in recent years.

The historical analysis presented in this study, spanning from the colonial era to the Vietnam War, has provided a rich context for understanding the enduring importance of the citizen-soldier tradition in this Constitutional Republic and the complex interplay of state and federal interests in the governance of the militia. By shedding light on the legislative acts, organizational reforms, and key leadership figures that have shaped the evolution of the Texas militias over time, this research has sought to inform current debates about the role of the National Guard and the State Guard in the 21st century.

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Appendix

Figure S.1
The Evolution of U.S. Military Policy, 1775–Present



NOTES: USAR = U.S. Army Reserve; RC = reserve component; GWOT = Global War on Terror.

Table A.1
Summary Table of 19th Century Militias and Volunteer Forces

Type of Force	Organization	Legal Basis	Use	Period of Existence	Links to Present Day
Militia manpower pool	Was not organized and is referred to in current law as the "unorganized militia." It comprised all free able-bodied males between 18 and 45 years of age.	1792 Uniform Militia Act and state laws stipulating all adult free men's liability for militia service.	Was the manpower base for the various militias described below, both voluntary and compulsory.	Originated in the first American settlements in Virginia and Massachusetts and runs to the present day.	Title 32 (The National Guard) and Title 10, Subtitle A (The Army) both stipulate that American men ages 18–45 are in the "unorganized militia."
Compulsory or common militias	Individual states required all men to be on militia musters and to meet for training as part of a militia company of approximately 60 men several times per year. Militia companies were often formed into regiments. By state and federal law, the common militia's service was limited to 3 months.	1792 Uniform Militia Act and state laws stipulating all adult free men's liability for militia service.	States used the compulsory militias for local law enforcement, defense, and fighting against Native Americans. In times of war or insurrection, the federal government would assign quotas to states for militia units. Local militia captains would muster their men and organize a small number of volunteers or conscripts. The newly formed militia unit would be in federal service for up to 3 months.	Began in the first American settlements of Virginia and Massachusetts but had severely atrophied to the point that fewer and fewer states required men to muster regularly for training; by the 1840s, compulsory militia muster drill was a rarity, especially in the North.	None.

Table A.1—continued

Type of Force	Organization	Legal Basis	Use	Period of Existence	Links to Present Day
State-sanctioned volunteer militias for federal service	Men interested in military affairs and the camaraderie of other like-minded men formed volunteer militia units independent of the state-generated common militias. They could be used in federal service for longer than 3 months.	State and local laws authorized governors, mayors, magistrates, etc., to utilize volunteer militia units. Their service on foreign soil during the Mexican-American War was founded on the Constitution's "raise and support armies" clause because they were brought into federal service as individual volunteers.	These volunteer militias were often called on by state governors for a variety of uses, including law enforcement and the escorting of dignitaries. Equally important, state governors offered these volunteer militias to meet federal quotas for the Mexican-American War and the Civil War.	The first volunteer militia was established in Boston in 1638. More developed in the 18th century. Volunteer militias were used extensively in the Mexican-American War and were the first militia units to respond to President Lincoln's call in the spring of 1861. Starting in the late 1870s, new volunteer militias began to form and call themselves "Guards" or "National Guards," increasingly under state control.	The modern National Guard traces its historical roots to the volunteer militias that emerged in the 1870s after the Civil War.
State-formed volunteer militias for federal service	The federal government issued calls to states to organize a quota of volunteers into regiments for federal service. These volunteer militias could serve for longer than 3 months in times of war.	1792 Uniform Militia Act, state militia laws, and the Constitution's "raise and support armies" clause.	Volunteer militias were used inconsistently during the War of 1812, but constitutional barriers to their use beyond U.S. borders limited their utility. During the Mexican-American War, volunteer militias were locally organized, but the states could use them to meet federal quotas in times of war for 1–3 years.	The apex for volunteer militias and volunteer forces was during the Civil War, when the early armies of the war from the North and South consisted overwhelmingly of volunteer units.	None.

Table A.1—continued

Type of Force	Organization	Legal Basis	Use	Period of Existence	Links to Present Day
Civil War volunteer regiments, Union Army *(The sheer number of volunteers relative to other U.S. wars makes this a separate category.)*	Through Lincoln's executive order, the federal government issued quotas to states for "volunteers." States then relied on local systems to organize regiments of infantry, cavalry, artillery, etc. These volunteer units were technically "militias" because, under the 1792 Uniform Militia Act, all men ages 18–45 were part of the "unorganized militia."	The 1792 Uniform Militia Act was amended twice during the Civil War. The authority to call on the militia was based on Article 1, Section 8's provisions to suppress insurrection. With the March 1863 Enrollment Act, volunteers (and draftees) were brought into federal service under the "raise and support armies" clause.	After organizing volunteer regiments and, in some cases, providing initial training, states sent them to rendezvous points where the regiments were brought into federal service and assigned to higher brigades for service in the various theaters of war. Terms of service ranged from 6 months to 3 years to the full duration of the war.	The Civil War. Although the states produced these kinds of volunteer units for the Mexican-American War and, in a more limited sense, the War of 1812, the aggregate size of the Union Army, made up largely of volunteer regiments, makes the Civil War distinct from previous U.S. wars.	None.
Federal volunteers for the Spanish-American War	The 1898 Volunteer Army Act authorized the federal government to organize, directly, volunteers with "special qualifications." As a result, three federal cavalry regiments were raised (one of which was Leonard Wood's and Teddy Roosevelt's 1st Volunteer Cavalry). These regiments were formed in territories rather than states to encourage volunteerism beyond state political limitations.	The 1898 Volunteer Army Act stipulated that these federal volunteer cavalry regiments would be organized in the territories directly by the federal government under the Constitution's armies clause. They were intentionally formed in the territories to bypass problems with the individual states and their governors, who were forming militia units for volunteering into federal service.	Only one volunteer cavalry regiment was actually formed: Wood and Roosevelt's 1st Volunteer Cavalry, which deployed with Regular Army forces to Cuba, was brigaded with a Regular Army cavalry division, and fought heroically at the Battle of San Juan Hill.	The Spanish-American War from April to August 1898. They were formed using existing territorial militia companies and individual volunteers in the territories of Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma, as well as volunteers from across the nation, and consolidated their training in San Antonio, Texas. Men from the northeast who were friends of Roosevelt also volunteered as enlisted men and officers.	None.

Summary Table of Legislation Pertaining to the Evolution of U.S. Military Policy

Statute/Act	Historical Context	Significance	Links to Titles 10 and 32
U.S. Constitution: Militia, Raise/ Support Armies, and President as Commander in Chief Clauses	• 1787: Framers want small standing army • Framers envision a select portion of the militia as a federal reserve • Framers also envision the militia as the military force to deal with domestic issues such as insurrection and enforcement of laws	• The constitutional basis for Regular Army, federal army reserve, and militias • No constitutional link between Regular Army and militia • Future policy—laws enacted—would therefore define roles of militia and Regular Army	• Title 32 states National Guard is trained and has its officers appointed under militia clause • Title 10 organized current U.S. Army under raise/ support armies clause
1792 Uniform Militia Act	• George Washington wants militia organized on his 1783 "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment"	• Congress passes militia law with no mechanism for federal enforcement • Is based on militia clause of Constitution • Only militia law until 1903	• Title 32 acknowledges 1792 act and that National Guard is organized under the militia clauses of the Constitution
1795 Amendment to the 1792 Calling Forth Act	• Concern over 1794 Whiskey Rebellion and possible future rebellions • Congress's trust in Washington allows them to give Executive control over militia to deal with domestic problems	• Gives President power to call forth militia without restrictions placed by the 1792 act • Starts the statutory movement away from the militia envisioned in Constitution	• Title 10 gives president authority to either "call forth" or "order" National Guard without congressional authorization per 1795 act
1799 "Augment the Army" Act	• Failure of negotiations with France increased fear of war between the two nations • Domestic unrest at home over taxes to pay for military mobilization increases need for expanded military to deal with insurrections	• Gives President power to expand temporarily the Regular Army by 24 regiments • President given authority to accept organized companies of volunteers from the militia into federal service • 1799 act gives President authority to use this expanded Army for the same purposes when "calling forth" the militia	• Title 10 gives President power to expand Regular Army and use it for domestic problems in combination with National Guard per the 1795 act

Table B.1—continued

Statute/Act	Historical Context	Significance	Links to Titles 10 and 32
1807 Insurrection Act	• With frontier expanding and continuing domestic unrest, there is need for Regular Army for internal problems in addition to Militias	• Gives President authority to use the Regular Army and Navy for internal rebellions and other problems • Completes the statutory movement away from militia envisioned in Constitution	• Title 10 gives President authority to use Regular forces for domestic problems
1863 Enrollment Act	• American Civil War. Union Army having trouble relying on states to bring men and units under federal control to meet manpower demand after two years of war with high casualties	• First federal statutory law that authorized a federal draft premised on universal military duty under the "raise and support armies" clause	• Title 10 relies on the Constitution to give it the statutory means to raise and support an army • Implicit is the assumption that a national draft might be necessary to do so, as stipulated in Title 50
1898 Act to Provide for Temporarily Increasing the Peace Establishment of the United States in Time of War	• Spanish-American War. Regular Army and state National Guards largely unprepared for expeditionary warfare • Debacle of deploying the Army to Cuba to fight Spain spurs significant postwar Army reforms	• Continues Congress on path increasing reliance on armies clause to organize army for war and maintains precedent for American men liable for service in "national forces"	• Same as 1863 Enrollment Act
1903 Act to Promote Efficiency of Militia (Dick Act)	• Spanish-American War reveals problems expanding Army and its readiness • Secretary of War (Elihu Root) implements major reforms for U.S. Army • United States enters world stage as new global power • Perceived need for major Army reform to fight 20th century industrial wars	• First update to Uniform Militia Act for federal organizing of militia since 1792 • Is based on militia clause • Is statutory birthday of modern Guard • Federal government recognizes state Guards as "organized militia" • Directs state Guards to be organized like Regular Army • Establishes federal oversight • Formalizes process of trading autonomy for federal aid • Directs Guard units to train for a minimum of 24 drill periods per year, including a 5-day summer encampment • Funds Guard 5-day encampments	• Title 32 refers to Guard as "organized militia" and directs state Guards to be organized like Regular Army • Title 32 is premised on militia clause and armies clause of Constitution

Table B.1—continued

Statute/Act	Historical Context	Significance	Links to Titles 10 and 32
1908 Army Medical Department Act (April)	• Experience In Spanish-American War with casualties because of poor sanitation and health issues drives need for reform in Army medical care	• Establishes Medical Reserve Corps • Statutory birthday of Army Reserve	• Title 10 Army Reserve premised on armies clause
1908 Dick Act Amendment	• Growing tension between Regular Army and War Department and state Guards • Constitutional debate over use of state Guards in foreign wars as organized militia • State Guards worry federal volunteers will eclipse their desire to be in first line of defense	• Establishes state National Guards as Organized Militia of Several States when called to federal service before any volunteers (individuals or units) and can deploy overseas • Further stokes legal debate over constitutionality of deploying the state Guards, organized on the militia clause, outside of United States	• Title 32 stipulates state Guards are trained and have their officers appointed under the militia clause
1916 National Defense Act	• World War I underway for two years • Mexican border issues • Debate over whether to have federal-only reserve or state National Guards as reserve in first line of defense • Need to reorganize Army for industrial-age warfare • Preparedness movement led by Elihu Root and other leading progressives argues for centralization of Army, universal military training for all American adult males, and rejection of state Guards as reserve force to Army, calls for federal reserve force envisioned in the War Department's "Continental Army Plan"	• Establishes National Guard as component of Army when federalized and in service of the United States • Constitutional premise is armies clause • Directs state Guards to be organized like Regular Army • Gives detailed organization direction for Army • Establishes Organized Reserves and Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) • Funds Guard for weekly armory training • Is major increase of federal oversight and control of Guard • Sets end strength goal for state Guards at 435,000 and Regular Army at 280,000 • States that Guards when federalized will be drafted as individuals • Establishes Militia Bureau under Secretary of War, not Army Chief of Staff	• Title 10 recognizes the Army National Guard of the United States as a standing reserve component of the Army • Virtually all funding for National Guard under Title 10 is based on Congress organizing the Guard for war under the armies clause • Title 10 allows for Reserve Officers Training

Table B.1—continued

Statute/Act	Historical Context	Significance	Links to Titles 10 and 32
1917 Selective Service Act	• U.S. enters World War I, needs to form quickly a mass citizen-based war army • Selective Service national draft is the means to provide manpower	• First major national draft in American history • Draws on 1898 act and 1863 Enrollment Act that virtually all adult males are susceptible to federal military service • First time Army receives major amounts of manpower without using the state militia systems	• Title 10 is statutory framework to carry out constitutional provision to raise and support armies • National conscription is an implicit mechanism in Title 10 and explicitly stated in Title 50, to carry out that function, if needed • Conscription into federal forces premised on armies clause
1920 Army Reorganization Act (amendment to 1916 National Defense Act)	• End of World War I yields more debate on how to organize peacetime army • War Department produces plan similar to 1915 Continental Army Plan that calls for federal-only reserve to Army • Backlash from Congress • John M. Palmer becomes key adviser to Senate Military Affairs Committee • Demobilization of Guard as individuals not units embitters Guard toward Regular Army	• Continues much of 1916 National Defense Act • Sets end strength goal for Guard 435,000, Regular Army 280,000 (but over next 20 years neither is funded to those levels) • Word "draft" used to bring Guard to federal service but says Guard can be used for any mission (implying foreign wars) • Makes Chief of Militia a Guard officer (formerly a Regular Army officer); also says if Guard demobilized from federal service will be by units, not individuals	• Title 10 National Guard Bureau headed by Guard officer
1933 National Guard Act (amendment to 1916 National Defense Act)	• Main problem is how to mobilize mass citizen-based war army • Both Regular Army and Guard at 50% • Organized Reserve units are manned at skeleton levels • Based on World War I experience, National Guard Association of the United States and Guard lobby Congress hard for Guard to be made reserve component of Army at all times. • National Guard had sought this kind of legislation since the years following end of World War I	• Is statutory birth of modern guard as dual state and federal reserve force • Establishes U.S. Army as the Regular Army, the National Guard of the United States, the National Guard while in the service of the United States, the Officers Reserve Corps, the Organized Reserves, and the Enlisted Reserve Corps • Says Guard is reserve component of U.S. Army at all times; because Guard is permanent reserve of Army the word "ordered" is used for first time • The statutory birthday of the modern Army Total Force	• Title 10 defines U.S. Army as Regular Army, Army National Guard of the Several States, the Army National Guard while in the Service of the United States, and the Army Reserve • Title 10 uses "call forth" and "order" to federalize Guard • Joins the armies and militia clauses into statutory law. • Title 32 reflects "joining" by stating Guard is trained and has officers appointed under militia clause; however, it is organized and equipped under the armies clause

Table B.1—continued

Statute/Act	Historical Context	Significance	Links to Titles 10 and 32
1940 Selective Service Act	• World War II looms • Regular Army, Guard, and Organized Reserves mobilizing and preparing • Palmer brought back by Marshall to think about postwar military policy • Guard worries again about being eclipsed by War Department relying on Army Reserve before Guard	• Stipulates explicitly the term "traditional military policy of the United States" is to maintain "at all times" the National Guard as "integral part of first line defenses"	• Title 32 (as does Title 50) stipulates almost verbatim the term "traditional military policy" as stated in the 1940 Selective Service Act

A Critical Assessment of the Texas Military Department

Chapter 2: The Transformation of the Texas National Guard from a Strategic Reserve to an Operational Force

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February 2025

Introduction

The evolution of the Army National Guard (ARNG) and Air National Guard (ANG) from the post-Vietnam era to the Global War on Terror represents a significant transformation in United States military strategy and force structure (Correll, 2011). This chapter examines the National Guard's journey through several distinct phases, each marked by unique challenges and adaptations that have shaped its current role as an integral component of the nation's defense capabilities.

The U.S. Department of Defense defines military transformation as "a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation's advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities" (Department of Defense, 2003, p. 3). This definition provides a framework for understanding the ARNG's evolution over the past five decades.

Throughout the history of the All-Volunteer Force, the Army National Guard (ARNG) has undergone four distinct phases of development and transformation, evolving into an operational and combat reserve for the Regular Army. This evolution culminates in the ongoing transformation known as Guard 4.0, marking the most significant shift in the force since the end of the Vietnam War.

Guard 4.0 aims to fully integrate the Army National Guard into the U.S. Army's force structure, positioning it to address contemporary security challenges as an essential component of national defense. This paper also examines the Air National Guard's transformation, applying similar frameworks to analyze its development.

The history of Army and Air National Guard transformations can be summarized as follows:

Guard 1.0

The Vietnam War marked a critical juncture in the National Guard's history. Political decisions to limit National Guard involvement in the conflict led to significant changes in the Guard's role and structure in its aftermath. The period from 1973 to 1984, known as Guard 1.0, saw the initial implementation of the Total Force Policy (Locklear, 2022, p. 5). Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird introduced this policy to integrate reserve components more effectively with their active duty counterparts (Laird, 1985, p. 15).

During this time, the focus was on rebuilding readiness and modernizing equipment across the force. However, the National Guard faced significant challenges such as low morale, recruitment and retention issues, as well as racial strife and drug use within the ranks (Doubler, 2003, p. 273).

The Total Force Policy emerged as a response to the challenges posed by the Vietnam War and the end of conscription. It sought to leverage the cost-effectiveness and unique capabilities of the reserve components while maintaining a smaller active force (Weigley, 1973, p. 567).

Guard 2.0

The transition to Guard 2.0 began in 1984, followed by Guard 2.5 from 1992 to 1993. These phases were characterized by a continued refinement of the National Guard's role in Cold War planning. For example, the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 aimed to address interservice rivalries, further shaping the Guard's evolving role (Doubler, 2003, p. 283).

The Persian Gulf War (1990-1991) provided the first real test of the Total Force Policy, revealing both strengths and weaknesses in integrating Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) forces (Doubler, 2003, p. 305). This period saw significant improvements in training, equipment, and personnel, enabling the ARNG to evolve into a more combat-ready reserve force prepared for deployment to global hotspots (Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2008, p. 6). Despite these advancements, challenges persisted. The National Guard continued to struggle with manning sufficient quality troops and equipping them with modern capabilities.

Guard 3.0

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, ushered in the era of Guard 3.0. This phase marked a transformative period for the National Guard, as it took on the role of an operational reserve, as designated by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (Department of Defense, 2006, p. 43). In this capacity, the ARNG committed thousands of soldiers and hundreds of units to rotational mobilizations alongside the active-duty Army, supporting operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other global theaters (Doubler, 2008, p. 189).

The increased operational tempo and prolonged deployments during this period led to concerns about the sustainability of the National Guard's dual role and the impact on readiness and retention (Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2008).

Guard 4.0

The transition to Guard 4.0 represents the latest evolution in the ARNG's transformation. This phase solidifies the operational reserve designation by increasing readiness and availability of select ARNG units to meet ongoing operational demands. It reflects a recognition of the National Guard's critical role in national defense and the need for a more agile and responsive force structure (Berglund, 2017, pp. 16-17).

The Texas National Guard: Challenges and Transformative Events

The implementation of the Total Force Policy set in motion a series of transformative events that would reshape the role and structure of the National Guard over the next several decades. The Texas Military Department, which includes the Texas Army National Guard, Texas Air National Guard, and Texas State Guard, has been at the forefront of this transformative journey.

The increased pace and complexity of missions, ranging from overseas deployments to domestic emergency response and border security operations, have tested the resilience and adaptability of the Texas National Guard (Texas Military Department, 2022, p. 4). The challenges faced by the Texas National Guard are emblematic of the broader issues confronting the National Guard as a whole, as it strives to balance its dual state and federal roles while maintaining readiness and operational effectiveness (Government Accountability Office, 2023, p. 1).

This chapter will explore the complex interplay of historical, legal, and political factors that have shaped the National Guard’s evolution through these phases. It will examine how each transition has been influenced by changing geopolitical landscapes, shifts in domestic policy, and the need to adapt to new roles and responsibilities within the framework of the Total Force Policy.

By analyzing these transformations, we can better understand the National Guard's current capabilities and its future trajectory as an integral component of the United States military. As we delve into the details of each phase, we will consider the challenges faced, the solutions implemented, and the lessons

learned. This analysis will provide valuable insights into the ongoing process of military transformation and the unique role that the Army National Guard plays in the nation's defense strategy.

Through this examination, we aim to contribute to the broader understanding of how the National Guard can be effectively integrated into a modern, agile, and responsive military force. Our analysis will shed light on the complexities of balancing state and federal responsibilities, maintaining readiness in the face of evolving threats, and adapting to the changing nature of warfare in the 21st century.

SECTION 1: Guard 1.0

Executive Summary

Following the Vietnam War, the United States military undertook substantial restructuring efforts, which included ending conscription and introducing the Total Force Policy in the early 1970s. In 1970, the Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird stated in a memorandum for the service secretaries that "Guard and Reserve units and individuals of the Selected Reserves will be prepared to be the initial and primary source for augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of active forces" (Markel et al., 2020, p. xviii). This policy was designed to integrate reserve units more closely with their active-duty counterparts, creating a seamless force capable of responding to a variety of contingencies. This policy shift presented new challenges for the National Guard, historically used as a strategic reserve for large-scale mobilizations rather than as a deployable combat force.

The late 1970s saw a resurgence of communist influence, as demonstrated by the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In response, the Reagan administration sought to reassert U.S. global influence in the 1980s, expanding defense spending and modernizing the armed forces. This era of increased military investment and strategic emphasis on readiness marked a pivotal period for the National Guard, enabling significant improvements in training, equipment, and personnel quality. These advancements sought to transform the National Guard into a combat-ready reserve force, equipped for rapid deployment to global hotspots. However, the Guard continued to face obstacles in recruiting high-quality troops and acquiring modern capabilities.

The Total Force Policy fostered closer ties between the Regular Army and the Army National Guard (ARNG), aligning Guard units more effectively with Army war plans and enhancing readiness. By the mid-1980s, increased resources allowed the ARNG to expand its ranks and prepare for roles in potential European conflicts and worldwide training missions. This period represents the critical evolution from "Guard 1.0" to "Guard 2.0," marked by a shift in the Guard's role within national defense. The changing geopolitical landscape, the shifts in domestic policy, and the integration within the Total Force Policy framework shaped this transformation, laying the groundwork for the National Guard's future development as a frontline component of national defense.

The Origins of the Total Force Policy: The Air National Guard

The Air National Guard (ANG) was instrumental in establishing the foundation for what would later become the Total Force Policy. The ANG's early integration with the Air Force began with the runway alert program in 1953, wherein Air Guard fighter squadrons supported the Air Defense Command (Hill, 1964, p. 535). This initiative proved successful and led to the establishment of the "Gaining Command Concept" in 1960 (Werner, 1978, p. 77). Under this model, the Air Force assumed responsibility for inspecting and overseeing the training of all ANG units, which was a significant step toward operational integration (Gross, 1985, p. 119).

Amid questions surrounding the ANG's role, the Air Force commissioned the RAND Corporation to conduct an evaluation of Air Reserve Components in the mid-1960s. Led by Dr. Theodore Marrs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Reserve Affairs, the study examined the ANG's tactical fighter units, which then comprised roughly 25% of the Air Force's total tactical fighter fleet (Gross, 1985, pp. 153-154).

Despite political and management constraints that limited the use of reserve forces, the RAND study recognized the ANG's combat potential and recommended expanded roles in close air support, battlefield area interdiction, air defense, tactical airlift, and tactical reconnaissance (Gross, 1985, pp. 154-155). This study also supported the idea that reserve forces could meet readiness standards cost-effectively, particularly in a time of budget constraints (Weigley, 1973, pp. 468-469).

However, these recommendations faced limitations due to strategic hesitancies within the Department of Defense, which preferred maintaining smaller reserve forces in higher readiness states. This approach led to the enactment of the Reserve Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act of 1967, which aimed to professionalize the reserve forces, though it stopped short of full integration (Gross, 1985, p. 156).

Integration and Improvements in the Air National Guard

Despite ongoing challenges, the Air National Guard steadily improved its combat readiness and modernized its equipment throughout the 1960s (LeMay, 1978/1995). A framework, known as the "gaining command" concept, was implemented adopted by the U.S. Air Force in 1960 to improve the readiness and integration of Air National Guard (ANG) units with active-duty Air Force units. Under this concept, ANG units were assigned to an active-duty Air Force command, known as their "gaining command," which would assume operational control of the ANG unit if it were mobilized for federal service (Air National Guard, n.d.).

Key Elements of the Gaining Command Concept

1. Standardization and Readiness: ANG units were required to meet the same training, equipment, and readiness standards as active-duty units within their assigned commands. This alignment ensured that ANG units could quickly integrate with active forces if mobilized. To achieve this, ANG units followed similar operational protocols, maintenance practices, and training regimens as their active-duty counterparts.
2. Training and Oversight: The concept allowed the Air Force to oversee the training of ANG personnel, ensuring that they were prepared for potential deployments and could perform effectively alongside active-duty forces. Active-duty Air Force commands provided ANG units with training guidance, resources, and support to help them achieve and maintain these standards. ANG units often conducted joint exercises with active-duty forces, which reinforced inter-operational skills and coordination.
3. Resource and Equipment Alignment: The concept prioritized ANG access to updated equipment and aircraft, although active-duty units generally received modernized equipment first. This framework also facilitated ANG access to surplus military aircraft, particularly those that had been phased out of active-duty inventories but were still operationally viable for reserve missions.
4. Operational Continuity: The concept also helped ensure operational continuity during mobilization. If ANG units were activated for federal duty, they would seamlessly transition under the operational control of their gaining command without a need for extensive retraining or reorganization, allowing for faster and more effective mobilizations in crises or wartime. (Gross, 1985, pp. 114-121)

Impact of the Gaining Command Concept

The gaining command concept was particularly important during the Cold War, when the Air Force needed to maintain a high state of readiness to respond to potential conflicts, particularly in Europe. By standardizing ANG training and equipment with active-duty forces, the concept allowed the Air Force to treat ANG units as an integral part of its force structure rather than a separate, less-prepared reserve. This integration was a foundational aspect of the Total Force Policy that later emerged in the early 1970s, which sought to more fully integrate reserve and active-duty components.

However, despite these successes, the ANG faced certain limitations in its military utility. High operational readiness requirements, political constraints limiting frequent mobilizations, and restrictions on certain high-demand missions, such as those requiring sustained high readiness or frequent deployments, hindered the full utilization of the ANG's potential (Air National Guard, n.d.).

The Army's Transition to an All-Volunteer Force

In 1965, a significant divide emerged between military leadership and political authorities regarding reserve force deployment in Vietnam. While the Department of Defense advocated for reserve deployment, political considerations led to different outcomes. Secretary of Defense McNamara announced the Select Reserve Force (SRF), a 150,000-member combined force of National Guard and Reserve units. The SRF underwent intensive training to meat high readiness goals for a potential Vietnam deployment (Doubler, 2001, p. 223). However, this force was ultimately disbanded in 1969 without ever seeing combat in Vietnam.

Also in 1965, McNamara proposed mobilizing 235,000 National Guard and Army Reserve members for Vietnam service. President Johnson, concerned about public reaction, rejected this recommendation (Gates, 1970, p. 31). Brigadier General Hal Nelson, Army Chief of Military History, characterized this decision as a "watershed moment in American military history." The consequences were far-reaching, according to Nelson, "the active force was required to undertake a massive expansion and bloody expeditionary campaign without the access to Reserve forces that every contingency plan had postulated, and the Reserve forces—to the dismay of long-term committed members—became havens for those seeking to avoid active military service in that war" (Sorley, 2005, pp. 19-20).

The repercussions of Johnson's 1965 decision became evident during the 968 Pueblo crisis with North Korea and the Tet offensive (Stewart, 2010, pp. 339-345). This prompted Johnson to issue Executive Order 11406, authorizing the activation of up to 24,500 National Guard and Reserve members (Doubler, 2001, p. 225). However, the readiness levels were concerning, reports indicated that every recalled unit failed to meet minimum combat readiness standards (Gates, 1970, p. 32). These forces were found to be demoralized, poorly equipped, and inadequately prepared. The situation deteriorated to the point where units filed class-action lawsuits challenging their mobilization's legality (Sorley, 2005, p. 20).

In theory, the National Guard, Army Reserve, and Regular Army should have been equipped to handle the same range of missions in the event of a large-scale mobilization. However, in practice, the Guard and Reserve were often undertrained and under resourced. Despite these challenges, by December 1969, more than 9,000 National Guard members had served in Vietnam, either in units or as individual volunteers and replacements (Doubler, 2001, p. 226).

Upon taking office, President Nixon swiftly acted on his campaign promise and established the Gates Commission (The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force), chaired by former Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates. The Commission was tasked with studying the feasibility of

transitioning from a draft-based military to an all-volunteer force (AVF) (Stewart, 2010, p. 374). In 1970, the commission published a report outlining key recommendations to support an effective AVF model (Gates, 1970, p. vii). Here are the major recommendations from the Gates Commission:

1. End Conscription: The commission's primary recommendation was to end the draft (conscription) and transition to an all-volunteer force. They argued that an AVF would be more effective, efficient, and fair, attracting motivated individuals interested in a military career rather than relying on conscripts.
2. Increase Military Pay and Benefits: To attract and retain high-quality personnel, the commission recommended significantly increasing military pay, especially for junior enlisted personnel. This increase was necessary to make military service competitive with civilian employment opportunities, which would be essential in the absence of a draft.
3. Improve Living Conditions and Job Satisfaction: Recognizing that quality of life impacts recruitment and retention, the Gates Commission recommended improving living conditions for military personnel. This included better housing, recreational facilities, and support services for service members and their families to make military life more attractive.
4. Enhance Educational Opportunities and Career Development: To appeal to a broader range of recruits, the commission suggested expanding educational benefits and career development programs. This included enhancing the GI Bill and providing training and education options that would help service members gain skills transferable to civilian careers.
5. Increase Recruiting Efforts and Programs: The commission recommended ramping up recruitment efforts, including expanding advertising and public outreach to convey the benefits and opportunities of military service to a wide audience. This would also involve enhancing the prestige of military service to attract young men and women.
6. Expand Selective Service System Standby Capability: While advocating for an AVF, the commission advised that the Selective Service System should be maintained in a standby capacity, allowing the government to reinstate conscription quickly in case of a national emergency or large-scale conflict.
7. Promote a Positive Public Image of the Military: The commission highlighted the importance of public perception in maintaining a voluntary force. It recommended efforts to improve the public's understanding and perception of the military, to help build pride in service and encourage volunteer enlistment.
8. Implement Efficient Manpower Utilization and Reduce Bureaucracy: The commission recommended improving efficiency in manpower use by eliminating unnecessary administrative positions and focusing on operational effectiveness. They argued that more efficient use of personnel resources would make an AVF more sustainable and effective.

The Gates Commission's recommendations led to a series of reforms under the Nixon administration, which officially ended the draft in 1973, transitioning to an all-volunteer force (Doubler, 2001, p. 238). The recommendations had a lasting impact, influencing not only military recruitment but also policy changes in pay, benefits, and support programs that continue to shape the structure of the U.S. military.

The Army, as the service most affected by fluctuating manpower levels, initiated an in-depth study to explore the feasibility of an all-volunteer force. This study, known as Project Volunteer in Defense of the Nation (PROVIDE), was part of the Army's broader effort to evaluate how a volunteer-only force might operate. PROVIDE examined a wide range of issues, including the costs of recruitment, standards of personnel quality, management of enlistment incentives, the number of recruits required, and the potential socioeconomic effects of eliminating conscription (Stewart, 2010, pp. 376-377).

Additional Context and Impact

Recognizing the limitations and fiscal challenges of an all-volunteer force, Laird introduced a total force concept as one of the concepts to prepare for the end of the draft. In 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin B. Laird issued a memorandum instructing the Services to provide improved support for their RC as part of a Total Force Concept. The key point of the Laird Memorandum was that "Guard and Reserve units and individuals of the Selected Reserve will be prepared to be the initial and primary source for augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the active forces" (Laird, 1970; Hunt, 2015, p. 292).

Three years later, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger formally elevated Laird's total force concept into a formal Department of Defense policy in 1973, which became known as the Total Force Policy. While Laird initially introduced the concept as a framework for integrating active and reserve components, Schlesinger's decision to make it an official DoD policy gave it the formal authority and structure required to be implemented across all branches of the military (Feickert & Kapp, 2014, p. 4; Doubler, 2001, p. 240).

Force Structure Deterioration and Institutional Challenges

By 1968, the Regular Army had grown to nearly 1.57 million soldiers, organized into approximately 16 divisions, along with numerous independent brigades and smaller units, to meet the demands of the Vietnam War and other global commitments (Stewart, 2010, pp. 376-377).

The Army's withdrawal from Vietnam initiated a cascade of structural changes that further strained military readiness. The reduction in force structure necessitated the inactivation of three divisions, while the exodus of experienced Vietnam veterans created significant leadership gaps. By 1974, budget constraints had reduced the Army to under 783,000, a reduction that demanded fundamental changes in force structure and management (Nielsen, 2010, p. 41).

The prolonged conflict in Vietnam had profound consequences on the U.S. Army's internal cohesion, resulting in widespread issues with discipline and morale that extended well beyond the battlefield. By the early 1970s, the Army was grappling with pervasive breakdowns in discipline, compounded by a surge in gang and criminal activity, rampant drug abuse, and deep-seated racial tensions. These problems were particularly severe within critical units stationed overseas, such as the Seventh Army in Europe, where deteriorating conditions threatened the Army's operational effectiveness and readiness (Scales, 1993, pp. 6-8). The internal strife left units underprepared and nearly ineffective for combat operations, making structural reform an urgent priority for military leaders (Palmer, 1984, p. 170).

One of the most significant challenges identified was the financial hurdle. The draft had provided a steady supply of young men for short-term service at minimal pay, which effectively acted as a "tax" on draftees who served at artificially low wages. Transitioning to an all-volunteer force would require substantially higher wages and benefits to attract qualified individuals, along with investments in recruiting, advertising, and retention programs. This financial burden was a major concern for policymakers, as the costs associated with an all-volunteer force would require a considerable increase in the defense budget to maintain troop levels and readiness (Stewart, 2010, p. 375).

The consequences of ending conscription were immediately felt by the Army National Guard (ARNG). The winding down of the Vietnam War, coupled with reduced draft quotas and the public discourse surrounding the end of conscription, led to a sharp decline in ARNG membership (National Guard Bureau, 1972, p. 26). The (NGAUS) initially opposed the elimination of the draft, warning that the ARNG would struggle to maintain its forces through voluntary enlistment alone, even with improved incentives and benefits (Tencza et al., 2020, p. 121).

To counter this challenge, the ARNG launched aggressive recruiting campaigns, including the "Try One in the Guard" program, which targeted veterans with existing military experience to bolster recruitment efforts (National Guard Bureau, 1970, p. 21). The Guard also expanded its recruiting infrastructure, establishing a dedicated team of 6,000 recruiters by 1972 and producing a variety of promotional materials to attract volunteers (National Guard Bureau, 1972, pp. 28-29).

Despite these efforts, the ARNG's manpower continued to decline sharply in the immediate aftermath of the draft's termination. By 1977, the force had dropped below 388,000 members, prompting significant concerns about its long-term viability (National Guard Bureau, 1972, p. 26). A particularly severe crisis occurred in 1977 when the exit of Vietnam-era Guardsmen, who had fulfilled their draft obligations, led to the loss of 104,000 soldiers, further reducing the ARNG's strength to 346,974 by 1979 (National Guard Bureau, 1977, p. 22; National Guard Bureau, 1979, p. 1).

Recognizing the gravity of these issues, General Creighton Abrams launched a comprehensive reform initiative in 1972, focusing on reshaping the Army's mission and improving its operational capacity. As Army Chief of Staff from 1972 to 1974, General Abrams aimed to redefine the Army's post-war strategic focus, aligning it with the shifting global security landscape of the 1970s. (Scales, 1993, p. 7).

In addition to Abrams, key leaders such as Generals Frederick Weyand and Donald V. Davison played pivotal roles in restoring order within the most troubled units, working tirelessly to improve discipline, strengthen leadership, and rebuild unit cohesion. Their efforts targeted the worst-affected units, laying the groundwork for broader institutional reform and helping to create a culture of accountability and professionalism within the ranks. However, the substantial increase in the Army budget necessary for improvements in soldiers' lives would not come until the late seventies (Scales, 1993, p. 8).

National Guard Bureau Headquarters (NGB HQ) and Organizational Changes

The Total Force Policy of the 1970s brought significant changes to the National Guard Bureau's (NGB) command structure, enhancing its role within the Department of Defense (DoD). In 1970, a reorganization established a joint NGB headquarters with distinct directorates for the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the Air National Guard (ANG), creating a more cohesive command framework. This structure introduced the position of Director of the Army National Guard (DARNG), a major general responsible for overseeing ARNG operations (National Guard Bureau, 1970, p. 14).

As the DoD increasingly relied on the Guard to support national defense, the position of Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) grew in importance. Reflecting this, in 1978, the DoD elevated the CNGB role to a three-star position, aligning it with the ranks of senior officers on the Army and Air Force Staffs. Lieutenant General LaVern E. Weber, formerly the Adjutant General of Oklahoma, became the first CNGB to hold this rank (National Guard Bureau, 1978, p. 4; National Guard Bureau, 1981, p. 1).

During this period, the National Guard expanded its presence to new U.S. territories, establishing National Guard jurisdictions in the U.S. Virgin Islands in 1973 and Guam in 1981, further supporting national defense across a broader geographic area (National Guard Bureau, 1973, p. 10).

Enlisted Association of the National Guard of the United States (EANGUS)

In 1972, the National Guard's enlisted members gained a formal advocacy organization with the establishment of the Enlisted Association of the National Guard of the United States (EANGUS). This association grew out of a 1970 meeting of senior enlisted Guardsmen in South Dakota who sought to enhance the Guard's role in national defense by advocating for improved status, welfare, and professionalism of enlisted personnel. EANGUS received its charter as a national organization in 1972,

headquartered in Alexandria, Virginia, and began publishing an association magazine to connect with its members. Working alongside the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS), EANGUS actively promoted legislation to increase pay and benefits for enlisted Guardsmen and to secure access to better equipment, facilities, and training. Although proposals have been made to merge NGAUS and EANGUS, both organizations continue to operate independently, serving as distinct advocates for the National Guard's officers and enlisted members, respectively (EANGUS, 2024).

Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC)

In response to the evolving strategic role of the Reserves, Congress amended existing laws, passing the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 1976. A critical component of this act was the introduction of Section 673b of Title X, which authorized the President to activate Reserve forces under the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC). This new provision allowed the President to call up the Reserves for up to 50,000 personnel, for periods of up to 90 days, without the need for congressional approval. This move represented an essential step in implementing the Total Force Policy, which sought to balance active and reserve forces, recognizing that the Reserves would be essential in bolstering military strength during peacetime.

This shift was largely influenced by after-action reports from Vietnam, which criticized the limited use of Reserves and underscored their importance in sustaining long-term military operations. The military was particularly focused on ensuring rapid access to Reserve units that provided essential logistical and deployment support critical for a swift, large-scale mobilization to Europe. Senate reports accompanying the 1976 legislation emphasized that the new Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up authority was intended to offer the President greater flexibility in mobilizing Reserve forces. Lawmakers anticipated that this flexibility would not only improve the credibility of Reserve units but also enhance the overall efficiency and readiness of the Total Force Concept, reinforcing the integration of active and Reserve components as a cohesive national defense strategy (Markel et al., 2020, pp. 34-35).

Organization – The Roundout Program

General Creighton Abrams implemented a series of foundational reforms during the post-Vietnam era that fundamentally reshaped the Army's structure, doctrine, and reliance on reserve components, collectively known as the Total Force Policy. One of his first moves was supporting Army Chief of Staff General William Westmoreland's proposal to restructure the Continental Army Command (CONARC) and Combat Developments Command (CDC) into two distinct organizations: Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Forces Command (FORSCOM). The establishment of TRADOC centralized responsibility for the Army's training, doctrine development, and modernization efforts, while FORSCOM focused on readiness and operational command, providing a clearer division of duties and increasing overall efficiency (Nielsen, 2010, p. 40).

Abrams also increased the Army's combat divisions from 13 to 16 without raising end strength, a move that strategically increased the "tooth-to-tail" ratio (the number of military personnel it takes to supply and support ("tail") each combat soldier ("tooth")) by shifting certain combat support and sustainment functions to the reserve components. This adjustment allowed the Army to optimize resources and more effectively allocate personnel to critical combat roles, enhancing the Army's capacity to respond to global threats with limited resources (Markel et al., 2020, p. 32).

To further support modernization, Abrams prioritized five critical weapons systems—known as the "Big Five": the M1 Abrams tank, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the Apache and Blackhawk helicopters, and the Patriot Air Defense Missile. Despite budget constraints, focusing research and development on these

systems enabled the Army to concentrate limited resources on key capabilities, laying the foundation for expanded procurement in the 1980s when defense budgets increased (Scales, 1993, pp. 19-20).

A particularly innovative element of Abrams's Total Force approach was his integration of the Army National Guard (ARNG) roundout brigades into the Regular Army's force structure. To achieve the 16-division model with the maximum number of personnel that Congress authorized (end strength) of only 785,000 soldiers, Abrams introduced under structured divisions, which relied on ARNG brigades to complete their operational capacity. This roundout concept was initially used at the battalion level but was expanded to brigade-level units under Abrams's direction, demonstrating an explicit commitment to using reserve components as integral parts of active-duty divisions (Markel et al., 2020, p. 32).

The roundout brigades became essential to Abrams's strategy, providing combat-ready forces that could be deployed alongside Regular Army units. While these ARNG brigades were expected to require additional time for training and integration, particularly in European deployment scenarios, their inclusion underscored Abrams's commitment to a Total Force structure. This approach not only met manpower and readiness needs within budget limitations but also strengthened the Army's ability to respond to NATO and global defense obligations, aligning with Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's vision of a cohesive active-reserve force (Doubler, 2003, pp. 242-243).

A New Mission

The new all-volunteer force emerging after the Vietnam War required more than just manpower; it needed a focused mission and a doctrine tailored to the types of conflicts it might face. The Army began developing a new operational doctrine to redefine its mission, aiming to align with evolving global threats and the strategic shift that followed President Nixon's 1969 Guam Doctrine, later called "strategy of realistic deterrence". In the Guam Doctrine, Nixon declared that the U.S. would maintain a more limited defense establishment, prioritizing a "1½-war" contingency. This concept implied that while the United States would maintain the ability to fight a major conventional war, likely in Europe or Northeast Asia, it would simultaneously prepare for a smaller, regional conflict, such as a counterinsurgency in the developing world (Herbert, 1988, p. 5).

By the early 1970s, American intelligence agencies reported that the Soviet Union had reinforced its presence in Europe, adding five armored divisions and positioning forces further west. If general war had broken out in Europe during this period, the U.S. Army and its NATO allies would have faced Warsaw Pact forces that were superior in both numbers and, increasingly, in equipment quality (Scales, 2010, pp. 381).

The new doctrinal approach prioritized NATO's defense against the Warsaw Pact, implementing a strategy centered on defensive maneuver and firepower to counteract Soviet forces effectively. This doctrine not only reflected Abrams' strategic priorities but also responded to evolving defense policies and budgetary restrictions within the Department of Defense (DoD), which sought to sustain military readiness amidst fiscal constraints (Markel et al., 2020, pp. 30-34; Romjue, 1984, pp. 6-7).

The Army's assumptions regarding future conflict were soon validated by the 1973 Yom Kippur War, a high-intensity conflict that underscored the effectiveness of combined arms tactics and the importance of deploying trained, equipped forces capable of rapid mobilization. Observing these developments, military planners recognized that the Army's reserve components, particularly the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve, needed to be fully integrated to ensure the Army's capacity for swift deployment and combat readiness in emerging global crises (Doughty, 1979, pp. 40-46).

The war began on October 6, 1973, during Yom Kippur and Ramadan, with a surprise attack by Egypt and Syria that caught Israel off guard due to significant intelligence failures (Scales, 1993, p. 9; Jewish Virtual Library, 2023). This unexpected initiation highlighted the importance of constant vigilance and accurate intelligence in modern warfare.

The war's intensity and lethality raised serious concerns about the U.S. Army's readiness for a similar conflict (Romjue, 1984, pp. 6-7). The initial success of Arab forces, with Egypt crossing the Suez Canal and Syria advancing into the Golan Heights, contrasted sharply with Israel's quick victories in previous conflicts like the 1967 Six-Day War (Britannica, 2023). This shift in military dynamics underscored the evolving nature of modern warfare.

The war demonstrated the increased lethality of the modern battlefield, particularly with precision weapons. It showed that the U.S. could not rely solely on technological superiority, as Soviet equipment proved highly capable (Chapman, 1992, pp. 1-3). New weapons like anti-tank guided missiles (e.g., the Sagger) and advanced air defense systems proved especially effective, inflicting heavy losses on Israeli forces (Scales, 1993, pp. 9-10; Britannica, 2023).

The conflict and subsequent oil embargo also highlighted the strategic importance of the Middle East. Planning for out-of-area contingencies, including in the Middle East, began in the mid-1970s, leading to concepts like the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (Scales, 1993, p. 42). However, the Army's planning continued to view potential conflicts in the context of a broader confrontation with the Soviet Union (Chapman, 1993, pp. 10-11).

The war escalated into a superpower confrontation, with both the United States and the Soviet Union providing military support to their respective allies. The U.S. initiated an emergency airlift to supply Israel with arms and equipment, marking a significant shift in U.S. foreign policy towards a more active role in Middle Eastern affairs (Burr, 2003). The high human cost of the war, with approximately 2,200 Israeli soldiers killed and significant losses among Arab forces, led to a reevaluation of military strategies and highlighted the need for diplomatic resolutions (Britannica, 2023).

In response, the U.S. Army focused on improving training and doctrine to offset Soviet numerical advantages. General William E. DePuy summarized the war's lessons with the aphorism "What can be seen can be hit; what can be hit can be killed" (Markel et al., 2020, p. 40). The Army began preparing for high-intensity, but potentially brief, conflicts in Europe (Romjue, 1984, pp. 3-6).

The Yom Kippur War served as a pivotal moment in military history, prompting significant reforms in U.S. military doctrine, training, and equipment procurement. It underscored the importance of modern warfare tactics and technology, while also reshaping regional dynamics and international relations. The conflict's lessons continued to influence U.S. military planning and strategy for decades, preparing for both potential Soviet threats in Europe and emerging challenges in other regions.

Doctrinal Reform

General William E. DePuy, a combat-tested officer from World War II and Vietnam, brought a practical and focused approach to Army doctrine as the first commander of TRADOC, a position he assumed in 1973. DePuy viewed doctrine as an essential tool for preparing soldiers for real battlefield conditions, emphasizing the idea that effective doctrine must be understood by the majority of soldiers responsible for employing it. To this end, DePuy prioritized practical and field-oriented instruction, using doctrine to unify the Army’s training, equipment, and operational standards (Romjue, 1984, pp. 3-4).

In 1976, DePuy personally oversaw the development of the new Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, which marked a significant departure from Vietnam-era doctrine. Reflecting his combat experiences and the evolving nature of warfare, DePuy's manual focused on Active Defense, a concept emphasizing the "primacy of defense" in a high-intensity battlefield setting. The manual was influenced by recent conflicts, particularly the 1973 Yom Kippur War, which demonstrated the destructive power of modern precision weapons, such as anti-tank missiles. DePuy's doctrine was designed to help soldiers "win the first battle" in a short, intense conflict, where firepower and precision would be critical to countering numerically superior adversaries, such as the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces in Europe (Scales, 1993, p. 13).

DePuy's doctrine, however, faced criticism, especially over the Active Defense concept. Detractors argued that it prioritized defensive tactics at the expense of offensive maneuver, with some, like Lieutenant General Donn A. Starry, questioning its effectiveness in countering the large, echeloned Soviet forces stationed along the inter-German border. Starry, who later succeeded DePuy as TRADOC commander, recognized the limitations of the doctrine and advocated for a more balanced approach that could also address deep Soviet echelons before they engaged American forces directly (Romjue, 1984, pp. 14-15).

This critique laid the foundation for the AirLand Battle (ALB) doctrine, which emerged in the 1982 revision of FM 100-5. AirLand Battle built on DePuy's focus on combined-arms operations but introduced an operational-level framework that emphasized three types of operations—close, deep, and rear—requiring commanders to simultaneously manage all three to disrupt, delay, and degrade enemy forces at various depths. The doctrine also stressed the importance of synchronizing ground and air forces to seize the initiative and exploit depth, allowing U.S. forces to fight outnumbered and win through superior maneuver, timing, and coordination (Scales, 1993, p. 14; Romjue, 1984, pp. 66-73).

AirLand Battle became a central feature of the Army's operational philosophy, influencing training, organizational structure, and procurement. It provided the basis for the development and acquisition of the "Big 5" modern weapon systems: UH-60 Blackhawk, AH-64 Apache, M1 Abrams Tank, Patriot Missile System, and M2/3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, which gave the Army a qualitative edge. Recognizing that U.S. and NATO forces could not match Soviet manpower or equipment in quantity, AirLand Battle leveraged American technological advantages to counteract numerical inferiority and optimize battlefield effectiveness. This doctrine would later prove instrumental in the planning and execution of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, where it guided the coalition's successful strategy against Iraqi forces (Burket, 2019, p. 10, 125).

Training

In the early 1970s, the U.S. Army recognized the urgent need to overhaul its training methods, which had changed little since World War II. A 1970 study by the Army War College identified significant conflicts between career advancement incentives and readiness reporting, suggesting that some officers inflated unit readiness ratings to enhance their promotion prospects. An October 1970 study by the Office of the Secretary of Defense further criticized the subjective nature of training indicators, noting a tendency among commanders to underestimate the impact of personnel issues on readiness (Wong & Gerras, 2015, p. 24).

Responding to these concerns, Chief of Staff General William C. Westmoreland prioritized training reforms and established the Board for Dynamic Training in 1971, led by Brigadier General Paul Gorman. This initiative sought to improve training through standardized task descriptions, greater realism, and measurable performance criteria.

By this time, both Regular Army and reserve component units were grappling with inadequate training resources, a shortage of equipment, and a lack of comprehensive readiness. The focus on recruiting and retention after Vietnam also increased pressure on the Army to create effective, engaging training that could prepare soldiers for the demands of modern warfare. This period marked a training revolution that aimed to elevate the proficiency of Regular Army forces, though it was a time commitment that reserve components struggled to match (Chapman, 1991, p. 1).

Under Westmoreland's successor, General William E. DePuy, the newly formed Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) became the focal point of training reform. DePuy viewed training as an integral part of readiness and famously adopted the slogan, "An army must train as it fights." TRADOC began by removing young officers from classrooms and emphasizing field training in critical combat skills, shifting away from rigid schedules toward a "systems approach to training." This approach broke down complex combat tasks into individual skills with set conditions and measurable standards, which soldiers could be held accountable to master (Scales, 1993, p. 12).

In 1975, TRADOC introduced the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP), which provided a standardized framework to evaluate training readiness for companies, battalions, and brigades. ARTEP objectively assessed unit performance and exposed weaknesses in garrison standards that did not translate to field readiness. However, ARTEP also faced limitations: while it measured individual and small-unit proficiency, it was less effective at assessing critical combat skills like leadership, terrain navigation, and synchronization of forces, which are essential for larger operations and difficult to quantify in training exercises (Chapman, 1991, p. 7; (Scales, 1993, p. 12).

Further innovations continued to emerge as TRADOC introduced technologies like the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) to simulate direct fire combat. MILES allowed soldiers to experience realistic, high stakes combat scenarios without live ammunition, adding a layer of depth to their training that firing ranges could not replicate. Nevertheless, TRADOC leaders realized that even with improvements, training in controlled settings could not fully replicate the unpredictability and complexity of combat. To close this gap, the Army later established National Training Centers (NTC) in the 1980s, where units faced realistic, force-on-force simulations that better prepared soldiers for real-world deployments (Scales, 1993, p. 21; Chapman, 1991, p. 37).

Ultimately, the training revolution initiated in the 1970s brought significant improvements to the Army's readiness and laid the groundwork for the doctrinal advancements of the AirLand Battle era. It aligned training practices more closely with the realities of modern warfare and helped establish the foundational skills necessary for the success of U.S. forces in later conflicts like Operation Desert Storm.

Combat Training Centers

The NTC focused on the tactical readiness of combat units, allowing soldiers to perform mission-essential tasks in conditions that simulated the complexity and unpredictability of real combat. Observer-controllers (OCs) at the NTC provided units with detailed feedback based on standards from the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP), which enhanced unit proficiency and identified gaps in readiness. The rigorous AAR process was a hallmark of the NTC, where commanders reviewed their performance against OPFOR, receiving specific critiques on tactics, leadership, and decision-making. The AAR exposed leaders to the realities of their command decisions, fostering an "institutional obsession" for realistic training (Chapman, 1992, p. 24).

In 1984, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) highlighted a recurring issue: the U.S. Army's performance in initial battles had historically suffered due to senior leaders' inexperience in

commanding large units. Lieutenant General Jerry Bartlett, then commander of the Combined Arms Center at CGSC, identified this as a training gap and suggested that generals and their staffs required an experience similar to the National Training Center (NTC), which was designed to rigorously train colonels and battalion commanders. The NTC, located at Fort Irwin, California, was established in 1981 and became a cornerstone of the Army's training revolution, offering highly realistic, force-on-force simulations against a professional Opposing Force (OPFOR) skilled in Soviet tactics (Scales, 1993, p. 22-23).

The Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), implemented under Bartlett's direction, addressed the challenge of training senior leaders by using computer-driven simulations that tested division and corps staffs in command and control under realistic battlefield conditions. To enhance authenticity, the program employed the unit's own communications equipment and included a structured after-action review (AAR) supervised by experienced retired generals. Though initially met with resistance, BCTP was championed by Chief of Staff General Carl Vuono, who emphasized the importance of candid feedback for continuous improvement (Chapman, 1992, p. 146; Scales, 1993, p. 22).

While the NTC primarily targeted maneuver units, combat support and sustainment units also participated to a lesser extent, although these units often lacked the same training frequency and support. As noted by Lieutenant Colonel Jo B. Rusin in 1988, the heavy support missions of combat service support units made it challenging to allocate adequate training time (Markel et al., 2020, p. 49). The NTC model eventually inspired additional Combat Training Centers, including the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, and the Combat Maneuver Training Center at Hohenfels, Germany, each tailored to different aspects of combat readiness (Chapman, 1992, PP. 145-146).

By 1991, over 155 battalions, including 12 Army National Guard (ARNG) units, had completed NTC rotations, reflecting the Army's commitment to preparing units for high-intensity conflict. This rigorous training approach became essential to the success of later operations, such as Operation Desert Storm, where the lessons learned from NTC rotations were directly applied in combat (Markel et al., 2020, pp. 45-46).

Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES)

The Vietnam War severely impacted the Army's noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps, prompting Army leadership to reassess and reform NCO development. The physical, moral, and psychological strain from extended combat tours took a heavy toll on young NCOs, resulting in high casualty rates and a wave of experienced NCOs leaving the service. Those who remained faced an Army struggling with declining morale, pay issues, and eroded discipline in the aftermath of the war. By the late 1960s, this situation had left the NCO Corps, traditionally considered the "backbone" of the U.S. Army, in a weakened and demoralized state (Scales, 1993, p. 24).

In response, Army Chief of Staff General William Westmoreland, influenced by Vice Chief of Staff General Ralph Haines, initiated the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) in 1969 to standardize and enhance NCO training. The NCOES introduced a four-tiered approach to NCO education, which paralleled the officer training structure, aiming to restore professionalism and competence across all levels (Arms, 2007, p. 41). The four levels included:

1. Primary Level Training: Modeled after earlier NCO academies, this initial level focused on foundational skills.
2. Basic and Advanced Levels: These required board selection for attendance and included technical skill development, leadership training, and rigorous evaluations.

3. Sergeants Major Academy: Established at Fort Bliss, Texas, in 1972, the academy was the pinnacle of the NCOES, offering a curriculum that paralleled the Army War College. Selection to attend became a prestigious achievement for senior NCOs, symbolizing the highest level of NCO education and leadership training (Scales, 1993, p. 24).

This structured system ensured that promotion within the NCO ranks required proven competence at each level, with each phase of training preparing NCOs for responsibilities at the next grade. The NCOES helped rebuild the NCO Corps by instilling professionalism, fostering trust between officers and NCOs, and elevating the role of sergeants within the Army. As NCOES-trained sergeants demonstrated improved leadership and technical skills, officers increasingly entrusted them with greater responsibilities (Arms, 2007, p. 42).

Army Readiness Reporting Challenges

In the years following the Vietnam War, the U.S. Army grappled with significant concerns about the integrity and accuracy of its readiness reporting. A 1970 Army War College study indicated that the career management system's structure created incentives for officers to overstate their units' readiness. The *Study on Military Professionalism*, conducted by researchers at the U.S. Army War College, underscored this issue, stating that, "Inaccurate reporting—rampant throughout the Army and perceived by every grade level sampled from O-2 through O-7—is significant." The report cited a captain who, during the Vietnam War, asserted that meeting the high demands of superiors often required officers to "lie, cheat, and steal" to fulfill expectations and statistical benchmarks (U.S. Army War College, 1970, p. 20; Wong & Gerras, 2015, p. 24).

The Army's efforts to standardize readiness assessment began on August 23, 1963, with the introduction of Army Regulation (AR) 220-1, the first standardized, service-wide system for measuring and reporting unit readiness. Reflecting the budgetary limitations of the prior decade, AR 220-1 served a dual purpose: it was both a method for assessing unit readiness and a means of determining resource needs. This approach highlighted a foundational philosophy of early Army readiness reporting—it primarily functioned as a tool for resource justification rather than a direct assessment of combat capability, which was at odds with the system envisioned by the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) (Pate, 1975, p. 21).

The initial version of AR 220-1 quickly proved insufficient, prompting a revision within eight months of its implementation. Over the next decade, AR 220-1 underwent multiple revisions, reflecting the Army's ongoing efforts to improve the accuracy and utility of readiness reporting. A major milestone came with the seventh version of AR 220-1, implemented on July 1, 1975, which marked the first instance of full alignment with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Force Status and Identity Report (FORSTAT) system. This achievement represented the culmination of a decade-long initiative to reconcile the Army's readiness reporting standards with those of the Joint Chiefs, finally fulfilling both organizations' information needs (Pate, 1975, p. 21).

Alongside developments in the active Army's readiness reporting, the Army introduced a parallel system specifically for the Army Reserve Component (RC). However, by 1973, this separate Reserve readiness assessment was phased out, and the RC was fully integrated into the unified Army/OJCS readiness reporting system. This integration ensured consistency in readiness assessments across both active and Reserve forces, enhancing the credibility and coherence of the Army's overall readiness framework (Pate, 1975, p. 40).

In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the Army faced concerns about the integrity of its readiness reporting system. A 1970 Army War College study highlighted that the incentives created by the career management system could tempt some officers to rate their units higher than their actual condition. Additionally, an October 1970 OSD study criticized the subjective nature of the training indicators and the tendency of commanders to underestimate the effects of personnel problems on training readiness

The Army introduced its first standardized, service-wide system for measuring and reporting unit readiness on August 23, 1963, with Army Regulation (AR) 220-1. This initial system reflected the Army's budget constraints of the previous decade. Notably, AR 220-1 served a dual purpose: it not only provided data on unit readiness but also established a method for determining resource requirements. This approach reveals a significant philosophical underpinning of early Army readiness reporting—it was primarily designed as a tool for resource justification rather than as a combat capability assessment, which contrasted with the system envisioned by the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) (Pate, 1975, p. 21).

The initial version of AR 220-1 proved inadequate, requiring revision after just eight months. Since its 1963 introduction, the regulation underwent multiple revisions. The seventh version of AR 220-1, implemented on July 1, 1975, marks the first full compliance and integration with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Force Status and Identity Report (FORSTAT) system. This milestone represented the culmination of a decade-long effort to align the Army's readiness reporting system with that of the Joint Chiefs, finally satisfying both parties' information requirements (Pate, 1975, p. 21).

Concurrent with the active Army's readiness reporting evolution, a parallel system was developed for assessing Army Reserve Component (RC) readiness. By 1973, this separate RC system was phased out and integrated into the unified Army/Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) readiness reporting system (Pate, 1975, p. 40).

Overseas Training and Mobilization Preparedness

Under the Total Force Policy, the U.S. Army's emphasis on rapid deployment to NATO and other critical regions required the National Guard to enhance its overseas training and mobilization readiness. While prior to Vietnam, National Guad units had conducted limited training in places like Hawaii, Alaska, and Puerto Rico, the 1970s marked a period of increased Guard participation in overseas exercises, particularly in Europe, to support NATO's defense posture (Doubler, 2003, p. 245).

Beginning in 1972, foreign exchange programs like the exchange between Minnesota's 47th Infantry Division and the Norwegian Home Guard provided ARNG soldiers with valuable international experience. This success led to similar programs, such as rifle companies from New York's 42nd Infantry Division and Massachusetts's 26th Infantry Division training with the British Territorial Army in Wales in 1977 (Doubler, 2003, p. 245).

To strengthen readiness in Central Europe, ARNG units also began participating in the Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) exercises, starting in the mid-1970s. These annual exercises simulated rapid deployment and prepared Guard units for the logistical challenges of moving personnel and equipment to Europe. In 1980, the South Carolina ARNG's 3-178th Field Artillery became the first complete ARNG battalion to deploy directly from U.S. armories to West Germany, signifying the increased role of the ARNG in NATO defense exercises. In fiscal year (FY) 1980, 6,500 personnel from 73 different National Guard units participated in the deployment training program, and 19 National Guard units were integrated into Reforger Deployments (National Guard Bureau, 1980, pp. 34, 39).

The Texas Air National Guard, specifically the 136th Airlift Wing, participated in the REFORGER (Return of Forces to Germany) exercises in 1983. During this time, the 136th supported Operation COLD FIRE, which was part of REFORGER 83, involving operations from unimproved airfields, intra-theater logistical and tactical airlift, and aeromedical evacuations (National Guard Bureau, 1983, p. 42).

A significant step in operational alignment was the 1979 introduction of the CAPSTONE Program, which assigned each ARNG unit a designated "gaining command" for wartime missions, fostering collaboration with active-duty units. CAPSTONE provided Guard units with specific mission details, projected deployment locations, and timelines, allowing commanders to tailor training for their assigned roles. This alignment gave ARNG units a clear sense of purpose, particularly as CAPSTONE initially focused on NATO's European mission. However, CAPSTONE also faced challenges in implementation (Doubler, 2003, p. 245).

By 1982, a Government Accountability Office (GAO) audit revealed that many reserve units had yet to establish contact with their gaining commands, with contact rates varying significantly across readiness regions due to inadequate tracking mechanisms (Government Accountability Office, 1982).

Despite these challenges, CAPSTONE and overseas training exercises were instrumental in preparing ARNG units for potential deployment scenarios in Europe. The program also adapted to shifting strategic priorities, assigning some ARNG units to the newly established Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) for potential operations in Southwest Asia, marking the first time Guardsmen prepared for a Middle Eastern conflict. Additionally, the CAPSTONE Program included detailed mobilization schedules and timelines, which guided Guard commanders in prioritizing realistic training for rapid deployment to Europe and other theaters (Markel et al., 2020, p. 49).

Modernization and the Big Five

During the 1970s, as the U.S. Army faced the likelihood of confronting a numerically superior Soviet adversary, the challenge of maintaining combat parity within budget constraints became pressing. Military theorists typically assert that defending forces can hold their ground effectively if the attacker's advantage does not exceed a 3:1 ratio. However, intelligence estimates in the 1970s indicated that Warsaw Pact forces had a far greater advantage over NATO forces in Europe. Recognizing the improbability of increasing American military manpower due to budget limitations, Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams prioritized technological advancement to close the gap in combat effectiveness (Stewart, 2010, pp. 383-384).

This approach led to the development of the "Big Five" systems, a suite of advanced weaponry designed to give the Army a technological edge (Scales, 1993, pp. 19-20). The Big Five included:

1. The M1 Abrams Tank
2. The Bradley Fighting Vehicle (infantry combat vehicle)
3. The AH-64 Apache (attack helicopter)
4. The UH-60 Black Hawk (transport helicopter)
5. The Patriot Missile System (air defense)

The impetus behind these systems also drew from innovations in space and defense technology, where the research had advanced capabilities in weaponry and logistics. General Abrams leveraged his influence in Washington, rallying support for modernization amidst a challenging budget environment. This approach necessitated a strict focus on the Big Five systems, despite competing demands from within the Army's materiel development community, which comprised numerous advocates for various programs. Abrams'

prioritization of the Big Five, combined with his advocacy in Congress, laid the groundwork for the Army's modernization strategy (Stewart, 2010, pp. 384-389).

The post-Vietnam transition to the Total Force Policy also required the Army to allocate advanced equipment to Reserve Components (RC), including the Army National Guard (ARNG) (Cocke et al., 1977b, p. 63). During the Vietnam War, reserve equipment had often been redirected to active forces. However, as U.S. involvement in Vietnam wound down, the Army redirected resources to the Reserve Components to better align them with their new responsibilities under Total Force Policy. Despite this shift, critical deficiencies persisted, especially in tanks and communication system (Cocke et al., 1977a, pp. 59, 95).

One significant development in the Reserve Components was the rapid growth of ARNG aviation. As active-duty aviation units were deactivated post-Vietnam, the Army transferred helicopters, pilots, and aviation units to the ARNG. In 1971 alone, 320 helicopters, including UH-1 Hueys, AH-1 Cobras, and CH-54 Flying Cranes, were reassigned to the ARNG, increasing its aviation inventory to over 1,200 airframes. By 1972, the ARNG had 3,617 aviators and 1,542 helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, marking a substantial expansion. This growth prompted the creation of an ARNG Aviation Division in 1974 to manage pilot training, safety, and aircraft maintenance. A separate staff group became necessary to manage aviation assets, and in 1974, an Aviation Division appeared in the ARNG Directorate. In addition to managing pilots and aircraft, the division supervised safety, training, and maintenance programs. By 1980, nearly 30% of the Army's total aviation assets were in the ARNG (National Guard Bureau, 1971, p. 3; National Guard Bureau, 1972, p. 36; National Guard Bureau, 1974, p. 145).

Modernization efforts extended to fielding advanced equipment, such as the M1 Abrams tank, to select reserve units alongside active-duty units based on deployment schedules rather than component status. This "first to fight" distribution approach meant that some ARNG units received state-of-the-art equipment ahead of Regular Army units. The Bradley Fighting Vehicle and Tactical Fire Direction System (TACFIRE), for instance, were deployed to reserve units around the same time as to active forces, underscoring the Army’s commitment to simultaneous modernization across the Total Force (Markel et al., 2020, pp. 26, 54).

Constitutional Foundations and the War Powers Resolution

The Framers of the U.S. Constitution carefully structured the nation’s war powers to prevent any dangerous concentration of authority. Having experienced the tyranny of King George III, they were wary of granting any individual or small group the power to unilaterally involve the nation in war (Annexstad, 2020, p. 17). As James Madison wrote to Thomas Jefferson in 1798, “the Constitution supposes, what the History of all [Governments] demonstrates, that the [Executive] is the branch of power most interested in war, [and] most prone to it. It has accordingly with studied care vested the question of war in the [Legislature]” (Madison, 1798).

The U.S. Constitution divides war powers between Congress and the President. Article I, Section 8 clause 11 exclusively assigns Congress the power to declare war, thereby ensuring public debate and legislative accountability on matters of conflict (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11). Article II, however, designates the President as Commander-in-Chief, entrusting them with the authority to lead the armed forces and wage war once it has been declared (U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1). Over time, presidents have used this Commander-in-Chief role to justify engaging in military actions abroad without formally declaring war or seeking explicit congressional approval (Ramsey & Waxman, 2023, p. 748).

Madison wrote in detail about war powers in his *Letters of Helvidius*,

> In the general distribution of powers, we find that of declaring war expressly vested in the congress, where every other legislative power is declared to be vested; and without any other qualification than what is common to every other legislative act. The constitutional idea of this power would seem then clearly to be, that it is of a legislative and not an executive nature … Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things, be proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded. They are barred from the latter functions by a great principle in free government, analogous to that which separates the sword from the purse, or the power of executing from the power of enacting laws. (Madison, 1793)

Alexander Hamilton explained the limits on presidential war powers in *Federalist No. 69*,

> The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and admiral of the Confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies, all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature. The governor of New York, on the other hand, is by the constitution of the State vested only with the command of its militia and navy. (Hamilton, 1788)

The War Powers Resolution and Congressional Action

Amid escalating concerns over executive overreach, particularly following the Vietnam War, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution in 1973. This act was designed to reassert congressional control over decisions that place U.S. forces in hostilities, reflecting concerns that the President's unilateral decisions could involve the nation in prolonged conflicts without legislative oversight. President Nixon vetoed the resolution, viewing it as an infringement on executive authority. However, Congress responded by overriding the veto, signaling a rare bipartisan consensus on limiting executive power and reaffirming Congress's role in authorizing military engagements (Weed, 2019, p. 1).

The War Powers Resolution requires the President to notify Congress within 48 hours when deploying troops into hostilities and mandates a withdrawal within 60 to 90 days unless Congress explicitly authorizes an extension. The Resolution aimed to curb the growing trend of unilateral executive actions in military affairs and to clarify the separation of powers in wartime decisions (H.R. 287, 1973).

Challenges to the War Powers Resolution

Despite its intent, the War Powers Resolution has faced challenges across all branches of government:

1. Executive Branch: Successive presidents have argued that the War Powers Resolution limits their constitutional role as Commander-in-Chief and have narrowly interpreted key terms, such as "hostilities," to justify bypassing congressional oversight. This interpretation has enabled military actions to occur without formally invoking the Resolution's requirements (Koh, 2011).
2. Judicial Branch: In *INS v. Chadha* (1983), the Supreme Court ruled against legislative vetoes, casting doubt on Congress's authority to compel the President to withdraw troops through concurrent resolutions (INS v. Chadha, 1983; Collier, 1984, p. 10). This decision weakened the enforcement mechanisms Congress had intended.
3. Legislative Inaction: Despite creating the War Powers Resolution, Congress has often refrained from challenging presidential actions, sometimes failing to summon the political will to pass legislation that would end or restrict conflicts (Weed, 2019, pp. 9-62). This inaction has

undermined the Resolution's purpose and contributed to the erosion of congressional authority in military matters.

Presidents have consistently asserted that the War Powers Resolution infringes on executive power, leading to varied levels of compliance. Even with the Resolution in place, many presidents claim broad, unilateral authority to deploy military forces in defense of national interests, creating an undefined threshold of what actions constitute "war" and require congressional approval (Weed, 2019, p. 6).

The Total Force Policy and the National Guard's Role

Article I, Section 8, Clauses 15 and 16 make up the "militia clauses" of the Constitution. The Constitutional Charter for the Guard confirms that Article 1 Sec. 8 serves as the basis for the National Guard. "The Army National Guard's charter is the Constitution of the United States. Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution contains a series of 'militia clauses,' vesting distinct authority and responsibilities in the federal government and the state governments" (National Guard Bureau, n.d.).

The Constitution requires Congress to declare war before the president can commit troops to any offensive military action. Following this constitutional logic, any overseas deployment of the National Guard purely for combat operations exceeds the authority of the executive branch unless authorized by Congress, especially without a formal declaration of war. Limiting the Guard's combat role to situations backed by a congressional declaration of war would align federal actions with constitutional intent, preserving the original balance between state and federal responsibilities.

Article I, Section 8's militia clauses form the constitutional charter for the National Guard, defining when and how the federal government can call upon these state-controlled forces. They underscore the importance of Congress's role in authorizing combat deployments, reinforcing that foreign engagements involving the National Guard should ideally follow a formal declaration of war. This framework protects the intended balance of power and ensures that the National Guard's deployment aligns with both constitutional principles and the collective will of the people through their representatives (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15; U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 16).

The War Powers Resolution represents Congress's effort to reassert its constitutional authority over military engagements, but it has faced substantial resistance. The executive branch's narrow interpretations, judicial rulings limiting legislative power, and Congress's reluctance to challenge the President have collectively undermined the Resolution's intended effect. This ongoing struggle over the constitutional balance of war powers illustrates the tension inherent in the U.S. system of separated powers, as each branch continues to interpret its role in wartime decision-making in ways that both reflect and challenge the intentions of the Framers.

Civil Defense and Homeland Security during the Total Force Policy Era

The period between 1965 and 1975 marked a significant transformation in American civil defense policy, characterized by a shift from purely military preparedness to an integrated approach encompassing both national security and natural disaster response. This evolution occurred against the backdrop of the Total Force Policy era, where the military began integrating active duty, reserve, and National Guard components into a unified force structure. Similarly, civil defense underwent its own integration, attempting to merge traditional defense preparedness with natural disaster response capabilities. This section examines how a series of natural disasters, changing geopolitical circumstances, and domestic priorities reshaped the federal government's approach to civilian protection and emergency management.

The Path to Change: Natural Disasters and Policy Evolution

A series of major natural disasters rattled the nation in 1965. Hurricanes Hilda and Betsy devastated the Southeast, an Alaskan earthquake caused a damaging tidal wave in California, and a lethal tornado swept through Indiana on Palm Sunday in 1965. Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana sponsored legislation that granted emergency Federal loan assistance to disaster victims. The bill passed in 1966, and Bayh urged Congress over the next few years to provide even more disaster assistance to citizens. The concept of all-hazards assistance was gaining adherents, at the expense of civil preparedness for attack on the homeland (Steinberg, 2000, pp. 174-175).

The Vietnam War further complicated civil defense priorities during the Johnson years. As the war progressed, it demanded increasing amounts of time, money, and resources. Although civil defense efforts continued to receive modest funding, and would for the next twelve years, no major steps were taken to enhance overall capabilities (Blanchard, 1986, p. 15; Kerr, 1983, p. 142).

Public interest in traditional civil defense measures had declined significantly by this time. Several historians attribute this waning enthusiasm to multiple factors: a diminished perception of risk, psychological numbing to the destruction of nuclear weapons, and a growing belief that civil defense measures would not ultimately be effective in the event of nuclear war (Boyer, 1984, p. 830). This shift in public sentiment was evident in the lack of support for ambitious shelter building projects and evacuation drills (Kincade, 1978, p. 105).

Nixon's Dual-Use Approach and Organizational Change

By the time President Nixon entered office, public and government interest in civil defense had fallen precipitously from its peak in the early 1960s. However, the devastating impact of Hurricane Camille in August 1969 exposed critical weaknesses in federal disaster response capabilities and catalyzed a fundamental shift in civil defense policy. The hurricane's aftermath highlighted the urgent need for a more coordinated and comprehensive approach to disaster management.

In response, the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) position was created through the Disaster Relief Act of 1969. The FCO, appointed by the President, was responsible for managing federal disaster assistance directly in affected areas. This role represented an important step toward more coordinated disaster response, though its effectiveness was initially limited by the fragmented nature of federal emergency management (Homeland Security National Preparedness Task Force, 2006, p. 15).

In June 1970, the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) released its comprehensive assessment in National Security Study Memorandum 57, which starkly concluded that the Nation's preparedness for natural disasters was minimal to nonexistent (Blanchard, 1986, p. 17). This led to two significant policy changes through National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 184: the establishment of a "dual-use approach" to Federal citizen preparedness programs and the replacement of the Office of Civil Defense with the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA) (Homeland Security National Preparedness Task Force, 2006, p. 14).

The decision to adopt the dual-use approach was influenced significantly by resource constraints. Civil defense funding during Nixon's first term barely exceeded the low $80 million per year level of the Eisenhower Administration when adjusted for inflation (Blanchard, 1986, p. 19). This limited funding made the efficiency advantages of the dual-use approach particularly attractive to policymakers.

The shift toward natural disaster preparedness aligned with broader foreign policy objectives, particularly the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD) and arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. The signing of SALT I in 1972, which limited anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense deployment sites, made it politically advantageous to reduce emphasis on nuclear attack preparedness (Blanchard, 1986, p. 18).

State and local authorities welcomed the dual-use approach, as it allowed them to address specific regional hazards while maintaining basic attack preparedness capabilities. This localized focus encouraged new coordination and participation that had been lacking in previous purely nuclear-focused planning (Dynes & Quarantelli, 1975). Planning for natural disasters was perceived to be more effective, less resource intensive, and able to deliver tangible benefits at the state and local level.

The Nixon administration implemented sweeping organizational changes to support the new dual-use policy. The creation of the DCPA was followed by Reorganization Plans 1 and 2 (1970 and 1973), which redistributed emergency management responsibilities across multiple federal agencies. Executive Order 11725 of 1973 further dispersed preparedness tasks among agencies including HUD, the General Services Administration, and the Departments of the Treasury and Commerce (Homeland Security National Preparedness Task Force, 2006, p. 16).

This reorganization, however, created significant implementation challenges. The new bureaucratic structure dispersed responsibility for disaster relief across more than 100 federal agencies, leading to coordination difficulties and ineffective response capabilities (Haddow & Bullock, 2003, p. 5).

The Disaster Relief Act of 1974 attempted to address some of these bureaucratic inefficiencies (H.R. 12412, 1974). The Act provided direct assistance to individuals and families following disasters and established a mechanism for involving state and local governments in all-hazards preparedness activities. It also provided matching funds for state and local programs, though overall funding remained comparable to pre-Kennedy levels (Homeland Security National Preparedness Task Force, 2006, p. 16).

Relationship with the Texas Disaster Act of 1975

As the federal government expanded its role in disaster relief, states began to develop their own mechanisms for emergency management. In Texas, the Legislature passed the Civil Protection Act in 1951, establishing the Office of Defense and Disaster Relief and the Disaster Relief Council, headed by the governor (Grubbs, 2019). This action was largely motivated by growing concerns about the threat of nuclear war, highlighting how disaster preparedness often reflected contemporary geopolitical anxieties.

Recognizing the need for national coordination to complement federal efforts, the Council of State Governments (CSG) drafted an "Example Disaster Act" in 1972 and distributed it to state legislatures across the country (Office of Emergency Preparedness, 1972, p. 4). This model legislation quickly gained traction, with many states passing identical or similar bills.

In Texas, the push for comprehensive disaster legislation found a champion in Senator Aaron Robert "Babe" Schwartz. Representing Galveston, a coastal area frequently affected by hurricanes, Schwartz had witnessed the devastating impacts of several major storms during his tenure, including Hurricanes Audrey (1957), Carla (1961), Beulah (1967), and Celia (1970) (Roth, 2010, pp. 9-10). These experiences motivated Schwartz to advocate for stronger disaster response mechanisms at the state level.

The CSG's Example Disaster Act of 1972 provided Schwartz with the template he needed to advance his legislative agenda. On March 9, 1973, he filed Senate Bill 786, which closely mirrored the CSG's model

legislation (S.B. 786, 1973). The bill moved swiftly through the legislative process, with committee hearings and floor debates lasting only a few minutes each. Governor Dolph Briscoe signed the Texas Disaster Act into law on May 28, 1973, making Texas one of the first 22 states to adopt legislation based on the CSG's model (Voit, 1995, p. 35).

The Texas Disaster Act of 1973 granted significant powers to the executive branch, allowing for the issuance of executive orders with "the force and effect of law," the suspension of existing laws, and the declaration of a state of disaster. The Act also provided a mechanism for the legislature to terminate a state of disaster "by concurrent resolution" at any time (S.B. 786, 1973). While these provisions raised potential constitutional concerns, there is no evidence that the legislature addressed these issues during the bill's consideration.

The Texas Disaster Act of 1975, (HB 2032, 1975) by State Representative Joe Allen, addressed and clarified issues in the previous disaster legislation, formally creating the Division of Disaster Emergency Services under the governor's office. This Act redefined aspects of the Texas disaster response, giving the executive branch the power to suspend laws and enforce orders during a state of emergency. However, it introduced significant concerns regarding the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches, most notably altering the legislature's authority to terminate a disaster declaration.

Where the 1973 Act had stipulated that the legislature could end a disaster by a "concurrent resolution," the 1975 Act changed this to require termination "by law" (S.B. 786, 1973; HB 2032, 1975) This change effectively allowed the governor to unilaterally maintain disaster declarations until the legislature, convening only biennially, could pass a law to revoke it. The Texas legislature, unable to call itself into session, must rely on the governor to convene a special session for any such action. Additionally, since any new law must be approved by the executive, the governor could, in effect, perpetuate a state of disaster without legislative oversight (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2023).

This framework presents a risk of consolidating power within the executive branch. This permits a “one-branch rule," allowing the governor unchecked authority over the state’s laws and functions during a disaster declaration. Given that Texas, unlike many other states, meets only biennially, there could theoretically be up to 18 months where legislative intervention is delayed.

Some states, like Alaska, have provisions requiring the legislature to review any disaster declaration within days of issuance, providing a timely check on executive power. These approaches offer models Texas might consider to restore balance and ensure timely legislative oversight while preserving the state’s emergency response framework. The Texas Disaster Act must be amended to be in line with the Texas Constitution. This will protect the separation of powers and safeguard Texans' rights against potential executive overreach during prolonged emergencies (Garcia, 2021, p. 15).

The Evolution of Civil Defense: From Ford to Reagan

The mid-1970s marked a significant shift in Cold War strategy that directly impacted civil defense policy. The doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) gradually gave way to more nuanced approaches, including the concept of limited nuclear strikes against strategic military and industrial targets rather than population centers. This strategic evolution complicated the already challenging landscape of civil defense policy inherited from the Nixon administration.

The organizational fragmentation initiated under Nixon became increasingly problematic during Ford's tenure. Three separate agencies held primary responsibility for civil defense: the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) advised the President, the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Federal

Disaster Assistance Agency managed disaster relief, and the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA) coordinated state and local preparedness efforts (Kerr, 1983, p. 148).

Recognizing these structural problems, Congressional committees began investigating the disjointed nature of civil defense administration. In 1976, two significant recommendations emerged: the House Armed Services Committee proposed placing civil defense management within the Executive Office of the President, while the Joint Committee on Defense Production advocated combining the three primary agencies into a single entity (Kerr, 1983, p. 148).

Under Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, the Ford administration attempted progress through the Civil Rights Program (CRP), which included modest budget increases in 1975 for city evacuation plans and population defense measures (Kincade, 1978, p. 108). However, these increases proved short-lived, as civil defense continued its perennial struggle against traditional military expenditures for limited resources. The following year, the modest gains were reversed as funds were redirected to offensive military capabilities (Kincade, 1978, p. 114). Overall funding remained stagnant, continuing at levels similar to the Nixon years. The Congressional Research Service's 1976 evaluation was damning, labeling U.S. civil defense efforts "a charade" (Wolfe, n.d.).

The Carter Years: Reform Attempts and FEMA's Creation

President Carter immediately recognized the need to address the fragmented civil defense bureaucracy. His administration initiated an interagency study that led to the Presidential Review Memorandum 32 in September 1977. The study endorsed the previous Congressional committees' recommendations for consolidating civil defense agencies under unified leadership with direct White House access (Homeland Security National Preparedness Task Force, 2006, p. 18).

In September 1978, Carter issued Presidential Directive (PD) 41, which attempted to clarify the administration's civil defense vision. The directive positioned civil defense as an element of "enhanced deterrence and stability" but notably lacked any specific implementation plan (Blanchard, 1986, p. 21). The administration concluded that pursuing "equivalent survivability" with the Soviet Union was unnecessary, effectively limiting the scope of civil defense ambitions (Homeland Security National Preparedness Task Force, 2006, p. 18).

The debate over creating a unified disaster preparedness agency gained unexpected urgency on March 28, 1979, when an unprecedented civilian nuclear accident occurred at Three Mile Island near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania (Raum, 1979). The incident exposed critical weaknesses in disaster response: slow reaction times, poor coordination between local and federal authorities, and significant communication failures (Haddow & Bullock, 2003, p. 5). These failures provided concrete evidence of the need for centralized emergency management and directly influenced subsequent policy decisions.

Partially catalyzed by the Three Mile Island crisis, Carter issued Executive Order 12148 on July 20, 1979, establishing the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Homeland Security National Preparedness Task Force, 2006, p. 18). This represented the largest consolidation of civil defense efforts in U.S. history, bringing together:

- The Federal Insurance Administration
- The National Fire Prevention and Control Administration
- The National Weather Service Community Preparedness Program
- The Federal Preparedness Agency of the General Services Administration
- The Federal Disaster Assistance Administration activities from HUD

However, ambitious plans faced familiar obstacles. Carter's 1980 budget request of $108 million proved inadequate for implementing the new structure (Kerr, 1983, p. 160), and Congress rejected higher funding requests the following year, prioritizing other initiatives (Kerr, 1983, p. 165). Congressional leaders faced little public opposition to these funding decisions, as most Americans had lost faith in the government's ability to mitigate nuclear war impacts. Some communities openly refused to participate in Civil Rights Programs, believing they would prove ineffective in an actual nuclear attack. This deep public skepticism would persist throughout the remainder of the Cold War period, fundamentally shaping civil defense policy possibilities (Homeland Security National Preparedness Task Force, 2006, p. 19).

The Reagan Era: Reviving Dual-Use and Integrated Management

The Reagan administration initially signaled intentions to build upon previous civil defense foundations. A significant milestone came in December 1981 when Congress amended the 1950 Civil Defense Act, officially sanctioning the dual-use approach by allowing civil defense funds to support both natural disaster preparation and homeland attack response (Blanchard, 1986, p. 22). The amendment contained an important stipulation: while funding and planning for peacetime disasters were now officially sanctioned, these activities could not overtly detract from attack preparedness programs. Despite this caveat, the legislation promoted dual-use concepts reminiscent of the Nixon era's approach (Homeland Security National Preparedness Task Force, 2006, p. 20).

FEMA responded in 1983 with the innovative Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS), designed to develop comprehensive all-hazard preparedness plans at the federal level (Blanchard, 1986, p. 23). The IEMS emphasized local context, tasking state civil defense planners with developing multihazard preparedness plans based on specific regional threats. Under this system, state planners would facilitate the development of preparedness plans tailored to local hazards while maintaining consistency with federal guidelines. The system aimed to create "direction, control and warning systems which are common to the full range of emergencies from small, isolated events to the ultimate emergency -- war" (Homeland Security National Preparedness Task Force, 2006, p. 20).

Despite IEMS's attempt to bridge the gap between civil defense and disaster preparedness, Congress remained unconvinced about its ability to effectively manage all-hazard preparedness. Specifically, legislators questioned whether the system could adequately balance local disaster preparation with national defense requirements. This skepticism manifested in persistent underfunding, as Congress consistently failed to meet FEMA's requested budget levels. This financial constraint continued the historical pattern of ambitious civil defense initiatives being hampered by insufficient resources.

In the closing years of the Reagan Administration, efforts were made to address concerns about non-attack preparedness through policy refinements. The 1986 Meese Memorandum, issued as Executive Order 12656, assigned specific lead roles to various federal agencies based on disaster types, ensuring a more structured federal response across diverse scenarios. This delegation clarified inter-agency responsibilities, marking a step forward in federal preparedness (Sylves & Cumming, 2004).

Then, on November 23, 1988, the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 was amended to become the Stafford Act. This amendment significantly clarified FEMA's role in disaster management, formally establishing the process for disaster declarations and defining the statutory basis for federal assistance during emergencies. With the Stafford Act, FEMA's mandate in coordinating federal disaster response and recovery efforts was solidified, setting the foundation for how the agency would handle future crises. However, as disasters unfolded in subsequent years, FEMA’s role and effectiveness would be subject to scrutiny and calls for further improvement (H.R. 12412, 1974).

The period from Ford through Reagan thus represented both continuity and change in civil defense policy. While organizational structures evolved significantly, culminating in FEMA's creation and the IEMS approach, persistent challenges remained: insufficient funding, public skepticism, and the difficulty of balancing attack preparedness with natural disaster response. The era demonstrated both the enduring appeal of integrated emergency management and the substantial obstacles to its effective implementation, a tension that would continue to shape homeland security policy well into the future.

The Counterdrug Program: A Pivotal Collaboration in Combating Transnational Threats

The Counterdrug Program, authorized under Section 112, Title 32, United States Code (32 U.S.C. § 112), has become central to the United States' strategy against drug trafficking and related transnational threats. By leveraging the distinct capabilities of the military and fostering collaboration with civilian law enforcement, this program has played a crucial role in disrupting illicit drug operations and supporting national security. Over the decades, this initiative has evolved, reflecting a blend of legislative measures, operational adaptations, and legal frameworks designed to maximize interagency cooperation.

Historical Context and Legal Framework

The origins of the Counterdrug Program trace back to the early 1980s, a period when urbanization and population growth along the U.S.-Mexico border contributed to rising illegal immigration and drug smuggling concerns (Dunn, 1996). In response to these challenges, Congress passed the Defense Authorization Act of 1982, which clarified and expanded the permissible roles of the military in assisting civilian law enforcement. Although this act did not directly amend the Posse Comitatus Act, it allowed military assets and personnel to provide logistical and intelligence support within defined legal limits, an essential step in the evolving War on Drugs (Matthews, 2006).

Further expansion of military support came with the passage of Chapter 15 of Title 10, "Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials" (10 U.S.C. 15), in 1981. While this legislation permitted general military cooperation with civilian agencies, its specific intent was to empower the Department of Defense (DoD) to increase counterdrug support activities without violating Posse Comitatus restrictions on direct military involvement in domestic law enforcement (H.R. 3519, 1981). The Defense Drug Interdiction Assistance Act of 1986 further clarified the boundaries for military support, authorizing the DoD to operate and maintain equipment loaned to law enforcement agencies, conduct training, and share intelligence relevant to criminal activity.

Funding and Implementation

Congress has consistently allocated funds to the Department of Defense specifically for counterdrug operations, channeled through the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counter Narcotics and Global Threats (DASD/CN). Unlike other military support roles that may require cost-sharing or reimbursement, these counterdrug allocations support a unique and dedicated function without reimbursement requirements, underscoring the priority placed on counterdrug missions (Center for Law and Military Operations, 2024, pp. 144-145).

The National Guard Counterdrug (CD) program is managed through the National Guard Bureau's (NGB) J3/4/7's J32-CD Division, which involves both active duty and National Guard full-time participation. Congress's continued financial support has allowed the program to expand and sustain itself as a comprehensive component of the nation's counterdrug strategy (National Guard Bureau, 2020).

National Guard Participation

National Guard units play a unique role in the Counterdrug Program by placing members (M-Day or Federal Technicians) on Full-Time National Guard Duty - Counter Drug (FTNGD-CD) orders under 32 U.S.C. § 502(f). Under this designation, National Guard personnel can engage in specific counterdrug activities and collaborate directly with civilian law enforcement. Members serving under FTNGD-CD are aligned with statutory provisions of the Counterdrug Program (32 U.S.C. § 112), but they also have the flexibility to transition to federal active duty under Title 10 or State Active Duty (SAD) status, if necessary (Center for Law and Military Operations, 2024, pp. 68).

The Texas National Guard was among the early adopters of the Counterdrug Program, initiating support operations in 1985 after President Ronald Reagan's declaration of the War on Drugs. Alongside National Guard units from New Mexico, Florida, and California, the Texas National Guard was among the first to conduct counter-narcotics support missions in collaboration with law enforcement. These early efforts underscored the commitment of state forces to national security objectives, setting the stage for the formal establishment of the National Guard Counterdrug Program (Moura, 2019).

The ability of the National Guard to operate under Title 32 allows it to bridge federal and state missions, supporting law enforcement in ways that regular active-duty forces cannot. This distinct status enables the National Guard to support local law enforcement agencies effectively while remaining under state control.

Program Expansion and Enhanced Capabilities

Despite wide public perception that the United States had lost control of its borders, Department of Defense and law enforcement officials continued to oppose an increased DOD role in securing them (Government Accountability Office, 1988).

A New York Times article in 1986 questioned the DOD's reluctance to participate in protecting the border from foreign threats, noting how easily terrorists could exploit this weakness:

> The day can easily be foreseen when one of our cities is held hostage by a terrorist group or a terrorist state; the stuff of novels can quickly become reality. At that point, we would be asking: how did they get the bomb into our country? Whose job was it to stop the incoming weapon at our border? Why have we spent trillions on defense when any maniac can fly in a bomb that can destroy a city? (Felicetti & Luce, 2003, p. 160)

However, in September 1988, Congress enacted legislation to increase the role of the military in drug interdiction as part of the Defense Authorization Act for 1989. The conference committee bill required the DOD "to plan and budget for the effective detection and monitoring of all potential aerial and maritime threats to the national security." It also designated the DOD as the lead federal agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the country (H.R. 4481, 1988).

The 1989 Defense Authorization Act significantly expanded the Department of Defense's (DoD) role in supporting civilian law enforcement, particularly in counter-drug efforts, while preserving core military readiness and maintaining civilian control over direct law enforcement activities. Specifically, this legislation amended 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-378 to formalize and broaden the assistance that military personnel could offer to civilian authorities. The Secretary of Defense was now mandated to consider the requirements of civilian law enforcement when planning military training exercises or operations, emphasizing the importance of integrating drug-related intelligence sharing with law enforcement agencies (Felicetti & Luce, 2003, p. 161).

Additionally, DoD personnel and equipment were authorized to intercept vessels and aircraft detected outside of the U.S., redirecting them to areas designated by civilian law enforcement, thereby bolstering interdiction capabilities on an international scale. The Act also removed prior restrictions from 10 U.S.C. § 375, which had limited the DoD's participation in interdiction operations, while maintaining restrictions on direct law enforcement actions like search, seizure, and arrest, as reaffirmed in the re-ratified non-preemption provision of 10 U.S.C. § 378 (Felicetti & Luce, 2003, p. 161).

Another significant shift was the elimination of the requirement for the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense to jointly determine the existence of an emergency before authorizing military assistance. This legislative change facilitated a more streamlined and responsive DoD support structure, aimed at enhancing drug interdiction and counter-drug intelligence efforts without necessitating a formal emergency declaration (Felicetti & Luce, 2003, p. 161).

The provisions of the 1989 Act reflect a clear congressional intent to expand DoD's direct involvement in law enforcement, with an emphasis on supporting civilian authorities in countering drug-related threats. This broadened mandate underscored the evolving role of the military in domestic and international drug interdiction while maintaining a careful balance between military readiness and the primacy of civilian law enforcement in direct policing functions.

Throughout the 1990s, the Counterdrug Program expanded to support not only law enforcement but also community-based organizations that play a crucial role in drug prevention. This expanded mission allowed the program to operate domestically in a support role, providing a model for effective civil-military operations that respect the rule of law and legal constraints.

Guard 2.0 & 2.5: Historical Analysis of the National Guard Transformation, 1984-2001

The Army National Guard (ARNG) underwent significant transformations between 1984 and 2001, a period known as Guard 2.0 and 2.5. This era was marked by increased structure, standardized training, and improved readiness practices, as the United States adapted to the evolving threats of the Cold War and the post-Cold War world (Doubler, 2003, p. 248).

Guard 2.0: The Reagan-Era Military Buildup

In The Reagan administration, determined to restore American military strength and counter the threat of the Soviet Union, presided over the largest peacetime military buildup in U.S. history. This unprecedented commitment to expanding and modernizing the nation's defense capabilities led to a doubling of the Pentagon's budget between 1980 and 1985, setting the stage for a global increase in America's military reach and influence (Wirls, 1992, pp. 31-41). Reagan's fiscal priorities and strategic doctrines set his administration apart from previous presidencies, positioning a reinvigorated military as the cornerstone of America's stance against Soviet expansion and enhancing global perceptions of U.S. strength.

The Reagan administration's approach to defense spending represented a marked shift from prior administrations, largely due to its rejection of the fiscal constraints that had previously shaped U.S. military policy. The administration challenged the notion of limited resources, which had led to the creation of the Total Force Policy—a policy designed to integrate the Reserve Components with the Regular Army to maximize military effectiveness within budgetary limits. By contrast, Reagan's administration aimed to expand military capabilities beyond these constraints (Winkler, 2015, pp. 167-183).

Rather than increasing the size of the Regular Army substantially, however, Congress focused on expanding the Reserve Components, which remained short by approximately 175,000 trained personnel from their FY 1986 wartime objectives (Markel et al., 2020, p. 44). This congressional focus underscored the commitment to an expanded, agile force while still leveraging the integration principles of the Total Force Policy.

During this period, the Total Force Policy continued to evolve, as the Reagan administration refined its focus on integrating the Reserve Components into operational plans. Through policies such as the Presidential Select Reserve Call-Up Authority, the administration streamlined Reserve Components' accessibility, reflecting the policy's maturation in response to an increasingly complex strategic environment. Although the military's primary focus remained on the Soviet Union, the expanded and integrated force posture allowed the Army to prepare for contingencies in other regions as well, meeting the administration's desire for both a Soviet-focused deterrent and a globally capable military (Doubler, 2003, p. 247-249).

Throughout the 1980s, the Army worked to improve the readiness and accessibility of its Reserve Components, aiming to reduce the disparities in readiness and training between Reserve and Regular Army units. Authorized strength for the Army Selected Reserve rose from approximately 544,000 in 1977 to 780,000 by 1991. Key to this improvement were expanded recruiting and training opportunities, including rotations at the newly developed NTC, which provided Reserve units with access to high-quality training environments previously reserved for Regular Army units (Markel et al., 2020, p. 47).

Additionally, the Reagan buildup facilitated the provision of more modern equipment for Reserve Components, although equipment shortages remained a common challenge to achieving complete readiness (Reserve Forces Policy Board, 1988, pp. 122-124). Equipment was allocated under a "first to fight" principle, with some Reserve units prioritized over Regular Army units to ensure that those most likely to be mobilized would have access to the best resources (Reserve Forces Policy Board, 1988, p. xx).

Despite these limitations, the Reagan administration's commitment to Total Force Policy helped ensure that the Reserve Components would remain a fundamental part of national defense strategy. The combination of increased funding, advanced training, and equipment modernization during this period significantly enhanced the Reserve Components' operational proficiency and solidified their role in both immediate and future defense planning.

However, it is worth noting that the Reagan Defense Buildup, while successful in revitalizing the U.S. military's capabilities, also led to an increase in national debt and sparked concerns about over-reliance on technological advancements potentially at the expense of personnel readiness. Additionally, while the buildup bolstered deterrence and readiness, the swift expansion of the defense budget raised debates over long-term fiscal sustainability and resource prioritization

Divided Loyalties: Perpich v. U.S. Department of Defense and the Army National Guard's Evolving Federal Status

The Army National Guard (ARNG) has long held a dual status as both a state militia and a federal reserve force. This unique position has led to conflicts between state governors and the federal government, particularly regarding the deployment of ARNG units for overseas training and operations. The case of *Perpich v. U.S. Department of Defense* in the mid-1980s highlighted this tension and ultimately strengthened the federal government's authority over the National Guard.

ARNG Participation in Overseas Deployment Training (ODT)

In the 1980s, ARNG units participated extensively in overseas deployment training (ODT) as part of efforts to improve their readiness and increase their relevance. These deployments rose steadily from approximately 4,200 soldiers in FY 1981 to nearly 40,000 soldiers in 1991 (Reserve Forces Policy Board, 1992, p. 95). Many of these ODT exercises took place in Central America, inserting the ARNG into the controversy surrounding U.S. foreign policy in the region (Markel et al., 2020, p. 61).

Some governors, such as Michael Dukakis of Massachusetts and Rudy Perpich of Minnesota, attempted to assert their authority to prevent units from their states from participating in missions whose purpose they opposed. In response, Congress amended Title 10 of the U.S. Code to prevent governors from withholding their consent "because of any objection to the location, purpose, type, or schedule of such active duty" (10 U.S.C. § 12301). The House Armed Services Committee even considered withholding federal funds from states that declined to participate in such training and operations (Markel et al., 2020, p. 61).

Perpich v. U.S. Department of Defense

When the Department of Defense deployed a Minnesota National Guard unit to Honduras for ODT in 1987, Governor Perpich assented under the constraints of the "Montgomery Amendment" but sued to reverse what he viewed as the abrogation of his authority over the National Guard under the constitution's militia clause (Cooper, 1991; Curtis, 1988; Beckman, 1991). The case went to the U.S. Supreme Court, where a unanimous decision determined that the National Guard's dual status gave the President ample authority to determine the time, place, manner, and conduct of training for National Guard units and individuals in a federal status (Cooper, 1991; Curtis, 1988; Beckman, 1991).

The 1990 Supreme Court case *Perpich v. Department of Defense* explains that the National Guard is composed of two overlapping but distinct organizations: the State National Guards and the National Guard of the United States (*Perpich v. U.S. Department of Defense*, 1990, p. 345). When individuals enlist in a State's National Guard, they must also simultaneously enlist in the National Guard of the United States, as it is a reserve component of the armed forces (*Perpich v. U.S. Department of Defense*, 1990, p. 345; 10 U.S.C. § 10101).

Federal and State Roles

While the State National Guards are primarily funded by the federal government, the governor of each state remains in charge of the National Guard unless it is called into active federal service. This is supported by case law, including *Holdiness v. Stroud* (1987) and *Blackwell v. United States* (1963). The National Guard receives significant federal funding, which supports training, equipment, and operations. However, primary control remains with the state governor unless federalized, which involves the Guard being called into active duty under federal orders.

Perpich v. U.S. Department of Defense and the reasoning behind the Supreme Court's decision maximized the formal federal authority over the National Guard, solidifying its status as primarily a reserve component of the U.S. Army and only secondarily a militia of the various states and territories (Cooper, 1991; Curtis, 1988; Beckman, 1991). This shift in the balance of power between state and federal authorities over the National Guard reflects the ongoing evolution of the ARNG's role and identity in the U.S. military structure.

Operation Just Cause

After 15 years of internal reform, the Army regarded its transformation from a conscript-based force to a professional, volunteer force as largely complete. During this period, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 had introduced critical reforms in joint operations by enhancing the authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and streamlining the operational chain of command through unified combatant commands. This legislative shift would play a pivotal role in the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama—Operation Just Cause—the first large-scale test of joint operational capability under the new military structure (Stewart, 2010, p. 406).

In the late 1980s, escalating tensions with Panama were driven by dictator Manuel Noriega's growing support for drug trafficking and incidents of violence against U.S. soldiers and civilians. This instability prompted President George H.W. Bush gave the order for Operation Just Cause on December 17, 1989. The initial attack took place at midnight on December 20, 1989. Designed as a rapid and precise intervention, the operation aimed to neutralize the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) and remove Noriega from power with minimal casualties and damage (Scales, 1993, p. 33-34).

Just Cause presented a meticulously coordinated joint assault planned by Generals Maxwell Thurman and Carl Stiner, demonstrating the complex planning and real-time execution capabilities enabled by the Goldwater-Nichols reforms. The operation included airborne assaults on 27 different objectives across Panama, all synchronized for a nighttime execution. Many of the U.S. Army's elite forces—Rangers, Special Forces, and elements from the 82nd Airborne Division, 7th Infantry Division (Light), and 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized)—were involved, alongside the 193rd Infantry Brigade, which was permanently stationed in Panama. Support elements from the Air Force, Navy SEAL teams, and Marine Corps were seamlessly integrated into a unified command structure through a simplified, shared communication plan (Scales, 1993, p. 33).

Once initiated, Just Cause proceeded as planned, overwhelming the PDF and neutralizing key units within approximately ten hours. The success of the operation validated the Army's professionalization efforts and demonstrated the effectiveness of joint operations in achieving rapid, decisive outcomes. The ability of U.S. forces to simultaneously overwhelm multiple enemy positions with precision and coordination underscored the newfound confidence in high-quality soldiers trained for complex, high-stakes missions (Stewart, 2010, pp. 401-406).

The operational success of Just Cause foreshadowed key aspects of Desert Storm. First, it demonstrated the value of overwhelming force applied rapidly to achieve clear objectives, ensuring low casualties and minimal infrastructure damage. Additionally, Just Cause exemplified the high degree of trust that the President and his advisors placed in field commanders, granting them operational flexibility—a principle that would also shape the approach in the Gulf War (Scales, 1993, p. 34).

The challenges that arose after combat in Panama were also instructive. Soldiers quickly transitioned from combat to stability operations, including securing prisoners of war, providing humanitarian assistance, and restoring civil order. These responsibilities highlighted the complexities of post-conflict stabilization, which would prove even more daunting after Desert Storm. In both Panama and Iraq, the Army found itself taking on the role of a peacekeeping and governance force, underscoring the need for planning beyond the battlefield (Scales, 1993, p. 34).

The U.S. Army's journey through Just Cause revealed the profound impact of reform on military effectiveness. Just Cause not only underscored the Army's new professionalism but also validated the strategic and operational changes brought by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The operation marked a turning point, illustrating that integrated joint operations, enabled by a professional volunteer force, were essential for 21st-century warfare.

ANG Participation in Operation Just Cause

ANG units participated in Operation Just Cause due to their regularly scheduled presence in Panama for Operations CORONET COVE and VOLANT OAK. On December 9, 1989, the 136th Tactical Airlift Wing (TAW) deployed aircraft and personnel to Operation VOLANT OAK at Howard Air Base, Panama. From December 21 to December 24, 1989, the deployed wing members were subject to hostile ground fire but did not sustain any serious damage. During this rotation, the aircrews flew 55 sorties, 39 of which were combat sorties in support of Operation Just Cause (National Guard Bureau, 1990, pp. 36-37, 42, 67).

Congressional Involvement and Debate

Before the invasion, Congress had called for the President to intensify unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral measures and consult with other nations on ways to coordinate efforts to remove General Noriega from power (H.R. 2991, 1989). The Senate had adopted an amendment supporting the President's use of appropriate diplomatic, economic, and military options to restore constitutional government in Panama and remove General Noriega from power. However, the Senate defeated an amendment authorizing the President to use U.S. military force to secure Noriega's removal "notwithstanding any other provision of law" (S. 1711, 1989).

Everything Changes: The Soviet Union Collapses

The collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s brought significant shifts in the global order, directly impacting the U.S. military and the National Guard. With the Soviet threat removed, the U.S. aimed to maintain a Regular Army capable of handling remaining threats with less reliance on reserve components (Doubler, 2003, p. 256). Mikhail Gorbachev’s rise to power in 1985 marked the beginning of Soviet reforms aimed at reducing military expenses. By the end of 1989, symbolic events like the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe signaled the Cold War’s end (Stewart, 2010, pp. 413-416).

In the U.S., the "peace dividend" became a rallying call for reduced defense spending, despite President George H. W. Bush's warnings about remaining global threats. Public opinion favored reallocating resources toward social programs, and the Bush Administration developed "Quicksilver," a comprehensive plan to reduce the military by 25% over the next decade (Wirls, 1992, pp. 20-223).

Congress opposed drastic cuts to the reserve components, arguing that reserves were a cost-effective option. The Senate Appropriations Committee emphasized reliance on the "roundout division" structure, requesting the establishment of a "super roundout division" with two Guard/Reserve brigades and one active brigade (Markel et al., 2020, p. 64).

The National Guard addressed readiness issues in the late 1980s with extensive reorganizations—the largest since 1968. Demographic changes required shifting units: a brigade from Vermont moved to Texas, and one in Massachusetts was deactivated. The National Guard Bureau consolidated the 50th and 26th Divisions to form a single, strengthened division in the northeast (National Guard Bureau, 1988, pp. 34-38, 61).

Following a historic peak of 456,980 soldiers in 1989, the ARNG prepared for cuts. In January 1990, the Army informed the ARNG of a planned reduction of 10,000 soldiers to meet budget targets (Doubler, p. 60). However, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, shifted focus, with the ensuing threat to oil reserves in Saudi Arabia putting defense cuts on hold (National Guard Bureau, 1990, p. 20).

The Total Force Policy in a New Era: National Guard Participation in the Persian Gulf War

The 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War is often cited as a validation of the Total Force Policy, which aimed to integrate the Army's reserve components into the active duty force. However, the context in which the policy was designed and implemented had changed dramatically by the time Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. This essay examines the reserve component's participation and performance during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and assesses the implications of the war for the future of the Total Force Policy in a new strategic environment.

Road to War

In the years leading up to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Southwest Asia had been plagued by turmoil and conflict. The overthrow of the Iranian government by Islamic fundamentalists in 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan later that year, and the prolonged Iran-Iraq War throughout the 1980s contributed to the region's instability (Scales, 1993, pp. 42-43).

As tensions escalated in the Persian Gulf, President George H. W. Bush and his national security advisors closely monitored the situation. Following consultations with U.S. defense officials and a request for assistance from Saudi Arabia's King Fahd, the United States launched Operation Desert Shield on August 7, 1990, initiating a massive buildup of Allied combat power in the region (Scales, 1993, pp. 44-45).

Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird had originally designed the Total Force Policy to provide a fiscally feasible conventional deterrent against the numerically superior Warsaw Pact forces. By August 1990, however, the Soviet Union had effectively collapsed, leaving the U.S. Army with excess capacity. In this new context, the Persian Gulf War served less as a test of the Total Force Policy as originally conceived, and more as an experiment in how the Army would meet the needs of a new and uncertain era (Stewart, 2010, pp. 416-427).

Operation Desert Shield

Initial Deployment and Reserve Component Mobilization

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, took the United States and its allies by surprise (Markel et al., 2020, p. 66; Woodward, 1991, pp. 206-208; Gordon & Trainor, 1995, pp. 4-30). In response, President George H. W. Bush quickly decided to deploy military forces to deter further Iraqi aggression (Scales, 1993, p. 45). The XVIII Airborne Corps, consisting of the 82nd Division Ready Brigades (DRB) Airborne Division, formed the heart of the Army's initial contribution (Scales, 1993, p. 48-51). The 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) were soon to follow (Scales, 1993, pp. 87-90)

The rapid deployment of U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia highlighted the need for extensive logistical support (Scales, 1993, pp. 60-63). Central Command planners recognized that the creation of an adequate logistical base in Saudi Arabia would be impossible without the immediate call-up of National Guard and Reserve units (Scales, 1993, p. 45).

These Regular Army divisions required considerable reserve component support, as 73 percent of the Army's support forces were in the reserve component (Scales, 1993, pp. 48-54). On August 7, 1990, the same day the 82nd Airborne began its deployment, the National Guard Directorate started preparations for a major mobilization. The Army requested Guard volunteers, with a particular focus on Arabic-

speaking linguists, military lawyers, chaplains, and aviation support personnel (National Guard Bureau, 1990, pp. 1, 22, 42, 57).

President Bush opted for an incremental approach to the reserve component call-up, utilizing the 1976 mobilization authority under Section 673b, Title 10, U.S. Code. This authority allowed for the mobilization of 200,000 reserve component personnel for 90 days, with the option to renew for an additional 90 days (National Guard Bureau, 1990, p. 1; Doubler, 2003, p. 263). On August 22, 1990, President Bush activated almost 25,000 Army National Guard and Reserve soldiers under the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) authority (National Guard Bureau, 1990, p. 1; Reserve Forces Policy Board, 1992, p. 11).

The National Guard Bureau issued Alert Order #1 on August 24, notifying 69 Army National Guard units that they would soon be mobilized to support Operation Desert Shield. Although typically brief, this alert phase was a critical period that allowed units to begin immediate preparation for deployment. This period enabled soldiers to start necessary readiness activities in advance, essentially providing a “jump-start” for mobilization (Melnyk, 2001, p. 10).

During the alert phase, states used the time strategically to "cross-level" personnel and equipment, transferring resources from units not slated for deployment to those that were mobilizing. This proactive approach allowed Guard units to address shortfalls and streamline their resources, which proved highly effective. Remarkably, 97% of Guard units met the Army’s deployability standards on the very first day of their mobilization (Melnyk, 2001, p. 10-11).

Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm was the first application of Title 10 USC 673b legislation allowing the President to activate up to 200,000 Reservists for 90 days to meet the requirements of an operational mission. By the end of the Persian Gulf War, 62,411 ARNG soldiers in 398 units had been called to active duty, with most units meeting or exceeding Army deployment standards. In addition to the units and personnel that were federalized, 1,132 ARNG soldiers volunteered as individuals and were placed on active duty (National Guard Bureau, 1991, pp. 25, 82).

Readiness and Performance of Support Units

Almost all of the activated reserve component units were support units, including logistics and combat support units such as engineers and artillery (Brauner et al., 1992, p. 57). About 70% of these units had a readiness status of C-3 or better, indicating that they had the required resources and training to undertake major portions of their wartime missions (Brauner et al., 1992, p. 46; Reserve Forces Policy Board, 1992, p. 121). Regular Army support forces reported similar levels of readiness (Reserve Forces Policy Board, 1992, p. 121).

Support units mobilized and deployed within weeks, performing their functions effectively in combat. However, a contemporary Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that many units overstated their readiness, and that evaluations of National Guard units' readiness were even less reliable (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1991, pp. 4-5)

Roundout Brigades and Combat Unit Mobilization

While the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps received authority to activate combat troops, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney initially restricted the Army's reserve component mobilization to combat support and combat service support units (Scales, 1993, pp. 53, 131). As a result, Army divisions deploying to

Saudi Arabia in the early weeks of Desert Shield, such as the 24th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division, did so without their assigned roundout brigades plus a roundout battalion from the Texas Army National Guard (Scales, 1993, pp. 53, 131; Melnyk, 2001, p. 5).

The scope of Desert Shield changed dramatically on November 5, 1990, when President Bush signed Executive Order No. 12733, authorizing the mobilization of Guard and Reserve combat units for possible use in a ground offensive to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait (The White House, 1990; Melnyk, 2001, pp. 10-11). Between November 21-30, 1990, a total of 99 ARNG units, including most of the elements of three roundout brigades, entered active federal service (The White House, 1990; Melnyk, 2001, pp. 10-11).

The Army's handling of the roundout brigades, particularly the 48th Infantry Brigade from the Georgia ARNG and the 155th Armored Brigade from the Mississippi ARNG, became a source of great frustration for the Guard in an otherwise successful war effort. The decision not to mobilize these units alongside their parent divisions raised questions about the readiness and capabilities of ARNG combat units in the post-Cold War era. The failure of a widespread mobilization did not comprehensively validate the policy, as the majority of the National Guard remained in garrison stateside (Scales, 1993, pp. 53, 131).

Performance of Other Reserve Components

The Air National Guard contributed to the Gulf War with a notable yet limited deployment of squadrons and support personnel, marking a significant commitment to the conflict despite its small scale (Gross, 1995, pp. 185-189; Gladman, 1990, p. 15). The Army National Guard, however, faced challenges in meeting the demands of the war.

Officials indicated that many mobilized Army Guard units did not meet the required readiness standards, rendering them unsuitable for direct combat operations (Hart, 2003, p. 141; Stentiford, 2010, p. 231). General Norman Schwarzkopf's "first in, first out" policy applied uniformly across active, Guard, and Reserve forces, although it did not consider the financial and logistical implications of deploying Guard and Reserve members. Many of these personnel faced challenges from extended absences from civilian jobs, compounded by the costs associated with keeping Guard and Reserve units on active duty (Duncan, 1997, pp. 121-122).

From September 1990 to January 1991, the Texas Army National Guard mobilized eight units to support the Gulf War, with four of these deploying to the Middle East. The deployed Texas units included the 1104th Transportation Detachment, the 217th Evacuation Hospital, Company G of the 149th Aviation Battalion, and the 49th Air Traffic Control Platoon. These units, totaling 657 personnel, engaged in support operations that were crucial to the military campaign. Their tasks ranged from logistical and supply management to the transportation of personnel and equipment, medical support and evacuation services, and air traffic control functions (Olson, 1976).

Deployment of National Guard units often involves the selective mobilization of personnel with specific skills from various units, a process known as "cross-leveling." This practice enhances operational efficiency by ensuring that the personnel deployed possess the requisite capabilities, optimizing the Guard's contributions to the broader military objectives (Olson, 1976).

The Total Force Policy and the Air National Guard in the Persian Gulf War

The Air National Guard (ANG) played a significant role in supporting the U.S. military during the Persian Gulf War, demonstrating the effectiveness of the Total Force Policy in integrating reserve component forces with their active duty counterparts. One notable example of the ANG's contribution was the deployment of the Texas Air National Guard's 136th Mobile Aerial Port Squadron (MAPS) in support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (136th Airlift Wing, n.d.).

On August 27, 1990, the 136th MAPS was called to active duty and deployed to Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, becoming the first ANG unit to be activated in support of the Gulf War (136th Airlift Wing, n.d.). The unit seamlessly integrated with active U.S. Air Force units, providing critical services to the total force. On November 16 and 17, 1990, the 136th MAPS set a new U.S. Air Force record by loading 5,458,070 pounds of cargo, surpassing all previous achievements by active, guard, and reserve units (136th Airlift Wing, n.d.).

In addition to the 136th MAPS, ANG aircrews, maintainers, and support personnel were deployed to Al Ain in the United Arab Emirates, where they consolidated with other units to form the 1630th Tactical Airlift Wing (Provisional) (136th Airlift Wing, n.d.). Throughout February 1991, the 1630th Tactical Airlift Wing (Provisional) participated in a historic movement, stockpiling more than 60 days of supplies for an entire army corps within the Theater of Operations (136th Airlift Wing, n.d.).

By integrating reserve component forces with their active duty counterparts, the U.S. Air Force was able to leverage the skills and expertise of Texas Air National Guard personnel to support critical operations and achieve mission success. The performance of ANG units during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm served as a testament to the value and role that reserve component forces play in the nation's defense.

The Total Force Policy Adapts, Guard 2.5, 1992–2001

Perspectives in Conflict: Assessing Reserve Component Unit and Individual Performance in the Persian Gulf War

The Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991 served as a critical test for the U.S. military's Total Force Policy, particularly regarding the readiness and effectiveness of reserve component units. In the aftermath of the conflict, stakeholders across the Department of Defense, reserve components, and Congress commissioned numerous studies to assess the performance of these units and draw lessons for future force planning and policy (Markel et al., 2020, p. 78).

The employment of reserve component support forces was generally viewed as successful. The DoD's internal evaluation found that "The call to active duty and the performance of the RC [reserve component] members who served in connection with the Gulf conflict were marked with extraordinary success" (Department of Defense, 1992, p. H-20). These support units played crucial roles in deploying, supporting, and sustaining Army combat forces, marking the first large-scale integration of reservists with their Regular Army counterparts since the Korean War.

However, the readiness of Army National Guard (ARNG) combat brigades emerged as a contentious issue. The roundout brigades, designed to bring Regular Army divisions to full strength, were unable to demonstrate their proficiency before the war's end and never deployed. This outcome raised questions about the viability of relying on large ARNG combat formations in future conflicts.

Several key studies, including those by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and RAND Corporation, found significant shortcomings in the readiness of ARNG combat brigades. The GAO report stated,

> The Army has not adequately prepared its National Guard roundout brigades to be fully ready to deploy quickly. When the three brigades were activated, many soldiers were not completely trained to do their jobs; many noncommissioned officers were not adequately trained in leadership skills; and Guard members had difficulty adjusting to the active Army's administrative systems for supply and personnel management which are different from those the National Guard uses in peacetime. (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1991, p. 3)

The GAO identified several factors contributing to these deficiencies, including inadequate peacetime training, overstated readiness reports, and the need for substantially revised post-mobilization training plans. The report noted that active Army trainers developed new plans requiring "over three times the number of training days estimated in readiness reports and requiring the support of almost 9,000 active Army trainers and other personnel" (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1991, p. 3).

The National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) disputed these assessments, arguing that the roundout brigades had demonstrated their readiness for deployment. They criticized the ad hoc nature of the readiness assessment process, which was controlled entirely by Regular Army officials (Chapman, 1997, p. 247). This disagreement highlighted the tensions between Regular Army and National Guard perspectives on readiness standards and evaluation methods.

Despite these conflicting viewpoints, a consensus emerged that it would take at least 90 days to prepare an ARNG combat brigade for deployment in future conflicts. Army Chief of Staff Gordon Sullivan testified that this timeline was necessary, largely due to the likelihood of personnel shortages upon mobilization (Markel et al., 2020, p. 82). This estimate would become increasingly significant in subsequent deliberations over Army force structure and force mix, particularly as post-Cold War planning scenarios placed a premium on rapid deployment.

However, GAO analysts noted that even the 90-day figure was not dependable, as the Army had not specified the criteria for its validation decision and the tremendous amount of active Army resources used to support the brigades' training might not be available in a future crisis (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1991, p. 5).

The Persian Gulf War experience also revealed several systemic issues affecting reserve component readiness. The Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) authority proved inadequate, as it did not allow access to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), necessitating cross-leveling of personnel from other units to fill vacancies. Individual readiness problems were also prevalent, with many soldiers arriving at mobilization stations in a non-deployable status due to medical, dental, or training deficiencies (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1991, p. 21).

To address the identified shortcomings, the GAO recommended several measures, including more intensive leader training and education, closer Regular Army supervision of ARNG brigades' training and readiness, better screening of individual readiness, and clearer definition of readiness and deployment standards (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1991, pp. 22, 28).

Two Army reforms struck directly at programs that had been at the heart of the Total Force Policy for nearly twenty years. The Roundout Program was the ARNG's most visible casualty following Desert Storm. Also, the shift from forward-deployed divisions to a CONUS-based force caused a major

restructuring of the CAPSTONE Program, which had laid the foundation for much of the ARNG's success and failures in the Persian Gulf War (Doubler, 2003, p. 289; National Guard Bureau, 1993, pp. 39-40).

Congress also took action to improve reserve component readiness while resisting significant reductions to reserve force structure and end strength. The Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992, enacted as Title XI of the FY 1993 National Defense Authorization Act, mandated several measures to enhance ARNG combat unit readiness (H.R. 5006, 1992).

Title XI also directed the Secretary of the Army to associate every National Guard unit with a Regular Army counterpart, granting Regular Army commanders significant authority over Guard units' training plans, readiness reports, and officer promotions. This increased oversight aimed to address the disparities in readiness assessment and training standards that had become apparent during the Gulf War (Markel et al., 2020, p. 85).

Title XI outlined 18 specific measures to improve Guard readiness, focusing on enhancing leadership skills and improving personnel, medical, and dental programs (H.R. 5006, 1992).

Key provisions of Title XI included:

1. Increasing the level of military experience in the Guard, mandating that by September 1997, 65% of officers and 50% of enlisted soldiers should have prior active service of at least two years.
2. Implementing stricter officer promotion reviews and noncommissioned officer education requirements.
3. Requiring more frequent medical screening and dental checkups to address deployment issues encountered during Desert Shield.
4. Revising the Army's readiness reporting system to provide a more accurate portrayal of unit readiness.
5. Assigning up to 5,000 Regular Army personnel to Guard units to improve readiness.
6. Creating compatible personnel, supply, maintenance, and financial administrative systems across all Army components by 1997.

Bold Shift and Revamped ARNG Training

To implement these Title XI changes, the Army introduced the "Bold Shift" readiness enhancement program. This initiative aimed to increase reserve component readiness and facilitate more positive interactions between Regular Army and Guard personnel. Bold Shift focused on improving the training of commanders, staffs, and small unit leaders, with the goal of enabling ARNG combat brigades to deploy more rapidly than the roundout brigades had during Desert Storm (Sortor et al., 1994, pp. 107-112; Oland & Hogan, 2001, pp. 63-64).

The program introduced new initiatives to improve the training of commanders, staff, and small unit leaders, with a key objective of enabling ARNG combat brigades to be ready for deployment in a shorter time period than the three roundout brigades had required during Desert Storm (Doubler, 2003, p. 291).

The Bold Shift program emphasized training at the lowest levels of organization, targeting the skills of individual soldiers, crews, squads, and platoons. It introduced "lanes training," where Guardsmen maneuvered through predetermined sites while reacting to various tactical scenarios. The program also implemented a "crawl-walk-run" training philosophy, emphasizing the mastery of basic skills before advancing to more complex tasks. Regular Army advisors closely monitored training, provided logistical

support, and facilitated detailed discussions and critiques after each training session. Bold Shift also established the operational readiness evaluation, an inspection and training exercise that assessed a Guard unit's readiness and ability to deploy quickly (Sortor et al., 1994, pp. 107-111).

Within three years of implementing Title XI and Bold Shift, the Army reported near full compliance with most provisions. However, personnel readiness remained a significant challenge. The elimination of medical units and facilities during the post-Cold War drawdown made periodic medical and dental screening throughout the Guard difficult to achieve. As a result, medical resources were primarily focused on Guardsmen in early deploying units (Doubler, 2006, p. 292).

The experiences of the Persian Gulf War and the subsequent reforms significantly influenced the Army's approach to reserve component readiness and integration. These changes aimed to address the shortcomings identified during the conflict and ensure that reserve forces could meet the demands of future military operations more effectively.

Implementation Challenges and Project Standard Bearer

Within three years of Title XI's enactment, the Army reported near full compliance with most of its provisions. However, personnel readiness remained a significant challenge, as the elimination of medical units and facilities during the post-Cold War drawdown made periodic medical and dental screening throughout the Guard impossible. Medical resources were primarily focused on Guardsmen in early deploying units. Acquiring sufficient numbers of former active-duty personnel to raise the experience level throughout the ARNG also proved difficult. While soldiers leaving active duty during the drawdown were often attracted to the Guard, this source of manpower diminished as the pace of personnel cuts slowed (Doubler, 2003, p. 292).

In response to the post-Desert Storm reforms, the ARNG Directorate established Project Standard Bearer on November 1, 1991, to develop, coordinate, and institutionalize policies and programs ensuring the readiness and early deployment capability of high-priority Guard units. Project Standard Bearer controlled many aspects of the Guard's involvement in Title XI and Bold Shift, initially focusing on the roundout and roundup brigades before expanding to include a large pool of combat support and combat service support units (National Guard Bureau, 1992, pp. 30-32, 38).

The project initiated personnel and equipment policies that shifted declining resources to high-priority units, requiring them to maintain a 95% manning level of fully trained soldiers and 100 percent of their equipment. Innovative recruiting and retention policies, such as enlistment bonuses for new recruits in early deploying units, supported robust manning (National Guard Bureau, 1992, pp. 30-32, 38).

Project Standard Bearer also played a key role in selecting and managing the Guard's portion of new contingency force support units. The ARNG initially provided 192 combat support and combat service support units, eventually increasing its commitment to 389 units. Through Standard Bearer initiatives, the percentage of selected units meeting the Army's readiness standards for deployment rose from 84% to 97%. By 1993, the readiness of the ARNG's contingency force support units exceeded that of those in the Regular Army or the U.S. Army Reserve (National Guard Bureau, 1993, pp. 37-40).

Adapting to an Evolving Strategy: Total Force Policy and the Strategic Reviews of the 1990s

The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s led to a decline in perceived threats to the United States and a corresponding decrease in available resources for defense. This context gave rise to a series of major strategic reviews, including the Base Force effort (1989-1993), the Bottom-Up Review (1993),

and the Quadrennial Defense Review (1997), to assess the implications of these factors. These reviews, though motivated by different factors, involved the same community of people assessing the same strategic situation under the same resource constraints (Sherry, 2008, p. vii).

Declining Resources for Defense

The reduction in resources available for defense was perhaps the single greatest factor affecting the evolution of the Total Force Policy between 1992 and 2001. The budget deficit had become an issue of intense concern in Congress, leading to the passage of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Budget Control Act in 1985, which required automatic, across-the-board spending reductions if the deficit exceeded a statutory maximum (H.J. Res. 372, 1985). In 1989, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requested substantial cuts in defense spending for the FY 1990 budget, and while it did not get the full reductions, it did achieve a freeze (Larson et al., 2001, p. 9).

As the decline of the Soviet threat became apparent, momentum for defense cuts grew, with the debate shifting from how much the nation had to spend to deter the Soviets to how much the Department of Defense could afford to cut in an uncertain world. From FY 1991 through FY 2001, the Army's total obligational authority decreased by 34%. The Joint Staff projected a 25% reduction in real defense spending between 1989 and 1997 (Jaffe, 1993, pp. 2-15).

The Base Force's major implication for subsequent reviews and the Total Force Policy was the force-sizing construct that emerged from it. With no clear and significant threats to U.S. interests replacing the Soviet Union, planners substituted the construct of more-theoretical regional contingencies, loosely modeled on the Persian Gulf War and cross-border aggression on the Korean peninsula (Oland & Hogan, 2001, p. 14). Rapid response to these contingencies was at a premium, with Army analysis indicating that the lead brigade deployed for the first contingency needed to arrive within four days, while the last elements of a five-division corps needed to close within 75 days (Oland & Hogan, 2001, p. 14).

During the Persian Gulf War, reserve component support forces had demonstrated their ability to meet these timelines, at least partially, while Army National Guard (ARNG) maneuver forces had not. DoD and Army leaders reasoned that since the reserve components experienced most of the growth in the 1980s, it made sense to reduce them as the threat from the Warsaw Pact declined (Markel et al., 2020, p. 82). Guard advocates disputed this rationale, resisting any rationale that might lead to a reduction of ARNG force structure or resources.

Congress received the Base Force proposals with some skepticism, favoring larger reductions to Regular Army forces and smaller ones for the reserve components. Congress did not fully approve the DoD's recommendation, choosing instead to reduce reserve component strength by only 54,320 over FYs 1992 and 1993 while increasing procurement of equipment for the reserve components, increasing full-time support levels, and passing the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992. Congress's rationale for these decisions emphasized cost, with the Senate Armed Services Committee estimating that the Army's proposed force structure incurred $370 million in additional costs by failing to transfer more support functions to the reserve components. The committee also appeared to assume that there were no significant differences in performance between Regular Army and reserve component forces (Markel et al. 2020, p. 95).

While the Senate Armed Services Committee was adamant that the Army integrate reserve component forces into its force structure to a much greater extent, it was willing to consider different approaches to employing ARNG maneuver forces to augment Regular Army units. In the short run, Congress largely

sided with the reserve components but did not compel DoD or the Army to rely on ARNG combat forces to execute the base force strategy (Markel et al., 2020, pp. 97-98).

The Bottom-Up Review Refines Base Force Estimates

In 1993, the incoming Clinton administration conducted the Bottom-Up Review to review U.S. strategy considering the changing world situation, believing that it could realize a larger "peace dividend" than that provided by the Base Force. The review continued to use the two-major-regional-contingency force-sizing construct articulated during the Base Force, resulting in similar implications for the Army and no changes to Army components' roles (Sherry, 2008, pp. 84).

The Bottom-Up Review prescribed further reductions to reserve component end strength, from about 700,000 in 1993 to 575,000 in 1999, and proposed an Army National Guard (ARNG) force structure of 37 brigades organized into five divisions and enhanced readiness brigades, which had the goal of being able to deploy in 90 days to reinforce active forces. The review also articulated an intention to employ reserve component forces in support of Regular forces in peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian assistance operations, as well as replace Regular forces conducting such operations when they are needed for a major regional conflict (Aspin, 1993, p. 78)

Facing the contentious responsibility of allocating the approximately 575,000 positions prescribed for the Army's reserve components among them, the Secretary of the Army tasked a group of senior officers representing various stakeholder groups in the reserve components and the reserve associations, chaired by Vice Chief of Staff J. H. Binford Peay III, to resolve the issue. The resulting "Offsite Agreement" of October 29, 1993, allocated roles and missions among the three Army components and the Bottom-Up Review's reductions to reserve component force structure, formalizing trends that had been developing for some time, essentially divesting the Army Reserve of combat missions and focusing it on support roles while the ARNG retained combat force structure (General Accounting Office, 1995, pp. 1-2)..

Congress supported the Bottom-Up Review's recommendations for reductions in the Regular Army but declined to reduce ARNG combat force structure to five divisions and enhanced readiness brigades. The Bottom-Up Review continued the paradigm established by the Base Force, with the Regular Army providing the combat forces to implement strategy, supported by a combination of Regular Army and reserve component support forces, while ARNG combat forces continued to exist but were intended to provide strategic depth to reinforce the Regular Army should operational demands exceed the calculations of the review's supporting analysis (Markel et al., 2020, p. 103).

Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces

Shortly after the Bottom-Up Review, Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to establish an independent panel, the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM), to review roles and missions, with a focus on evaluating and identifying overlap of missions between the services (Sherry, 2008, p. 92). One of the more ominous findings of the commission was that the Army's reserve forces were a good example of the lack of appropriate organization, training, or appropriate equipage in the Armed Forces (Sherry, 2008, p. 98).

CORM argued that the combat structure exceeded the requirements of two major regional conflicts and recommended five general principles (Markel et al., 2020, p. 104).:

1. Shape and size the Total Force to meet the military requirements of the national security strategy

2. Allocate resources on a tiered basis with higher priority for training, resources, personnel, and equipment to units scheduled to deploy early and frequently

3. Eliminate or reorganize reserve component forces with lower-priority tasks to fill shortfalls in higher-priority areas

4. Ensure that individuals and units of the Reserve Components are incorporated into all relevant operational plans and used as such

5. Improve integration and cooperation between Regular and reserve components.

CORM also recommended a "quadrennial strategy review" at the beginning of each presidential administration as a way to compel each incoming presidential administration to articulate a national strategy and align resources to support it. In pursuit of this objective, Congress mandated that the executive branch conduct strategic reviews every four years, with the first to take place in 1996–1997, as part of the FY 1997 NDAA (H.R. 3230, 1996) .

The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review and Contingency Operations

The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was expected to either force reconsideration of U.S. strategy, the budget and resources underpinning that strategy, or both (Sherry, 2008, p. 119). However, the QDR's analysis produced an outcome very similar to that of the Base Force and Bottom-Up Review. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Army's programmed force structure in 1997, before any cuts, left "substantial Guard structure in place that has no valid war-fighting mission" (Government Accountability Office, 1997, p. 2).

The force structure primarily at issue consisted of the Guard's combat divisions and brigades. Joint Staff-led wargames and other analyses also informed the 1997 QDR estimates of end-strength requirements and reached similar conclusions, although Army National Guard (ARNG) participants complained that the wargames were terminated arbitrarily, before circumstances would have required the commitment of Guard divisions (Markel et al., 2020, p. 106).

Controversy erupted almost immediately, with members of the Senate Armed Services Committee observing that the Regular Army and the ARNG seemed to be "feuding," a conclusion that Secretary of Defense William Cohen and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John M. Shalikashvili regretfully validated. The National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) wrote President Clinton, alleging that any reduction in the ARNG's end strength would imperil the ability of the ARNG in the several states to perform state missions. However, an earlier RAND study had found that the National Guard structure was largely unused during state emergencies and disasters, and that the federal government provided ample capabilities and resources to assist states when overwhelmed (Brown et al., 1995, p. xxi).

Congress resolved the issue by allowing the Army's three components more end strength than the Army asked for, reducing authorized end strength from 495,000 in FY 1998 to 484,800 for FY 1999. Congress did not force the Army to reduce Regular Army force structure and end strength to the point at which it would have to rely on ARNG combat forces to meet the demands of strategy. In 1992, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin had noted that "[t]he relationship between the Army National Guard and the active Army is simply not what it should be" (Markel et al., 2020, p. 180).

Consistent Roles and Declining Resource Levels

1. Declining Resources and Shifts in the Total Force Policy

The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) confirmed the approach taken by previous defense assessments, emphasizing that Regular Army forces, supported by Reserve components, would respond to initial demands in any major regional conflicts. As contingency needs increased, Reserve components were intended to fill additional roles as required. Despite these expectations, resource levels for all branches declined significantly through the 1990s.

Regular Army personnel strength, for instance, fell sharply—from approximately 727,500 in 1991 to around 480,000 by 1999—a level that remained fairly constant through 2001 (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 2015, Table 7-5). Reserve components also saw substantial reductions, despite opposition from reserve leadership and congressional allies. In 1991, authorized Reserve end strength stood at around 776,000 personnel, with 457,300 in the Army National Guard (ARNG) and 318,700 in the Army Reserve (Markel et al., 2020, p. 111). The 1999 fiscal year ended with ARNG strength at 357,469 (National Guard Bureau, 1999, p. 37).

2. The Influence of Contingency Operations on Reserve Component Roles

Contingency operations following the Persian Gulf War influenced the Total Force Policy in ways that strategic reviews had not anticipated. While previous assessments defined the Total Force around large-scale, conventional combat, these newer operations underscored the need for flexibility. Increasingly, the Army was tasked with peacekeeping and support missions less suited to its Regular combat units.

Through the 1990s, Army deployments for contingency operations accelerated, peaking in Fiscal Year 1999, when an average of 31,000 soldiers were deployed on any given day. This high level of commitment was unprecedented for the post–Vietnam era (Brune, 1998; Clark, 2001; Kretchick, Baumann, & Fishel, 1998; McDonnell, 1999; Stewart, 2002). Initially, the Army relied heavily on Regular Army forces; however, as demand grew, the Department of Defense (DoD) increasingly turned to Reserve components for their specialized support capabilities (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1995c, pp. 21–25). For instance, the Army Reserve deployed 1,613 individual augmentees to support operations in Bosnia (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1998, p. 4).

3. Policy Adjustments and the Increased Use of Reserve Forces

The DoD sought expanded authorities to mobilize Reserve forces for extended deployments, particularly for long-term peacekeeping operations (U.S. Department of Defense, 1994, p. iii). Peacekeeping missions indirectly shaped the Total Force Policy as concerns arose over their impact on the readiness of Regular Army combat units (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1996b; Davis, 1996; Markel et al., 2020, p. 106). Toward the decade's end, the Army began tasking ARNG division headquarters with operational control roles in Bosnia and Kosovo, demonstrating a shift toward integrating Reserve units more directly into peacekeeping missions (Haworth, 2011, p. 75; U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000a, p. 10).

4. Strategic Implications of Reserve Component Integration

The evolving needs of peacekeeping operations achieved what nearly a decade of strategic review could not: creating lower-risk opportunities for integrating Reserve combat forces into active operations. By preserving Regular Army forces for potential large-scale conflicts, the DoD found an effective way to balance its operational commitments. Employing ARNG units for peacekeeping missions allowed the DoD to meet global demands while reserving active-duty combat troops for higher-priority missions, thereby enhancing the flexibility of the Total Force Policy.

The Deployment of the 49th Armored Division to Bosnia in 2000

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the United States Army continued to support peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR). As the security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina improved, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) decided on October 25, 1999 to implement a phased reduction of SFOR by approximately 50% between November 1999 and April 2000, leading to a decline in U.S. Army strength in MND (North) from 5,400 in November 1999 to 3,900 in February 2000 (Stewart 2010, pp. 441-453).

A significant development in the U.S. Army's involvement in Bosnia occurred on March 7, 2000, when the 49th Armored Division, Texas Army National Guard (ARNG), succeeded the 10th Mountain Division in commanding MND (North). This deployment marked the first time since the Korean War in the early 1950s that a division-size Reserve Component (RC) formation had deployed outside the United States. The 49th Armored Division headquarters commanded units from the Active Army, such as the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, as well as units from the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) and the ARNG (National Guard Bureau, 2000, pp. 24-25, 28, 37).

The 49th Armored Division headquarters and its attached Regular Army and Reserve units successfully took over the NATO peacekeeping mission in the northern region of Bosnia, replacing the 10th Mountain Division and serving an eight-month rotation before being relieved later that year. This deployment demonstrated the increasing role of Reserve Component forces in meeting the demands of contingency operations and highlighted the evolving nature of the Total Force Policy in the post-Cold War era.

Contemporary Trends and Analysis of the National Guard's Role in the 21st Century

In the 21st century, the National Guard's role has significantly expanded, shifting from a strategic reserve to an operational force utilized in both domestic and international missions. This transition became evident with increased deployments in the Gulf War, Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti, as well as domestic responses to natural disasters and urban riots. These deployments signaled a shift in expectations for the Reserve Components, reflecting the demands placed on them both in peacetime and crisis.

Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, this transformation accelerated as the National Guard became a crucial component of the Total Force, supporting both international and domestic missions more frequently. This change built on a subtle trend that had begun in the 1990s with Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, where the Guard was mobilized for both involuntary and voluntary missions. The post-9/11 era saw a further shift away from using the National Guard purely as a strategic reserve, with the Department of Defense (DoD) increasingly viewing the Guard as a versatile "on call" force. This shift occurred with limited Congressional and public input on the policy's formation (Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2008, p. 6).

The National Governors Association has voiced concerns over this operational shift, pointing to challenges such as the lack of coordinated federal-state planning, inadequate funding for re-equipping Guard units post-deployment, and insufficient coordination in emergency responses. Governors have highlighted the need for better dual-use equipment and increased consultation between states and the DoD on Guard missions (Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2008, pp. 220-222).

Traditionally, the National Guard's federal combat mission was prioritized over state duties, with state service often considered a secondary function, enhancing public relations (Stentiford, 2002, p. 74). However, the Guard's expanded role in recent years—marked by deployments in both domestic crises and overseas conflicts—underscores the dual necessity of its federal and state missions. This evolution

reflects the National Guard's growing significance in maintaining readiness for a wide range of contingencies that span military, disaster, and homeland security needs.

The Evolution of Civil Defense and Homeland Security in the United States: From the Cold War to the 21st Century

During the Cold War era, the United States developed a complex set of strategies to contain the Soviet Union and protect its national security interests. A critical component of this containment policy was the establishment of a civil defense system designed to safeguard American citizens in the event of a nuclear attack (Gaddis, 2005, p. 352). However, the civil defense program faced numerous challenges and criticisms, with experts like John Dowling and Evans M. Harrell arguing that it presented a "choice of disasters" rather than an effective solution (Dowling & Harrell, 1987, p. 86).

President Ronald Reagan's approach to civil defense marked a significant shift from the policies of his predecessors. Reagan openly rejected the doctrine of mutual assured destruction and the détente that had been a centerpiece of the Carter Administration (Gaddis, 2005, p. 352). On March 23, 1983, Reagan proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which focused on using ground-based and space-based systems to protect the United States from strategic nuclear ballistic missile attacks (Dowling & Harrell, 1987, p. 86). SDI challenged the 1972 SALT I agreement banning strategic defenses and demonstrated a more proactive and aggressive approach to defensive measures (Dowling & Harrell, 1987, p. 86).

In the late 1970s, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was created to consolidate various disaster response and civil defense functions under one agency (Sylves & Cumming, 2004). FEMA's role and responsibilities evolved over time, particularly in response to major terrorism events and natural disasters that occurred between 1988 and 2001 (Rubin et al., 2003). The Meese Memorandum signed in 1986, delegated lead response roles to certain Federal agencies, depending on the type of disaster (Exec. Order No. 12656, 1988). The Disaster Relief Act of 1974 was amended in 1988 to become the Stafford Act, which defined the disaster declaration process and provided the statutory authority for federal assistance during a disaster (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2006, p. 21).

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) stands as a pivotal piece of legislation in the United States' approach to disaster management and response. Enacted on November 23, 1988, the Stafford Act significantly amended the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, establishing a comprehensive framework for federal natural disaster assistance to state and local governments (Sylves & Cumming, 2004; Harton, 2024).

Named after Senator Robert T. Stafford, who played a crucial role in its passage, the act was designed to provide a more organized and efficient means of federal assistance. Its primary goals were to ensure timely support for state and local governments during disasters, encourage comprehensive disaster preparedness plans, and foster improved intergovernmental coordination (Harton, 2024).

Structure and Key Provisions

The Stafford Act is organized into seven titles, each addressing different aspects of disaster response and recovery. This structure allows for a comprehensive approach to disaster management, covering everything from the process of declaring a disaster to the types of assistance available.

One of the act's most significant provisions is the authorization for the President to issue two types of disaster declarations: emergencies and major disasters. Emergencies typically require limited federal intervention, while major disasters call for a more extensive federal response. This distinction allows for a flexible and appropriate allocation of resources based on the severity and scope of the disaster.

The act grants the President substantial authority in disaster response. Upon declaring a national emergency, the President can access funds and disaster relief assistance previously set aside by Congress. This provision ensures a rapid and decisive federal response when needed (Harton, 2024).

Federal Assistance Programs

The Stafford Act authorizes three main types of federal assistance:

1. Individual Assistance: This program provides direct aid to individuals and businesses affected by a disaster. It can include temporary housing, grants for home repairs not covered by insurance, disaster unemployment assistance, and crisis counseling (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2024).
2. Public Assistance: This program allocates funding and expertise to state and local governments for the repair, replacement, or restoration of disaster-damaged, publicly owned facilities and the facilities of certain non-profit organizations (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2024).
3. Hazard Mitigation Assistance: This forward-looking program provides funding aimed at reducing the long-term risks to people and property from natural hazards. It supports efforts to rebuild in a way that reduces vulnerability to future disasters (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2024).

Implementation and Coordination

Once a disaster is declared, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) takes on the crucial role of coordinating relief efforts. FEMA's responsibilities include drafting agreements with affected states, outlining the period of the disaster, areas eligible for assistance, types of assistance required, and cost-sharing provisions (Harton, 2024).

Under the George H.W. Bush Administration, several natural disasters challenged the nation's nascent approach to all-hazards preparedness. The Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, the largest in U.S. history at the time, exposed the Administration's lack of preparedness in managing a large-scale environmental crisis (Rubin et al., 2003). Instead of using FEMA through the Stafford Act to coordinate the response, Bush invoked the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, under which the Environmental Protection Agency and Coast Guard managed the event, drawing much criticism for the poor response (Rubin et al., 2003).

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, FEMA underwent further reorganization and reform efforts aimed at enhancing its ability to respond to disasters and support homeland security initiatives. These changes were driven in part by the increasing threat of terrorism and the recognition that effective disaster response and civil defense were critical components of national security (Hogue & Bea, 2006, p. 15).

The 1992 Los Angeles Riots: The Role of the California National Guard and the Federalization Debate

The 1992 Los Angeles riots, which erupted on April 29, 1992, following the acquittal of four police officers charged with using excessive force during the arrest of Rodney King, exposed underlying racial tensions and socio-economic disparities in the city. The unrest led to widespread violence, property

damage, injuries, and loss of life, prompting the activation of the California National Guard by Governor Pete Wilson (Schmidt, 1993, p. 3). The Guard's deployment, which swelled to over 10,000 troops, marked the largest domestic deployment since the 1960s (Doubler, 2003, p. 308).

The California National Guard played a crucial role in restoring order and supporting local law enforcement by securing key facilities, patrolling neighborhoods, assisting with arrests, and providing logistical support. However, the deployment also highlighted challenges and limitations, such as a lack of appropriate training, equipment, and leadership for urban riot control. The events raised broader questions about the Guard's capacity to manage increasing domestic demands amid growing social unrest (Schmidt, 1993, pp. 6-7).

The decision to federalize the California National Guard on May 1, 1992, by President George H. W. Bush sparked a debate over the appropriate use of federal troops and the National Guard in civil disturbances. The federalization issue is particularly important due to the framers of the Constitution's reluctance to use Regular Army and Marines to quell civil unrest. The last time federal troops were used to restore order was during the 1971 anti-war demonstrations in Washington, D.C (Schmidt, 1993, pp. 15-16).

The fundamental principle that the preservation of law and order is the responsibility of state and local governments was violated to varying degrees by the governor of California, the mayor of Los Angeles, and law enforcement officials at the city, county, and state levels. The media played a significant role in lulling the nation and its civilian leadership into a false sense of security, leading to a failure to recognize the potential for a devastating civil disorder (Schmidt, 1993, pp. 15-16).

The National Guard's unique dual mission—one state and one federal—allows the governor, as commander-in-chief, to use the Guard to assist civil authorities in accordance with applicable state laws (National Guard Bureau, 1992, p. 23). Within 24 hours of being alerted, the California Army National Guard had more than 3,500 soldiers on duty, and within another 24 hours, there were 7,800 soldiers mobilized (National Guard Bureau, 1992, p. 4). However, the media's perception that the National Guard was slow to respond due to a lack of immediately available ammunition led to pressure on civilian leadership to request federal assistance.

On May 1, 1992, President Bush issued Proclamation 6427, ordering the restoration of law and order in Los Angeles and other districts of California, as required by Section 334, Chapter 15, Title 10 of the United States Code. This executive order expressly answered jurisdictional questions and provided federal agencies with the authority to act in a law enforcement capacity during the unrest (Webster, 1992, p. 153). Contrary to popular belief, the Posse Comitatus Act, which generally prohibits the use of federal troops for law enforcement, was waived by the President's proclamation (Schmidt, 1993, pp. 15-16).

However, by the time federal troops were deployed on May 3, 1992, the riot was largely over, with the National Guard and local law enforcement having regained control of the situation. The Senior Civilian Representative for the U.S. Attorney General (SCRAG) and the Joint Task Force Commander made a conscious decision to prohibit the National Guard and federal troops from performing law enforcement tasks, as they were not trained for such roles. This decision led to a decline in the number of missions performed by the Guard and a return to full unit integrity (Schmidt, 1993, pp. 25-26).

The Los Angeles riots of 1992 highlighted the importance of anticipating and planning for civil disturbances, as well as the need for better coordination among civilian leaders, law enforcement, and the National Guard. The decision to federalize the Guard raised questions about the appropriate use of federal troops in civil disturbances and the implications of such actions on the Guard's state and federal roles. The

events also underscored the significance of educating civilian leaders about the capabilities and limitations of the National Guard and the potential consequences of federalization (Scmidt, 1993 pp. 28-31).

In summary, the 1992 Los Angeles riots served as a stark reminder that even the most powerful nation on earth is not immune to unexpected and devastating civil disturbances. The California National Guard played a critical role in restoring order, but the deployment also exposed challenges and limitations in training, equipment, and coordination with civilian authorities. The federalization debate that followed highlighted the need for a clear understanding of the legal framework governing the use of federal troops and the National Guard in civil disturbances, as well as the importance of maintaining the delicate balance between state and federal responsibilities in preserving domestic tranquility.

The Evolution of Homeland Security and the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act

In the 1990s, the United States witnessed a significant shift in its approach to emergency preparedness and homeland security. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) underwent a major reorganization, and the growing threat of terrorism led to the passage of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act in 1996. This section explores the evolution of homeland security policies during the Clinton administration, the development of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team (WMD-CST) concept, and the ongoing debates surrounding the nation's preparedness for terrorist attacks involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

FEMA's Reorganization and the All-Hazards Approach Under the leadership of Director James Lee Witt, appointed by President Bill Clinton, FEMA underwent a significant reorganization in the early 1990s. Witt created three functional directorates corresponding to the major phases of emergency management: mitigation; preparedness; training and exercise; and response and recovery (Daniels, 2000, p. 13; Hogue & Bea, 2006, p. 18). In February 1996, Clinton elevated the FEMA directorship to Cabinet-level status, improving communication between the Director and the President (Sylves & Cummings, 2004, p. 6).

This reorganization allowed FEMA to focus on addressing natural disasters without fear of negative political reactions from civil defense advocates (Roberts, 2004, p. 18). The Agency's Mitigation Directorate focused many of its early programs on hazards such as flooding and earthquakes (Roberts, 2004, p. 19).

Rising Threat of Terrorism and Legislative Response

Despite FEMA's shift towards an all-hazards approach, the threat of terrorist attacks inside the United States began to emerge. In 1993, Congress included a joint resolution in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) calling for FEMA to develop capabilities for early detection, warning, and response to potential terrorist use of chemical or biological agents or weapons (Rubin et al., 2003, Appendix A). The period between 1995 and 1996 saw a series of major terrorist attacks, including the Tokyo subway sarin attack, the Oklahoma City bombing, and the Khobar Towers bombing (Rubin et al., 2003, p. 27).

In response, Congress passed the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, also known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act, as part of the NDAA for fiscal year 1997. The Act required the Department of Defense (DoD) to provide civilian agencies at all levels of government with training and expert advice on appropriate responses to the use of a WMD against the American public (H.R. 3730, 1996).

Development of the WMD-CST Concept

The development of the WMD-CST concept can be traced back to October 1997, when the Defense Review Board requested the integration of the Reserves and National Guard into WMD domestic preparedness programs. In January 1998, an Integrated Concept Team, known as the "Tiger Team," produced a report entitled "Department of Defense Plan for Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction" (Taylor, 2000, p. 3).

The Tiger Team report identified the capabilities the U.S. military should prepare to provide to local, state, and federal authorities in response to a WMD attack. It also described the concept, program model, and funding required to produce the Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) Team, later renamed the WMD-CST. The WMD-CST intended to assist the local response to NBCR WMD attacks by rapidly assessing the hazard, advising local authorities on necessary measures, and facilitating the arrival of follow-on federal support. The Tiger Team report called for 10 such teams, each aligned with one of the 10 FEMA regions (Taylor, 2000, p. iii).

Debates Surrounding the WMD-CST Concept

The development of the WMD-CST concept has raised considerable debate over the merits of the new organization. Some critics argued that the WMD-CST was incapable of providing timely support to local authorities (Taylor, 2000). Others questioned the ability of the DoD to provide personnel sufficiently trained to provide meaningful support to civilian first responders (Smithson & Levy, 2000).

Positive reviews emphasized the WMD-CSTs' ability to respond rapidly to events due to their ability to operate under Title 32 or Title 10 authority (National Guard Bureau, 2000). However, up until March 2001, no evaluations of the WMD-CST program based on actual performance were available (National Guard Bureau, 2000).

As the 20th century ended, a new concept of homeland security began to emerge. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 62, signed in May 1998, created the Office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism within the Executive Office of the President, designed to coordinate counterterrorism policy, preparedness, and consequence management (Combating Terrorism, n.d.).

PDD 63, issued later that year, established principles for protecting the nation by minimizing the threat of smaller-scale terrorist attacks against information technology and geographically distributed supply chains (Presidential Decision Directive 63, 1998). The directive designated federal agencies as lead agencies in their sector of expertise and required the creation of a National Infrastructure Assurance Plan (Presidential Decision Directive 63, 1998).

The Hart-Rudman Commission, chartered by the DoD, recommended the creation of a Cabinet-level National Homeland Security Agency responsible for planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security (Hogue & Bea, 2006, p. 18). The Gilmore Commission, officially known as the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, developed and delivered a series of five reports to the President and Congress between 1999 and 2003, with 146 of its 164 recommendations adopted in whole or in part (RAND National Security Research Division, n.d.; Wikipedia, n.d.; Congressional Research Service, n.d.).

The initial months of George W. Bush's presidency saw a general continuation of existing homeland security policies, focused on counterterrorism, defense against WMD, and the protection of critical infrastructure (Lansford, 2003). The Administration implemented changes to the structure of national

security and homeland security policy generation, replacing the Clinton-era ad hoc interagency working groups with Policy Coordination Committees within the National Security Council (Lansford, 2003).

Conclusion: Guard 2.0/2.5 and Transition to Guard 3.0

The era of Guard 2.0/2.5 (1984-2001) marked a significant period of transformation for the Army National Guard, characterized by modernization efforts, structural changes, and operational challenges. This period saw the Guard adapting to the evolving geopolitical landscape, particularly the waning of the Cold War and the emergence of new global threats.

During this time, the National Guard underwent substantial changes in its force structure and operational readiness. The addition of two new Army divisions—one heavy and one light—reflected the Guard's commitment to maintaining a versatile and capable force (Department of the Army, 2001). The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 further reshaped the organizational structure of the military, including the Guard, aiming to enhance interservice cooperation and operational effectiveness (Brown, 2011, p. 41).

The Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991 served as a critical test for the Guard's readiness and deployment capabilities. The mobilization of over 62,000 Army National Guard soldiers highlighted both the Guard's significant contribution to national defense and the challenges it faced in rapid deployment scenarios (Doubler, 2003, p. 259). This experience led to a reevaluation of mobilization timelines, with the realization that combat brigades required 60-90 days of post-mobilization training, rather than the previously assumed weeks-long preparation (Locklear, 2022, p. 4).

These lessons learned during Guard 2.0/2.5 had profound implications for the Guard's training focus and operational role. The emphasis shifted towards individual, crew, squad, and platoon-level training to build a solid foundation for combined arms operations. This approach aimed to enhance the Guard's readiness for non-rapid contingency operations, aligning more closely with its evolving role in national defense strategy (National Guard Bureau, 2001).

As the Guard transitioned into the 3.0 era (2001-2017), it faced unprecedented challenges and opportunities. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, marked a pivotal moment, catalyzing a rapid transformation of the Guard's role in both domestic security and overseas operations. The immediate response saw over 50,000 Guard members mobilized for homeland security and counterterrorism efforts abroad, signaling the beginning of a new operational tempo for the organization (Locklear, 2022, p. 6).

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan further cemented the Guard's transition to an operational reserve, a shift formalized by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (Department of Defense, 2006). This period saw a dramatic increase in Guard deployments, with over 144,000 National Guard and Reserve personnel on active duty by September 2003, including 28,000 dedicated to homeland security (Stewart, 2010, p. 495).

The Guard 3.0 era was characterized by longer deployments, initially lasting 15-24 months, with up to 12 months boots on the ground. However, public concern over these extended deployments led to their eventual reduction, reflecting the delicate balance between operational needs and domestic considerations (Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2008).

In conclusion, the transition from Guard 2.0/2.5 to Guard 3.0 represents a significant evolution in the role and capabilities of the Army National Guard. The experiences and lessons learned during the Persian Gulf War and subsequent conflicts shaped a more agile, responsive, and integrated force. As the Guard entered the 21st century, it demonstrated its ability to adapt to new threats and operational requirements,

solidifying its position as an essential component of the total force concept. The challenges and successes of this period laid the groundwork for the Guard's continued evolution, ensuring its readiness to meet both domestic and international security challenges in an increasingly complex global environment.

Guard 3.0: The National Guard and Homeland Security in the Post-9/11 Era

Operation Noble Eagle and the Immediate Response

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the United States faced an unprecedented challenge in responding to attacks on its own soil by a non-state actor. As noted by the U.S. Army Center of Military History, "The United States experienced the most substantial attack on American soil since Pearl Harbor" (Brown, 2011, p. 197). The initial response followed traditional patterns of reserve component employment, with thousands of National Guard and Army Reserve personnel mobilized under Operation Noble Eagle to secure critical infrastructure and reassure the public (Donnelly, 2011, p. 35).

The mobilization for ONE was authorized under a partial mobilization declared by President George W. Bush on September 14, 2001, invoking 10 U.S.C. §12302 (Executive Order No. 13223, 2001). This authorization allowed for the involuntary activation of members of the Ready Reserve for up to 24 consecutive months, with up to 1 million members serving on active duty at any given time.

Through Executive Order 13223, the President delegated mobilization authority to the Secretary of Defense and, for the Coast Guard, to the Secretary of Transportation (later transferred to the Secretary of Homeland Security) (Executive Order No. 13223, 2001). This action marked the beginning of a significant shift in the employment of reserve components, building upon changes that had begun during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in the 1990s (Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2008, p. 10).

Mobilization Policies and Challenges

At the outset of the Global War on Terror, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld sought to establish clear guidelines for the mobilization of reserve components. To maintain force stability during this critical period, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld invoked "stop-loss" authority on September 19, 2001. This measure, delegated to individual military services, allowed for the retention of personnel beyond their scheduled separation or retirement dates, ensuring the preservation of critical skills during the crisis.

The Department of Defense initially limited mobilizations to a single period of no more than 12 months (Anderson, 2021, p. 101). Additionally, the DoD aimed to maintain a utilization rate for Reserve Components not exceeding 17% per year (Chu, 2005). These policies were intended to balance the need for reserve capabilities with the preservation of the voluntary nature of reserve service. However, as the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq intensified, the demand for reserve component capabilities persisted beyond initial expectations.

Operation Noble Eagle represented a significant expansion of military involvement in domestic security operations. As defined by the U.S. Army, ONE encompassed "military operations related to homeland security and support to federal, state, and local agencies in the wake of the September 11th attacks" (Donnelly, 2011, p. 35). Over the course of fiscal year 2002, the National Guard contributed more than 10,000 soldiers to missions such as reinforcing security at U.S. military bases, patrolling airports, and guarding other potential terrorist targets (Donnelly, 2011, p. 35-36).

The increased reliance on reserve components for both domestic security and overseas operations led to what many observers termed a transformation to an "operational reserve" (Cahlink, 2004). This shift represented a major evolution in American military policy, moving away from the traditional concept of the reserves as a strategic force to be fully mobilized only in times of major war. Instead, the Army began to rely heavily on recurring mobilizations of reserve component forces to meet ongoing operational requirements (32 U.S.C. § 102, n.d.).

The operational tempo following 9/11 was intense and varied. For instance, the Texas Army National Guard conducted border security operations in support of U.S. Customs from October 2001 to November 2002, while simultaneously providing security at Air Force installations and state nuclear power plants (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2004). Air National Guard units also played a crucial role, with the 147th Fighter Wing in Texas flying 284 combat air patrol missions over New York City and Washington, D.C., between December 2001 and March 2002, and continuing to support homeland defense and special events security thereafter (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2004).

The massive mobilization for ONE occurred against a backdrop of ongoing debates about military force structure and readiness. Prior to 9/11, concerns had been raised about the strain placed on the military by numerous overseas missions. Congress enacted legislation to monitor personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) levels, fearing negative impacts on retention. Studies indicated that while some deployments could positively affect retention, excessive PERSTEMPO could have detrimental effects (Hosek & Totten, 1998; Sticha et al., 1999; Kapp, 2002, p. 29).

These concerns were exemplified by Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki's testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in July 2001. Shinseki asserted that "[g]iven today's mission profile, the Army is too small for the mission load it is carrying" (U.S. House of Representatives, 2001, pp. 18-19).

Transformation of NORAD and Creation of NORTHCOM

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, exposed critical vulnerabilities in the North American Aerospace Defense Command's (NORAD) capability to respond to internal threats, prompting a significant transformation in its mission and operations.

Prior to 9/11, NORAD's air defense capabilities were primarily oriented outward, beyond U.S. borders, reflecting its Cold War origins. Established in 1958 as a bi-national organization between the United States and Canada, NORAD's original mission focused on providing aerospace warning and control for North America, with a particular emphasis on external threats such as Soviet bombers. However, the events of 9/11 starkly demonstrated that this outward-focused approach left the nation vulnerable to threats originating within U.S. airspace (Kreisher, 2007).

Operation Noble Eagle marked a significant shift in NORAD's operational focus. This operation emphasized the surveillance and control of airspace over Canada and the United States to address internal threats, representing a fundamental expansion of NORAD's traditional mission. The transformation involved a comprehensive integration of NORAD's radar and communication networks with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) systems, enabling near-instantaneous alerts in the event of unusual aircraft activity (Kreisher, 2007).

A crucial component of this evolving defense strategy was the creation of the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) in 2002. On April 25, 2002, President Bush approved a new Defense Department

Unified Command Plan, establishing U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). This new command provided command and control of the Department of Defense's homeland defense efforts and coordinated military support to civil authorities (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005, p. II-7).

The creation of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) on October 1, 2002, marked "the first time a single military commander has been charged with protecting the U.S. homeland since the days of George Washington" (U.S. Northern Command, 2012, p. 5). NORTHCOM's primary mission is to provide command and control for the Department of Defense's homeland defense efforts and to coordinate military support to civil authorities (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005, p. II-7).

USNORTHCOM's mission statement reflects its dual roles in homeland defense and civil support: "Our mission is to defend our homeland – Deter, detect, deny, and defeat threats to the United States, conduct security cooperation activities with allies and partners, and support civil authorities" (U.S. Northern Command, n.d.). This comprehensive approach encompasses homeland defense (HD), defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), and security cooperation (SC), in addition to standard Geographic Combatant Commander-assigned responsibilities.

As a geographical combatant command, NORTHCOM's area of responsibility is extensive, encompassing the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and surrounding waters out to approximately 500 nautical miles, including the Gulf of Mexico and the Straits of Florida (U.S. Northern Command, n.d.). This broad geographical scope underscores the command's critical role in defending against a wide range of potential threats to North America.

The creation of NORTHCOM represented a significant reorganization of U.S. military command structures, incorporating NORAD into a more comprehensive defense strategy that encompassed ground and coastal security alongside air defense (Kreisher, 2007). This integration allowed for a more coordinated and effective response to potential threats across multiple domains.

Like other combatant commands, NORTHCOM operates with a relatively small number of permanently assigned personnel for routine operations. When tasked by the National Command Authority to conduct specific homeland defense or civil support operations, NORTHCOM receives forces from U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) (Knight & Bowman, 2007, p. 2). This flexible structure allows for rapid response to emerging threats and efficient resource allocation.

The transformation of homeland defense capabilities also redefined the relationship between federal and state forces in domestic operations. While the National Guard, under the control of state governors and adjutants general, remains the primary military responder in civil support operations, the Department of Defense now has clearly defined protocols for supporting civil authorities when state and local resources are exhausted or overwhelmed (Department of Defense, 2010). This support is provided under the direction of a designated Lead Federal Agency, with the National Response Framework (NRF) designed to maximize unity of effort in federal responses to domestic emergencies (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2019).

The Department of Homeland Security

Prior to 9/11, the Bush administration had initiated modest changes to homeland security policy, replacing Clinton-era ad hoc interagency working groups with more formalized Policy Coordination Committees within the National Security Council (Lansford, 2003). However, the terrorist attacks catalyzed a comprehensive reassessment of homeland security strategies and organizational structures.

In the wake of 9/11, the Bush administration established the White House Office of Homeland Security on October 8, 2001 (Executive Order No. 13228, 2001). This office was tasked with developing and coordinating a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats. The creation of this office marked the beginning of a series of initiatives aimed at enhancing national preparedness and response capabilities.

The administration introduced several key programs to engage citizens in homeland security efforts. The USA Freedom Corps, announced in the 2002 State of the Union address, aimed to promote a culture of service and responsibility. Under this initiative, the Citizen Corps was established within FEMA to involve Americans in community preparedness through programs such as Community Emergency Response Teams and Neighborhood Watch (The White House, 2002).

To improve public communication regarding threat levels, the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) was implemented on March 12, 2002. This color-coded system aimed to convey threat information to the public and safety officials, allowing for the implementation of protective measures based on the perceived level of risk (The White House, 2002).

The development of strategic documents played a crucial role in outlining the administration's vision for homeland security. The National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS), released by the Office of Homeland Security in July 2002, provided a framework for aligning federal resources to secure the homeland against terrorist attacks. The NSHS identified six critical mission areas: intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, domestic counterterrorism, protecting critical infrastructure, defending against catastrophic terrorism, and emergency preparedness and response (Homeland Security National Preparedness Task Force, 2006).

The most significant organizational change came with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) through the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (H.R. 5005, 2002). This reorganization, the largest since the creation of the Department of Defense in the late 1940s, consolidated approximately 200,000 personnel from 22 federal agencies under a single department with an initial budget of $37 billion (Daalder et al., 2002).

To provide a comprehensive framework for managing domestic incidents, President George W. Bush signed Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) on February 28, 2003. HSPD-5 established a single, comprehensive national incident management system (NIMS) and tasked the Secretary of Homeland Security with its development and administration (The White House, 2003).

Under the leadership of Secretary Tom Ridge, DHS launched several initiatives to enhance national preparedness. The Ready Campaign, introduced in February 2003, aimed to educate and empower Americans to prepare for and respond to natural disasters and potential terrorist attacks (Homeland Security National Preparedness Task Force, 2006, p. 27). Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-8), issued in December 2003, further defined the scope of preparedness and outlined DHS's role in creating a National Preparedness Goal and coordinating efforts across various levels of government and the private sector (The White House, 2003).

The appointment of Michael Chertoff as DHS Secretary in February 2005 brought about additional changes. Chertoff's Second Stage Review resulted in a six-point agenda that emphasized increasing preparedness for catastrophic events, strengthening border security, enhancing transportation security, improving information sharing, and realigning the DHS organization to maximize mission performance (Congressional Research Service, 2006).

The devastating impact of Hurricane Katrina in August 2005 exposed significant shortcomings in national preparedness and response capabilities. The inadequate federal, state, and local response to this unprecedented catastrophe prompted a comprehensive review of disaster planning across the country. The review, released in June 2006, identified critical flaws in disaster planning, including failure to account for the full scope of catastrophic events, outmoded planning processes, and inadequate coordination (Homeland Security National Preparedness Task Force, 2006, p. 28).

National Guard Homeland Security Missions

The development and implementation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) represent a significant evolution in the United States' approach to domestic counterterrorism and emergency response.

Even before the September 11 attacks, rising concerns over potential terrorist threats led to new responsibilities for the Department of Defense in domestic antiterrorism. Congress passed legislation in 1996 charging the DoD with this new mission, particularly focusing on the ability to respond to chemical, biological, and explosive weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks against civilian populations (Public Law 104-201, 2006; National Guard Bureau, 1999, pp. 36, 78-79).

The Department of Defense has unique capabilities and resources that can provide crucial support to civil authorities when necessary. Although primarily organized for combat operations abroad, DoD military personnel and equipment have proven highly effective in domestic disaster relief operations (Department of Defense, 2010). However, it is important to note that in these instances, the DoD's role is always one of support, with civilian authorities retaining primary responsibility for domestic operations (U.S. Department of Defense, 2013a).

When federal forces do respond in a support role, they operate under the direction of a designated Lead Federal Agency (LFA). The National Response Framework (NRF), developed by the Department of Homeland Security, is designed to maximize unity of effort when federal agencies work together to respond to domestic emergencies (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2019). This framework emphasizes the importance of interdepartmental and interagency coordination and planning in addressing complex homeland security challenges.

The concept of WMD-CSTs emerged in October 1997 when the Defense Review Board requested the integration of Reserves and National Guard into WMD domestic preparedness programs. In January 1998, an Integrated Concept Team, known as the "Tiger Team," produced a report outlining the capabilities the U.S. military should provide to local, state, and federal authorities in response to WMD attacks (Department of the Army, 1998). This report introduced the concept of Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) Teams, later renamed WMD-CSTs, designed to assist civilian authorities in responding to CBRN incidents.

The Tiger Team's recommendations, accepted by the Secretary of Defense and published as part of Defense Reform Initiative, called for ten teams aligned with FEMA regions, capable of operating under both state (Title 32) and federal (Title 10) authority (Cohen, 1997). This dual-status capability was intended to provide flexibility in responding to WMD attacks at both state and federal levels.

A critical component of this new mission was the creation of National Guard Civil Support Teams (CSTs). These highly specialized units were designed to assist civilian first responders in identifying chemical, biological, or radiological contamination, assess potential damage, and provide technical assistance

during WMD attacks. Each CST consisted of 22 full-time personnel equipped with sophisticated communications and mobile chemical reconnaissance capabilities (National Guard Bureau, 1999, pp. 36, 78-79).

However, the WMD-CST concept faced criticism from its inception. Major James E. Taylor argued that WMD-CSTs were incapable of providing timely support to local authorities (Taylor, 2000). Similar concerns were echoed by researchers at RAND Corporation and the Stimson Center, who questioned the teams' effectiveness and the Department of Defense's ability to provide adequately trained personnel for meaningful support to civilian first responders (Smithson & Levy, 2000, p. 227). By 2001, Congress had authorized 32 CSTs, with responsibility for their management transferring from DoD to the National Guard Bureau (NGB) to expedite activation.

The operational capabilities of WMD-CSTs were first tested during the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the subsequent anthrax attacks in October 2001(National Guard Bureau, 2001, pp. 38-41). New York's 2nd WMD-CST responded to the World Trade Center attacks, assembling 18 of 22 members within 90 minutes of notification and deploying to Manhattan by nightfall on September 11 (Erichsen, 2002, p. 41). While the team detected no chemical or biological agents, it provided critical communications support, utilizing its Unified Command Suite (UCS) to reestablish communications between local, state, and federal response agencies after New York City's Incident Command System was destroyed.

This deployment revealed both strengths and limitations of the WMD-CST concept. The 11-hour response time to travel 182 miles raised doubts about the teams' ability to meet the one-hour deployment requirement for effective WMD response. However, the 2nd CST's ability to provide communications support and assist in coordinating response agencies validated the "advise" and "facilitate" functions of the WMD-CST concept (Bogart, 2002).

WMD-CSTs also supported first responders during the October 2001 anthrax attacks. Pennsylvania's CST deployed survey teams to Maryland to check mailrooms, while Florida's 44th CST supported the Palm Beach County Department of Emergency Management in surveying the contaminated American Media Building in Boca Raton (Kielbasa, 2002, p. 4). These deployments demonstrated the WMD-CSTs' ability to sustain initial first responder efforts and provide unique capabilities, such as field tests for biological agents, that many local HAZMAT teams lacked.

The heightened security environment following 9/11 led to the deployment of WMD-CSTs in support of special events, including the 2002 Super Bowl and Winter Olympics. This pre-positioning of teams with first responders represented a departure from the original employment concept, indicating a preference among civilian emergency managers for immediate access to WMD-CST capabilities rather than relying on rapid deployment from distant locations (Erichsen, 2002, p. 41).

Analysis of WMD-CST performance reveals mixed results in meeting their original design requirements. While the teams have demonstrated value in their "advise" and "facilitate" functions, they face significant challenges in meeting the one-hour deployment requirement due to stationing decisions, lack of dedicated aircraft, and the time required for deployment authorization under Title 32 (Taylor, 2000, p. 37).

The WMD-CST experience offers valuable lessons for future Department of Defense planning in homeland defense and WMD consequence management. It underscores the critical importance of response time in emergency planning and the challenges of committing state, regional, or federal assets to rapid response missions. As demonstrated by the WMD-CSTs, assets that cannot arrive within the critical

response window, regardless of their capabilities, may be of limited value in minimizing casualties from WMD attacks.

To further enhance WMD response capabilities, the Guard organized Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosives Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFPs). These units augmented existing CSTs by enhancing detection, decontamination, and treatment capabilities. By December 2005, 12 CERFPs were operational, with five more authorized in the 2006 Defense Authorization Act (National Guard Bureau, 2005, p. 23).

Operation Enduring Freedom

The strategic framework for the war in Afghanistan emerged rapidly following the September 11, 2001, attacks. In a pivotal conversation on September 12, General Hugh Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Tommy Franks, CENTCOM commander, outlined two primary objectives: destroy al Qaeda and remove the Taliban regime (Franks & McConnell, 2004, p. 250-252). Within ten days, CENTCOM developed a four-phase operational plan that encompassed the buildup of combat power, commencement of combat operations, defeat of Taliban and al Qaeda forces, and sustained military operations to prevent their resurgence.

The campaign faced formidable logistical and operational challenges due to Afghanistan's remote location and rugged terrain. Approximately the size of Texas, Afghanistan's topography ranged from massive mountain ranges in the north and east to broad, arid desert plains in the south and west (U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2004, pp. 3-7). The country's limited infrastructure, compounded by the devastation from the Soviet occupation, further complicated military operations.

President George W. Bush's address to Congress on September 20, 2001, set the stage for imminent military action. He issued non-negotiable demands to the Taliban, including the surrender of Usama Bin Laden and closure of terrorist training camps (The White House, 2001a, pp. 1-7). The following day, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Franks presented the operational plan to the President, who approved it with a two-week preparation timeline (Franks & McConnell, 2004, pp. 278-282).

Operation Enduring Freedom officially commenced on October 7, 2001, with President Bush addressing the nation and cruise missiles and B-2 Spirit stealth bombers striking targets in Afghanistan (The White House, 2001b, pp. 1-2). The initial strike force comprised 40,000 combatants from a coalition of 31 nations, supported by nearly 400 aircraft and 32 ships (Franks & McConnell, 2004, p. 284).

The composition of forces for OEF reflected the Total Force Policy and the allocation of units between the Army, Air Force, and National Guard which necessitated the immediate employment of Guard and Reserve components. The Air National Guard (ANG) played a particularly crucial role, providing nearly half of the USAF's theater airlift capability with 22 C-130 Hercules units and 41% of the KC-135 tanker aircraft fleet (National Guard Bureau, 2000, pp. 66-70).

The Air National Guard's contribution to the early stages of OEF was substantial and multifaceted. ANG units provided critical refueling and airlift operations globally, while special operations units engaged in direct combat. As the campaign progressed, the ANG's role expanded to include close air support, airspace management, and infrastructure support. The establishment of two global air bridges, one from the West Coast across the Pacific and another from the East Coast through Europe to Southwest Asia, was a logistical feat that heavily relied on ANG capabilities. Air Guard refueling units were deployed along these routes to support the massive movement of personnel and equipment. Strategic airlift capabilities,

such as those provided by New York's 105th Airlift Wing operating C-5 Galaxies, became crucial in sustaining the air bridges (Doubler, 2006, pp. 38-43).

The austere conditions of Afghan airfields necessitated the use of C-17 Globemasters and C-130 Hercules for in-theater operations. ANG C-130 units, such as Wyoming's 153rd Airlift Wing, became a permanent presence in the region, operating from bases like Karshi-Khanabad in Uzbekistan. Beyond airlift and refueling, specialized ANG units played critical roles in the campaign. Pennsylvania's 193rd Special Operations Wing provided the only airborne psychological operations platform in the Defense Department. Kentucky's 123rd Special Tactics Squadron contributed essential combat controllers and pararescuemen, while Alabama's 280th Combat Communications Squadron supported special forces operations with advanced communications systems (Doubler, 2006, p. 12).

The Army National Guard's initial contributions focused on intelligence and linguistic support, reflecting the unique demands of the war on terror. On October 25, 2001, Utah's 142nd Military Intelligence Battalion mobilized linguists and intelligence specialists, followed by similar mobilizations from Florida, Washington, and Illinois (Doubler, 2006, p. 28-30).

As the campaign intensified, the role of Army National Guard special forces units expanded. In December 2001, the 19th Special Forces Group from Utah mobilized, followed by the 20th Special Forces Group from Alabama in January 2002 (Johnston, 2006, p. 6). By February 2002, elements of the 19th Special Forces Group were deployed to Uzbekistan, supporting operations in the Hindu Kush (Briscoe et al., 2003, pp. 216-219).

These early deployments, while demonstrating the Guard's readiness to respond, also revealed systemic challenges in the mobilization process. Units faced shortages of equipment, limited access to training ammunition, and competition for resources with active-duty units (Johnston, 2006, pp. 7-9).

As the Global War on Terror progressed, the National Guard's roles and missions continued to evolve and expand. In Afghanistan, the Guard took on significant responsibilities in training and advising the Afghan National Army. In September 2003, the 45th Infantry Brigade mobilized to take over responsibility for Task Force Phoenix, a mission previously managed by Special Forces and active component units (Doubler, 2006, pp. 34-35). This 1,100-soldier force, drawn from 19 different states, exemplified the Guard's increasing role in specialized missions and its ability to adapt to complex operational environments.

Operation Iraqi Freedom

Transformation of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve from a strategic reserve to an operational force

The Army's pre-9/11 vision, as outlined in its Transformation initiative, had implied reducing reliance on reserve component forces for major operations. An Army white paper on Transformation called for "higher levels of integration between the active and reserve components to the point of truly being The Army, not three separate components" (Department of the Army, 2001, p. 18). However, the same document also emphasized the need to place the most urgently needed capabilities in the force available for immediate employment, namely the Regular Army.

The Army's heavy reliance on its reserve components evolved largely out of necessity. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan required more capacity than the Regular Army could provide. While Congress had pressured the DoD to enlarge the services, particularly the Army, after the 9/11 attacks, the DoD instead

opted to rely more heavily on the reserve components to provide the necessary manpower and capabilities for overseas operations (Punaro, 2013).

This evolution, however, has not been without criticism. The National Governors Association expressed concerns about "a lack of coordinated planning for the use of nonfederal forces, insufficient coordination of state and federal emergency response capabilities, inadequate funding to re-equip Guard units returning from active duty abroad, a lack of dual-use equipment, and insufficient consultation with governors by the Department of Defense" (Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2008, p. 56). These concerns highlight the complex challenges of balancing the National Guard's dual state and federal roles in the new security environment.

Balancing the needs of individual states for disaster response and homeland security with the federal requirements for overseas deployments became an ongoing challenge for Guard leadership and policymakers.

This shift prompted a reevaluation of the balance between active and reserve components. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's initiative to rebalance force structure across components reflected this changing dynamic. However, the continued heavy reliance on the Guard for both overseas deployments and homeland security missions highlighted the complexities of achieving this balance.

Historically, the National Guard has prioritized its federal combat mission over its state responsibilities. Stentiford notes that the National Guard traditionally viewed its service in a state capacity as a "secondary function" that primarily served to improve "public relations" (Stentiford, n.d., p. 74).

Prior to 9/11, the National Military Strategy primarily viewed the Reserve Component, especially the Army National Guard, as a strategic reserve rather than an operational force. This approach reflected the historical reliance on the National Guard to augment the regular army during times of national crisis (Brown, 2011, p. 197). However, the unprecedented nature of the 9/11 attacks, conducted by a non-state actor on American soil, challenged existing strategic paradigms and forced a reevaluation of how the Department of Defense would adapt its institutions, strategies, and capabilities to this new security environment.

As the United States engaged in operations in Afghanistan and later Iraq, the role of the reserve components expanded significantly. The Army National Guard (ARNG) combat forces assumed responsibility for stability operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, freeing Regular Army units for other missions. By the spring of 2004, ARNG combat forces were deployed to conduct stability operations in Iraq, initially viewed as a temporary measure to allow Regular Army brigades to convert to a new modular design (Geren & Casey, 2008).

The concept of an "operational reserve" emerged as a response to the increased demands placed on the U.S. military following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and subsequent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Lieutenant General Steven Blum, then Chief of the National Guard Bureau, articulated this shift in 2004, describing the move away from a strategic reserve model designed for a potential World War III scenario to a more active, readily deployable force (Markel et al., 2020, p. 137).

This transition was driven by the realization that the Regular Army lacked the capacity to secure Iraq by itself as the insurgency intensified. As General John Abizaid, commander of U.S. Central Command, acknowledged in July 2003, the United States had become embroiled in "a classical guerilla type campaign" (Wright & Reese, 2008, p. 32). Consequently, the Army turned to its reserve components, initially as a stopgap measure pending reorganization of the Regular Army.

However, as the insurgency in Iraq intensified, it became apparent that the DoD and the Army would need to make heavy and recurrent use of reserve component combat and support forces to meet operational demands. This shift represented a major evolution in American military policy. As noted by the 2008 Department of Defense Directive 1200.17, the Army's employment of its reserve components as an "operational force" marked a significant departure from previous practices (Department of Defense, 2008).

The scale of reserve component involvement in overseas operations was unprecedented. Between September 2001 and December 2008, the Army Reserve and Army National Guard provided approximately 35% of the soldiers deployed to Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom (Bonds et al., 2010). This level of engagement represented a significant departure from previous conflicts, such as the Korean War, where reserve components were employed extensively but not in sustained combat roles.

The transition to an operational reserve was not without challenges. Public perceptions grew that reserve component soldiers and units were receiving inequitable treatment during pre-deployment training and lower priority for critical equipment while deployed (Markel et al., 2020, p. 137). News stories emerged of reserve component soldiers purchasing makeshift armor with their own money to counter the rising threat of improvised explosive devices (Leung, 2004; PBS NewsHour, 2004; Banerjee & Kifner, 2004).

Despite these challenges, the Guard and its advocacy organizations generally supported the increased operational role. Major General Gus Hargett, chairman of the board of the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS), characterized the increasing use of Guard formations as "the new normal" (Markel et al., 2020, p. 142). This sentiment was echoed by General Blum, who asserted that employing the Guard and Reserve enhanced political support for the war by engaging communities across America (Markel et al., 2020, p. 142).

However, the operational demands placed significant strain on the reserve components' readiness. Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, Chief of the Army Reserve, warned of a "broken force" in a December 2004 memorandum to the U.S. Army Chief of Staff. He highlighted concerns about the negative impact of current policies on mobilization, training, and reserve component manpower management (Ives, 2005). Also, readiness for homeland security missions was unknown because DOD had not fully defined requirements for homeland security missions or established readiness standards and measures for them.

Throughout much of the period between 2003 and 2011, Regular Army units deployed every other year, while reserve component units typically deployed once every four to five years. This pattern of deployment reflected the transformation of the reserve components into an "operational reserve," a term that gained widespread usage among military leaders and policymakers (Cahlink, 2004; Markel et al., 2020, p. 126).

Despite being programmed and funded primarily as a later-deploying strategic reserve, the Army Guard has assumed extensive, sustained overseas missions. Units with high-demand specialties have faced repeated and extended deployments, prompting the retraining of other units to address capability shortages.

The Army Guard has also expanded its homeland security role, providing critical infrastructure protection, security at Air Force installations, and support along U.S. borders. Similarly, the Air Guard has taken on new missions, such as conducting combat air patrols over U.S. cities, with about one-third of its members activated between September 2001 and March 2004. By that time, approximately 102,500 Army

and Air National Guard members—primarily from the Army Guard—had been mobilized (Government Accountability Office, 2004).

To address these challenges, the Department of Defense and Congress took several steps. The Senate Armed Services Committee's report on the FY 2005 National Defense Authorization Act expressed support for initiatives to integrate the Active and Reserve components (H.R. 4200, 2004). Congress also established the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve to work out the details of how DoD should support this transition (Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2008, p. 1).

The Army increased recruiting and retention incentives massively to maintain force levels across all components. Active component enlistment and reenlistment incentives climbed from approximately $354 million in 2004 to $1.343 billion in 2006 (in constant 2016 dollars). Army Reserve incentives increased from $60 million to $366 million, and Army National Guard incentives went from $146 million to $639 million over the same period (Markel et al., 2020, p. 145).

Despite these efforts, the Army faced significant recruiting challenges. A 2010 RAND study found that while incentives were critical to meeting accessions objectives, they came at a high cost. The study estimated that a 100% increase in the enlistment bonus would only produce a 5.5% increase in enlistments (Asch et al., 2010, p. 21). Moreover, the war itself had a sizable negative effect on high-quality enlistments (Asch et al., 2010, p. 26).

Transformation of National Guard State Headquarters

The transformation of the National Guard's state headquarters and the development of Joint Task Forces (JTFs) in the post-9/11 era marked a significant shift in the organization's structure and capabilities. This section examines the evolution of state headquarters from State Area Commands (STARCs) to Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQs) and the subsequent implementation of JTFs for domestic operations.

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks, state National Guard headquarters recognized the need for enhanced coordination and information sharing. Most states quickly established 24-hour joint operations centers (JOCs) equipped with advanced communications technology. These JOCs provided a networked interface for transmitting information to local and state agencies, the National Guard Bureau (NGB), and federal entities (National Guard Bureau [NGB], 2005). By spring 2005, every National Guard state headquarters had a fully functioning JOC, reflecting a key tenet of Department of Defense transformation: networked headquarters providing a common operating picture (NGB, 2005).

The impetus for converting STARCs to joint organizations came with Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum's appointment as Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) in 2003. General Blum identified significant redundancy in state headquarters structures, with 162 separate headquarters entities across 54 states and territories. He declared, "That's too much headquarters, that's too much overhead, that's too much duplication... That's too much waste" (Logan, 2004, p. 1).

On May 16, 2003, General Blum outlined a plan to reorganize STARCs into Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQs). The new JFHQs would merge separate Army and Air National Guard components under the Adjutant General's direction, mirroring joint warfighting headquarters in organization and function (NGB, 2003). These JFHQs were tasked with meeting new command and control requirements, integrating reserve and active-duty forces during emergencies, and broadening coordination with state, local, and federal agencies.

Initially, some Adjutants General were hesitant about the reorganization. However, Major General John Kane, Adjutant General of Idaho and president of the Adjutants General Association of the United States, noted that "[t]he adjutants general accepted very favorably the things that Lt. Gen. Blum laid out for them" (Haskell, 2003).

The conversion process began with states reporting "initial operating capability" as JFHQs on October 1, 2003. Throughout 2004, NGB and the states engaged in continuous dialogue regarding the structure and essential missions of the new headquarters. By August 2004, 56% of states had completed the transition to "fully operational, provisional organizations," and by November 2005, this figure had risen to 89% (NGB, 2004; NGB, 2005).

A key innovation in the JFHQ concept was the ability to establish JTFs for specific missions. These JTFs were designed to provide command and control for all state military assets and federal forces during domestic emergencies. To enable this, Congress amended Title 32 USC in 2004, allowing a National Guard general to serve in both federal and state status while commanding a Guard JTF (Doubler, 2006, p. 70).

The first test of this new command arrangement came during the G8 Summit at Sea Island, Georgia, in June 2004. Brigadier General William T. Nesbitt, a Georgia Guardsman, commanded a JTF that included Guard troops from 13 states, two Navy ships, 30 aircraft, and Navy SEAL teams. This operation marked the first time a National Guard JTF commanded both state and federal troops concurrently, ensuring unity of effort and command for a major homeland security mission (Haskell, 2004, pp. 1, 12).

The success of the G8 Summit JTF led to similar arrangements for the 2004 Democratic and Republican national conventions and Operation Winter Freeze, a border security mission along the U.S.-Canada border from November 2004 to January 2005 (Schwabel, 2007, p. 10).

The new JFHQ and JTF structures faced their most significant challenge during Hurricane Katrina in August 2005. The National Guard mounted an unprecedented response, with over 50,000 Guard personnel from all states and territories deploying to the affected region. JFHQs in Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana each organized JTFs to coordinate emergency response and manage the influx of Guard assets (Corum, 2005, pp. 28-29).

The Guard's response to Katrina was the largest and fastest in U.S. history, with Guard personnel comprising 80% of the entire military response. The operation demonstrated the effectiveness of the new command structures and the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) network in coordinating a massive, multi-state response

The JTF model was further tested during Operation Jump Start, which began in May 2006 to support U.S. Customs and Border Protection along the Southwest border. JTFs were established in Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California to manage the deployment of up to 6,000 Guard members. By September 2006, Guard personnel had assisted in apprehending over 12,700 illegal immigrants and seizing 17,000 pounds of illegal drugs (Blum, 2006).

The success of these new structures in operations ranging from the G8 Summit to Hurricane Katrina and Operation Jump Start demonstrated the Guard's adaptability and effectiveness in its evolving domestic role.

ARNG's Approach to Readiness

The shift to an operational force model necessitated a fundamental change in the ARNG's approach to readiness. The traditional alert-mobilize-train-deploy sequence gave way to a more proactive train-alert-deploy model, reflecting the new reality that mobilization was a question of "when," not "if" (Buchalter & Elan, 2007, p. 22). This paradigm shift aimed to ensure that all units were prepared for potential deployment before receiving official notification. While not entirely novel—the Texas 49th Armored Division had successfully employed a similar approach for its 2000 peacekeeping mission in Bosnia—the widespread application of this model presented new challenges in the context of sustained, large-scale deployments (Doubler, 2003, p. 367).

The scale of ARNG mobilizations during this period was unprecedented. In fiscal year 2005 alone, the ARNG mobilized 141,760 soldiers, with 104,169 mobilized at any given time and 74,360 deployed overseas (Anderson, 2020, p. 62). This surge allowed the active component to accelerate its modular transformation while maintaining operational commitments. However, it also placed enormous strain on ARNG personnel and equipment resources.

The Army's modular transformation, while aimed at creating more self-sustaining brigade combat teams (BCTs), had mixed effects on the ARNG. While it potentially reduced the demand for support units by providing active component brigades with organic support structures, it also resulted in the ARNG losing combat brigades. This reduction in combat brigades raised concerns among senior Guard leaders about decreased dwell time for remaining BCTs, potentially affecting retention and overall force readiness (Doubler, 2006, pp. 90-91).

Personnel management emerged as a critical challenge during this period. Despite policy directives emphasizing early notification and discouraging multiple involuntary mobilizations (Schnaubelt et al., 2017, pp. 32-33), units continued to face significant personnel shortfalls. The practice of cross-leveling—transferring personnel from non-deploying units to fill gaps in deploying units—increased dramatically. The average percentage of cross-leveled personnel needed to fill a deploying unit tripled from 10% in 2003 to over 30% in 2006 (Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2007, p. 21).

The experiences of individual units illustrate these challenges. For instance, the Florida Army Guard's 1st Battalion, 111th Aviation Regiment, mobilizing for Iraq in May 2006, received cross-leveled personnel as late as the day of mobilization, precluding any pre-mobilization training or readiness screenings (Anderson, 2021, p. 65). Similarly, the 36th Combat Aviation Brigade from Texas mobilized in spring 2006 with 2,800 soldiers from over 46 different states, along with Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Army Reserve fillers (Anderson, 2021, p. 66).

Equipment shortages compounded the personnel challenges. The policy of leaving equipment in theater, combined with unusually high usage rates and the ongoing modular transformation, created significant equipment deficits across the ARNG. The percentage of equipment needing cross-leveling for a deploying unit increased from 40% in 2003 to over 60% in 2006 (Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2007, p. 21). The number of units required to donate equipment to support one deploying formation tripled from an average of four in 2002 to 12 in 2005 (Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2007, p. 22).

The scale of equipment transfers was staggering. In June 2004, ARNG equipment transfers totaled 35,000 pieces; by July 2005, this figure had nearly tripled to 101,000 pieces (Government Accountability Office, 2005, p. 4). These transfers included major items such as helicopters, which were shuffled between states to support mobilizations, limiting opportunities for maintenance and modernization (Anderson, 2021, p. 65).

The cumulative effect of these equipment transfers and overseas deployments was severe. By July 2005, the National Guard Bureau estimated that the ARNG had only 34% of its essential equipment on hand when excluding substitute items, equipment undergoing maintenance, and equipment left overseas (Government Accountability Office, 2006, p. 9). Between 2003 and 2005, the ARNG left over 64,000 pieces of equipment valued at $1.2 billion overseas, significantly degrading both stateside training capabilities and domestic emergency response capacity (Government Accountability Office, 2006, pp. 10-14).

The impact of these shortages on domestic emergency response became painfully apparent during Hurricane Katrina in August 2005. While the National Guard mobilized over 50,000 personnel for the response effort, with a peak of 40,000 deployed simultaneously in September, the operation strained the force (The White House, 2006, p. 43; Government Accountability Office, 2006, pp. [ii], 2, 6-7).

Some responding units had recently returned from overseas deployments, while others, such as Louisiana's 256th Infantry Brigade, were unavailable due to ongoing overseas commitments (The White House, 2006, p. 43; Government Accountability Office, 2006, pp. [ii], 2, 6-7).

The concept of an operational reserve represented a departure from historical precedents. In World Wars I and II, the nation fully mobilized the reserve components for the duration of the conflicts. During the Korean War, portions of the reserve components were mobilized for specific periods. In contrast, during the Vietnam War, the reserves were hardly mobilized at all, with President Johnson opting to wage the war primarily with active component forces. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, saw the Army mobilizing reserve component forces on a recurring basis, a situation that existing mobilization laws had not anticipated (32 U.S.C. § 102).

Health Readiness

Health readiness remained a critical concern for ARNG mobilizations. As of August 1, 2006, the ARNG reported only 20% of its force as fully medically ready according to Department of Defense standards (Anderson, 2020, pp. 69-70) To address this issue, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs implemented the Periodic Health Assessment (PHA) policy on February 16, 2006 (Winkenwerder, 2006). This annual assessment included a self-reported health status, medical records review, and identification of medical issues requiring correction. However, the policy's effectiveness was limited by a lack of resources and authority to address identified deficiencies, particularly for Guard members not eligible for TRICARE benefits (Winkenwerder, 2006).

To bridge the gap in health coverage, the Army expanded its TRICARE Reserve Select (TRS) program. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2005 extended TRS eligibility to soldiers mobilized after 9/11 for continuous service of at least 90 days (H.R. 4200, 2004). Subsequent legislation further expanded eligibility and introduced a tiered system based on qualifications and cost-sharing (H.R. 1815, 2006). Despite these efforts, a January 2007 Health Care Survey of DoD Beneficiaries revealed that uncertainty about eligibility and coverage options contributed to lower enrollment in the program (Health Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate, 2007, p. 2).

Training for Lethality

Training for mobilizing ARNG units during 2005-2006 showed incremental improvements, but persistent challenges remained. Units faced excessive coordination burdens, with one aviation battalion commander reporting "too many masters" and at least six major entities requiring updates and statuses (Anderson,

2021, p. 65). The lack of clearly defined mobilization training lists often resulted in duplicated efforts at mobilization sites (Anderson, 2021, p. 65).

To address these issues, the Army consolidated reserve component training responsibilities under First Army on January 16, 2006 (Anderson, 2021, p. 74). This consolidation aimed to standardize the training chain of command and focus the mission on mobilization support. However, challenges persisted, including a "one size fits all" training model often focused on Iraq-specific scenarios, even for units bound for Afghanistan (Anderson, 2021, p. 76).

The introduction of the eXportable Combat Training Center (XCTC) in July 2005 marked a positive development in ARNG training. This initiative offered a transportable training capability, allowing more Guard units to experience intense, combat training center-like exercises at various locations (Anderson, 2020, p. 79)

The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model

As the need for long-term force presence in Iraq and Afghanistan became apparent, the Army adopted a unit rotation approach known as ARFORGEN. Based on guidance from the Army Campaign Plan of 2004, ARFORGEN replaced the linear model of tiered readiness with a rotational model of progressively readied units for cyclical deployments (Feickert, 2022, p. 1).

This model represented a departure from the individual rotation policies employed during the Korean and Vietnam wars, which were believed to have "badly damaged unit cohesion" (Palmer, 1984, p. 204). Under ARFORGEN, units would cycle through stages of formation, training, deployment, and redeployment (Harvey & Schoomaker, 2006). This approach aimed to maintain unit integrity and cohesion while meeting the demands of prolonged conflicts.

The model consisted of three phases (“Reset/Train,” “Ready,” and “Available”) organized into Expeditionary Force packages (Posture Statement, United States Army 2006, p. 10). The ARFORGEN model established deployment goals for both active and reserve components. Active Regular forces were to deploy for no more than one year out of every three, while reserve component forces were limited to one year mobilized out of every six (Whitlock, 2006, p. 5). These goals aligned with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's July 2003 guidance, reflecting a desire to balance operational needs with the sustainability of the force.

ARFORGEN aimed to increase predictability, improve force availability, and maintain surge capacity while balancing the needs of families, civilian employers, and student-soldiers (Posture Statement, United States Army 2006, p. 10). The model also introduced a progressive equipment fielding system aligned with each phase, although wartime demands often eclipsed the concept's timeline during initial implementation (Government Accountability Office, 2006, p. 19).

However, the implementation of ARFORGEN faced significant challenges, particularly in interpreting the partial mobilization authority under Section 12302 of Title 10. The statute's language was ambiguous, leading to differing interpretations of mobilization limits. In 2002, Department of Defense officials, including Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness David Chu, interpreted the provision as limiting involuntary mobilization to 24 cumulative months under a single invocation of partial mobilization authority (Markel et al., 2020, p. 132).

The deteriorating situation in Iraq throughout 2006, culminating in what appeared to be approaching civil war, forced a reassessment of this interpretation. The Iraq Study Group's recommendations for dramatic

changes and potential U.S. withdrawal were countered by President George W. Bush's decision to implement the "Surge" or "Baghdad Security Plan" (Baker & Hamilton, 2006). This strategy required a substantial increase in U.S. forces, necessitating a reevaluation of mobilization policies.

A pivotal moment in ARNG mobilization policy came on January 19, 2007, with Secretary of Defense Robert H. Gates' "Utilization of the Total Force" memorandum. This policy shift addressed critical areas in manning and significantly altered Guard mobilization training. Key points included:

1. Limiting single mobilizations to a maximum of one year, removing the "cumulative" rule and returning to a "consecutive" interpretation of Title 10 USC.
2. Shifting mobilization management from individual to unit-based, aligning with the ARFORGEN cycle.
3. Establishing concrete goals for dwell times and instructions for force incentives (Marion & Hoffman, 2018, pp. 158-159).

These changes aimed to enhance unit cohesion and predictability while acknowledging the increased operational tempo of the Guard (Marion & Hoffman, 2018, pp. 158-159).

This policy effectively interpreted partial mobilization authority as limiting involuntary mobilization to 24 consecutive months but allowing recurring mobilizations under the same authority. This interpretation provided the flexibility needed to support the surge and ongoing operations while addressing concerns about excessive mobilization.

The one-year mobilization limit, however, had implications for the roles reserve component forces could play. A 2015 RAND Corporation analysis revealed that most reserve component support units required between 43 and 73 days of post-mobilization training, while Army National Guard combat brigades needed between 69 and 155 days (Pint et al., 2015, pp. 50-52). Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) assigned to security operations required 69 to 87 days, while those conducting counterinsurgency operations needed 94 to 155 days of post-mobilization training.

These training requirements, combined with the one-year mobilization limit, influenced the types of missions assigned to reserve component units. Of the 45 Guard BCTs analyzed by RAND, only nine were employed in counterinsurgency roles, while 27 were deployed as security forces, and nine were tasked with training and assisting partner security forces (Pint et al., 2015, p. 50). This distribution reflects the practical constraints imposed by the mobilization policy on the employment of reserve component combat units.

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Recruiting

By the end of 2006, the Army National Guard constituted 38% of the total Army force structure and the Air National Guard constituted 34 percent of the total Air Force aircraft (Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2007, p. 14). The Guard's transition to an operational reserve meant more frequent deployments and faster mobilization requirements. All 34 Guard combat brigades had mobilized at least

once in support of the Global War on Terror, in addition to contributions to missions in Africa and the Pacific, and domestic emergency responses.

Despite these challenges, the ARNG showed improvements in recruiting and retention. Initiatives such as the Guard Recruiting Assistance Program (G-RAP) and Every Soldier a Recruiter (ESAR) helped reverse the declining end-strength trend, although the Guard still fell short of its mandated 350,000 soldiers by 4,000 (Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2007, p. 14).

Air National Guard Transformation

In June 2002, the Air Force articulated its vision for defense transformation, aiming to exploit advanced technologies, network-centric warfare, and novel organizational constructs. This transformation sought to convert the Air Force from an industrial age to an information age force while completing its transition from a Cold War to a post-Cold War organization (Headquarters, United States Air Force, 2002, pp. i-xi). The Air Force's new mission statement, "to fly and fight in Air, Space, and Cyberspace," reflected the radical nature of this transformation (Headquarters, United States Air Force, 2002, p. i).

The Air Force's transformation plan, known as the "Flight Plan," aimed to advance six core competencies: air and space superiority, global attack, rapid global mobility, precision engagement, information superiority, and agile combat support. Central to this plan was the promotion of new technologies exemplified by the F-22 Raptor and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, as well as the adoption of novel organizational structures (Headquarters, United States Air Force, 2003, pp. i-x).

For the ANG, this transformation necessitated significant changes to accommodate plans for fewer aircraft, fewer flying units, and fewer bases while considering new organizations and missions. Lieutenant General Daniel James III, the new Director of the Air National Guard (DANG), unveiled the ANG's transformation strategy, "VANGUARD," at the Senior Leadership Conference in December 2002 (Doubler, 2006, p. 94).

VANGUARD acknowledged the Air Force's desire to shift from a "Cold War garrison force" to a "21st Century expeditionary force," emphasizing fewer, more advanced combat aircraft concentrated in larger flying organizations and stationed on a smaller number of bigger bases. This strategy had two significant implications for the ANG:

1. Future aircraft modernization would not be predicated upon receiving newer, more advanced aircraft on a one-for-one basis for each legacy aircraft retired.
2. Fewer aircraft concentrated in larger units would likely result in a reduction in the number of flying wings and squadrons. (Doubler, 2008a, p. 94)

VANGUARD also recognized the Air Force's expanding interest in innovative mission areas, suggesting that the ANG might consider new functions in space, command and control, intelligence, reconnaissance, information warfare, and unmanned aerial vehicles (Doubler, 2008a, p. 94).

However, VANGUARD faced resistance from The Adjutants General (TAGs), who were reluctant to eliminate, downsize, or transfer flying units between states. By June 2004, less than half of the states had submitted VANGUARD plans to the National Guard Bureau, and a year later, one-third of the states still had not complied (Doubler, 2008a, p. 94-95).

Despite these challenges, the ANG continued to make significant contributions to Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF) deployments in support of the war on terror. By 2004, the ANG was flying

nearly half of all USAF theater airlift missions, 43% of tanker missions, and 32% of fighter missions. Additionally, 15% of Air Guard combat support organizations saw overseas service (Doubler, 2008a, p. 95).

In December 2004, the Air Force announced new transformation initiatives as part of its Future Total Force (FTF) concept. These initiatives aimed to better integrate active duty, Guard, and Reserve personnel while fielding advanced weapons systems and exploring new mission areas (Headquarters, United States Air Force, 2004, pp. 33-34). The FTF concept introduced three "test cases" for promoting transformation and intraservice cooperation:

1. A partnership between the active duty 1st Fighter Wing and the Virginia ANG's 192nd Fighter Wing during the transition to the F-22 Raptor.
2. Stationing active duty airmen with the Vermont ANG to learn from experienced citizen-airmen.
3. Implementation of the "reachback" concept, allowing Air Guard members to perform missions globally while remaining at their home stations, as demonstrated by the Texas and Arizona ANG conducting Predator UAV missions. (Doubler, 2006, p. 95)

These initiatives represented a significant shift in the ANG's role and capabilities, moving towards a more integrated and technologically advanced force structure. However, the transformation process also presented challenges, particularly in balancing the need for modernization with the preservation of the ANG's traditional structure and state-based identity.

Hurricane Katrina and The National Response Plan

The Guard's dual role as both a state and federal force added another layer of complexity to the policy considerations. Balancing the needs of individual states for disaster response and homeland security with the federal requirements for overseas deployments became an ongoing challenge for Guard leadership and policymakers.

The National Response Plan (NRP) and its implementation during Hurricane Katrina exemplify the complex interplay between federal, state, and local authorities in disaster response during the Global War on Terror (GWOT). The NRP, released by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2004 and revised after Hurricane Katrina, outlines the nation's approach to natural and man-made disasters (Department of Homeland Security, 2004; Department of Homeland Security, 2006, p. 27). Rooted in the U.S. Constitution, the NRP recognizes that primary responsibility for disaster planning, preparation, and response lies with the states. Local authorities request state assistance when overwhelmed, and states, in turn, appeal to the federal government when their resources are exhausted (Department of Homeland Security, 2004).

Central to the NRP is the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which provides a consistent framework for incident management across all levels of government. The Incident Command System, a key component of NIMS, coordinates responses through five functional areas: command, planning, operations, logistics, and finance/administration (Department of Homeland Security, 2004, p. 7). This system's flexibility and scalability allow it to manage disasters of varying magnitudes while maintaining consistent terminology and command structures.

The NRP also incorporates the Emergency Support Function framework, which divides responsibilities into at least 15 topical areas, ranging from transportation to long-term community recovery (Department of Homeland Security, 2004, p. xii). This comprehensive approach aims to provide a unified command structure for all hazards across jurisdictions.

Key roles within the NRP include the Principal Federal Officer (PFO), appointed by the Secretary of Homeland Security to coordinate overall federal incident management, and the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), responsible for managing federal resource activities in Stafford Act disasters (Department of Homeland Security, 2004, p. 33). The Joint Field Office (JFO), a temporary federal facility established locally during disasters, coordinates operational federal assistance and provides a common operating picture for all federal agencies (Department of Homeland Security, 2004, p. 16).

The NRP distinguishes between "Incidents of National Significance," which require management by the Secretary of Homeland Security, and more routine incidents handled by state and local authorities (Department of Homeland Security, 2004, p. 15). A "Catastrophic Incident Annex" addresses no-notice or short-notice incidents of catastrophic size where anticipatory planning is not possible (Department of Homeland Security, 2004, p. 44).

The events surrounding Hurricane Katrina in 2005 provide a case study in the application of the NRP and the challenges of coordinating a large-scale disaster response. The chronology of events leading up to and following the hurricane's landfall illustrates the complex interplay of federal, state, and local authorities in disaster response.

Preparations began on August 23, 2005, when the National Hurricane Center announced the formation of Tropical Depression 12. As the storm intensified and approached the Gulf Coast, various agencies initiated response preparations. The Department of Defense conducted an inventory of its response capabilities and established a "crisis action cell." The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) activated its hurricane liaison team, and the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) issued warning orders to regional and state emergency preparedness officers (The White House, 2006; U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006).

On August 26, 2005, as the hurricane turned towards New Orleans, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco activated the state's Emergency Operations Center and declared a state of emergency (U.S. House of Representatives, 2006, p. 64). Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour took similar actions in his state (U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006, p. 503). Both states began activating their National Guard units, and NORTHCOM issued an execute order to set initial DoD relief actions in motion.

President Bush declared states of emergency in Louisiana on August 27 and Mississippi on August 28, releasing federal aid under the Stafford Act. FEMA Director Michael Brown deployed to Louisiana, and Defense Coordinating Officers were sent to both affected states (The White House, 2006; U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006).

Hurricane Katrina made landfall near Buras, Louisiana, on August 29, 2005, as a strong Category Three storm. The extent of the devastation became apparent the following day, prompting Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff to declare Katrina an Incident of National Significance and appoint Michael Brown as the PFO. Lieutenant General Russel Honoré was designated as commander of Joint Task Force Katrina (The White House, 2006; U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006).

Hurricane Katrina's devastating impact was unprecedented in scope and scale. With winds reaching 127 mph and a storm surge of 27 feet, it became the costliest residential disaster in U.S. history (National Weather Service, 2006). The storm affected over 93,000 square miles, causing widespread destruction from New Orleans, Louisiana, to Mobile, Alabama. The human toll was severe, with 1,330 lives lost and property damage estimates reaching $108 billion (National Weather Service, 2006). Thousands were left

without necessities such as shelter, power, clean water, sanitation, and food, overwhelming emergency responders and exposing weaknesses in the nation's Emergency Response Plan (Townsend, 2006, pp. 1-2).

The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina revealed critical flaws in the national preparedness for catastrophic events and the capacity to respond effectively. As noted in the federal government's after-action report, "Emergency plans at all levels of government – including the 600-page National Response Plan that set forth the Federal government's plan to coordinate all its departments and agencies and integrate them with State, local, and private sector partners – were put to the test and came up short" (Townsend, 2006, pp. 1-2). This failure was not limited to a single level of government but permeated federal, state, and local response efforts.

The complexity of the situation in the weeks following the hurricane's landfall amplified the challenges faced by emergency responders (Townsend, 2006, pp. 1-19). The sheer scale of the disaster created what policy scientists term a "wicked problem": a complex scenario with no finite solution, lacking a definable problem statement or definitive stopping point, and which cannot be objectively evaluated as right or wrong (Rittel & Webber, 1973, pp. 155-69). This complexity overwhelmed existing emergency management protocols, leaving government officials struggling to formulate an effective response.

The inadequacy of the government's response was publicly acknowledged by then-President George W. Bush in a joint news conference on September 13, 2005. He stated, "Katrina exposed serious problems in our response capability at all levels of government, and to the extent that the federal government didn't fully do its job right, I take responsibility" (CNN, 2005). This admission underscored the systemic nature of the failures exposed by Hurricane Katrina.

Despite these shortcomings, there were notable successes in the response effort, particularly among first responders. The federal after-action report highlighted the innovative collaboration among "government, private sector, faith-based, non-profit, and other volunteer personnel who collaborated in innovative ways to provide medical, financial, and housing assistance" (Townsend, 2006, p. 48). Among these collaborative efforts, State Defense Forces played a significant role.

James J. Carafano, Senior Research Fellow for National Security and Homeland Security, emphasized the importance of State Defense Forces in the Katrina response: "As the emergency response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated, these groups can be an important supplement to the National Guard, particularly during catastrophic disasters. When trained, disciplined, and well organized, local responders are essential for providing immediate aid and security" (Carafano & Brinkerhof, 2005). Carafano further advocated for enhanced support from Congress and the Bush Administration to better organize, train, and equip these volunteer units.

National Guard's Response to Hurricane Katrina

The mobilization of National Guard forces for Hurricane Katrina began before the storm made landfall. Governors in Louisiana and Mississippi activated their respective Army and Air National Guard units in anticipation of the hurricane's impact (The White House, 2006, p. 24). By the time Katrina struck on August 29, 2005, over 5,900 Army and Air National Guard service members were operating in Louisiana and just over 3,800 in Mississippi (Wombwell, 2009, p. 4). In the following days, the number of soldiers, sailors, and airmen surged significantly, reaching over 72,000 Active, Reserve, and Guard members at its highest point (Wombwell, 2009, p. 4).

The scale of this response was unprecedented in National Guard history. Prior to Katrina, the largest domestic National Guard deployment was 16,599 troops supporting the response to the 1989 San Francisco earthquake, primarily from California and mobilized over a three-month period (National Guard Bureau, 1990, p. 82). In contrast, the Katrina response saw a much larger force assembled in a matter of days, demonstrating the Guard's capacity for rapid, large-scale mobilization.

The initial requests for assistance from Louisiana and Mississippi were made through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), focusing on security, engineering support, and helicopter assets (U.S. House, 2006, pp. 59, 61, 66-67). As the catastrophic nature of the disaster became apparent, both states issued more general calls for assistance, leading the National Guard Bureau (NGB) to coordinate the response in both states (U.S. House of Representatives, 2006).

However, this rapid mobilization and deployment process faced several challenges. The Senate report noted that most National Guard troops dispatched to Louisiana were unaware of their specific mission or location until arrival (U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006). This lack of pre-deployment information hampered the effectiveness of the initial response.

The availability of National Guard units was also a limiting factor. With some units federalized for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan or engaged in domestic operations under Title 32, only about 75% of each state's National Guard forces were available on average (U.S. Army, 2005). Furthermore, the response primarily relied on volunteers, with the National Guard response averaging about 15% of "available" troops across contributing states.

The command and control (C2) structure during the Katrina response was complex and multifaceted. National Guard troops mobilized to state active duty were under the command of their respective state Adjutants General (TAGs), who also had tactical control of National Guard forces from other states (The White House, 2006, p. 55). To manage the large influx of out-of-state forces, the Chief of the NGB deployed National Guard division headquarters to both Louisiana and Mississippi, subordinate to the respective state TAGs.

Concurrently, the Department of Defense established Joint Task Force Katrina (JTF-Katrina) the day after landfall, building up the federal C2 structure as active-duty units arrived. This led to a dual C2 structure, with National Guard and active-duty units operating under separate commands. Governor Blanco of Louisiana rejected proposals for a unified command structure, including a suggestion to make the JTF-Katrina commander a dual-status commander overseeing both federal and state forces (U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006).

The separate chains of command employed during the disaster significantly degraded the integration and synchronization of over 54,000 National Guard and 20,000 Title 10 military personnel from different commands (Government Accountability Office, 2006). This lack of integration led to inefficiencies and duplication of efforts, with no single entity having a comprehensive view of the deployed forces, ongoing missions, and outstanding requirements.

The White House report noted that the "fragmented deployment system and lack of an integrated command structure for both active duty and National Guard forces exacerbated communications and coordination issues during the initial response" (The White House, 2006, p. 43). These issues were compounded by poor communications infrastructure and conflicting priorities between state and federal commanders.

In the aftermath of Katrina, the Department of Defense (DoD) initially sought to address these issues by proposing legislation that would allow the president to federalize the National Guard in domestic emergencies without prior consent from state governors. This approach, however, met with strong opposition from state governors, who viewed it as an infringement on their primary responsibility for disaster response within their borders (Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2008, p. 21).

The tension between federal and state authorities over military command in domestic operations persisted through several iterations of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). In 2007, Congress passed DoD-drafted amendments to the Insurrection Act, expanding presidential authority to federalize the National Guard. However, these changes were repealed in the 2008 NDAA following unanimous opposition from governors (Schumacher, 2011).

Recognizing the need for improved communication between DoD and state governors, Congress mandated the creation of the Council of Governors in the 2008 NDAA. This bipartisan council of 10 governors was designed to provide a forum for exchanging views on the National Guard and civil support missions with federal officials. However, the establishment of the Council was delayed, leading to continued unilateral efforts by the DoD to expand its authority over reserve components for domestic operations (Schumacher, 2011).

A significant breakthrough came with the establishment of the Council of Governors by Executive Order on January 11, 2010. The Council's Unity of Effort Working Group was tasked with addressing the proper integration of military forces during domestic operations. Through collaborative efforts involving multiple plenary meetings, workshops, and conference calls, the Council developed the Contingency Dual Status Commander concept for no-notice events (Schumacher, 2011, p. 4).

The Dual Status Command concept represents a cooperative approach to increase unity of effort and purpose for state and federal military support during domestic emergencies. This command structure allows a single commander to command both federal (Title 10) and state forces (National Guard in Title 32 and/or State Active Duty status) with the consent of a governor and the authorization of the president. Importantly, this arrangement maintains separate chains of command for federal and state forces, preserving the constitutional division of authorities (Schumacher, 2011, p. 4).

Under the DSC structure, the commander exercises authority within each chain of command separately. When acting under state authority, the DSC cannot issue orders to federal military forces, and vice versa. This arrangement ensures that the president retains command of federal forces, while the governor maintains exclusive command and control of state military forces unless federalized (Schumacher, 2011, p. 4).

The implementation of the DSC concept for no-notice events builds upon procedures successfully employed for pre-planned events since the 2004 NDAA. By establishing standardized procedures for commanding and integrating state and federal military forces, the DSC approach aims to eliminate the time-consuming task of synchronizing organizational structures under crisis conditions. This allows for a more focused and efficient military response to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate property damage (Schumacher, 2011, p. 4).

Despite these challenges, the National Guard's response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated its capacity for rapid, large-scale mobilization and deployment. However, the experience also highlighted areas for improvement, particularly in pre-deployment planning, inter-agency coordination, and command structure integration. While the separate C2 structures for National Guard and active-duty forces created some inefficiencies, the direct link between C2 structure and overall response effectiveness remains unclear.

SDF's Response to Hurricane Katrina

During the Katrina disaster, an estimated 2,274 SDF members from eight different states participated as emergency response personnel (Hershkowitz, 2006, p. 1). SDF members from Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, Texas, Maryland, Virginia, California, and Tennessee were activated at the request of their respective adjutant generals. Their primary roles included augmenting National Guard units and providing emergency medical care to those injured or displaced by the storm.

The Maryland Defense Force (MDDF) demonstrated the potential of SDFs in medical response by deploying an 81-person team to Louisiana. This team provided assistance in emergency management, health and mental hygiene, and homeland security (Carafano & Brinkerhof, 2005). Similarly, the California State Military Reserve (CASMR) contributed medical services, including initial trauma care, internal medicine, and food distribution assistance (Carafano & Brinkerhof, 2005).

The Texas State Guard, for example, activated over 1,000 members for 12-hour shifts to assist in shelter management, provide emergency medical aid, and support Red Cross operations (Carafano & Brinkerhof, 2005). Georgia, Virginia, and Tennessee activated SDF support personnel in unpaid status to aid shelters and provide medical and administrative support. Tennessee SDF members also assisted with transportation and housing for displaced disaster victims (Carafano & Brinkerhof, 2005).

The Katrina response highlighted the potential benefits of well-organized and trained SDFs in disaster relief efforts. Dr. Kent Seig suggests that SDF members can be trained to provide physical security, crowd control, medical and logistical support to regular forces, and local and state authorities (Sieg, 2005, pp. 3-7). The unique status of SDFs, not subject to the limitations of the Posse Comitatus Act, allows governors to utilize them flexibly without interfering with federal or National Guard missions (Sieg, 2005, pp. 3-7).

The experience of Hurricane Katrina also underscored the importance of local response capabilities. Carafano argues that state militias are ideal first responders because "they are continually stationed within their respective states and can be called up quickly and easily in times of need" (Carafano & Zuckerman, 2010). This local presence is particularly crucial given that federal aid can take up to 72 hours to reach a disaster area (Rhodes & Carafano, n.d.).

The professional backgrounds of many SDF members, including former military personnel and licensed medical, legal, and technical professionals, enhance their value in emergency response scenarios (Inspector General, Department of Defense, 2014). This expertise, combined with their local knowledge and rapid mobilization capabilities, positions SDFs as a cost-effective resource for states facing budget constraints and potential reductions in National Guard and military personnel (Carafano & Zuckerman, 2010).

Looking to the future, the potential for simultaneous major disasters—such as another Category 5 hurricane, a California earthquake, and a large-scale terrorist attack—underscores the need for robust local response capabilities. In such scenarios, the federal government may become overwhelmed, making local response critical for effective disaster recovery.

The Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)

The Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process of 2005 marked a significant milestone in the United States' efforts to restructure its military infrastructure. This section examines the 2005 BRAC round,

focusing on its unprecedented scope, the decision-making process, and its impact on military installations, with particular attention to Texas.

The 2005 BRAC round, often referred to as "the mother of all BRACs," was unique in its size, scope, and complexity (Government Accountability Office, 2013, p. 3). On May 13, 2005, the Department of Defense released its preliminary BRAC list, initiating a comprehensive review process (Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 2005). The BRAC Commission, an independent body responsible for reviewing the DoD's recommendations, conducted a thorough study before delivering its final recommendations to President Bush on September 8, 2005 (Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 2005).

This BRAC round was primarily focused on transforming military infrastructure rather than simply downsizing. However, the process faced challenges, particularly in terms of cost estimations. The 2005 BRAC Commission noted in its final report that the DoD's initial savings estimates had been "vastly overestimated," and suggested that the Department had claimed savings that were "not truly savings in the commonly understood sense of the term" (Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 2005, p. 3).

The scale of the 2005 BRAC round was unprecedented, impacting more than 800 installations worldwide (Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 2005). In Texas alone, the Commission's final recommendations included the closure of three major installations: Naval Station Ingleside, Brooks City-Base, and Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant. The Commission also recommended four major realignments in Texas: Red River Army Depot, Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, Lackland Air Force Base, and Sheppard Air Force Base (Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 2005).

One notable deviation from the DoD's initial recommendations was the Commission's decision not to close Red River Army Depot, instead opting for its realignment. This decision highlights the Commission's role in critically evaluating and, when necessary, modifying DoD proposals based on their independent analysis.

The implementation of the 2005 BRAC round faced significant challenges, particularly in terms of costs. GAO analysis found that savings estimates submitted during the 2005 round were overvalued by as much as 67%, with one-time implementation costs rising from $21 billion to $35.1 billion (Government Accountability Office, 2013, p. 3). This $14.1 billion increase was primarily due to rising construction costs associated with subsidiary projects not included in the original BRAC implementation plan (Government Accountability Office, 2012, p. 34).

The 2005 BRAC round also marked a shift in prioritization criteria. While previous rounds had considered potential costs and savings, the 2005 round explicitly prioritized military value above other factors (H.R. 2944, 2001). This shift in focus contributed to the underestimation of costs and overestimation of savings, as decisions were made primarily on strategic rather than financial grounds.

The timeline for implementing the 2005 BRAC recommendations was substantial. By law, all changes outlined in the Commission's report were required to be complete by September 15, 2011, nearly six years after the recommendations took effect (Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 2005). This extended implementation period reflects the complexity and scale of the realignments and closures involved.

In conclusion, the 2005 BRAC round represented a significant effort to transform U.S. military infrastructure. While it achieved its primary goal of realigning military assets to better meet strategic

needs, it also highlighted the challenges inherent in such large-scale restructuring efforts, particularly in accurately estimating costs and savings. The experience of the 2005 BRAC round has shaped subsequent discussions about military infrastructure management and has influenced congressional views on potential future BRAC rounds.

The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process marked a significant turning point in the transformation of the Air National Guard (ANG), bringing both challenges and opportunities for the organization. This section examines the impact of BRAC on the ANG, the resulting controversies, and the subsequent adaptation of the Air Guard to new missions and organizational structures.

The Department of Defense approached the 2005 BRAC with the dual objectives of promoting defense transformation goals and generating cost savings through infrastructure reduction (Government Accountability Office, 2005, pp. 1-3). For the Air Force, BRAC presented an opportunity to reshape itself into a smaller, more capable fighting force stationed on fewer bases (Department of Defense, 2005, pp. 1-3).

On May 13, 2005, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced the DoD's BRAC recommendations, which included 33 major base closures and 30 major realignments. The Air Force requested 10 base closures and 62 realignments, with 37 directly affecting the Air Guard (Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 2005, p. iv). The proposed changes were extensive:

1. Two-thirds of all ANG units would be affected by the closure or realignment of 30 facilities.
2. Twenty-three units were scheduled to lose 163 aircraft, nearly 15% of the Air Guard's inventory.
3. Seven states would be left without a flying unit.

These recommendations sent shockwaves through the National Guard community. The National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) labeled the action a "fiasco," and Adjutants General across the country expressed shock and dismay (Grant, 2005). Governors and Guard leaders raised concerns about the impact on homeland security missions, the importance of maintaining local community ties, and the traditional authority of governors to station their assigned Guard units.

By late August 2005, the governors of Connecticut, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Washington had filed lawsuits to block BRAC implementation, citing a key provision of U.S. Code, Title 32: "No change in the branch, organization, or allotment of a unit located entirely within a state may be made without the approval of its governor" (Grant, 2005). Chief of the National Guard Bureau, General H. Steven Blum, succinctly captured the sentiment: "If you take the flying unit out of the National Guard, you've taken the 'Air' out of the... Air National Guard" (Grant, 2005).

Throughout the summer of 2005, the BRAC Commission held public meetings nationwide to refine the DoD's recommendations. In its final report, the commission acknowledged that the closure or realignment of ANG bases was "one of the most difficult issues" it faced during deliberations (Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 2005, p. iv). The commission worked with the Air Force, National Guard Bureau, and Adjutants General to develop recommendations that would achieve the DoD's objectives while addressing state concerns.

The final BRAC report, issued in September 2005, was less severe for the ANG than DoD's original proposal but still had a significant impact. Key outcomes included:

1. Only Kulis ANG Base in Alaska was closed.

2. Connecticut became the only state left without a flying unit.
3. The ANG aircraft fleet saw a net loss of 163 aircraft through realignments. (Doubler, 2006, p. 96)

Despite the upheaval caused by BRAC, the Air Guard continued its transformation efforts, particularly in creating multicomponent units and embracing new missions. In August 2006, the Kansas ANG established a new distributed ground system intelligence center at McConnell Air Force Base, housing the 161st Intelligence Squadron (Doubler, 2008a, p. 97). This unit exemplified the ANG's adoption of advanced technological capabilities and intelligence-gathering roles.

The ANG also entered a new era in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operations. In November 2006, California's 163rd Reconnaissance Wing became the first Air Guard unit to operate the MQ-1 Predator, conducting overseas missions from California in support of the war on terror (Smith, 2006, pp. 1, 6). This development demonstrated the ANG's ability to leverage reachback capabilities and contribute to global operations from home stations.

Homeland security missions became an increasingly significant aspect of the ANG's portfolio. The creation of Civil Support Teams (CSTs) and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFPs) saw increased participation from Air Guard personnel in land-based homeland security operations (Doubler, 2008a, p. 98-99). The ANG also reorganized its medical assets into Expeditionary Medical Support (EMEDS) systems, creating mobile medical units capable of serving both overseas and domestically (Doubler, 2008a, p. 98).

The Air Guard's adaptability was further demonstrated during Operation Jump Start in 2006, where nearly 25% of National Guard troops deployed to the Southwest border were ANG personnel, assisting law enforcement in addressing illegal immigration (Doubler, 2008b, p. 37).

In conclusion, the 2005 BRAC process presented significant challenges for the Air National Guard, threatening its traditional structure and state-based identity. However, the ANG demonstrated resilience and adaptability by embracing new missions, technologies, and organizational structures. As the Air Guard continues to implement BRAC recommendations and pursue transformation initiatives, it faces the ongoing challenge of balancing its dual role as a state militia and a federal reserve component while maintaining its relevance in an evolving national security landscape.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review

The evolving role of the National Guard (NG) in the post-9/11 era has been shaped by a series of strategic reviews, doctrinal changes, and operational experiences. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) marked a significant shift in the conceptualization of the NG's role. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld emphasized the need to "operationalize" the Reserve Component, making select Reservists and units more accessible and deployable (Department of Defense, 2006 p. 76). This redefinition reflected the growing reliance on the NG for both domestic and international missions in the context of the Global War on Terror.

The Army's doctrinal response to this new strategic environment is encapsulated in Field Manual 3-0 (FM 3-0), which introduces the concept of full spectrum operations. FM 3-0 defines this as the simultaneous combination of "offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations" within an interdependent joint force framework (Department of the Army, 2008, pp. 3-17). This doctrine recognizes the NG's expanded role in both homeland security and as an operational reserve.

The four fundamental operations outlined in FM 3-0—offensive, defensive, stability, and civil support—are applied in varying degrees based on mission requirements. For instance, homeland security missions prioritize civil support operations, with minimal focus on traditional offensive and defensive military operations (Department of the Army, 2008, pp. 3-17). This flexibility in doctrine allows for the adaptation of force composition and mission focus to meet diverse challenges.

FM 3-0 explicitly acknowledges the NG's primacy in domestic response, stating that "[u]sually the Army National Guard is the first military force to respond on behalf of state authorities" (Department of the Army, 2008, pp. 3-17). The manual also highlights a key legal distinction: "National Guard forces under state control have law enforcement authorities that Regular Army units do not have" (Department of the Army, 2008, pp. 3-17). This unique dual-status capability enables the NG to bridge the gap between civilian law enforcement and federal military forces in domestic operations.

However, the increased operational tempo of the NG over seven years of combined combat and domestic operations has raised questions about its long-term sustainability in this dual role. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, in its March 2007 report, highlighted the challenges faced by the NG in meeting these expanded responsibilities. The commission noted that the NG was conducting operations with high operational and personnel tempo across multiple areas of operation, necessitating the cross-leveling of equipment and personnel to maintain unit strength (Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2007, p. viii).

The commission's report also emphasized the evolving threat landscape, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, fractured "non-actor" states creating regional and global instability, radical Islamic groups, pandemic diseases, and emerging competition among global powers. These threats, combined with the effects of globalization, are likely to increase the nation's reliance on the NG (Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2007, p. viii).

The impact of globalization on national security strategy was further highlighted in the 2008 Army Posture Statement. Army Chief of Staff General George Casey noted that "Globalization accelerates the redistribution of wealth, prosperity, and power, expanding the 'have' and 'have not' conditions that can foster conflict" (Department of the Army, 2008, p. 2). This assessment aligns with Thomas Friedman's analysis in "The Lexus and the Olive Tree," which posits that increasing global interconnectedness through technology can exacerbate security risks from non-state actors (Friedman, 2000, p. 405).

The transformation of the NG's role reflects a broader shift in U.S. military strategy and capabilities. As General Peter J. Schoomaker, the 35th Army Chief of Staff, stated before a congressional commission, "The Army is incapable of generating and sustaining the required forces to wage the global war on terror ...without active, Guard, and reserve [components] surging together" (Schoomaker, 2006).

State Defense Forces

President George W. Bush highlighted the growing significance of reserve components in homeland security, stating, "The National Guard and reservists will be more involved in homeland security, confronting acts of terror and the disorder our enemies may try to create" (Bush, 2001). This recognition was echoed by two influential advisory panels, the Hart-Rudman Commission and the Gilmore Panel, both of which recommended that the National Guard adopt homeland security as its primary mission (Roxborough, 2001, p. 17; (Gilmore Commission, 2002, p. xi).

However, this proposed shift in focus met resistance from organizations such as the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA).

These groups argue that while National Guard units can perform homeland security roles, their primary purpose should remain interoperability with the Army for regional contingencies (Doubler, 2002, p. 18-19). This debate highlights the tension between maintaining combat readiness and developing specialized homeland security capabilities.

The National Strategy for Homeland Security, released by the White House Office of Homeland Security in 2002, assigns primary responsibility for emergency services in the event of a terrorist attack to states and localities (Office of Homeland Security, 2002, p. viii). This approach aligns with the proposed order of response outlined by General William F. Kernan, then Commander of Joint Forces Command, which begins with first responders, followed by the National Guard, and finally the reserves and active components (Brinkerhoff, 2002).

However, this reliance on state and local resources presents significant challenges. First responder forces under gubernatorial control are largely non-standardized across states, employing varying procedures and organizational structures. The Hart-Rudman report highlights a critical issue: "With few exceptions, first-responder commanders do not have access to secure radios, telephones, or video conferencing capabilities that can support communications with county, state, and federal emergency preparedness officials or National Guard leaders" (Tulak et al. 2003, p. 134). This lack of standardization and interoperability poses significant obstacles for U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) planners developing contingency plans for military support (Tulak et al. 2003, p. 135).

State Defense Forces, operating alongside the National Guard, represent a potentially valuable resource in this order of response. Authorized by Title 32, U.S. Code, section 109(c), SDFs cannot be called into federal service, ensuring their availability to state governors even when National Guard units are federalized (32 U.S.C. § 109). This unique status allows SDFs to focus exclusively on homeland security tasks in support of their state or territorial governor, an option not available to Air and Army National Guard forces, which must maintain readiness for potential combat roles (Brinkerhoff, 2002).

The importance of SDFs becomes particularly apparent when considering the potential depletion of first responder ranks during major military operations. As Fay Fiore notes in an L.A. Times article, the mobilization of reserve components for overseas deployments often results in a significant loss of personnel from police, fire, and emergency services departments, many of whom serve in reserve units. This dual commitment of personnel creates a vulnerability in domestic emergency response capabilities precisely when heightened readiness may be required due to elevated threat levels (Fiore, 2003).

Recognizing these challenges, the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, chaired by James Gilmore, recommended that NORTHCOM develop comprehensive plans for military support to civil authorities. These plans should account for scenarios where other national assets are fully engaged or unable to respond, or when missions require additional or different military support (Gilmore Commission, 2002).

The shift in focus towards homeland security has prompted a reevaluation of SDFs' role and capabilities. SDFs are the ultimate guarantors of state-specific missions in the event of National Guard federalization.

Both the Hart-Rudman Commission and the Gilmore Panel noted that while the National Guard will likely comprise the bulk of forces provided to NORTHCOM in a crisis, these units are primarily trained for warfighting rather than homeland defense or civil support missions (Gilmore Commission, 2002, p. 95). Addressing this gap in specialized training and equipment for SDFs will be crucial for enhancing the effectiveness of state military forces in homeland security roles.

State Defense Forces, in contrast to the National Guard, have no combat mission and can focus exclusively on homeland security tasks. This specialization is reflected in their emphasis on emergency management training, with many SDF personnel are certified through courses offered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and its National Disaster & Emergency Management University (Federal Emergency Management Agency, n.d.). The State Guard Association of the United States (SGAUS) further promotes this specialization by offering a Military Emergency Management Specialist badge, establishing a national standard of competence (State Guard Association of the United States, 2023).

However, integrating SDFs into broader homeland security and defense structures presents several challenges. While SDFs share a similar culture, rank structure, and organizational framework with active and reserve component military forces, their training, equipment, and operational standards may vary significantly both within and between states (Tulak, Kraft, & Silbaugh, 2003, p. 134). Addressing these inconsistencies and developing standardized protocols for interoperability with other state and federal assets will be crucial for maximizing the effectiveness of SDFs in homeland security operations.

The legal framework governing the use of state military forces in various scenarios requires careful consideration. While National Guard units can transition to federally funded Title 32 status during federally declared disasters, SDFs remain under state control except in cases of martial law or homeland defense operations against an aggressor (Armstrong & Gisoldi, 1989, p. 21). This complexity necessitates clear protocols and agreements to ensure effective coordination between state and federal forces in diverse emergency scenarios.

Furthermore, the development of SDFs as a robust homeland security asset will require significant investment in training, equipment, and organizational development. In 2002, only four states had contingency plans in place to respond to a significant terrorist attack (Tulak, Kraft, & Silbaugh, 2003, p. 135). Expanding this preparedness across all states and territories with SDF programs will necessitate coordinated effort and resource allocation at both state and federal levels.

Response to Terrorist Attacks

Following the attacks, the New Jersey Naval Militia mobilized its Disaster Medical Assistance Team and Chaplain Corps to support survivors and rescue workers at Staten Island, New York. Additionally, Naval Guardsmen assisted in transporting evidence from Ground Zero to Manhattan's Chelsea Pier and Staten Island (Tulak et al., 2003, p. 16).

The New Jersey Naval Militia's involvement extended to Operation Noble Eagle, where they performed a variety of critical tasks. These included:

1. Providing 24-hour staffing for the New Jersey National Guard's Joint Operations Center at Fort Dix.
2. Supporting rescue and recovery efforts in New York City with ferry services across the Hudson River.
3. Providing waterborne security to enable the reopening of the George Washington Bridge.
4. Augmenting State Marine Police crews.
5. Securing New Jersey's nuclear power plants.
6. Supporting U.S. Navy waterborne security forces at Naval Weapons Station Earle. (Romanick, personal communication, February 27, 2003; Tulak et al., 2003, p. 16)

While the focus has primarily been on land and naval components of State Defense Forces, it is important to note that some states, including Alaska, New York, Texas, and Virginia, have SDFs with air components (Stentiford, n.d.). These air assets can provide valuable support in homeland security operations, particularly when Air National Guard units are unavailable due to federal commitments.

In addition to SDF air components, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) can draw upon other aerial resources for homeland security operations. The Civil Air Patrol (CAP), as the congressionally designated civilian auxiliary to the U.S. Air Force, is already integrated into state emergency management operations across all 50 states, Washington, D.C., and the territories of the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. CAP maintains capabilities to respond to natural and man-made disasters or national emergencies, including aircraft, vehicles, communications equipment, and trained volunteers (Headquarters, Civil Air Patrol, 2002, p. 1).

The Civil Air Patrol's capabilities in support of homeland security include:

1. Providing airborne communications relay platforms.
2. Uploading reconnaissance pictures to limited access websites for law enforcement agencies.
3. Deploying airborne and ground search and rescue teams for disaster response and recovery.
4. Employing limited radiological monitoring capabilities.
5. Potential for equipping platforms with chemical and biological detection sensors.

CAP's involvement in recent homeland security operations underscores its value. Following the 9/11 attacks, CAP provided the first aerial perspective of the World Trade Center disaster site at the request of the Governor of New York. CAP members also manned positions at FEMA Region Operations Centers and State Emergency Operations Centers, and provided communications and coordination support to FEMA Region 1 Regional Operations Center (Headquarters, Civil Air Patrol, 2002, p. 14).

The integration of State Defense Forces and auxiliary organizations like the Civil Air Patrol into homeland security operations presents both opportunities and challenges. While these forces offer valuable local knowledge and specialized capabilities, their effective coordination with federal assets and other state resources requires careful planning and clear protocols.

The command and control structure for state military forces in homeland security operations presents both opportunities and challenges. State Adjutants General (AGs) often serve as the senior officials responsible for emergency management, running state Emergency Operations Centers during crises (Fleming, 2001, p. 8). This positioning allows AGs to effectively coordinate state military forces through, at the time, the State Area Command (STARC) headquarters and subordinate units (Spencer & Wortzel, 2002, p. 6).

The integration of state military forces with federal response mechanisms has evolved through experiences such as support for the 1996 and 2002 Olympic Games. The 2002 Salt Lake City Olympics saw the formation of the Combined Joint Task Force-Olympics (CJTF-O), which utilized memorandums of agreement between various state AGs, CJTF-O, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and the National Guard Bureau to establish "tasking authority" over Title 32 forces (Eastman, 2002, p. 6). This model provides a potential framework for U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to coordinate state military forces in homeland security operations without directly commanding them.

Case Study: SDF Specialty (Medical) Units

The challenges facing SDF recruitment and retention are multifaceted. While major crises tend to inspire volunteerism, research shows that this pro-social surge is often short-lived (Penner, 2004, p. 653).

Additionally, the increasing professionalism required of volunteers in fields such as emergency response has raised the bar for participation, potentially deterring some would-be volunteers (Hampson, 2005).

Despite these challenges, some SDFs have successfully adapted to the new security environment by focusing on medical and public health roles. The Maryland Defense Force (MDDF) provides a compelling case study of this transformation. In response to the 9/11 attacks and subsequent natural disasters, the MDDF reorganized its medical directorate and registered it as a Medical Reserve Corps (MRC), following the model established by the Texas State Guard (Hershkowitz & Wardell, 2005).

In March 2003, at the direction of the Governor of Texas, the Texas Medical Reserve Corps was officially incorporated into the Texas Military Forces under the command of the Texas Adjutant General (Texas State Guard, n.d.). This integration represents a novel approach to organizing medical volunteer resources, combining the expertise of civilian health professionals with the organizational structure and discipline of a military unit. The Texas MRC is co-sponsored by The University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio and other state-supported health science centers, providing a strong academic and professional foundation for its operations (Texas State Guard, n.d.).

The primary mission of the Texas MRC is to respond to public health emergencies within the state, including biological terrorism and natural epidemics. Its membership consists of trained, licensed, and indemnified health professionals and medical support volunteers who prepare to support lead public health authorities with surge capacity and specialized emergency skills (Texas Department of State Health Services, n.d.). This unique combination of civilian medical expertise and military organization allows the Texas MRC to provide a structured and efficient response to public health crises.

The Texas MRC, also known as the Texas Medical Rangers, differs from its civilian counterparts in its military structure and statewide organization. While civilian medical reserve corps are typically organized along county lines, the Texas Medical Rangers operate on a state-wide basis, allowing for greater flexibility and resource allocation during large-scale emergencies (Greenstone, 2006, p. 27). This structure enables the Rangers to deploy across the state as needed.

The effectiveness of this model was demonstrated during the responses to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. The Texas Medical Rangers were called to State Active Duty and deployed throughout Texas in the wake of both disasters (Greenstone, 2006). During these mandatory deployments, which lasted several weeks each, the Rangers provided critical medical support and established emergency medical facilities.

In response to Hurricane Katrina, Rangers in northern Texas augmented emergency medical care operations at the Dallas Convention Center and the Dallas Reunion Arena. They also established a Disaster Hospital site in Tyler, Texas. The Rangers implemented several innovative practices during this deployment, including:

1. Providing 24-hour roving medical patrols to assess and reassess evacuees.
2. Establishing isolation areas to control disease spread.
3. Implementing a hand-sanitizing program that prevents potential epidemics. (Greenstone, 2006, p.27-28)

The Hurricane Rita response further demonstrated the Rangers' capabilities. They established and administered a Disaster Hospital for special needs patients evacuated from southern Texas. An inspector from the Office of the Surgeon General of the United States described this hospital as a "best practices model". The facility was organized along the specifications of a field military hospital, allowing for effective administration of care to hundreds of patients in serious need (Greenstone, 2006, p. 28).

The success of these deployments highlights the advantages of the Texas Medical Rangers' military organizational structure in providing an effective and coordinated response to large-scale public health emergencies. The uniformed medical reserve model allowed for the imposition of structure and discipline in potentially chaotic situations, enhancing the overall effectiveness of the emergency response (Greenstone, 2006, p. 39).

The MDDF's medical unit demonstrated its value during the response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005. By order of Maryland Governor Robert Ehrlich, Jr., the MDDF deployed medical and support personnel to Louisiana, alongside civilian volunteers from the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene's statewide Medical Reserve Corps. To address legal and logistical challenges, the MDDF took the innovative step of inducting civilian volunteers as temporary MDDF soldiers, providing them with liability protection, workers' compensation coverage, and access to military resources (Nelson et al., 2006).

This approach proved highly effective, allowing the MDDF to provide organized, well-supported medical assistance in the chaotic post-Katrina environment. The success of this mission led to increased interest in the MDDF's medical capabilities and sparked growth in its medical ranks (Nelson et al., 2006).

Following the Katrina mission, the MDDF's medical unit, now designated as the 10th Medical Regiment (10MEDRGT), continued to expand its role. In 2006, the unit participated in a groundbreaking overseas humanitarian mission to Bosnia, marking the first time an SDF had been deployed outside the United States. This mission not only provided valuable medical care to underserved Bosnian communities but also enhanced the MDDF's reputation and attracted more volunteers to the unit (Nelson et al., 2006, p. 13).

The 10MEDRGT has since been involved in various initiatives supporting the National Guard and civil authorities, including staffing surge capacity field treatment centers during emergency exercises and providing mental health professionals for Post-Deployment Health Reassessments (PDHRA) for the Maryland Army National Guard (Nelson et al., 2006, p. 21).

The success of the MDDF's medical unit highlights the potential for SDFs to play a significant role in homeland security and emergency response. By focusing on specialized capabilities like medical support, SDFs can provide valuable resources to their states while offering meaningful volunteer opportunities to skilled professionals who may be hesitant to join the National Guard due to concerns about involuntary mobilization (Nelson et al., 2006, p. 22).

Integrating the Reserve Components after ARFOGEN

The Department of Defense (DoD) has significantly redefined the role of reserve components, transforming them from a primarily strategic reserve into a critical part of routine military operations. This shift was codified in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012, which granted broader authority for the use of reserve forces. Section 12304b of the 2012 NDAA authorized service secretaries to mobilize up to 60,000 reservists simultaneously for preplanned missions, including joint exercises and recurring operational events, with a maximum mobilization period of 365 consecutive days (H.R. 1540, 2011). This authority came with the condition that the amount of personnel and associated costs be accounted for in the annual budget for the relevant fiscal years. This budgetary requirement marked a notable shift toward a more predictable, sustainable reliance on reserve forces.

The Senate Armed Services Committee highlighted the purpose of Section 12304b: “to enable reserve component units to train, organize, and plan for operational missions with the same rigor as active-component units under structured service force generation plans”. This approach aimed to align reserve

units' operational readiness with that of their active-duty counterparts, reflecting a broader DoD goal to enhance overall force readiness by incorporating reserve components into regular military cycles (Markel et al., 2020, p. 151).

The increased reliance on reserve components was partly a response to the high operational tempo following 9/11, which drove a need for sustainable troop levels. Between 2002 and 2017, the DoD maintained budget levels for the Army's active, Guard, and Reserve components to meet critical end strengths. However, end strength alone did not fully capture reserve component contributions during this period. A RAND study showed that the median number of duty days for Army National Guard (ARNG) soldiers rose modestly from 39 in 2000 to 42 in 2013, with a similar increase for Army Reserve soldiers. This increase, though moderate, highlighted the balance needed between operational demand and the part-time nature of reservists' service, which must also accommodate their civilian commitments (Klimas et al., 2017).

The greater reliance on reserve components was matched by a significant expansion in full-time support personnel, including Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) staff and military technicians, whose numbers rose from 67,249 to 82,296—a 22% increase by 2015. This growth was essential to sustain the heightened operational tempo and ensure the reserve units' readiness, providing a foundation for administrative continuity, training, and logistics support.

Operations and maintenance (O&M) funding rose significantly for all three Army components from 2002 to 2015. However, according to a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study, much of this increase was consumed by rising costs in civilian labor, healthcare, and fuel, rather than new or enhanced operational capabilities (Congressional Budget Office, 2017). This redirection of funds to cover escalating baseline costs limited the potential for substantive growth in reserve component readiness and capacity.

The Crisis of Integrity: Ethical Challenges in the U.S. Military

In recent years, the U.S. military has faced a growing concern regarding ethical transgressions and moral integrity across its ranks. This issue has garnered attention from the highest levels of leadership, with former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel expressing deep concern about potential breakdowns in ethical behavior and moral courage (Kirby, 2014). The prevalence of these ethical lapses raises questions about the overall health of the force and the culture of accountability that the American public has come to expect from its military.

Instances of ethical misconduct have been observed across various branches of the military. In the Air Force, a cheating scandal involving nearly half of the nuclear missile launch officers at one base highlighted significant integrity issues (Cooper, 2014). The Navy faced similar challenges when 30 senior enlisted instructors responsible for training sailors in nuclear reactor operations were suspended for involvement in a cheating scheme (Cloud, 2014). The Army was not immune to such problems, with evidence of deceptive reporting in personnel evaluations to circumvent weight standards (Gould et al., 2014).

These incidents, while troubling in themselves, point to a more systemic issue within the military culture. The root of this problem may lie in the overwhelming number of requirements placed on military units and individuals, creating an environment where full compliance with all directives is virtually impossible. This predicament forces leaders and subordinates to make difficult choices about which requirements to prioritize and which to potentially neglect or misreport.

The magnitude of this challenge is evident in several studies conducted over the past two decades. In 2001, the Army Training and Leader Development Panel noted that much of the Army was no longer following or capable of following its own training management doctrine due to the sheer volume of tasks and limited resources, especially time (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2002, pp. 2-9). A subsequent U.S. Army War College study in 2002 quantified this issue, revealing that company commanders were expected to fit 297 days of mandatory requirements into just 256 available training days (Wong, 2002).

The problem persisted, as evidenced by a 2012 Department of the Army Inspector General report, which found that none of the inspected companies in the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process were able to complete all mandatory training and administrative tasks. This inability to meet all requirements significantly impacted their capacity to lead effectively and care for soldiers (Wong & Gerras, 2015, p. 5).

The crux of the issue lies in the military's culture of zero defects, which often makes it unacceptable for units or individuals to report noncompliance with directives. This creates a dilemma where leaders must choose between admitting failure to meet impossible standards or submitting reports that may not accurately reflect the true state of affairs. The resulting ethical quandary forces many in the military to grapple with questions of integrity and honesty in their reporting and self-assessments.

This situation raises critical questions about how the military can reconcile the impossible task of accomplishing all directed training with a bureaucratic system that demands confirmation of every requirement's completion. The choices facing military personnel—whether to admit noncompliance or submit potentially false reports—have significant implications for the ethical foundation of the armed forces.

To address this crisis of integrity, it is crucial for the military to engage in open, professional dialogue about these challenges. The institution must also exercise restraint in the proliferation of requirements and accept a certain level of risk in promoting truthful leadership at all levels. Only through such measures can the U.S. military hope to realign its practices with the high ethical standards expected by both its members and the American public.

National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force: Context, Findings, and Impact on the Air National Guard and Texas Air National Guard

The National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force (NCSAF) was established by the United States Congress to address pressing concerns regarding the Air Force's structure amidst fiscal constraints and evolving global security threats. The Commission's mandate included assessing the balance and integration between active duty Air Force, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve. This essay delves into the NCSAF's establishment, its findings, and the subsequent impact on the Air National Guard, with a particular focus on the Texas Air National Guard (TXANG).

Context Behind the Establishment of the NCSAF

The establishment of the NCSAF was driven by several factors. The fiscal downturn of 2008 and ensuing economic tribulations imposed stringent budgetary constraints on the U.S. government, including the Department of Defense. There was an urgent call to augment cost-effectiveness within the military. Concurrently, global security threats were in flux, with a growing focus on asymmetric warfare, cyber threats, and swift response capabilities (Cordesman, 2014). These shifts mandated a reevaluation of the Air Force's structure to guarantee its capacity to effectively counter diverse challenges.

Moreover, the optimal employment of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve was a subject of ongoing discourse. Traditionally perceived as strategic reserves, these components were increasingly acknowledged for their contributions to routine operations and homeland security missions (Winkler, 2010). Prior structural studies, such as the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) processes and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), further highlighted the imperative of continual assessment and adaptation of military force structure (Nagl & Sharp, 2010).

Key Findings Related to the Air National Guard

The NCSAF's report, disseminated in January 2014, encompassed several salient findings and recommendations pertinent to the Air National Guard:

1. Cost-Effectiveness: The Commission discerned the Air National Guard as a cost-effective element of the Air Force. Guard units characteristically incur lower operational costs compared to Active Duty units, attributable to reduced personnel expenses, as Guard members typically serve on a part-time basis and do not necessitate full-time benefits (National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force, 2014).
2. Operational Effectiveness: The Air National Guard exhibited considerable operational effectiveness in overseas deployments and domestic missions. Guard units frequently possess a wealth of experience and specialized skills, bolstering mission accomplishment (National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force, 2014).
3. Homeland Defense and Disaster Response: The Air National Guard fulfills a pivotal role in homeland defense and disaster response, with units strategically dispersed throughout the United States for prompt reaction to natural disasters, emergencies, and other domestic contingencies (National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force, 2014).
4. Integration and Utilization: The report accentuated the necessity of integrating the Air National Guard more efficaciously with the Active Duty Air Force and Air Force Reserve. This encompasses ensuring Guard units have access to contemporary equipment, training, and mission opportunities to sustain readiness and interoperability (National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force, 2014).
5. Sustainment of Capabilities: The Commission advocated for the preservation and augmentation of certain proficiencies within the Air National Guard, such as airlift, refueling, and cyber operations, where the Guard has exhibited distinct strengths (National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force, 2014).

Impact of the NCSAF's Recommendations

The NCSAF's recommendations had significant impacts on the Air Force:

1. Policy and Organizational Changes: The Air Force enacted numerous policy and organizational modifications to enhance the integration of the Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve components. These endeavors aimed to streamline command structures and ameliorate coordination across components (Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, 2015).
2. Resource Allocation: The findings swayed budgetary decisions, leading to escalated investment in the Air National Guard for specific mission areas. This ensured Guard units remained well-equipped and prepared for both federal and state missions (Reserve Officers Association, 2014).
3. Operational Practices: The Air Force adopted practices to amplify the utilization of the Air National Guard in regular operations, capitalizing on their cost-effectiveness and experience for overseas deployments and active missions (Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, 2015).

4. Legislative Actions: Congress integrated the Commission's findings into subsequent defense authorization bills, endorsing the Guard's role in homeland defense and ensuring continued investment in its capabilities (Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, 2015).
5. Cultural Shift: A notable cultural shift transpired within the Air Force, recognizing the merit of the Total Force concept, which underscores the seamless integration of Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve components to forge a more adaptable and proficient force (Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, 2015).
6. Enhanced Operational Roles: The NCSAF's emphasis on the operational effectiveness of the Air National Guard led to the augmented utilization of TXANG units in both federal and state missions. Texas units, renowned for their proficiency in disaster response, experienced expanded roles in homeland security and emergency response operations (Texas Military Department, 2017).

The Army's Aviation Restructure Initiative: Balancing Fiscal Constraints and Operational Demands

The U.S. Army's 2014 Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI) serves as a compelling case study in the challenges of balancing fiscal constraints, operational demands, and the evolving role of reserve components in the post-Iraq and Afghanistan war era. This initiative, developed in response to budget pressures and ongoing operational requirements, sparked a contentious debate about the future of Army aviation and the role of the Army National Guard (ARNG) as a combat reserve.

Fiscal Pressures and Operational Demands

The Budget Control Act of 2011, colloquially known as "the sequester," set the stage for the ARI by imposing significant budget cuts on the Department of Defense. The Army faced particularly severe reductions, with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) estimating a $26.4 billion decrease in the Army's total obligational authority between fiscal years 2016 and 2019 (Department of Defense, 2013b). These cuts disproportionately affected Army aviation, which, despite comprising only 11% of the Army's force structure, typically consumed about a third of the Army's base procurement budget (Markel et al., 2020, p. 159).

Concurrently, the Army faced high operational demands for its aviation assets, particularly attack helicopters, in ongoing operations and contingency plans. This demand, coupled with the need to upgrade aging platforms like the OH-58 Kiowa scout observation helicopter, created a perfect storm of fiscal pressure and operational requirements (Stapler, 2016, pp. 1-4).

In response to these challenges, the Army developed the ARI in the summer of 2014. The initiative proposed several significant changes to Army aviation:

1. Retiring the OH-58 Kiowa platform and canceling associated upgrade programs.
2. Employing the new AH-64E Apache as both an attack and scout platform, teamed with unmanned aircraft systems.
3. Consolidating all AH-64 Apache helicopters in the Regular Army.
4. Transferring 111 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters to the ARNG.
5. Replacing aging training aircraft with the UH-72 Lakota.
6. Inactivating three Regular Army aviation brigades. (Markel et al., 2020, pp. 160-161)

The Army's rationale for these changes focused on cost-effectiveness and meeting anticipated operational demands. By consolidating attack helicopters in the Regular Army, the ARI aimed to maximize the availability of these high-demand assets for both ongoing operations and contingency requirements.

Controversy and Opposition

The ARI's proposal to remove all AH-64 Apaches from the ARNG met with strong opposition from the National Guard and its congressional supporters. Critics argued that the initiative threatened the ARNG's status as the Army's "combat reserve" and could set a precedent for removing other combat capabilities from the Guard (Markel et al., 2020, p. 158).

The National Guard Bureau offered a counterproposal that would retain six battalions of attack helicopters in the ARNG, increasing the total number of attack helicopter battalions from 20 to 24. However, this alternative came at the cost of reduced operational float aircraft and higher overall expenses (Government Accountability Office, 2015, pp. 3-4, 14-15).

The Army's analysis, validated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation directorate and the Government Accountability Office, found that the ARI force structure met potential contingency demands more effectively than the ARNG's alternative. This conclusion was largely based on the difference in readiness cycles between Regular Army and reserve component units. Under the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model, active component units were available for nine months out of every 24, while reserve component units could be mobilized for only one year out of six (Department of Defense, 2016, p. 19).

Congressional Intervention and the National Commission on the Future of the Army

In response to the controversy, Congress intervened to delay the ARI's implementation. The Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act established the National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA) to investigate the issue further. The legislation explicitly referenced the ARNG's role as the "combat reserve of the Army" and required the Secretary of Defense to affirm that transferring helicopters from the ARNG would not create unacceptable risk to this role (H.R. 3979, 2014).

Congress's reluctance to upset the balance established by the 1993 Off-site Agreement, which had defined the roles of the Army's three components, was evident in the Senate Armed Services Committee report accompanying the legislation. The report emphasized the success of the agreement in fostering partnerships between active and reserve components during the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq (Markel et al., 2020, p. 167).

The National Commission on the Future of the Army: A Compromise on the Aviation Restructure Initiative

The National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA), established in April 2015, was tasked with resolving the controversy surrounding the Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI) and addressing broader issues concerning the roles of Army components and their ability to support national strategy under budget constraints. The commission's work culminated in a January 2016 report that proposed a nuanced compromise on the ARI issue while emphasizing the importance of unity between the Regular Army and the Army National Guard (ARNG).

The NCFA's Recommendations

The NCFA's recommendation on the ARI represented a middle ground between the Army's original proposal and the National Guard Bureau's alternative. Instead of completely removing AH-64 Apache helicopters from the ARNG as proposed by the ARI, or retaining six full-strength battalions as suggested by the National Guard Bureau, the commission recommended that the ARNG retain four understrength battalions, each with 18 Apaches instead of the standard 24 (National Commission on the Future of the Army, 2016, p. 84-92). This compromise solution necessitated cross-leveling from other units in the event of a full battalion deployment.

Rationale Behind the Compromise

The NCFA's decision appeared to prioritize harmony and cooperation among Army components over strict adherence to specific operational requirements or resource constraints. The commission cited several factors in favor of this modified approach:

1. Improved wartime "surge" capability: Retaining four Apache battalions in the ARNG enhanced the Army's ability to maximize unit commitment in large-scale operations (National Commission on the Future of the Army, 2016, p. 3).
2. Addressing component unity: The commission argued that the original ARI proposal would "exacerbate a problem highlighted in this report: the lack of unity between the Regular Army and Army National Guard forces" (National Commission on the Future of the Army, 2016, p. 85).
3. Operational tempo and cost considerations: The modified approach offered benefits in terms of managing deployment cycles and overall costs.
4. Commitment to integration: Perhaps most significantly, the NCFA emphasized that maintaining Apaches within the ARNG would ensure "commitment to regular use of those forces, therefore contributing to a key Commission goal of achieving one Army that works and trains together in peacetime and, if necessary, fights together in war" (National Commission on the Future of the Army, 2016, p. 92).

Congressional Endorsement and Implications

Congress endorsed the NCFA's recommendations, thereby validating the allocation of roles and missions among the Army's three components (Markel et al., 2020, p. 169). This endorsement reaffirmed the ARNG's role as the Army's "combat reserve." However, by rejecting the National Guard Bureau's proposal for six full-strength Apache battalions and instead approving only four understrength battalions, Congress also signaled its intent to continue relying primarily on the Regular Army for critical land power capabilities in high-priority operational scenarios.

The National Commission on the Future of the Army

The National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA) was established in 2015 by the U.S. Congress to assess the structure, roles, and missions of the U.S. Army, including the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG), and the Army Reserve. The creation of the NCFA was a direct response to concerns about the future force structure and the balance between the Active Component and Reserve Components, particularly in light of budget constraints and changing global threats (National Commission on the Future of the Army, 2016).

General Joseph F. Dunford Jr., USMC, stated in a testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, “The abrupt, deep cuts resulting from the Budget Control Act forced our military to make topline-driven decisions, such that we now have a strategy with little to no margin for surprise. Therefore, we are operating at higher levels of risk to our defense strategy. To limit adverse consequences, we need

the certainty of a more predictable funding stream, time to balance force structure, modernization, compensation, and readiness, and the flexibility to make trade-offs" (National Commission on the Future of the Army, 2016, pp. 43).

The NCFA was established amid new global security threats and the need for a restructured Army, alongside budgetary limitations imposed by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (National Commission on the Future of the Army, 2016, pp. 3). Disputes over resource allocation between the Active Army and Reserve Components necessitated an independent review (DuBois & Cancian, 2016; Congressional Research Service, 2016, p. 1).

The NCFA's report recognized the Army National Guard's role in the Total Force, highlighting its operational effectiveness, cost-efficiency, and recommendations for maintaining end strength and capabilities (National Commission on the Future of the Army, 2016).

The Role of the National Guard in U.S. Defense Strategy

Historically, the National Guard has played a dual role as both a state and federal force, contributing to domestic operations and national defense. The post-9/11 era saw an unprecedented reliance on the National Guard for overseas deployments, raising questions about its readiness and capacity to fulfill its domestic responsibilities (Pickup, 2008). The NCFA was tasked with evaluating these roles, particularly in the context of budgetary pressures and the need for a flexible, responsive military force. The Commission's findings underscored the importance of maintaining a robust and ready National Guard as an integral component of the Total Army Force (National Commission on the Future of the Army, 2016, p. 12).

Key Recommendations of the NCFA

The NCFA made several key recommendations regarding the structure and operational capacity of the National Guard. Among the most significant was the proposal to retain the 11 ARNG combat brigades, countering earlier proposals to reduce the Guard's combat forces (National Commission on the Future of the Army, 2016, p. 22). This recommendation was rooted in the recognition of the Guard's unique capabilities, particularly its ability to provide surge capacity in times of national crisis. The Commission also recommended enhancing the Guard's cyber capabilities and improving the integration of the Guard with the Active Army in planning and operations (National Commission on the Future of the Army, 2016, p. 34).

Impacts on Force Structure

The NCFA's recommendations had a profound impact on the force structure of the National Guard. The decision to retain the ARNG combat brigades ensured that the Guard remained a key component of the nation's combat forces, capable of deploying rapidly in response to global contingencies. This decision was pivotal in maintaining the Guard's relevance in the broader defense strategy, as it allowed the ARNG to continue playing a critical role in both domestic and overseas operations (National Commission on the Future of the Army, 2016, p. 57). Furthermore, the emphasis on cyber capabilities has led to the development of new units and training programs within the Guard, positioning it as a leader in the military's efforts to counter emerging cyber threats (National Commission on the Future of the Army, 2016, p. 35).

Operational Readiness and Training

One of the primary concerns addressed by the NCFA was the operational readiness of the National Guard. The Commission recommended increased funding for training and equipment modernization to ensure that the Guard could meet the demands of both its state and federal missions (National Commission on the Future of the Army, 2016, p. 28). This recommendation has had a lasting impact on the Guard, resulting in improved readiness levels and a greater ability to integrate with Active Army units during joint operations. The increased emphasis on training has also led to more frequent and complex exercises, enhancing the Guard's ability to respond to a wide range of contingencies (National Commission on the Future of the Army, 2016, pp. 75-77).

The Evolving Role of the National Guard

The NCFA's findings and recommendations have contributed to an evolving role for the National Guard in U.S. defense and homeland security. The Guard has increasingly been called upon to perform a variety of missions, from disaster response and homeland defense to cyber operations and international deployments (Smith & Carter, 2022, p. 2). The Commission's emphasis on maintaining a strong and capable Guard has helped ensure that it remains a versatile and essential component of the Total Army Force. This evolution is evident in the Guard's expanded participation in joint exercises, increased integration with Active Army forces, and enhanced capabilities in emerging domains such as cyber and space (National Commission on the Future of the Army, 2016, p. 37).

The Sunset Process in Texas: A Tool for Government Oversight and Reform

The Texas Legislature established the Sunset process in 1977 as a response to public perceptions of government inefficiency and overreach. This innovative approach serves as a powerful oversight tool, allowing the Legislature to systematically evaluate state agencies and programs (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2023). The Sunset process operates on a fundamental principle: every state agency is subject to automatic termination unless explicitly renewed by legislative action.

At its core, the Sunset review begins with a critical question: Is the state agency still necessary? If deemed essential, the review then delves into the agency's effectiveness, efficiency, and overall performance in fulfilling its mission. This comprehensive evaluation encompasses an agency's programs, rules, and operations (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2023). The process is designed to be both thorough and inclusive, actively seeking public input to identify areas for improvement and potential problems.

The Sunset Commission, comprised of 12 members including senators, representatives, and public appointees, oversees this process. The commission's leadership rotates between the Senate and House every two years, ensuring a balanced perspective. An executive director, appointed by the commission, leads a staff responsible for conducting reviews, supporting commission meetings, and serving as a resource during legislative sessions (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2023).

Currently, 131 agencies are scheduled for Sunset review over the next 12 years, with an average of 22 agencies evaluated biennially through 2035. While most state agencies are subject to this process, there are exceptions, including some river authorities, constitutionally created agencies, and most judicial and higher education institutions (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2023).

The Sunset process is guided by specific criteria outlined in the Texas Sunset Act, focusing on agency efficiency, effectiveness, fairness, and accountability. These criteria provide a structured framework for evaluating agencies and their continued relevance in a changing world (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2023).

The outcomes of a Sunset review can be far-reaching. Based on the commission's recommendations and public input, the Legislature may decide to abolish an agency, continue its operations (typically for another 12 years), or consolidate functions across multiple agencies to streamline government operations. Additionally, the commission can recommend statutory changes to address identified issues and issue management directives to agencies for operational improvements (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2023).

By regularly reassessing the need for and effectiveness of state agencies and programs, the Sunset process in Texas serves as a model for government accountability and reform. It provides a structured mechanism for adapting government functions to evolving societal needs and ensuring that public resources are used efficiently and effectively.

The Texas Military Department: 2017 Self Evaluation Report

The Texas Military Department (TMD) stands as a pivotal organization in both state and national defense, demonstrating remarkable adaptability and commitment to service. Since September 26, 2011, Texas Service Members have maintained an unbroken presence in active combat zones, with the Texas Army National Guard deploying over 600 units—an unparalleled record among state Army National Guards (Texas Military Department, 2017, p. 1). This continuous engagement underscores the TMD's significant role in national security efforts.

At the state level, the TMD's responsiveness to emergencies and disasters is equally impressive. From October 2015 to the time of reporting (excluding Hurricane Harvey response), TMD Service Members evacuated or rescued more than 1,800 Texans from flood waters alone. The department's versatility is evident in its involvement in a wide array of missions: 34 tropical weather, 43 flood, 29 aviation fire, 26 ground wildfire, 24 winter weather, 70 civil, and 32 law enforcement missions between January 2003 and May 2016 (Texas Military Department, 2017, p. 5). This extensive engagement translates to over 627,000 man-days on state-related responses since January 2013, highlighting the TMD's crucial role in Texas's emergency response infrastructure.

The TMD's responsibilities extend beyond immediate crisis response. The agency manages an extensive portfolio of military facilities, maintaining seven million square feet of Texas Air and Army National Guard structures. However, this responsibility comes with significant challenges. More than half of the Army facility space, totaling 5.9 million square feet, was constructed over 50 years ago and requires substantial repairs (Texas Military Department, 2017, p. 5). Recognizing this issue, the Adjutant General initiated the State of Texas Armory (STAR) program in 2014, a 10-year plan to address the state's facility needs.

Funding for facility maintenance and upgrades presents both challenges and opportunities. While the Texas Legislature invested $19 million for the 2016-2017 biennium, the need for additional resources remains critical. Importantly, state investments often attract federal matching funds, amplifying their impact. In 2016, for instance, $9.7 million in state funds for major facility repairs were matched by $16.7 million in federal funds, resulting in a total investment of $26.4 million (Texas Military Department, 2017, pp. 8-9). This matching mechanism underscores the importance of continued state support, as it directly influences the agency's ability to secure federal investment.

The TMD's role in disaster response has evolved significantly over time. Prior to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the department did not actively plan civil support operations. The aftermath of Katrina led to the development of more structured planning efforts, including the creation of Mission Ready Packages (MRPs). These MRPs are tailored, scalable capabilities designed to meet specific needs identified by the Texas Division of Emergency Management (TDEM). The MRP catalog details each package's task,

purpose, concept of operations, personnel requirements, equipment needs, and daily cost to the state (Texas Military Department, 2017, p. 28).

The Texas State Guard (TXSG), a component of the TMD, has played a crucial role in disaster response since the 1950s. The TXSG's involvement in major events, such as the 2003 Space Shuttle Columbia disaster and the response to Hurricanes Rita and Katrina in 2005, led to significant organizational changes. In 2006, the TXSG underwent a reorganization to better align with disaster response needs, and in 2008, it was further restructured as Civil Affairs to enhance its effectiveness in disaster scenarios (Texas Military Department, 2017, p. 43).

In conclusion, the Texas Military Department demonstrates remarkable versatility and dedication in serving both state and national interests. From combat deployments to natural disaster responses and facility management, the TMD's contributions are diverse and significant. However, the agency faces ongoing challenges, particularly in maintaining and upgrading its aging infrastructure. Continued support from both state and federal sources will be crucial in ensuring the TMD's ability to meet its wide-ranging responsibilities effectively.

The Texas Military Department: Balancing Federal Priorities and State Responsibilities

The Texas Military Department (TMD) plays a crucial role in managing the state's military forces, responding to international deployments, and addressing both state and national disasters. However, a comprehensive review by the Sunset Commission revealed significant challenges in the department's internal management and operations, particularly in balancing its federal military obligations with state administrative requirements (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2018).

As of fiscal year 2017, TMD maintained over 23,200 personnel in its military forces, underscoring its substantial operational scope. The department's leadership structure is complex, with the adjutant general, appointed by the governor, overseeing both the military command and the administrative support functions. This dual responsibility creates a unique organizational dynamic where federal priorities often overshadow state administrative concerns (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2018).

The department's funding structure reflects this duality. In fiscal year 2017, TMD received more than $58 million in federal funds for operations, supplemented by $490 million for federal personnel, purchases, and equipment. State appropriations totaled approximately $28.1 million, with an additional $14.6 million from border security contracts with the Department of Public Safety. This complex funding arrangement necessitates strict adherence to both federal and state regulations, a balance that has proven challenging for the department (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2018).

A key issue identified by the Sunset Commission is the department's struggle to consistently prioritize state administrative interests amidst its federal and military obligations. The commission found that TMD's focus on federal, military, and emergency matters often eclipsed its responsibilities as a state agency. This imbalance has led to poor compliance with state rules, particularly in financial processes and state property tracking, as evidenced by several independent audits and internal assessments (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2018).

The organizational structure of TMD contributes to these challenges. State law designates an "executive director" as the civilian officer responsible for state administration, including payroll, purchasing, and human resources. However, this position reports to the adjutant general, creating a potentially awkward separation of duties. The executive director oversees 45 state employees handling administrative

functions and coordinates with 505 other state employees and approximately 4,300 federal personnel who report through different chains of command (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2018).

This structure has led to several issues:

1. Diluted responsibility: The separation of state administrative duties from the adjutant general's office risks diminishing the adjutant general's visibility into and responsibility for state matters.
2. Limited authority: Despite the title, the executive director lacks clear authority to enforce state policies across all TMD programs, including those with significant state appropriations.
3. Compliance resistance: Administrative staff often face resistance from program staff when attempting to enforce state policies, citing military missions and federal regulations as justification.
4. High turnover: The tension between administrative and program staff has contributed to a higher-than-average turnover rate among state administrative staff, with TMD consistently ranking among the highest in state agency turnover rates (State Auditor's Office, 2017).
5. Outdated administrative rules: TMD has not updated its administrative rules since 2011, despite statutory requirements for review every four years. This lag has left the department's policies out of sync with significant changes in state contract law, such as those introduced by Senate Bill 20 in 2015 (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2018).

To address these issues, the Sunset Commission recommended clarifying statute to better integrate state administration into TMD's leadership structure. This change aims to ensure broader oversight across all of the department's diverse state programs and functions. Additionally, the commission suggested improvements in the department's purchasing processes, recommending the adoption of enhanced tools for data collection and information sharing across its decentralized programs (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2018).

The commission also identified several TMD programs using significant state funding that require new strategic direction. These include the Texas State Guard, the Texas Challenge Academy for at-risk youth, and the state-funded tuition assistance program for guard members. Recommendations for these programs aim to mitigate potential risks to the state and improve their effectiveness (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2018).

In conclusion, while the Texas Military Department continues to fulfill its vital role in state and national defense, it faces significant challenges in balancing its federal military obligations with state administrative requirements. The Sunset Commission's recommendations provide a roadmap for addressing these issues, emphasizing the need for clearer organizational structure, improved compliance with state regulations, and enhanced strategic direction for key state-funded programs.

The Texas State Guard: Challenges and Opportunities for Strategic Development

The Texas State Guard, a component of the Texas Military Department, plays a crucial role in the state's emergency response capabilities. However, a comprehensive review by the Sunset Advisory Commission in 2018 revealed significant challenges in the Guard's management and support structure, highlighting the need for strategic improvements to ensure its long-term effectiveness and sustainability.

As of fiscal year 2017, the State Guard maintained a force of approximately 1,900 members, comprising professionals from diverse backgrounds including law enforcement, military, medical, legal, and computer engineering fields (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2018). Despite its relatively small size, the State Guard has demonstrated its value through numerous missions. Between fiscal years 2007 and 2017,

the Guard deployed 7,605 personnel across 115 missions, responding to hurricanes, wildfires, and border operations (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2018, p. 26).

The State Guard operates on a modest annual budget of $1.4 million in state general revenue. Half of this funding supports nine full-time staff at Camp Mabry in Austin, while the remainder provides a limited daily stipend of $121 for members attending annual or specialized training. Notably, most positions, including that of the commanding general, are unpaid, relying heavily on the volunteerism of its members (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2018, p. 25).

Despite its cost-effectiveness and operational flexibility, the State Guard faces significant challenges that threaten its long-term viability and effectiveness. The Sunset Commission's review uncovered a pervasive lack of institutional support and oversight from the TMD, leading to deep frustration among State Guard members. In a survey conducted by Sunset staff, more than 600 State Guard members responded, rating the TMD lowest on statements related to asset availability, infrastructure, and administrative support (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2018, p. 26).

Key issues identified by State Guard members include:

1. Prolonged delays in administrative processes, including approvals to join the Guard, receive orders, and obtain expense reimbursements.
2. Insufficient staffing, with only nine paid personnel supporting 1,900 members statewide.
3. Lack of basic supplies and resources, such as computers, office supplies, and internet access.
4. Poor communication channels between State Guard units, headquarters, and TMD.
5. Absence of officially assigned meeting locations, forcing some units to convene in makeshift spaces. (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2018, p. 26)

These challenges have contributed to a concerning trend in State Guard membership. The organization currently loses more members than it recruits annually, with an average attrition of 400 members compared to 300 new recruits. Moreover, member retention is problematic, with over half of current members having less than five years of service and fewer than 15% serving for more than a decade (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2018, p. 27).

The Sunset Commission also identified issues with the TMD's strategic management of the State Guard. The department's approach to mission assignments appears reactive, lacking a holistic assessment of sustainable and safe missions for the Guard. This ad hoc approach has led to inconsistent training, unclear expectations for members, and resource allocation challenges (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2018, p. 27).

A particularly problematic issue is the equipment dilemma faced by State Guard members. The TMD does not provide all the necessary equipment for training, expecting members to use personal resources. However, liability concerns restrict the use of personal equipment during state-activated missions, creating a frustrating paradox for members during actual emergencies (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2018, p. 27).

Furthermore, the review revealed missed opportunities for resource leveraging and joint training between the State Guard and the Texas National Guard. Despite overlapping functions in areas such as medical evacuations, the two organizations rarely train together. This lack of coordination became evident during Hurricane Harvey, where many National and State Guard units worked together for the first time during the actual disaster response (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2018, p. 28).

To address these challenges, the Sunset Commission recommended that the TMD develop a comprehensive plan to provide better support and strategic direction for the State Guard. This plan should address issues of resource allocation, training coordination, and clear mission definition. Additionally, the Commission suggested exploring opportunities for increased collaboration between the State Guard and the National Guard, leveraging existing resources and facilities to enhance overall preparedness and response capabilities (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2018).

In conclusion, while the Texas State Guard continues to provide valuable service to the state, significant improvements in management, resource allocation, and strategic planning are necessary to ensure its long-term effectiveness and sustainability. Addressing these issues will not only enhance the Guard's operational capabilities but also improve member morale and retention, ultimately strengthening Texas's emergency response infrastructure.

Conclusion and Transition to Guard 4.0

The era of Guard 3.0 (2001-2017) marked a transformative period for the Army National Guard (ARNG), characterized by unprecedented operational demands and significant organizational changes. This period saw the ARNG evolve from a strategic reserve into an operational force, capable of meeting both domestic and international challenges with increased readiness and effectiveness.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, catalyzed the largest mobilization of ARNG soldiers since World War II, demonstrating the Guard's crucial role in national security (Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2008). Over the next 16 years, the ARNG simultaneously engaged in overseas combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan while maintaining its domestic responsibilities. This dual-mission capability underscored the unique value of the ARNG within the U.S. military structure.

Despite facing significant challenges, including force reductions due to sequestration and budget constraints, the ARNG emerged from the Guard 3.0 era as a more capable and battle-tested force. The reduction from 350,200 to 335,000 personnel, with further cuts anticipated, necessitated a strategic redistribution of force structure across states and territories (Kramer, 2014). This process, while complex, ultimately contributed to a more efficient and balanced ARNG.

As we transition from Guard 3.0 to Guard 4.0, the ARNG faces new challenges and opportunities. The concept of Guard 4.0, initiated in 2016 with the approval of enhanced readiness guidance, aims to further increase the ARNG's operational readiness and availability on a predictable, rotational basis (Locklear, 2022, p. 6). This new phase is structured around three periods extending to 2050, each addressing evolving threats and operational requirements.

The fundamental shift in Guard 4.0 is the move away from the traditional model of lengthy mobilization times towards a more agile force capable of rapid deployment. This transformation involves using the Army's Associated Units Pilot Program, increasing Combat Training Center rotations, and enhancing training days for select units (Army National Guard, 2017, p. 6). The associated unit program, which integrates ARNG units with Regular Army units, further exemplifies the total force approach underlying Guard 4.0.

As we look towards the future, the ARNG must continue to adapt to meet the challenges of an increasingly complex global security environment. The success of Guard 4.0 will depend on the ARNG's ability to maintain high levels of readiness in training, manning, and military education, while sustaining these improvements over time. This evolution represents not just a change in operational approach, but a fundamental reimagining of the ARNG's role within the broader U.S. military structure.

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A Critical Assessment of the Texas Military Department

Chapter 3: The Path Forward

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Introduction

The United States is navigating its most complex security environment since World War II, defined by the potential for a near-peer conflict and unprecedented asymmetric threats to the homeland. This dynamic landscape demands a transformative approach to national defense and state security—one that prioritizes agility, innovation, and cost-effectiveness. Nearly 80 years have passed since the nation last engaged in a global conflict, and 35 years since the Cold War shaped U.S. preparedness for large-scale engagements. Today, military readiness is deemed "grossly inadequate" to counter evolving threats (Commission on the National Defense Strategy, 2024, p. v).

Challenges to military preparedness for war in multiple regions around the globe are exacerbated by inflation and the growing national debt, which strain defense budgets and risk degrading capabilities (Hernandez, 2024). Modernization efforts have necessitated difficult trade-offs between force structure and readiness. The Department of Defense (DoD) increasingly depends on the National Guard as an operational combat reserve, marking a fundamental shift from its historical role as a strategic reserve (Reserve Forces Policy Board, 2020, pp. 32, 40-66).

A New Strategic Direction

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has articulated a clear vision under President Donald J. Trump's leadership to achieve Peace through Strength through three interconnected initiatives (U.S. Department of Defense, 2025):

Reviving the Warrior Ethos: The Secretary will establish high and uncompromising standards that emphasize unity and shared purpose across the force. This renewed focus on the warrior mindset aims to rebuild trust and strengthen military cohesion at a critical moment in American history.

Rebuilding Military Capabilities: By matching threats with capabilities, the Department will reform the defense industrial base, streamline acquisition processes, and accelerate the adoption of emerging technologies. These efforts will ensure America maintains the world's most lethal and effective fighting force.

Reestablishing Global Deterrence: The strategy prioritizes robust homeland defense across all domains by deterring aggression from near-peer competitors, like the CCP, responsibly ending wars and reorienting to key threats. This approach combines unwavering support for allies with an unequivocal message: America's adversaries—foreign and domestic—have been put on notice regarding our resolve and capabilities.

This paper addresses these challenges by focusing on three critical dimensions:

1. Evolving Strategic Environment: Today's global security landscape is marked by simultaneous conflicts of varying intensity across multiple regions, from large-scale conventional warfare in Ukraine to hybrid warfare in Gaza and Syria. This operational environment, combined with unrestricted warfare and gray zone activities from adversaries like China and Iran, demands rapid and comprehensive military modernization (National Intelligence Council, 2024, p. 2). The U.S. military must not only keep pace with evolving threats, tactics, and technologies but decisively outpace its competitors. This imperative drives the transformation and modernization of force structure, training requirements, and operational concepts across all warfighting domains, while maintaining robust homeland defense capabilities (Fox, 2024c, p. 1).

2. Total Force Readiness: The Military's comprehensive transformation demands an understanding of our readiness and ability to defeat our enemies and defend our homeland. In evaluating the

readiness of U.S. military forces, and particularly the Texas National Guard, we must address three fundamental questions: ready for what types of conflicts and missions, ready for when these challenges may emerge, and what specific elements of the force need to be ready. Secretary Hegseth's vision represents the critical component of this readiness transformation, focusing on enhanced lethality, strict standards, accountability and unwavering preparedness across the full spectrum of operations (U.S. Department of Defense, 2025). As the Guard evolves into a fully integrated operational force, it must maintain the highest standards of combat readiness. This transformation, known as Guard 4.0, ensures the National Guard remains a crucial component of both state security and the nation's defense, ready to deploy, fight, and win when called upon (Army National Guard, 2024).

3. Reconstitution of the Texas State Guard: Reestablishing the Texas State Guard as a robust, state-focused and primary homeland defense force directly addresses the unique and multifaceted security challenges facing Texas. Inspired by successful models like the Florida State Guard, this transformation enhances disaster response and homeland defense capabilities while alleviating strain on the Texas National Guard (Florida State Guard, n.d.). A flexible and cost-effective force, the restructured Guard will align more closely with state priorities, improve coordination with agencies, and bolster Texas's resilience against evolving threats. Achieving this vision requires strategic resource allocation, targeted training, and comprehensive stakeholder engagement to ensure both effectiveness and long-term sustainability. This proposal offers a pathway to balance state needs with federal obligations, ultimately bolstering both Texas and the nation in an era of unprecedented security challenges.

The Evolving Landscape of Global Security

The nature of warfare has undergone a profound transformation in the 21st century, challenging traditional paradigms and necessitating a reevaluation of military strategy, tactics, and global security frameworks. Modern warfare, as it exists today, can be defined as a complex, multidimensional conflict environment characterized by the integration of advanced technologies, the blurring of lines between state and non-state actors, and the expansion of the battlefield into new domains including cyberspace and outer space (Hoffman et al., 2024).

Historically, warfare has evolved through several distinct phases, each marked by technological and doctrinal innovations. The period immediately following the Soviet Union's collapse saw American military dominance and the emergence of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), emphasizing precision-guided munitions and information dominance (Boot, 2006). The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, fundamentally altered this paradigm, introducing an era of persistent conflict against non-state actors and irregular warfare. Today, the return of great power competition, coupled with unprecedented technological advancement, has created a security environment that combines elements of both conventional and irregular warfare while introducing entirely new domains of conflict.

The current global threat landscape is increasingly complex and dynamic, encompassing a wide range of state and non-state actors with diverse capabilities and strategic objectives. State actors such as China, Russia, and Iran are heavily investing in advanced military technologies, including hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and space-based assets, in an effort to challenge U.S. military supremacy and reshape the global order.

China

China represents the most consequential and systemic adversary to U.S. national security and the international order. Recent analyses reveal China's defense spending has increased five-fold over the past two decades, reaching an estimated $471 billion in 2024 when accounting for purchasing power parity (Center for Strategic and International Studies, n.d.). Beyond conventional military modernization, China's strategy of "unrestricted warfare" specifically targets American vulnerabilities through combined military, technological, economic, and information operations (Barno & Bensahel, 2016)

PLA officers wrote that unrestricted warfare "means that any methods can be prepared for use, information is everywhere, the battlefield is everywhere, and that any technology might be combined with any other technology" and that "the boundaries between war and non-war and between military and non-military affairs has systematically broken down." They recommended that the PRC "use asymmetric warfare" to attack the United States and employ "nonmilitary ways to defeat a stronger nation such as the United States through lawfare (that is, using international laws, bodies, and courts to restrict America's freedom of movement and policy choices), economic warfare, biological and chemical warfare, cyberattacks, and even terrorism" (Gershaneck, 2020).

Persistent conflict now defines the international security environment, marked by sustained gray zone campaigns to undermine rivals through disinformation, election interference, and economic destabilization (National Intelligence Council, 2024).

For example, the Salt Typhoon cyberattack, a coordinated effort by Chinese state-sponsored hackers, represents a paradigm shift in the scale and implications of cyber warfare. By compromising major U.S. telecommunications networks, including devices such as routers and switches, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has demonstrated its ability to infiltrate critical infrastructure essential for national security. This breach exposed sensitive customer call records and private communications of high-value government and political figures, eclipsing prior cyberattacks like SolarWinds and the Colonial Pipeline breach (Freeman, 2024).

Brandon Wales, executive director of the CISA, previously stated,

> "It is very clear that Chinese attempts to compromise critical infrastructure are in part to pre-position themselves to be able to disrupt or destroy that critical infrastructure in the event of a conflict" (Harding, 2024).

Non-state Actors and Foreign Terrorist Organizations

Adversarial Non-state Actors and Foreign Terrorist Organizations have adapted to the modern battlefield by leveraging commercially available technologies to enhance their operational effectiveness. The democratization of advanced technologies has enabled non-state actors to achieve capabilities previously reserved for nation-states. Terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS have been known to use encrypted communication platforms, unmanned aerial systems (UAS), and the dark web for coordination and propaganda dissemination (Graham, 2016; National Intelligence University, 2021; Awasthi, 2024).

This mirrors the strategy of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria, which utilized a combination of strategic planning, drone warfare, and alliances with other rebel groups to execute a successful offensive against the Assad regime (Christou, 2024). HTS, with its roots in Al-Qaeda, benefited from its experience and the use of drones not only for surveillance but also in combat operations, significantly contributing to their military success (Tollast, 2024). Similarly, Mexican cartels have adopted advanced drones for both surveillance and offensive operations, demonstrating how non-state actors use dual-use technologies to gain asymmetric advantages in conflicts (Kesteloo, 2024).

Also, the ongoing attacks by Houthi rebels on commercial shipping in the Red Sea provide a compelling example of how asymmetric capabilities can have strategic impacts. Since 2019, the Houthis have conducted numerous attacks on ships using a combination of low-cost technologies, including (Gambrell, 2024):

1. Drone Boats: Unmanned surface vessels laden with explosives have been used in suicide attacks against ships. These vessels are often constructed from readily available materials and guided by simple GPS systems
2. Anti-Ship Missiles: The Houthis have employed both older Soviet-era missiles and newer Iranian-supplied systems. Some of these missiles have been modified to extend their range and improve their guidance systems
3. Naval Mines: The deployment of sea mines in shipping lanes has posed a significant threat to maritime traffic. These mines are often based on older designs but incorporate modern sensors and detonators.

Russia-Ukraine War

Today's global security landscape presents complex challenges that are most evident on modern battlefields, where recent conflicts reveal warfare's rapid evolution. The Russia-Ukraine War stands as a prime example, transforming battlefields into complex environments that test the limits of military capabilities, doctrine, and adaptability. This conflict's significance extends beyond regional boundaries, providing vital insights into warfare's future—where advanced technologies, conventional operations, irregular tactics, and gray zone activities combine to reshape our understanding of modern combat (Hackett & Nagl, 2024).

As we analyze the key lessons emerging from this conflict—spanning the devastating effectiveness of FPV drones, the challenges of electromagnetic spectrum transparency, counter-UAS systems, electronic warfare (EW) jammers, real-time all-source surveillance, the debilitating impact of MANPADS on close air support (CAS), grinding wars of attrition, the re-emergence of trench warfare, and the complexities of political and information warfare—it becomes clear that the United States and its allies are critically underprepared for the demands of 21st-century combat (Johnson, 2022; Commission on the National Defense Strategy, 2024, p. v). This section examines the defining characteristics of the modern battlefield as illuminated by the Russia-Ukraine War, providing a lens through which to assess glaring readiness gaps and the urgent reforms required to fortify national and allied security.

The End of Battlefield Opacity

While war remains fundamentally a clash of human wills fought for political objectives, the Russia-Ukraine War has revealed a revolutionary shift in how modern battles are fought and won. This shift stems primarily from the elimination of battlefield opacity – the traditional 'fog of war' has been replaced by an environment of persistent, multi-layered surveillance. In this new paradigm, centuries-old military fundamentals now operate within an ecosystem of commercial technology and precision targeting that has transformed both offensive and defensive operations (McEnany & Roper, 2024).

The scale of this transformation is most evident in the proliferation of advanced surveillance technologies, particularly commercial satellite platforms that have democratized battlefield awareness (Lin-Greenberg & Milonopoulos, 2022). Companies like Maxar Technologies exemplify this shift, providing near-real-time, space-based imagery capable of collecting almost 2 million square kilometers of 30-centimeter class imagery daily (Maxar Intelligence, 2024). This commercial capability, combined with military-grade

systems, has created an unprecedented level of battlefield transparency where traditional concealment tactics have become largely obsolete (Zikusoka & Rondeaux, 2023).

The operational impact of this transparency manifests in two critical ways. First, it has fundamentally altered force protection requirements. A recent study on the war in Ukraine by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) stated, "there is no sanctuary in modern warfare" (Anderson et al., 2024, p. 98). The Battle of Bakhmut demonstrated this reality, with reports of 50 unmanned aerial systems (UAS) maintaining continuous surveillance over the battlefield. This persistent observation has forced military units to radically revise their operational patterns, dispersing headquarters, command and control centers, and logistics hubs across wider areas to ensure survival.

RUSI's study on Ukraine identified three key elements of modern battlefield survivability: sufficient dispersal to become an economically unfeasible target, rapid movement to disrupt enemy kill chains, and utilization of hardened structures. In this environment, concealment and camouflage have evolved beyond traditional visual considerations to encompass the full electromagnetic spectrum. Combat units must now manage multiple signatures—thermal, acoustic, and seismic—that can betray their position to advanced detection systems. This complex operating environment highlights the inherent advantages of light infantry. In Ukraine, small light infantry units have proven particularly effective, leveraging their natural ability to thrive in severely restricted terrain with the ability to disperse, conceal, and launch coordinated strikes while presenting minimal signatures to enemy detection systems (Anderson et al., 2024, p. 98).

Second, this transparency has created a lethal synergy between observation and precision fires. Ukrainian General Valery Zaluzhny's observation that "we see everything the enemy is doing and they see everything we are doing" underscores how this mutual transparency has transformed combat dynamics (McBreen, 2024, p. 3). The battle of Avdiivka provided stark evidence of this transformation, where "140 Russian machines [were] ablaze—destroyed within hours of coming within range." This rapid destruction of exposed forces demonstrates how the combination of surveillance and precision fires has created an environment where detection almost invariably leads to destruction (McBreen, 2024, p. 3).

This new battlefield reality has produced an intriguing economic dimension in modern warfare. High-end precision weapons now operate alongside relatively inexpensive capabilities like FPV drones, both proving crucial in high-intensity combat. The resulting fires network—the integration of UAS observers with long-range artillery—has emerged as the dominant battlefield system, capable of engaging any exposed target with devastating effectiveness regardless of the platform's cost.

The implications for military infrastructure and operations are profound. Traditional military facilities—command posts, forward operating bases, airfields, and fire bases—have become highly vulnerable to this combination of persistent surveillance and precision strikes (Beagle et al., 2023). This vulnerability has driven a return to dispersed, hardened defensive positions, reminiscent of World War I trenches but adapted for an era of ubiquitous observation. The result is a battlefield environment that simultaneously harkens back to historical warfare while embodying the most advanced technological capabilities of the modern era (Gurantz, 2024).

The success of future military operations will depend on adapting to these new realities. Forces must develop innovative approaches to survive and operate in an environment where traditional concepts of battlefield opacity no longer apply (Caspi, 2024). This adaptation demands a comprehensive

transformation spanning technology, doctrine, training, and force structure—all optimized for an era of persistent surveillance and precision targeting.

Assessing U.S. Military Readiness for Modern Warfare

Military preparedness requires a nuanced understanding of how conflicts manifest across different contexts. Wars are shaped by multiple intersecting factors, including combatants' policy objectives, military capabilities, economic resources, societal characteristics, and geographical constraints. These elements evolve over time, particularly as adversaries transition from initial operations to full mobilization, leading to distinct challenges across different theaters and phases of war.

The U.S. Army's 250-year history demonstrates remarkable adaptability across diverse conflict environments, from conventional state-on-state warfare to prolonged counterinsurgency campaigns. This historical flexibility underscores a crucial principle: while contemporary conflicts—such as the war in Ukraine—offer valuable insights, military planners must be cautious about drawing overly simplistic conclusions based solely on recent technological trends. For example, the rapid proliferation of drones, precision-guided munitions, and cyber capabilities has undeniably altered modern battlefields, but these advancements do not replace fundamental military principles such as force projection, logistics, and combined arms maneuver to control territory.

Effective strategic planning requires identifying both enduring patterns and significant discontinuities across historical conflicts, particularly when assessing potential confrontations with near-peer competitors like Russia and China, or asymmetric threats posed by non-state actors, including Al Qaeda, the Haqqani Network, and Mexican cartels.

Are we ready?

The 2022 *National Defense Strategy* established "a new framework for strategic readiness, enabling a more comprehensive, data-driven assessment and reporting of readiness to ensure greater alignment with [*National Defense Strategy*] priorities" (U.S. Department of Defense, 2022, p. 18). However, when evaluating U.S. military readiness—and specifically the Texas National Guard—through Richard Betts's three pivotal questions of "ready for what, ready for when, and what needs to be ready," significant gaps emerge that challenge our ability to address current and emerging threats effectively (Betts, 1995).

The 2024 Commission on the National Defense Strategy Commission identified systemic weaknesses within the Department of Defense (DoD) that undermine U.S. military readiness in an era of renewed great-power competition. DoD's entrenched bureaucratic processes, outdated procurement systems, reliance on aging military hardware, and institutional risk aversion stem from decades of uncontested military dominance. However, these legacy practices are poorly suited for today's rapidly evolving strategic environment (Commission on the National Defense Strategy, 2024, pp. v-ix)

There are isolated cases demonstrating that DoD can move with agility—such as the rapid establishment of the U.S. Space Force, the Defense Innovation Unit, the Office of Strategic Capital, and the Replicator Initiative—but these remain the exception rather than the rule. The broader DoD enterprise has yet to adopt the structural changes necessary to match the urgency of current threats. To address these shortcomings, both DoD leadership and Congress must break from an ossified, risk-averse culture and instead foster an organization capable of rapidly innovating, developing, fielding, and sustaining the force the United States requires (Lonsdale & Noonan, 2025).

The 2024 Commission on the National Defense Strategy assessed that the U.S. military lacks both the capabilities and capacity required to deter, and if necessary, prevail in large-scale conflict. The deficiencies within the defense industrial base (DIB) are particularly alarming; it is currently incapable of producing and replenishing the volume of equipment, technology, and munitions needed to sustain U.S. forces and support allied operations in the event of a protracted, multi-theater war (Commission on the National Defense Strategy, 2024, pp. 51-58).

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A full-scale conflict with a peer or near-peer adversary—particularly against China or Russia—would impose devastating costs, extending beyond military and personnel losses. Such a conflict would affect the life of every American in ways far beyond conventional warfare, making President Trump's mission to deter war and establish "Peace through strength" the far preferable—and less costly—path (U.S. Department of Defense, 2025).

The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) does not sufficiently account for the challenges posed by simultaneous conflicts across multiple theaters. U.S. military planning must recognize that future wars could overwhelm the capacity of the active-duty force, requiring substantial reliance on the National Guard (Commission on the National Defense Strategy, 2024, pp. ix, 21, 43) . Failure to address these challenges will leave the United States vulnerable to strategic coercion or outright military defeat in a future war. The time for reform is now.

Ready for What?

The character of war is evolving at an unprecedented pace, demanding a fundamental reassessment of U.S. Military and National Guard readiness. The rapid proliferation of first-person view (FPV) drones, electronic warfare (EW) systems, AI-enabled precision targeting, and advancements in cyber, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum have compressed the battlefield innovation cycle from years to mere weeks. This dynamic environment presents both unprecedented opportunities and significant challenges for U.S. forces. (Ling, 2024).

While emerging technologies provide a battlefield advantage, the Russia-Ukraine War underscores a critical paradox: despite advanced precision weaponry, cyber capabilities, and unmanned systems, large-scale conflicts remain dominated by attrition warfare and territorial control. The prolonged battles in the Donbas, the land bridge to Crimea, and Crimea itself illustrate that while technology enhances battlefield awareness and strike capabilities, it does not eliminate the necessity for sustained ground presence and combat power. (Evans et al., 2023).

This paradox highlights a strategic misalignment in modern force planning—overreliance on precision-strike capabilities without sufficient investment in force distribution, maneuver warfare, and logistics sustainment. A military force that prioritizes long-range fires over territorial control and force endurance risks strategic failure against an industrialized adversary prepared for prolonged warfare.

The modern battlespace fuses traditional warfighting principles with rapid technological innovation. The Ukraine conflict demonstrates the enduring necessity of (Fox, 2024a):

- Artillery dominance and mass fires: The persistence of trench warfare and heavy artillery fire demonstrates that massed fires still determine battlefield outcomes aided intelligence, surveillance & reconnaissance (ISR) technological advances.
- Sustained force presence: Securing and controlling territory requires boots on the ground; Anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) technologies, tactics and operations alone cannot achieve strategic objectives.
- Industrial-scale attrition warfare: Wars between peer or near-peer adversaries may necessitate a warfighting capacity beyond the current U.S. active-duty force.

The U.S. Military faces unprecedented challenges in maintaining combat readiness for modern peer conflict. As U.S. Army Colonel D.E. Johnson astutely observed, American forces suffer from a significant experience gap in offensive operations against sophisticated adversaries capable of contesting all domains in protracted warfare (Johnson, 2022). This observation takes on particular significance given that neither the United States nor its allies have engaged in warfare of the scale and intensity witnessed in recent conflicts since World War II.

The convergence of rapid technological advancement and evolving asymmetric tactics has exposed critical vulnerabilities in military readiness, modernization initiatives, and institutional adaptation capabilities. These challenges raise fundamental questions about the preparedness of both the U.S. Military and National Guard to meet the complex demands of contemporary warfare (Mahnken, 2024). The essential query facing military leadership—"Ready for what?"—demands rigorous examination of both technological innovation and enduring warfighting principles.

While artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, and unmanned systems will undoubtedly shape future battlefields, the fundamentals of large-scale, high-intensity warfare remain rooted in attrition, maneuver, and force endurance. This reality necessitates that the U.S. Military and National Guard prepare not only for precision-strike campaigns but also for sustained, high-intensity combat operations characteristic of modern peer conflict (Fox, 2024b).. The strategic implications are clear: failure to adapt these capabilities now significantly increases the risk of unpreparedness when deterrence proves insufficient.

Ready for When? Navigating the U.S. Military's Continuous Transformation

The United States Military stands at a pivotal juncture, it must be ready to "fight tonight" with multifaceted threats across various geographies while simultaneously transforming itself for future warfare (Commission on the National Defense Strategy, 2024, pp. 64-65). In response, Army Chief of Staff General Randy George has prioritized "continuous transformation," emphasizing the necessity for the Army to iteratively adapt and evolve in its combat strategies, organizational structures, training methodologies, and equipment procurement (U.S. Army War College, 2024, pp. 46-47). This approach is informed by the rapidly changing character of warfare, as evidenced by recent global conflicts.

The concept of continuous transformation is not merely a strategic preference but a requisite for maintaining operational superiority. The Army's approach recognizes that readiness is not a single state but rather a continuous spectrum across three interconnected time horizons (Rainey, 2024b):

1. Transformation in Contact (18–24 Months): This phase involves the rapid integration of new capabilities into deployed units for immediate testing and feedback. Such real-time assessments allow for swift adjustments, ensuring that innovations meet operational demands effectively.
2. Deliberate Transformation (2–7 Years): Focused on medium-term objectives, this period aligns with defense budget planning cycles. It entails a systematic development and deployment of capabilities anticipated to be essential in the near future, ensuring that the Army remains prepared for emerging threats.
3. Concept-Driven Transformation (7–15 Years): This dimension focuses on conceptual and technological innovations that will shape warfare through 2040 and beyond. It ensures the Army maintains strategic advantages while informing current transformation efforts.

A critical insight from the Army's approach is that these three readiness horizons are not separate but deeply interconnected. Decisions made for immediate readiness impact future capabilities, while long-term concept development influences current training and equipment priorities. This interdependence requires careful balance and continuous adjustment.

The Role of the Army National Guard: Guard 4.0

The current global security environment presents a stark challenge: the United States can no longer count on months of strategic warning before conflict eruption. This compressed timeline demands a fundamental shift in how we approach reserve component readiness. This reality demands a comprehensive reassessment of our national defense strategy, particularly regarding force structure and mobilization capabilities.

At the center of this reassessment is the critical role of the Reserve Component and National Guard within the Total Force concept. These components serve dual purposes: providing the Joint Force with rapid expansion capability during wartime while maintaining vital day-to-day operations across major theaters. Moreover, Reserve and National Guard units offer unique advantages in retaining specialized talent in high-demand fields that the Department of Defense might otherwise struggle to maintain, such as cyber warfare (National Guard Bureau, 2022).

Integral to the Army's continuous transformation is the evolution of the National Guard through the Guard 4.0 initiative (Army National Guard, 2024). Launched in 2017, this initiative represents the most comprehensive restructuring of the force since the Vietnam era, aiming to position the Army National Guard as a readily deployable and integral component of both the U.S. Army and the joint force (Locklear, 2022). Key aspects include:

- Predictable Unit Availability: Transitioning from a strategic reserve to an operational force with units available on a predictable and rotational basis.
- Enhanced Readiness and Lethality: Improving training proficiency and operational tempo through initiatives like the Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model (ReARMM).
- Addressing Social and Parity Challenges: Ensuring equitable benefits, services, and opportunities for Guard personnel to maintain retention, standards, lethality and readiness.

"The Army's continuous transformation strategy recognizes a fundamental truth: readiness cannot be viewed as a choice between present and future capabilities. As General Rainey emphasized, “We are not preparing for a theoretical future fight. The struggle for advantage is now” (Rainey, 2024b, p. 2) This reality demands that the Army maintain immediate combat readiness while simultaneously investing in

capabilities to counter evolving threats. Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth's commitment to "rebuild our military by matching threats to capabilities" reflects this dual imperative to enhance both current and future readiness (U.S. Department of Defense, 2025).

While this transformation reinforces the Guard's dual role in meeting national security challenges and domestic response obligations, significant challenges remain. The persistent disparities in funding, training resources, and support services between the Guard and Regular Army continue to pose substantial risks to both individual and unit readiness, potentially undermining the initiative's broader objectives (Reserve Forces Policy Board, 2020).

What Needs to Be Ready?

To evaluate U.S. military readiness, particularly within the Texas National Guard, we must establish clear objectives and assessment criteria. The DOTMLPF-P framework provides a comprehensive structure through seven critical domains: Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (Defense Acquisition University, n.d.). This systematic approach enables identification of capability gaps and their impact on military effectiveness against current and emerging threats, allowing for targeted solutions that align with National Defense Strategy objectives.

Military Doctrine: A Guide to the way we fight

Military doctrine forms the foundation of military operations, establishing fundamental principles that guide forces in executing national security objectives (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015). As the character of warfare evolves, doctrine must adapt accordingly to ensure armed forces remain effective against emerging challenges. This adaptation requires integration of historical lessons, assessment of contemporary complexities, and anticipation of future requirements.

The U.S. Army defines doctrine as guidance for "the conduct of operations by Army forces in the field," serving as "the body of professional knowledge that guides how Soldiers perform tasks related to the Army's role: the employment of landpower in a distinctly American context" (U.S. Department of the Army, 2019, p. 1-1). Unlike broader strategies or concepts, doctrine specifically addresses the implementation of existing procedures for current mission requirements.

Doctrine's relationship with other DOTMLPF components is particularly crucial. It serves as both catalyst and foundation—initiating and informing modifications across other domains while providing the framework that enables their effectiveness. Changes in training methods or organizational structure often require corresponding doctrinal shifts to achieve maximum impact, establishing doctrine as a critical driver of institutional transformation (U.S. Department of the Army, 2019, p. 1-1).

Historical Context and Evolution

During the Global War on Terror (GWOT), U.S. military doctrine underwent a significant transformation. Professional Military Education (PME) and operational training shifted their focus predominantly toward counterinsurgency operations. This period saw the Center for Army Lessons Learned emerge as a more influential source of guidance than traditional doctrine, as the rapid pace of tactical adaptations consistently outpaced conventional doctrinal publication cycles (U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, n.d.).

Today's security environment necessitates a more sophisticated and multifaceted doctrinal approach. The ongoing conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and Syria, combined with strategic competition from near-peer adversaries such as China and Russia, underscore the importance of developing doctrine that effectively integrates both conventional and irregular warfare capabilities. The operational landscape has become

increasingly complex with the emergence of hybrid warfare, the expansion of cyber operations, and the proliferation of gray-zone activities (National Intelligence Council, 2024).

Transforming Military Strategy for the Future

These evolving security challenges have fundamentally altered the requirements for modern land forces, particularly in their need to operate across expansive strategic distances. Success in this new environment demands multiple concurrent capabilities: securing and maintaining territorial control, conducting sustained operations in austere conditions, and rapidly adapting to dynamic adversary tactics. Furthermore, forces must achieve seamless interoperability with allies, maintain consistent combat readiness, and successfully integrate emerging technologies into their operational framework (Fox, 2024b). This comprehensive approach to military transformation reflects the increasingly complex nature of modern warfare and the necessity for adaptable, technologically advanced fighting forces.

The modern battlefield presents significant obstacles, driven primarily by adversaries' sophisticated anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. These systems pose direct challenges to military forces' ability to deploy and sustain operations in contested environments, a concern particularly relevant in potential conflict scenarios across Eastern Europe and the Indo-Pacific region (U.S. Department of the Army, 2021).

At its core, land warfare centers on territorial control—a mission that extends beyond initial capture to encompass sustained operational presence. Success in this domain requires forces capable of engaging in direct combat while maintaining sufficient operational depth to achieve both tactical and strategic objectives. These forces must demonstrate the resilience to endure combat stress while preserving their ability to either pursue and defeat enemy forces or defend against counterattacks (Fox, 2024b, p. 12).

This capability for territorial control directly enables broader joint force operations. Effective land forces are essential for securing and maintaining critical infrastructure such as airfields and ports, building combat power, and executing other vital military functions. Consequently, Army modernization initiatives must align with these foundational requirements of land warfare.

As historian T.R. Fehrenbach powerfully articulated, "you may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life—but if you desire to defend it, protect it and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men in the mud" (Piggee, 2017). This enduring wisdom underscores the continued relevance of land forces in modern military operations.

In response to current and future global security challenges, the Army has implemented a significant doctrinal shift through Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) (Judson, 2022). This framework emphasizes comprehensive integration across air, sea, cyber, and space domains.

The Army defines MDO as "Operations conducted across multiple domains and contested spaces to overcome an adversary's (or enemy's) strengths by presenting them with several operational and/or tactical dilemmas through the combined application of calibrated force posture; employment of multi-domain formations; and convergence of capabilities across domains, environments, and functions in time and spaces to achieve operational and tactical objectives" (U.S. Department of the Army, 2018, p. GL-7).

MDO seeks to achieve dominance through real-time, networked solutions that provide commanders with dynamic options for deterrence or decisive defeat through synchronized cross-domain actions. The

framework operates through a phased approach with strategic objectives designed to neutralize adversary advantages. According to the Army, these phases progress from competition through penetration, dis-integration, and exploitation, ultimately leading to re-competition to consolidate gains and establish strategic advantages (U.S. Department of the Army, 2018, p. iii).

However, the Army's current emphasis on stand-off capabilities and fires-centric warfare presents potential challenges to fundamental land warfare principles, particularly the essential requirement to take, hold, and control territory. Whether confronting Russian forces in Eastern Europe or defending territorial sovereignty in the Pacific, the Army must maintain its capacity for sustained ground operations. The unchanging logic of land warfare dictates that armies exist to engage other military forces for territorial control, enabling broader joint force objectives. This requires forces capable of both direct close combat and maintaining operational momentum after tactical victories (Fox, 2024c, pp. 6-8).

The shift toward long-range fires and unmanned aerial systems (UAS), while valuable, cannot fully substitute for the physical presence of ground forces in controlling key terrain (Cantin, 2024). Recent conflicts, particularly in Ukraine, demonstrate that ultimate victory requires boots on the ground to consolidate gains and prevent enemy reoccupation of cleared areas (Nagl & Crombe, 2024).

Furthermore, the transformation plan's limited consideration of Reserve Components represents a significant strategic oversight. These components provide essential combat and combat support capabilities, yet their role in the new force structure remains inadequately defined (Feickert, 2024, pp. 10-11).

Integration with Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO)

Joint All-Domain Operations represents the evolution of Multi-Domain Operations across all military services, enabled by Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) (Deptula, 2022). This comprehensive approach requires sophisticated technological integration and seamless coordination between forces. Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems form the backbone of this capability, enabling rapid situational awareness and decision-making across multiple domains. These systems must maintain secure communication and data exchange between diverse forces while ensuring operational security in contested environments (Selzer, 2024).

The CJADC2 framework integrates service-specific initiatives into a comprehensive command and control architecture. The Air Force's Advanced Battle Management System establishes the technological foundation for rapid information sharing and decision-making in air and space domains. Complementing this, the Navy's Project Overmatch ensures maritime integration and extended network capabilities for naval forces, while the Army's Project Convergence focuses on ground force integration and tactical edge computing. These coordinated efforts create an integrated command and control structure that enables effective joint force operations (Lockheed Martin, n.d.).

Doctrinal Alignment and the Texas Military Department

While CJADC2 represents the future of joint military operations, its successful implementation requires all components of the Total Force to maintain combat readiness and technological integration capabilities. However, this objective faces significant challenges at the state level, particularly within the Texas Military Department (TMD), where the balance between state and federal missions has become increasingly strained.

The TMD currently faces critical challenges in managing its dual state and federal responsibilities. The organization's heavy focus on Operation Lone Star has created a significant misalignment with national defense priorities, including the implementation of crucial joint operations capabilities (Texas Military Department, 2024a). This misalignment is particularly concerning given Gen. Daniel Hokanson's emphatic statement before the Senate appropriations committee: “The reason the Guard exists is to fight and win our nation's wars, period... There is no military training value in what we do there. This is a law enforcement mission... They're doing mission sets that are not directly applicable to their military skill sets. That time would be better-used building readiness to deter our adversaries” (Shane, 2024).

The predominant focus on long term state-specific operations has fundamentally altered the Texas National Guard's strategic direction, raising significant concerns about combat readiness and the ability to integrate with joint force operations (Beynon, 2024). This prioritization systematically diverts essential resources, training time and critical preparation to meet combat readiness standards and lethality.

The resulting decline in warfighting proficiency directly undermines the TMD’s ability to “accomplish the President's mission to deter war, and if necessary, defeat and destroy our enemies” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2025), in the rapidly evolving modern battlefield. These implications extend beyond immediate operational concerns, threatening long-term capacity to support future national defense initiatives and national military strategies.

The solution lies in a two-pronged approach: strategic reconstitution of the Texas State Guard (TXSG) as the state's primary homeland defense force, while simultaneously realigning the National Guard with federal readiness requirements. Drawing from Florida's State Guard model and its successful implementation of a professionally trained Special Missions Unit (SMU), a revitalized TXSG could assume primary responsibility for state missions, enabling the National Guard to refocus on its core function as a combat reserve and integration with joint force capabilities (Williams, n.d.).

Implementation requires immediate action along parallel tracks:

1. The Texas National Guard must reorient its doctrinal and operational focus toward combat readiness requirements, ensuring adequate resources for advanced military training and joint force integration.
2. The Texas State Guard requires modernization and proper resourcing to effectively assume primary responsibility for state homeland security and defense missions.

This comprehensive approach addresses both the immediate readiness crisis and long-term state security needs, fostering a more resilient and effective defense infrastructure for Texas while maintaining the National Guard's essential warfighting capabilities.

Organizational Evolution: A Response to Emerging Threats

The organizational component of DOTMLPF-P serves as a fundamental mechanism for military modernization, directing how the Army structures itself to meet evolving warfare requirements. However, today's transformation represents a concerning departure from historical approaches to force organization, driven by a myopic focus on emerging technologies rather than a comprehensive understanding that “that each war has a unique and malleable character, which is driven by political, societal, economic and geographic factors, as well as by technology” (Rose, 2024).

This current transformation introduces significant structural changes that may create critical vulnerabilities. The Army is substantially reducing traditional combat formations while consolidating capabilities at higher echelons. Simultaneously, it is increasing emphasis on long-range precision fires,

unmanned systems, and multi-domain operations to support joint force and coalition partners (Fox, 2024c, p. 2). This reorganization predominantly focuses on Active Component changes, raising serious concerns about Reserve Component integration and potentially creating significant gaps in Total Army capabilities.

The scope of these changes fundamentally alters the Army's operational approach in ways previous reorganizations did not. While past restructuring efforts maintained core ground combat capabilities, the current transformation's emphasis on long-range precision effects, drone and electromagnetic warfare, and multi-domain operations signals a dramatic shift in the Army's vision of future warfare. This reorganization moves beyond tactical adjustments to represent a comprehensive—and potentially risky—reconceptualization of modern combat operations that may not adequately account for the enduring requirements of ground warfare (Rose, 2024).

Program Cancellations and Modernization Challenges

In February 2024, the U.S. Army canceled the Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) program, citing lessons learned from the Russo-Ukrainian War, particularly the effectiveness of inexpensive unmanned aerial systems (DiMascio, 2024). This decision continues a pattern of terminated helicopter programs, including the Comanche attack helicopter in 2004 and the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter in 2008. The cancellation of FARA has left unfilled capability gaps in the Army's modernization efforts (Heckmann, 2024).

Simultaneously, the cancellation of the Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA) program signals a reevaluation of long-range precision fires capabilities (Fox, 2024c, pp. 2, 5). These decisions have created a significant capability gap in the air-ground littoral space—the crucial zone from ground level to several thousand feet above—potentially compromising future operational effectiveness in territorial control.

Force Structure Modifications

The Army's transformation includes a reduction in end strength by approximately 24,000 authorizations, reflecting both strategic choices and recruiting challenges. Two significant changes fundamentally alter traditional combat capabilities (U.S. Department of the Army, 2024, pp. 2-3).

The deactivation of cavalry squadrons in Stryker and Infantry Brigade Combat Teams transforms ground reconnaissance capabilities, based on the assumption that unmanned systems and theater-level intelligence assets can replace traditional scout functions (Judson, 2024). This assumption requires scrutiny given technical collection limitations in contested environments. Additionally, the consolidation of engineer assets at the division level prioritizes efficiency over tactical flexibility, potentially compromising Brigade Combat Teams' ability to conduct independent operations, particularly in scenarios demanding rapid mobility or counter mobility operations.

Multi-Domain Task Force Evolution

The Army's growth now centers on expanding its fires-centric warfare capability through Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs), designed as theater-level formations focused on protecting Joint and Coalition forces, conducting intelligence operations, delivering non-kinetic space and cyber effects, and providing long-range fires support (U.S. Department of the Army, 2024, p. 3).

This emphasis on MDTFs has driven significant force structure changes, including the replacement of combined-arms reconnaissance formations with UAS and other sensor systems. The 2024 force structure reductions primarily accommodate these theater-level commands, which notably lack close combat forces and inherent terrain control capabilities (Fox, 2024c, p. 3).

This emphasis on MDTFs has driven significant force structure changes, including the replacement of combined-arms reconnaissance formations with UAS and other sensor systems. The 2024 force structure reductions primarily accommodate these theater-level commands, which lack close combat forces and inherent terrain control capabilities. This shift signals a fundamental change in the Army's operational approach—moving away from mobile maneuver warfare toward a fires-centric attritional strategy. This transformation signals a fundamental shift from mobile maneuver warfare toward a fires-centric attritional strategy (Fox, 2024c, p. 3).

The Army's emphasis on stand-off capabilities and fires-centric warfare challenges a core principle of land warfare: territorial control. Whether confronting Russian forces in Eastern Europe or defending Pacific territories and allies in the Middle East, sustained ground operations remain essential. Armies fundamentally exist to "bring overwhelming and decisive force to close with and destroy the enemy" and control territory to enable broader joint force objectives (Beaumont, 2025). This requires forces capable of both direct combat and maintaining operational momentum through clearing enemy forces, protecting populations, and securing boundaries.

While long-range fires and UAS capabilities enhance military effectiveness, they cannot replace the physical presence of ground forces. Recent conflicts, particularly in Ukraine, demonstrate that securing victory requires boots on the ground to consolidate gains and prevent enemy reoccupation. The reduction in BCT engineering and reconnaissance capabilities undermines this mission, as these elements are crucial for maintaining offensive momentum and securing captured territory.

The U.S. Air Force's Strategic Transformation: Modernization and Reorganization in the Era of Great Power Competition

While the Army grapples with balancing territorial control capabilities against emerging multi-domain requirements, the Air Force faces its own transformational challenges. Following two decades of continuous deployments, the Air Force confronts significant readiness concerns that affect its personnel, equipment, and aircraft capabilities. These sustained operations have created cascading effects across the service, necessitating a comprehensive rebuilding of military readiness (Government Accountability Office, 2024).

The Air Force's 2022 reorganization initiative introduced the Air Force Force Generation (AFFORGEN) system, emphasizing unit-based training and deployment. This approach has evolved through implementation, with customizations for specific units like bomber squadrons (Government Accountability Office, 2024, p. 6).

In February 2024, Secretary Frank Kendall announced twenty-four key decisions addressing people development, readiness generation, power projection, and capability development. This transformation responds to intensifying great power competition and aims to rebuild capabilities degraded by continuous deployments (Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, 2024a).

This transformation has three key phases:

First, in 2023, the Air Force introduced the Expeditionary Air Base (XAB) model as its initial framework for force presentation. Second, in summer 2024, Air Task Forces (ATFs) began entering the AFFORGEN cycle during the reset phase. These units will reach deployment-ready status in fall 2025. Finally, starting in summer 2025, Combat Wings will become the primary deployable units.

Under this new structure, wings will be organized into three distinct categories (Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, 2024b):

- Deployable Combat Wings (DCWs): These comprise 24 wings, with 16 Active Duty and 8 Reserve Component units, designed to deploy as complete units.
- In-Place Combat Wings: These wings focus on mission-level warfighting readiness.
- Combat Generation Wings: These wings support power projection and installation readiness.

The transformation significantly refocuses Major Commands on their core missions. Air Combat Command, Air Mobility Command, and Air Force Global Strike Command will streamline their responsibilities by removing ancillary duties accumulated over decades. This refocusing mirrors the specialized approach employed by Strategic Air Command, Tactical Air Command, and Military Airlift Command during the Cold War era.

To support this transformation, the new Integrated Capabilities Command, led by a three-star general reporting directly to senior leadership, consolidates weapons development and requirements functions previously distributed across commands. This centralization streamlines capability development while enabling operational commands to focus on readiness. Within Air Force Materiel Command, the Information Dominance Systems Center now serves as the central authority for cyber warfare, electronic warfare, and digital infrastructure capabilities (Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, 2024a).

The establishment of Base Commands marks a fundamental shift in installation management. These commands establish a clear distinction between combat and base support operations, ensuring essential installation functions continue during unit deployments. This addresses a longstanding organizational challenge where base support and operational requirements competed for resources (Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, 2024a).

This new structure allows deployable units to concentrate on combat readiness while Base Commands maintain installation security, support functions, and daily operations. While this approach successfully adapts proven Cold War-era principles to meet modern operational requirements, two implementation challenges require attention: the full assessment of manning requirements for essential functions during unit deployments, and the need for specific implementation dates for key transition milestones (Government Accountability Office, 2024, pp. 17-20).

Space Force Evolution and Guard Integration Controversy

The Space Force's transformation mirrors some of the Air Force changes while addressing unique space domain requirements. The creation of Space Futures Command as the service's fourth Field Command establishes dedicated organizations for threat assessment, concept development, and mission design. Space Force Combat Squadrons will become the primary units of action, supporting U.S. Space Command through rotational deployments (Harpley, 2024).

However, a significant constitutional and operational controversy has emerged over Legislative Proposal 480, which would fundamentally alter the relationship between state National Guard forces and federal military space operations. The proposal would grant the Secretary of the Air Force unilateral authority to transfer Air National Guard units to the Space Force without obtaining state gubernatorial consent, departing from longstanding federal statutes (32 U.S.C. § 104; 10 U.S.C. § 18238) that protect state authority over National Guard units.

The proposal has drawn sharp criticism from state leaders, exemplified by Texas Governor Greg Abbott's formal opposition to the Department of the Air Force (Office of the Texas Governor, 2024). While Texas does not currently maintain space-focused Air National Guard units, Governor Abbott argues the proposal represents an unprecedented federal overreach that could undermine states' constitutional authority over their National Guard forces. This concern extends beyond space operations to the broader principle of

state control over National Guard resources for emergency response, natural disaster relief, and domestic security operations.

The national security implications of this jurisdictional dispute are substantial. Air National Guard units currently provide 30% of U.S. military space operations squadrons and 60% of electromagnetic warfare capability (Goheen, 2024). These units represent a crucial component of American space operations at a time when competition with China and Russia in the space domain is intensifying.

Rather than pursuing unilateral authority through Congress, the Air Force should develop a collaborative approach with state governors to enhance Space Force capabilities while preserving the traditional federal-state balance in National Guard administration. This would maintain operational effectiveness while respecting constitutional principles and protecting states' legitimate interests in maintaining emergency response and homeland defense capabilities.

The Organizational Framework and Operational Capabilities of the Texas Military Department

"The 2018 Army Strategy established that the Total Army's objectives and Title 10 duties are guided by the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy. However, despite claiming that force structure transformation is necessary to "bring in new capabilities to meet requirements under the National Defense Strategy," recent Army proposals focus almost exclusively on Active Component changes. While citing the Total Army Analysis as the foundation for planned transformation, the Army has not adequately explained the omission of Reserve Component considerations or potential impacts on Combat Aviation Brigade force structure changes (Feickert, 2024, pp. 1, 10-11).

This gap in strategic planning particularly affects organizations like the Texas Military Department (TMD), which operates as the nation's largest state military organization. TMD manages a comprehensive array of forces including the Texas Army & Air National Guard, Texas State Guard, and the Office of State Administration. With nearly 25,000 personnel, including more than 4,500 full-time staff across approximately 800 facilities, TMD executes diverse missions from disaster response and border security to federal combat deployments and counter-narcotics operations (Texas Military Department, 2024b, p. 3).

The organization's funding structure reflects its dual state-federal nature. In FY24, TMD received $527.6M in federal funding, complemented by $50.5M in state appropriations (Texas Military Department, 2024b, p. 3). Additional funding streams include interagency contracts, grants, and appropriated receipts.

The command structure centers on the Adjutant General, who serves as both the commanding general of Texas Military Forces and the TMD's administrative head. Appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate for a two-year term, the TAG establishes policy and maintains oversight of all military forces, facilities, and functions. Unlike typical state agencies, TMD operates without an independent policy-making body, with administrative rules flowing directly from the TAG or Governor (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2019, p. 5).

This organizational structure operates within a complex federal-state framework. The Department of Defense establishes mission parameters and operational requirements that align with national defense strategies, while Congress is tasked with organizing, arming and setting standards for educating and instructing the militia, which includes the Texas Army and Air National Guard. This means the federal government provides the framework for how National Guard units are structured, equipped, trained and funded, ensuring they meet national defense standards. This is particularly highlighted by the case *Abbott*

v. Biden , where the court discusses the federal role in ensuring readiness for federal missions (*Abbott v. Biden*, 2023, pp. 2-3, 14-25).

States carry direct responsibility for implementing federally established readiness standards for their National Guard forces. During non-federalized periods, this responsibility encompasses the comprehensive management of training, readiness metrics, and unit maintenance. The Texas National Guard's diverse force structure, including Infantry Brigade Combat Teams, Engineer companies, and Airlift wings, is specifically designed to provide combat capabilities that address current and emerging threats. Under this framework, Texas maintains responsibility for ensuring each unit and service member achieves and sustains the readiness levels required for their assigned combat missions (*Abbott v. Biden*, 2023, pp. 17-23). This obligation requires precise alignment between federal standards and state-level execution to maintain combat effectiveness across all units.

This symbiotic relationship is to ensure that the National Guard remains an effective component of both national military strategies and state disaster response, with clear lines of responsibility and authority delineated by constitutional and legal frameworks.

TMD Administrative Challenges

The Texas Military Department faces significant organizational challenges in executing its dual mission sets. A comprehensive 2019 Sunset Commission review revealed systemic issues in TMD's internal management and operations, particularly in balancing federal military obligations with state administrative requirements (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2019). These challenges stem from the inherent complexity of serving both state and federal authorities while maintaining distinct operational and administrative standards for each. These challenges are exacerbated by the long-term State Active Duty (SAD) missions, like Operation Lone Star (OLS).

The Sunset Commission identified a critical misalignment in TMD's operational priorities. While the department's federal military obligations remain essential to national defense, its role as a state agency demands equal attention to administrative compliance and oversight. The commission found that TMD's emphasis on federal and overseas military commitments often overshadowed its state agency responsibilities, resulting in deficient adherence to state administrative rules. This imbalance manifested particularly in financial management processes and state property accountability, as documented through multiple independent audits and internal assessments (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2024; Sunset Advisory Commission, 2019). The findings highlight the need for TMD to reorganize the force structure and develop systems that can simultaneously support both its federal military obligations and state administrative requirements.

The TMD's organizational structure further compounds its administrative challenges. While state law designates an 'executive director' as the civilian officer responsible for state administration—including critical functions like payroll, purchasing, and human resources—this position's effectiveness is compromised by its subordination to the adjutant general (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2019, p. 11). This reporting structure creates an inherent tension between state administrative requirements and military operational priorities, often hindering effective management of state affairs (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2019, pp 20-26).

The complexity of this arrangement is evident in the executive director's scope of responsibility. While overseeing 71 state employees handling administrative functions, the position must also coordinate with numerous other state employees and federal personnel who operate under separate chains of command (Texas Military Department, 2024a, p. 87). This fragmented authority structure creates significant challenges in maintaining consistent administrative oversight and policy implementation.

To address these structural deficiencies, TMD requires comprehensive organizational reform focused on four key areas:

1. Enhancement of the executive director's authority to ensure effective state administrative oversight
2. Improved integration between state administrative functions and federal operations
3. Updated administrative policies that clearly delineate state and federal responsibilities
4. Revised organizational structure with explicit lines of responsibility for state matters

Texas Army National Guard (TXARNG)

The Texas Army National Guard serves as a reserve component of the United States Army, sharing its fundamental mission to 'fight and win our Nation's wars.' This enduring commitment, captured in the Army's motto 'This We'll Defend,' reflects a heritage of national defense dating to the Revolutionary War (U.S. Department of the Army, n.d.). As part of the Army's broader purpose, the TXARNG contributes to dominating the land domain, operating within the combined joint force framework. While focused on ground operations, it employs and enables capabilities across sea, air, space, and cyberspace domains, providing joint force commanders with essential land-based effects that extend into other operational spheres.

With over 19,000 personnel, the TXARNG represents the largest component within the Texas Military Department (Texas Military Department, 2024a, p. 83). At its core stands the historic 36th Infantry Division with a primary mission of engaging and destroying enemy forces, seizing and holding terrain, and conducting sustained combat operations (Texas Military Department, n.d.-b). At its core stands the historic 36th Infantry Division, whose primary mission encompasses engaging and destroying enemy forces, seizing and holding terrain, and conducting sustained combat operations (Texas Military Department, n.d.-b). This division leads a comprehensive array of combat and support formations:

Combat Forces:

- 155th Armor Brigade Combat Team
- 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment
- 81st Stryker Brigade Combat Team
- 56th and 72nd Infantry Brigade Combat Teams

Combat Support and Sustainment:

- 36th Combat Aviation Brigade
- 36th Infantry Division Artillery
- 136th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade
- 176th Engineer Brigade
- 111th and 36th Sustainment Brigades

The 71st Troop Command serves as a crucial headquarters element, providing command, control, and administrative oversight for units preparing for both federal mobilization and Defense Support to Civil

Authorities. This command integrates specialized capabilities through several key units (Texas Military Department, n.d.-c):

- Special Operations Detachment – Africa
- 71st Theater Information Operations Group
- 71st Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigade
- 136th Expeditionary Signal Battalion
- 100th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment
- Detachment 1, 178th Cyber Protection Team
- 136th Regiment Regional Training Institute

While the TXARNG provides robust ground combat capabilities, the Texas Military Department's air component plays an equally vital role in national defense and state operations. The Texas Air National Guard complements these land forces with critical air power and specialized capabilities.

Texas Air National Guard (TXANG)

The Texas Air National Guard serves as a reserve component of the United States Air Force, operating under the motto "Aim High... Fly-Fight-Win." As an operational reserve for combat operations, the TXANG maintains approximately 3,000 airmen organized across three wings (Texas Military Department, 2024a, p. 83). These forces provide critical aerospace capabilities that enhance both the state's domestic response capacity and its contribution to national defense through air superiority, mobility, and support operations. The three airlift wings are as follows:

1. **136th Airlift Wing (Fort Worth)**: The 136th Airlift Wing (136th AW) is a highly capable unit of the Texas Air National Guard, specializing in tactical airlift missions using the C-130J Hercules aircraft. The 136th Airlift Wing is tasked with delivering tactical airlift capabilities, enabling the transport of personnel, equipment, and supplies into operational theaters and austere environments. The wing also supports aeromedical evacuation, airborne troop delivery, and disaster response missions as part of its commitment to the nation and the state of Texas (Whiting, n.d., pp. 9-13).
2. **147th Attack Wing (Ellington Field)**: The 147th Attack Wing (147th ATKW) of the Texas Air National Guard delivers unmatched Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) and precision strike capabilities through its operation of MQ-1B Predator Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). It plays a critical role in supporting both federal missions and state emergency response operations, ensuring real-time situational awareness and rapid response capabilities. Also, the Air Support Operations Squadron (ASOS) provides terminal control for weapons employment in a Close Air Support (CAS) scenario integrating combat air and ground operations (Whiting, n.d., pp. 14-19).
3. **149th Fighter Wing (San Antonio)**: The 149th Fighter Wing (149th FW) of the Texas Air National Guard plays a pivotal role in advancing air superiority and enhancing the combat readiness of U.S. Air Force pilots. As a dedicated F-16 flying training unit, it ensures that aircrews are expertly trained to fly and employ the F-16 Fighting Falcon, a versatile multirole fighter aircraft (Whiting, n.d., p. 20).

Joint Operations and Emergency Response

The individual capabilities of the Texas Army and Air National Guard, while formidable independently, achieve their full potential through integrated operations. Recognizing this, the Texas Military Department has established dedicated joint operations capabilities that enable coordinated responses to both domestic emergencies and federal missions across all domains. These capabilities are executed through specialized units such as:

- 6th Civil Support Team (WMD-CST) (Texas Military Department, n.d.-a): Equipped for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) response, providing specialized support during such incidents
- 136th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB), JTF-136 for FEMA Region VI (Texas Military Department, n.d.-d): This unit provides immediate response capabilities to support civil authorities for large-scale disasters and CBRN incidents for FEMA Region VI, which includes Texas and surrounding states (Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico and Oklahoma)
- Joint Counterdrug Task Force (Texas Military Department, n.d.-h): This unit collaborates with federal and state agencies, leveraging intelligence and operational resources to combat drug trafficking. "The Texas National Guard Joint Counterdrug Task Force detects, interdicts, and disrupts drug smuggling and associated illicit activities at the request of local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies by leveraging unique military skills and assets in order to support national counterdrug strategies and objectives, as well as the National Guard State Interdiction and Counterdrug Activities Plan for the State of Texas" (Texas Military Department, n.d.-h).

While the Army and Air National Guard components serve both state and federal missions, the Texas Military Department maintains a dedicated state defense force focused solely on domestic operations.

Texas State Guard (TXSG)

The Texas State Guard represents a unique component within the Texas Military Department's structure, operating as a volunteer-based, state-only military force. Under the direct authority of the Adjutant General of Texas and ultimate command of the Governor as Commander-in-Chief of state military forces, the TXSG provides capabilities for state emergency response (Texas Military Department, n.d.-g). With approximately 1,800 members, this force focuses exclusively on supporting state and local authorities during emergencies and enhancing homeland security. Its primary missions include shelter operations, managing points of distribution (PODs) for essential supplies, and operating an emergency tracking network to assist displaced individuals during disasters.

The TXSG aligns its four geographic brigades with Texas DPS Regions to ensure coordination with state and local authorities during emergencies and other state missions (Texas Military Department, n.d.-g):

- 1st Brigade: Covers DPS Regions 1 and 5.
- 2nd Brigade: Covers DPS Region 2.
- 3rd Brigade: Covers DPS Regions 3 and 4.
- 6th Brigade: Covers DPS Regions 6 and 7.

The Texas State Guard executes its state defense mission through a structured system of Mission Ready Packages (MRPs) distributed across its brigades. These MRPs represent modular, rapidly deployable capabilities, each precisely configured with the personnel, equipment, and resources needed for specific

emergency scenarios (Texas Military Department, 2020). Despite these contributions, the TXSG faces significant challenges that undermine its ability to operate effectively and grow sustainably.

However, despite this systematic approach to state defense and emergency response, the TXSG faces substantial operational and organizational challenges that limit both its current effectiveness and future growth potential. These challenges threaten to undermine the organization's ability to fulfill its vital role in Texas's comprehensive disaster response and homeland defense and security framework.

Key Issues Facing the Texas State Guard

The Texas State Guard faces significant systemic challenges that threaten its operational effectiveness. At the administrative level, severe staffing limitations create critical bottlenecks: just nine paid personnel manage an organization of nearly 1,800 volunteers. This skeletal administrative structure struggles to maintain basic support functions, causing delays in recruitment, mission assignments, and operational planning that compromise both daily operations and emergency response capabilities (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2019, pp. 27-32).

TMD's approach to TXSG management has been predominantly reactive, lacking strategic vision. Mission assignments occur without comprehensive long-term planning, creating misalignment between member capabilities and operational requirements. This absence of strategic direction has resulted in inefficient resource allocation and prevented the TXSG from developing into an effective standalone force (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2019, p. 28).

Resource constraints create a paradoxical situation that undermines readiness. While members must rely on personal equipment for training, state regulations prohibit the use of this same equipment during actual deployments due to liability concerns. This disconnect leaves units inadequately prepared for real-world missions. Communication challenges between units, headquarters, and TMD leadership further compound these issues, resulting in fragmented command and control and inconsistent operational standards (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2019, pp. 27-32).

The lack of dedicated training infrastructure significantly impacts force readiness. Without designated training facilities, the TXSG struggles to maintain consistent and effective training programs. This preparedness gap became evident during Hurricane Harvey operations, when State Guard and National Guard units were forced to integrate under crisis conditions without prior joint training experience (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2019, pp. 27-32).

The TXSG faces a critical personnel crisis. Current attrition rates significantly exceed recruitment, with annual losses of 400 members against only 300 new recruits. The force also struggles with retention: over half of current members have served less than five years, and fewer than 15% maintain service beyond a decade (Sunset Advisory Commission, 2019, p. 28).

This decline represents a dramatic shift from the organization's historical significance. Once a robust State Defense Force capable of defending Texas communities during World War II, the TXSG has been largely relegated to an auxiliary support role. This diminished status has contributed to low morale and accelerating personnel losses.

Creation of TMD Task Forces for Operation Lone Star

The Texas Military Department developed its task force structure for Operation Lone Star (OLS) based on geographic operational areas and mission requirements, shaped by border terrain and threat dynamics (Texas Military Department, 2022, p. 4). Rather than following traditional National Guard force structure, TMD implemented a cross-leveling approach, redistributing personnel, equipment, and weapons from

their organic units to form regionally focused task forces. This resulted in service members being reassigned to ad hoc formations instead of operating under their established unit command structures.

Current Task Force Organization
TMD established multiple task forces to execute OLS missions across the Texas border region:

- Task Force Eagle manages operations in the Del Rio Border Patrol Sector
- Task Force East manages operations in the Rio Grande Valley and Laredo Border Patrol Sector
- Task Force West manages operations in the El Paso and Big Bend Border Patrol Sectors
- Joint Task Force (JTF) Lonestar (Brigade HQ) serves as the higher command echelon coordinating overall operations

This organizational structure relies heavily on cross-leveling, where service members with various Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) are pulled from their original units. The Texas State Guard provides additional support, with personnel embedded within task forces to manage menial tasks and service support functions.

The extensive use of cross-leveling for OLS has created cascading effects that compromise TMD's ability to execute both state and federal missions. This organizational approach generates three critical vulnerabilities:

First, the disruption of unit cohesion fundamentally undermines combat effectiveness. Military units build operational capability through sustained collective training, developing the shared understanding and trust essential for complex operations. Cross-leveling fractures these relationships, forcing leaders to rebuild team dynamics while simultaneously executing demanding missions. This degradation of unit cohesion directly impacts operational effectiveness and safety.

Second, the redistribution of equipment creates significant training deficits across non-deployed units. When critical equipment is diverted to support OLS, home station units lose their ability to maintain readiness through realistic training. Without access to assigned vehicles, weapons and specialized equipment, units cannot execute the progressive training necessary to maintain deployment standards. This equipment shortage particularly impacts complex collective training events that form the foundation of combat readiness.

Third, these challenges create strategic vulnerability in TMD's ability to support national defense requirements. The Texas National Guard maintains crucial federal mission sets across multiple combatant commands. The degradation of unit readiness through personnel cross-leveling and equipment shortages compromises the guard's ability to respond to national emergencies or overseas contingencies. Furthermore, extended State Active Duty deployments often result in skill atrophy for all military occupational specialties, requiring extensive retraining before units can resume federal mission requirements.

Strategic Reorganization of Texas Military Forces
The Texas Military Department requires significant organizational restructuring to optimize both state emergency response, homeland defense capabilities and federal military readiness. A key element of this transformation involves establishing the Texas State Guard (TXSG) as an independent homeland defense force, enabling Texas to effectively double its disaster response capacity while preserving the combat readiness of its National Guard components.

The proposed reorganization establishes the TXSG as a distinct entity reporting directly to the Governor, separate from the Adjutant General's authority. This restructuring creates a dedicated leadership position for the TXSG, allowing the Adjutant General to focus exclusively on federal missions and combat readiness of the Texas Army and Air National Guard. This separation of command ensures clear lines of authority and streamlined decision-making during emergency operations.

The establishment of an independent TXSG command structure eliminates potential conflicts between state and federal missions. This clear delineation of responsibilities reduces administrative complexity and enhances coordination with other state agencies during emergency responses. The reorganization creates distinct operational channels for state-specific missions while maintaining the National Guard's focus on its primary role as a combat reserve force.

Critical to this transformation would be the implementation of dedicated funding mechanisms to support full-time staff positions, provide consistent training opportunities, maintain necessary equipment, and enable regular exercises with partners. This financial commitment would need to be sustained and predictable to build and maintain professional capabilities.

The key advantage of this approach lies in the ability to create forces specifically tailored to state homeland security and defense needs without the complications of federal requirements and deployments. By focusing solely on state missions, the Texas State Guard could maintain consistent presence and relationships within their jurisdictions, developing specialized knowledge and capabilities that might be diluted in National Guard units balancing both state and federal obligations. This specialized focus could allow the Texas State Guard to develop deeper expertise in critical infrastructure protection and stronger relationships with local stakeholders.

Addressing these challenges requires comprehensive reform across several domains. The possibility that future conflicts could overwhelm active-duty forces necessitates enhanced preparation of the Texas National Guard and planning for broader mobilization scenarios. This preparation must include modernization of training, equipment, and deployment capabilities for the Texas National Guard and a reconstitution of the Texas State Guard.

Training Management Framework

Training stands as the foundation upon which all aspects of modernization depend. Sun Tzu's timeless wisdom that “The victorious warrior wins first and then goes to war, while the defeated warrior goes to war first and then seeks to win” resonates powerfully in today's complex operational environment (Sun Tzu, 2010). This fundamental principle underscores how doctrinal advancements, organizational restructuring, and equipment fielding efforts ultimately succeed or fail based on our ability to prepare forces effectively for their wartime mission.

The evolving character of modern warfare demands a transformed approach to training that emphasizes combat lethality and effectiveness. As General Douglas MacArthur's enduring maxim reminds us, “In war, there is no substitute for victory” (MacArthur, 1951). This truth takes on new urgency in light of General Rainey's sobering warning about the consequences of inadequate preparation: “A bad day is not going to be 10% casualties; a bad day is going to be your firing brigade being gone” (Rainey, 2024a). This stark reality emphasizes the critical importance of restoring the warrior ethos through unwavering focus on “lethality, meritocracy, accountability, standards, and readiness” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2025).

The Army's training management system creates direct alignment between unit capabilities and essential tasks through a structured framework. Each Texas Army and Air National Guard unit, whether an Infantry

Company, Sustainment Battalion, or airlift wing, is designed with specific missions, functions, and capabilities. While units receive their organizational structure through Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) or Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDA), they train according to their Mission Essential Task List (METL)—the framework that identifies core tasks required for mission success in combat (Texas Military Department, n.d.-i, p. 9).

METL Development and Integration

Texas Army National Guard Units operate under a standard METL that reflects their design capabilities, as approved by the Department of the Army. METL development follows two parallel tracks to ensure units maintain both foundational and mission-specific readiness (Texas Military Department, n.d.-i, p. 16):

1. Standard METL – Defines the unit's core operational and warfighting capabilities as designated and approved by service headquarters. This establishes a baseline for all units of similar type.
2. Assigned Mission METL – Tailored to specific operational requirements, reflecting deployment orders, contingency plans, and evolving mission demands.

Mission Essential Task Lists: Air Force Implementation and Distinctions

The United States Air Force and Air National Guard employ a distinct approach to Mission Essential Task Lists that reflects its unique operational requirements and force structure. While sharing conceptual foundations with Army METLs, the Air Force framework emphasizes capability-based readiness through Air Force Mission Essential Tasks List within the Mission Prioritization Matrix (U.S. Department of the Air Force, 2024, p. 41).

The Air Force's METL framework prioritizes capability-based readiness rather than unit-specific tactical execution. This approach aligns with the Air Expeditionary Force construct, defining essential tasks necessary for mission accomplishment across major operational and functional areas. Combat Air Forces focus on air superiority and strategic strike missions, while Mobility Air Forces concentrate on airlift and aerial refueling capabilities. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance units maintain distinct task requirements focused on intelligence gathering and cyber operations.

Structural Framework and Development

Air Force doctrine, mission requirements, and force structure guide METL development, ensuring preparedness for both peacetime and combat operations. Air Force Instruction 10-201 provides comprehensive guidance for capability assessment and readiness evaluation. This framework differs significantly from Army implementations, particularly in its emphasis on broader operational capabilities rather than tactical unit-level execution Matrix (U.S. Department of the Air Force, 2024).

The Air Force METL system represents a sophisticated approach to ensuring operational readiness across multiple mission areas. Its focus on capability-based assessment and operational effectiveness, rather than tactical execution, reflects the Air Force's distinct operational requirements and global responsibilities. This framework continues to evolve, ensuring Air Force units remain prepared to project power globally and support joint operations across the full spectrum of military operations.

The National Guard METL System and ReARMM: A Critical Analysis

The National Guard's Mission Essential Task List (METL) system aims to ensure operational readiness by focusing on capability-based assessments. However, integrating this system with the Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model (ReARMM) presents unique challenges for Guard units. The National Guard's dual-role responsibilities create systemic tensions within ReARMM's standardized

framework creating critical gaps between ReARMM's intended benefits and its practical application in National Guard.

The U.S. Army's implementation of ReARMM marks a fundamental shift in force management strategy. This model aims to synchronize modernization and training cycles to enhance operational readiness across the force. However, the National Guard's distinctive dual-role status—encompassing both state and federal missions—creates unique implementation challenges that demand careful examination.

ReARMM: Synchronizing Readiness with Operational Demands

The Army developed ReARMM to address the growing complexity of multi-domain operations and evolving regional security challenges. The model represents a strategic response to the limitations of traditional readiness cycles, particularly in aligning units with Combatant Command (COCOM) requirements. However, the National Guard's implementation of ReARMM highlights critical operational and structural challenges that affect both state and federal mission capabilities (Feickert, 2022). ReARMM is structured in a three phase cycle (Texas Military Department, 2023, p. 5).

ReARMM's Three-Phase Structure and Implementation Challenges

Modernization Phase (12-18 Months)

This phase focuses on force restructuring, equipment upgrades, and integration of emerging technologies to enhance warfighting capability. Within the National Guard context, this phase faces substantial challenges stemming from equipment management practices. The current system of cascading equipment from Active Duty units to Guard formations often results in the transfer of aging or poorly maintained equipment. This has led National Guard units to incur unexpected costs, additional labor hours, and training delays which creates considerable readiness gaps (Government Accountability Office, 2024a, pp. 18-20).

ReARMM, while aiming for a synchronized approach to readiness, has not fully mitigated the challenges posed by the cascading of inoperable equipment from Active Duty to the National Guard. This practice has led to significant readiness issues, as Guard units are expected to maintain high operational standards with equipment that is often not combat-ready. Long-term state missions further disrupt the cyclical nature of ReARMM, leading to training, maintenance, and operational inefficiencies. The adaptability and predictability of ReARMM are thus compromised for the National Guard, necessitating a reevaluation of how equipment is managed and distributed across the Total Force to truly support the Guard's dual roles and mission requirements (Government Accountability Office, 2024a, pp. 18-20).

Training Phase (24-36 Months)

The training phase focuses on building unit proficiency through progressive individual and collective training events, yet the National Guard faces multifaceted challenges in time management, resource allocation, and facility accessibility. Units must maximize limited training days to meet federal requirements while long-term state deployments, such as Operation Lone Star, create significant gaps in training continuity that affect unit readiness for federal missions.

A fundamental disparity exists in training resource accessibility between Active Duty and National Guard units. While Active component units benefit from immediate access to ranges and training aids at installations like Fort Cavazos, National Guard Units often operate from armories located prohibitively far from these essential training facilities. This geographic dispersion of Guard units across numerous local armories throughout Texas creates an almost incalculable gap in readily available training resources (Knight, 2023, pp. 5-7).

This geographic dispersion also creates a significant logistical burden, as units must dedicate substantial portions of their limited training time to transportation rather than actual training activities. For many Guard units, several hours of a training day may be consumed by travel to and from training areas, effectively reducing a full training day to just a few hours of actual hands-on instruction and practical exercises.

The competition for training resources amplifies these challenges. When National Guard units secure access to training facilities, they face constant scheduling conflicts with Active units. Additionally, attempts to bridge the accessibility gap through virtual training platforms require substantial infrastructure investment that may not align with available funding. Units must carefully balance competing demands for equipment use between training and operational requirements, all while managing personnel availability that directly affects progression through required training objectives. This complex interplay of limited access, resource competition, and scheduling constraints creates a persistent challenge in maintaining required readiness levels (Knight, 2023, pp. 5-7).

Mission Phase (12-18 Months)

During this phase, units execute assigned operational missions, contingency deployments, or sustainment exercises while maintaining readiness for immediate tasking. However, since 2020, State emergencies, disasters and the border mission override federal mission preparations, forcing units to navigate multiple command relationships and competing priorities simultaneously (Anderson, 2022). Extended state activations can significantly impact federal deployment schedules, while cross-leveling personnel and equipment adds another layer of complexity to resource sharing and mission planning.

Systemic Impacts and Strategic Implications

The implementation of ReARMM in the National Guard environment reveals fundamental structural challenges that require strategic attention. The model assumes resource availability patterns that don't align with Guard realities, while state and federal requirements create competing demands for readiness. Traditional metrics fail to capture Guard-specific readiness factors, and current policies don't adequately address the complexities of dual-mission requirements.

Resource optimization presents another significant challenge. Equipment modernization efforts lack synchronized support systems, while training resources often misalign with operational patterns. Personnel systems struggle to track complex duty status changes, and financial systems require adaptation to address Guard-specific requirements effectively.

The successful implementation of ReARMM in the National Guard requires fundamental adaptations to address its unique operational environment and mission sets. If states were to professionalize and modernize their State Guard forces, positioning them as the primary military force for domestic operations, disaster response, and border security efforts, it would enable the National Guard to concentrate more fully on combat readiness through ReARMM's three phases. This realignment would streamline mission focus while maintaining critical homeland defense capabilities.

State investment in dedicated training facilities and equipment would significantly reduce logistical friction points that currently impact Guard readiness. These infrastructure improvements would support both State Guard domestic response capabilities and National Guard combat preparation activities. Through this approach, states could maintain robust domestic response capabilities through their State Guard while allowing the National Guard to better align with ReARMM's model through targeted structural adjustments, resource enhancements, and policy updates. This optimization would preserve the core benefits of ReARMM while better accommodating the National Guard's distinctive dual-mission requirements in both state and federal contexts.

The Commander's Role in Training Development

The Army National Guard's training development process follows a structured, top-down approach while enabling unit-level innovation within established parameters. This process begins at the national level and cascades through multiple command echelons before reaching individual units.

The Director, Army National Guard (DARNG) initiates this cycle by publishing annual training guidance that aligns with Army objectives. United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) then provides training and readiness oversight through First United States Army (FUSA), working directly with state Adjutants General (TAGs) to ensure compliance and effectiveness (National Guard Bureau, 2021, p. 1).

TAGs hold three primary responsibilities in this process: issuing command training guidance (CTG) for all ARNG units, reviewing and approving mission-essential task lists (METLs), and validating yearly training plans (YTPs) from subordinate units. This oversight ensures alignment between national objectives and unit-level execution while maintaining standards across the force (Knight, 2023, p. 3).

At the unit level, commanders play a pivotal role in translating these broad directives into effective training programs. While operating within the framework of approved METLs and YTPs, commanders have significant latitude to develop innovative training approaches that enhance both unit lethality and soldier retention (Texas Military Department, n.d.-i, p. 21).

The commander's influence in this process becomes most evident in the detailed planning and execution phases. While higher echelons establish the broad parameters through CTG and METL priorities, unit commanders shape how these requirements translate into practical, engaging, and effective training events. This responsibility requires commanders to balance multiple considerations (Texas Military Department, n.d.-e, p. 11):

- Meeting established readiness standards through a structured progression from individual skill mastery to collective unit proficiency
- Maximizing limited training time
- Maintaining soldier engagement and retention
- Ensuring training relevance through the use of scenario-based, threat-focused exercises to replicate real-world operational environments
- Managing resource constraints while achieving training objectives

Effective training development requires both adherence to established frameworks and creative implementation at the unit level. By understanding their role within this larger process, commanders can develop training programs that simultaneously meet institutional requirements and enhance unit combat effectiveness.

Training Management Capacity: Balancing Requirements and Resources

The Texas National Guard faces a fundamental challenge in managing training requirements within severely constrained time resources. This challenge directly impacts unit readiness, training effectiveness, and the Guard's ability to maintain combat capabilities. While Active Duty forces operate with approximately 257 training days annually, the Guard's '48/15' model provides just 63 paid training days per year—creating a significant disparity that affects every aspect of unit preparation and readiness (Knight, 2023, p. 4).

The "48/15" refers to the typical training schedule for National Guard members. Here's the breakdown (National Guard Bureau, 2021, pp. 5-6, 12):

1. **48 Unit Training Assemblies (UTAs)**: These are commonly known as "drill weekends." Each UTA is a 4-hour training period, and typically, Guard members complete four UTAs over a weekend (two on Saturday and two on Sunday). This adds up to 48 UTAs over the course of a year, which usually means 12 drill weekends.
2. **15 Annual Training (AT) Days**: In addition to the drill weekends, Guard members also participate in a 15-day annual training period. This is often conducted as a continuous two-week training session but can sometimes be split into shorter periods depending on the unit's needs.

When you add these together, you get the "48/15" schedule, which totals 63 paid training “days” per year.

The "39 days" is a simplified way of referring to the drill weekends alone (48 UTAs divided by 4 UTAs per weekend equals 12 weekends, or roughly 24 days) plus the 15 annual training days, which gives a rough estimate of 39 days.

Each Unit Training Assembly (UTA) is paid as one full day of pay. So, when you have a Multiple Unit Training Assembly (MUTA) 4, it means you are completing four UTAs over a weekend, which translates to four paid training "days" within that two-day period.

To summarize:

- **1 UTA** = 1 paid day
- **MUTA 4** = 4 UTAs over a weekend = 4 paid days

This is why the terminology can sometimes be a bit confusing, as the "days" in this context refer to pay periods rather than actual calendar days.

The impact of this time constraint manifests in three critical areas. First, command teams must accomplish the same administrative and training requirements as their Active Duty counterparts with less than 25% of the available time. Second, the compression of requirements into limited training periods often forces commanders to prioritize administrative compliance over tactical proficiency. Third, the development of innovative, relevant training suffers as units struggle to meet basic requirements within their time constraints (Knight, 2023, pp. 4-5).

Command teams face particularly challenging decisions in managing these limited resources. The requirement to either conduct training management during unpaid personal time or sacrifice their role as primary trainers during Unit Training Assemblies (UTAs), “drill weekends”, creates an unsustainable burden that affects both military effectiveness and retention. This situation often results in an over-reliance on full-time Readiness NCOs (RNCOs) for training management, potentially compromising the tactical relevance of unit training programs (Knight, 2023, pp. 4).

The institutional implications of these constraints extend beyond individual units to affect the entire readiness reporting system. Historical studies, including the 2012 Department of the Army Inspector General report and the 2002 U.S. Army War College analysis, demonstrate that even Active Duty units cannot complete all mandatory requirements within their available time (Wong & Gerras, 2015). This reality becomes even more problematic for Guard units operating under significantly greater time and resource constraints.

Operational Lone Star's Impact on Training and Readiness

The extensive commitment to Operation Lone Star (OLS), with over 4,700 service members and significant equipment deployments, creates a severe training and readiness crisis for the Texas National Guard (Satija, 2023; Texas Senate Committee on Border Security, 2024, p. 4). This situation manifests in two critical ways: first, service members deployed to OLS miss essential military training periods, and second, their home units must attempt collective training without key personnel and equipment, compromising unit cohesion and combat effectiveness.

Strategic Misalignment in State Planning

The Texas Military Department's Agency Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2025-2029 reveals a concerning shift in priorities that could further erode DoD standards of readiness. While the National Guard's primary function remains serving as a combat reserve for the Army and Air Force, the strategic plan prioritizes domestic operations, particularly disaster response and Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) missions for border security (Texas Military Department, 2024a, pp. 5-6, 15-19). This represents a significant departure from the Guard's core warfighting mission.

The plan's statements that "The Army and Air National Guard train and equip units for war-time response. The TMD must train and equip these same units for state response missions" and "the TMD remains focused on Operation Lone Star (OLS)," demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of resource limitations (Texas Military Department, 2024a, pp. 5, 15). Given that National Guard units already struggle to meet federal training requirements within their constrained training schedule, adding and prioritizing domestic operations training and operations will inevitably degrade essential warfighting capabilities.

Implications for Combat Readiness

This shift creates severe implications for national defense readiness. The combination of personnel and equipment committed to OLS, missed training opportunities, and the emphasis on domestic operations threatens to create a critical capability gap in the National Guard's ability to serve as an effective combat reserve. The absence of any substantive discussion of National Defense or National Military Strategy requirements in the state's strategic plan further suggests a disconnect between state priorities and federal obligations (Texas Military Department, 2024a).

The imperative to realign the Texas National Guard's training priorities has reached a critical juncture. In an era of intensifying global competition and evolving threats, our adversaries continue to advance their capabilities and preparedness. General Rainey's stark warning that "we need to put the… work in now, because, if not, we're going to trade blood for these lessons" underscores the profound consequences of failing to maintain combat readiness through effective training (Rainey, 2024a).

The path forward requires an unwavering commitment to restoring the warrior ethos and combat lethality. This transformation demands careful alignment between identified threats and required capabilities, ensuring that training directly addresses the challenges of modern warfare. We must recognize that today's operational environment leaves no margin for inadequate preparation or misaligned priorities.

The Texas National Guard stands at a decisive moment. While state missions hold importance, we cannot allow them to compromise our fundamental responsibility as a combat reserve force. The cost of prioritizing domestic operations over combat readiness may ultimately be measured not in dollars or time, but in the lives of service members inadequately prepared for the demands of modern warfare. This reality demands immediate action to rebalance our training focus and ensure our forces maintain the lethal edge necessary for battlefield success.

The solution lies in a comprehensive transformation of Texas's military forces. By reconstituting, modernizing, and professionalizing the Texas State Guard as the primary military force for state homeland defense and security operations, we can create a more effective total force structure. This transformed State Guard would assume primary responsibility for disaster response, border security, and other state missions, enabling the Texas National Guard to refocus on its essential role as a combat reserve force.

This strategic realignment offers a path to success both at home and abroad. A professional, well-resourced State Guard would provide Texas with dedicated, specialized capabilities for domestic operations, while allowing National Guard units to maintain the focused training and readiness necessary for federal wartime missions. This approach ensures that Texas maintains robust homeland defense capabilities while simultaneously preserving the combat effectiveness of its National Guard forces.

The stakes could not be higher. As potential adversaries modernize their forces and develop sophisticated capabilities, the margin between victory and defeat grows increasingly narrow. Through this decisive transformation of our force structure, we can ensure that Texas stands ready to meet any challenge—protecting our citizens at home while maintaining lethal, combat-ready National Guard forces prepared to fight and win our nation's wars. The time for this transformation is now—before we find ourselves paying for these lessons in blood rather than sweat.

Case Study: Florida State Guard

Florida's unique approach to disaster response and relief efforts, exemplified by the Florida State Guard (FSG), offers valuable insights for addressing the challenges faced by the Texas State Guard. The FSG operates as a premier domestic operations force separate from the Florida Military Department, providing several key advantages:

The FSG functions as a dedicated state-level force, allowing for focused training and expertise tailored specifically to Florida's disaster scenarios (Florida State Guard, n.d.). This includes specialized training in hurricane response tactics, flood mitigation techniques, search and rescue operations in coastal and swamp environments, and debris removal in tropical conditions. The FSG's status as a state-based force enables rapid mobilization without federal approval, allowing for pre-positioning of assets before storms make landfall, immediate response to developing situations, and seamless integration with local law enforcement and emergency management.

The FSG maintains its own equipment and assets, including high-water vehicles, boats for flood response, unmanned aerial systems for damage assessment, mobile command posts, and specialized tools for debris removal and temporary repairs. This dedicated resource pool ensures immediate availability during emergencies. Furthermore, the FSG works closely with other state agencies, fostering strong partnerships. This includes joint training exercises with other state commissions, coordinated response plans with county emergency management offices, and integrated communications systems with local law enforcement.

Tailored Response Units

The FSG is organized into specialized units, each with a specific focus (Florida State Guard, n.d.):

1. Crisis Response Battalion (CRB): Handles primary ground-based operations, manages points of distribution, and conducts humanitarian aid missions.

2. Aviation Response Squadron (ARS): Conducts aerial damage assessments, search and rescue operations, and deployment of mobile incident command vehicles.
3. Maritime Response Squadron (MRS): Manages inland and near-shore water operations, waterway reconnaissance, and flood response.
4. Special Missions Unit (SMU): Provides advanced search and rescue capabilities, medical evacuation procedures, and specialized training in water survival and aviation support.

Increased Overall Capacity
By maintaining the FSG separately from the Florida National Guard, the state effectively doubles its disaster response capacity. This structure allows for concurrent operations, strategic resource allocation, and extended sustainment during prolonged events.

The Florida State Guard, particularly through its Special Missions Unit (SMU), presents a compelling model for modern state defense forces. This professionally trained, purpose-built organization specializes in high-stakes operations spanning search and rescue, multi-domain reconnaissance, public safety operations and specialized interdiction missions. The SMU's success derives from its exceptional personnel—drawn from retired military special operators, law enforcement veterans, and other skilled professionals—who bring extraordinary expertise to complex emergency response scenarios (Williams, n.d.). Through advanced training and dedicated resources, the SMU demonstrates how state defense forces can effectively protect their communities while adapting to evolving security challenges.

A Texas State Guard for the Future: Protecting Texans, Leading the Nation
Texas is under siege on multiple fronts. Hurricanes and wildfires batter our communities. Cartels exploit the border, using drones, stash houses, and smuggling networks to infiltrate our state. Critical infrastructure like power grids and water systems faces escalating cyber and physical threats.

In each of these scenarios, the stakes are painfully clear: lives lost, communities devastated, and billions in economic damage. Yet, the Texas State Guard (TXSG), which should be a frontline defense for Texans, is underfunded, underutilized, and ill-prepared to meet these challenges.

Our National Guard is a critical asset, but its dual role as a state and federal force often leaves it stretched thin or unavailable. Texans deserve a solution that prioritizes our state’s unique needs—a reconstituted, independent Texas State Guard.

The Florida model offers valuable insights for transforming the Texas State Guard. By establishing specialized units, filled with professionals in their craft, tailored to Texas's unique challenges—including crisis response, cyber security, border operations, and maritime missions—a reconstituted Texas State Guard could leverage the state's exceptional talent pool while addressing specific state security requirements.

This transformation holds particular significance for Texas's future. Our state's history of self-reliance and innovation, from the Alamo to modern-day challenges, demonstrates our capacity for independent action in the face of adversity. A modernized Texas State Guard would enhance our ability to protect citizens during natural disasters, respond to unconventional threats, and maintain public safety without depending on federal intervention.

This initiative transcends theoretical policy considerations—it directly impacts the security and well-being of Texas families and communities. By implementing lessons learned from Florida's successful model, Texas can establish a state defense force that reflects both our proud military heritage and our commitment to protecting our citizens through innovative, effective emergency response capabilities.

Recommendations

TEXAS MILITARY DEPARTMENT RESOLUTIONS

Restructure the Texas State Guard as an Independent State Defense Force

Transform the Texas State Guard into an independent, robust state defense force separate from the Texas Military Department, enabling enhanced homeland security and disaster response capabilities while allowing the Texas National Guard to focus on federal operational requirements. This reconstitution will create specialized units capable of responding to state-specific threats and emergencies, supported by dedicated resources, professional staff, and clear command structures.

Crisis Response Battalion
A rapid reaction force trained for immediate deployment to natural disasters, civil disturbances, terrorist incidents, and other large-scale emergencies across Texas. This battalion would specialize in disaster response and disaster relief efforts: search and rescue, route clearance, distribution operations, humanitarian assistance, emergency management, and mass casualty response with basic medical support. Personnel would be highly trained in emergency logistics to support overwhelmed local agencies.

Aviation Response Squadron
A multi-role aviation element providing aerial surveillance, rapid personnel deployment, medical evacuation, and counter-smuggling reconnaissance using a fleet of fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and unmanned aerial systems (UAS). This squadron would enhance border security, disaster response, and emergency operations, integrating real-time ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) capabilities with ground units.

Maritime Response Squadron
A multi-role maritime element providing search and rescue, security operations, interdiction and rapid response in the inland waters, near-shore and off-shore in the Gulf of America and the Rio Grande River. The squadron would conduct counter-narcotics, human trafficking interdiction, critical infrastructure security, and disaster response missions. Equipped with fast patrol boats, drones, and Autonomous Surface Vessels, it would act as Texas's maritime defense force, securing ports and waterways against criminal organizations and foreign threats.

Special Missions Unit (SMU)
A highly selective, Tier 1 special operations force composed of prior Special Forces, SEALs, Rangers, Marine Recon, and Air Force PJ/CCTs. The SMU would focus on public safety operations, high-risk interdiction missions, advanced multi-domain reconnaissance, cartel and TCO disruption and search & rescue and asymmetric warfare training, giving Texas the ability to conduct unconventional operations against transnational threats.

Border Security Unit
A dedicated force to counter transnational criminal organizations, human trafficking, drug smuggling, and cartel incursions. Modeled after Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) and DPS Tactical Operations

Division, this unit would have the authority to operate on private land, public lands, and waterways, conducting static and mobile patrols, ground sensor monitoring, drone surveillance, and rapid interdiction operations. It would provide a Texas-based enforcement force outside federal restrictions.

Medical Unit - Texas Medical Rangers
To provide combat medic, field hospital, and mass casualty emergency response capabilities to support Texas Homeland Defense and public health crisis response efforts. The Texas Medical Rangers integrate tactical combat casualty care (TCCC), aeromedical evacuation, and rural medical support to deliver highly mobile, self-sufficient, and surge-capable medical aid in austere, high-risk, and disaster-affected environments. Its membership consists of trained, licensed and indemnified health professionals and medical support volunteers. The Texas Medical Rangers ensure Texas remains medically self-sufficient during crises, disasters, and public health emergencies. As a highly mobile, adaptable, and medically advanced force, this unit provides lifesaving care to Texas citizens, first responders, and military personnel in the most extreme environments, ensuring resilience, readiness, and rapid response in the face of any medical emergency.

Cyber Security & Technology Unit – Texas Cyber Command
This Unit will defend Texas's critical infrastructure, government networks, and private sector partners from cyber threats and electronic warfare ensuring statewide resilience against cyber warfare, cybercrime, and digital espionage. The Texas Cyber Command will conduct offensive, defensive, and intelligence-driven cyber operations to protect Texas from nation-state actors (China, Russia, Iran, North Korea), transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and cyberterrorists who seek to disrupt state security and infrastructure.

Intelligence Support Activity (ISA) Unit
Modeled after the Army's Intelligence Support Activity (ISA, aka "The Activity"), this highly specialized unit would conduct human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), and open-source intelligence (OSINT) collection. The ISA Unit would provide real-time actionable intelligence for border operations, counter-cartel operations, domestic security, and emergency response coordination.

Combat Training and Opposing Force (OPFOR) Unit
This Unit will serve as the dedicated adversary simulation force for the Texas State Guard, Texas National Guard, and State, County and local law enforcement, replicating conventional and asymmetric threats to provide the most realistic and challenging combat training environments possible. The Combat Training and OPFOR Unit would be the backbone of combat readiness for Texas Homeland Defense, ensuring every Texas warfighter trains against the highest standard of realistic adversary threats. By mimicking the most dangerous actors—from near-peer military forces to cartel insurgents—this unit guarantees that Texas forces are battle-tested, adaptable, and prepared to dominate any operational environment.

Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations (TADSS) Branch
This Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations (TADSS) Branch would be a cutting-edge force multiplier, ensuring every supported unit and soldier within the Texas State Guard, Army National Guard, and Air National Guard has access to the most advanced training technologies available. The branch will provide realistic, immersive, and adaptive training environments that enhance readiness across all domains, ensuring commanders and warfighters can train to exceed operational standards and prepare for the full spectrum of modern conflict.

Engineer Battalion

A highly mobile, self-sustaining engineering unit focused on critical infrastructure development, rapid fortifications, counter-mobility (barriers, checkpoints), explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), and emergency disaster relief. This battalion would support border security, temporary base construction, and rebuilding efforts after natural disasters.

Military Police Battalion
The MP Battalion will provide force protection, critical infrastructure security, and riot control policing for Texas National and State Guard facilities, critical infrastructure sites, and emergency response efforts, while also augmenting local, county, state, and federal law enforcement in times of crisis or domestic security threats. The Military Police Battalion would serve as Texas' first line of defense against civil disturbances, threats to state infrastructure, and emergency law enforcement shortages. With highly trained former and current law enforcement, this battalion would bridge the gap between military and law enforcement operations, ensuring Texas remains secure, stable, and prepared for any crisis scenario.

Wildland Firefighter Unit
An elite fire response team trained for airborne operations, wildfire suppression, disaster response, and emergency environmental operations in Texas's most fire-prone regions. This unit would integrate with other State aerial firefighting teams, use drones for wildfire tracking, and operate advanced firebreak construction to prevent catastrophic fires.

Space and Satellite Operations Unit
A space-focused intelligence and reconnaissance unit that leverages commercial, state, and military-grade satellites for real-time monitoring, communications, and GPS-denied operations. This unit would work in counter-drone technology, satellite-based surveillance for border and internal security, and communications resiliency to ensure Texas remains connected during crises.

This restructured Texas State Guard (TXSG) would be the most advanced, capable, and mission-driven state defense force in the country, integrating military, intelligence, law enforcement, and emergency response capabilities to secure Texas across all domains: land, air, sea, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum, and space.

Key Integration Capabilities
1. Joint Operations & Intelligence Centers (JOICs)
    - Every TXSG unit would have embedded liaisons within JOICs, ensuring real-time mission coordination and intelligence fusion.
    - These liaisons would work with Texas DPS, National Guard, Texas Rangers, and federal partners to maintain situational awareness and streamline operations.
    - Cross-domain integration would allow for coordinated responses across law enforcement, homeland security, and military forces.
2. Advanced ISR Network
    - Comprehensive Intelligence Fusion:
        - Drones (UAS), satellites, SIGINT, GEOINT, HUMINT, OSINT, and cyber intelligence would provide a complete operational picture.
        - AI-driven intelligence analysis would detect and predict threats, providing actionable intelligence to leadership.
    - Real-time Threat Monitoring:
        - Surveillance of border regions, high-risk smuggling corridors, and critical infrastructure using persistent ISR assets.
        - Integration with JOICs and Tactical Operations Centers (TOCs) for immediate action and mission tasking.
3. Interagency Coordination

- Seamless integration with:
    - Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) & Texas Rangers for border security, cartel interdiction, and homeland security.
    - Texas National Guard for defense operations, force protection, and disaster response.
    - Local & county law enforcement agencies to provide tactical and intelligence support.
    - State & federal emergency management agencies for disaster relief and crisis response.

4. Statewide Force Projection

- Decentralized Rapid Response Teams (RRTs) positioned throughout Texas to provide:
    - Immediate response to border incursions, cartel activity, cyber threats, wildfires, and natural disasters.
    - Specialized teams trained in urban warfare, unconventional operations, and law enforcement support.
    - Minimal reliance on federal assets, ensuring Texas has independent operational capability.

This restructured Texas State Guard would be the premier state defense force in the country—a hybrid of military, intelligence, and law enforcement—capable of securing all domains: land, air, sea, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum and space.

The implementation of this transformation requires careful coordination among multiple stakeholders, including state leadership, military planners, and emergency response agencies. Success depends on sustained commitment to:

1. Elite Recruitment & Professional Development

- Targeted recruitment of prior military, intelligence, law enforcement, and cybersecurity professionals.
- Competitive benefits to attract top-tier personnel:
    - Continuing Education Units (CEUs), professional development, and advanced training.
    - Texas-specific retirement benefits and financial incentives for long-term service.
    - Access to advanced leadership and technical training from Texas universities and military academies.

2. Modern Equipment, Technology, and Facilities

- State-funded investments in cutting-edge ISR, cyber warfare, and electronic warfare systems.
- Upgraded training facilities and operational centers modeled after SOCOM and DHS fusion centers.
- Dedicated funding for aviation, maritime, and special operations capabilities to enhance mobility and rapid deployment.

3. Clear Mission, Command Relationships & Responsibilities

- TXSG would function as an independent force with direct command authority from the Governor of Texas.
- Command structures modeled after Joint Special Operations Task Forces (JSOTF) to ensure rapid, decentralized decision-making.
- Defined operational roles in coordination with Texas National Guard, DPS, and local authorities.

4. Effective Integration with Other Forces & Emergency Response Agencies

- Formalized joint training exercises and intelligence-sharing agreements with:
    - County Sheriffs, State and local law enforcement & Texas Rangers
    - National Guard Counterdrug Task Force
    - Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) for cyber threat defense

- Texas Division of Emergency Management (TDEM) for disaster response & humanitarian aid

As global and domestic security landscapes continue to evolve, Texas could lead the nation in innovative approaches to state-level security and emergency response. This comprehensive proposal represents a forward-thinking strategy that balances state needs with federal obligations, ultimately strengthening both Texas and the nation. The implementation of this plan will position Texas at the forefront of state-level emergency preparedness and response, ensuring that the state is well-prepared to face the challenges of an increasingly complex and unpredictable world.

The reconstitution of the Texas State Guard represents a strategic response to these challenges. By creating a robust, state-focused force, Texas can address critical homeland security and emergency response requirements while allowing its National Guard units to focus on their evolving federal missions. This approach aligns with broader military transformation efforts through 2040, including the Army's adaptation to multi-domain operations and the Guard's transition to its 4.0 operating model

This transformation will not only alleviate the strain on the Texas National Guard but also provide the state with a flexible, cost-effective force capable of responding to a wide range of emergencies. The proposed structure ensures better alignment with state needs, improved administrative efficiency, and enhanced coordination with other state agencies.

Furthermore, the emphasis on specialized training, dedicated resources, and improved retention strategies will create a more professional and capable force. This will not only improve the state's emergency response capabilities but also provide valuable opportunities for Texans to serve their communities and develop critical skills.

The challenges facing Texas and the nation demand innovative solutions. The reconstitution of the Texas State Guard represents a bold yet pragmatic approach to enhancing our state's security and emergency response capabilities. It offers a cost-effective way to address current shortfalls while positioning Texas as a leader in state-level homeland security.

The security and well-being of all Texans depend on our ability to adapt to changing threats and to maximize the effectiveness of our resources. By acting now to implement this comprehensive plan, we can ensure that Texas remains strong, secure, and resilient in the face of any challenge.

Establishing The Texas State Guard as The Primary Domestic Operations Force

In Texas, the evolving national security landscape necessitates an optimization of the state's military forces, balancing combat readiness, homeland defense, and disaster response capabilities. The Texas State Guard (TXSG) has a unique opportunity to enhance the state's disaster response infrastructure by assuming the role of Texas's primary Domestic Operations (DOMOPS) force.

Currently, the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) holds primary responsibility for emergency response command within disaster districts (Grubbs, 2019). However, transitioning this leadership role to the TXSG could significantly improve disaster response efficiency and coordination. The TXSG must take on this responsibility, enabling:

1. **Focused Roles for State and National Guard Units:**

- The Texas Army and Air National Guard can prioritize their national defense missions, including LSCO and multi-domain operations, while the TXSG addresses in-state emergencies as the lead agency for Texas' Mission Readiness Packages.
- DPS can concentrate on its core law enforcement roles, enhancing its ability to manage public safety during emergencies.

2. **Improved Coordination Across Agencies:**
    - Designating the TXSG as the lead agency for Military Forces Mission Ready Packages (MRPs) would streamline interagency efforts, reducing duplication and improving communication between state and local agencies.
3. **Strengthened Regional and Statewide Response:**
    - With proper training, organizational structure, and regional alignment, the TXSG can ensure rapid and effective responses to natural and man-made disasters.

Investing in the TXSG's expanded role as the lead DOMOPS force will position Texas as a national leader in disaster preparedness and response, safeguarding its citizens while supporting national defense objectives.

JOINT: TEXAS ARMY & AIR NATIONAL GUARD & STATE GUARD

Establishing Pay Parity Across Texas Military Forces
Texas Military Department service members face substantial compensation inequities due to fragmented state laws governing military pay and benefits. Current statutes create an unjust system where compensation varies significantly based on duty status and component, despite service members performing similar missions in defense of Texas (Texas Military Department, 2022, p. 9).

The existing framework particularly disadvantages Texas State Guard members, who receive a fixed daily pay rate of $238.00 (Daily Base Pay – 179.00; Per Diem – 59.00) compared to the higher federal pay scale rates provided to National Guard members on State Active Duty (Texas Military Department, 2024c; Texas Military Department, n.d.-f). While National Guard members can access comprehensive federal benefits, State Guard members face limited state-level benefits that fail to provide equivalent support.

The Texas Legislature must amend Chapter 437 of the Texas Government Code to mandate standardized compensation across all components of the Texas Military Forces (Tex. Gov't Code § 437, n.d.). This reform should establish uniform pay scales, allowances, and benefits regardless of duty status or component designation. The legislation must ensure that Texas State Guard members receive compensation packages comparable to their National Guard counterparts when performing state service.

This comprehensive reform would strengthen force retention while recognizing that all Texas military service members deserve equal compensation for equal service to the state. The Texas Military Department must implement clear policies ensuring that duty status or component designation no longer determines a service member's compensation level. Establishing pay parity is essential for maintaining a capable, professional force across all Texas military components.

Establishing Benefit Parity for Extended State Active Duty Service
Texas National and State Guard members serving extended periods on State Active Duty face significant benefit disparities compared to partner agencies like the Department of Public Safety and Texas Parks and

Wildlife, despite performing similar mission-critical roles (Texas Military Department, 2022). Current classification as temporary state employees denies Guard members access to comprehensive Employee Retirement System benefits during prolonged state missions.

The unprecedented duration of recent state mobilizations, including COVID-19 response and Operation Lone Star, has exposed this critical disparity. While the Texas Military Department provides full ERS benefits to its civilian employees, service members on extended State Active Duty lack essential coverage including health insurance, retirement benefits, disability coverage, life insurance, and leave programs. This inequity persists despite Governor Abbott's indication that border security operations will require long-term Guard support.

The Texas Legislature must establish comprehensive benefit parity for Guard members serving extended State Active Duty exceeding 30 days. This reform should provide full Employee Retirement System benefits aligned with those received by Texas Department of Public Safety personnel, including complete health, retirement, disability, and insurance coverage (Texas Department of Public Safety, n.d.). Ensuring equal benefits for extended state service is essential for maintaining force readiness and appropriately supporting service members dedicated to Texas security missions.

Comprehensive Workers' Compensation Coverage for Service Members on State Active Duty
Texas service members deployed on Operation Lone Star currently face dangerous gaps in workers' compensation coverage due to outdated state laws that fail to recognize the unique demands of military service. The existing system, designed for conventional state employees working standard hours, leaves service members vulnerable when injuries occur during essential military activities outside traditional working periods (Texas Military Department, n.d.-i).

The continuous nature of military operations fundamentally conflicts with current workers' compensation framework. Service members maintain 24-hour readiness postures, conduct essential activities during non-traditional hours, and regularly traverse remote locations across Texas. Yet present law restricts coverage to injuries sustained during conventional working hours and direct duty tasks, ignoring the reality that military service demands constant commitment and readiness.

The Texas Legislature must reform state workers' compensation laws to provide comprehensive protection for service members on State Active Duty. These reforms should modify the Texas Government Code, Administrative Code, and Civil Practice and Remedies Code to ensure coverage aligns with military operational requirements. The revised framework must explicitly protect service members during all mission-essential activities, including training events, travel periods, and non-traditional duty hours.

This reform would close critical protection gaps while recognizing that military service differs fundamentally from conventional state employment. Comprehensive workers' compensation coverage is essential for maintaining force readiness and ensuring service members receive appropriate care when injured in service to Texas.

State of Texas Extension to Federal Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) for Texas State and National Guard Service Members on State Active Duty
Texas National and State Guard members face a critical gap in legal protections when serving on State Active Duty (SAD), lacking the comprehensive safeguards provided by the federal Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) (50 U.S.C. Chapter 50, n.d.). This disparity creates significant personal and professional vulnerabilities for service members responding to state emergencies, particularly during

extended mobilizations like Operation Lone Star and COVID-19 response missions (Servicemembers Civil Relief Act Centralized Verification Services, n.d.).

The unprecedented frequency and duration of recent state mobilizations, including natural disaster response, civil unrest management, pandemic support, and border security operations, have highlighted this protection gap. While federal Title 10 and Title 32 orders provide crucial SCRA protections such as interest rate caps and eviction safeguards, Texas Guard members on SAD receive only limited state protections, primarily concerning real property claims statutes of limitations.

Texas must join the twenty-two states that extend comprehensive SCRA protections to Guard members serving on SAD orders exceeding 14 days. This legislative change would ensure Texas service members receive equal legal safeguards regardless of duty status, protecting their civilian obligations during state emergency response missions. Comprehensive SCRA coverage for SAD service is essential for maintaining Guard readiness and protecting service members who defend Texas communities.

Enhancing Readiness Through Health, Fitness, and Resilience

The Texas Military Forces operational effectiveness depends fundamentally on the physical and mental readiness of its service members. Texas must address the critical readiness challenges within the Texas Military Forces through comprehensive health and fitness initiatives aimed at reducing obesity rates, decreasing lost duty days, and enhancing operational effectiveness.

The United States military currently faces an unprecedented health crisis that directly impacts force readiness and national security. Recent studies reveal that sixty-eight percent of U.S. service members fall within overweight or obese ranges on the body mass index, representing a dramatic increase in recent years (American Security Project, 2024). Military obesity rates across active-duty components have more than doubled over ten years, rising from 10.4% in 2012 to 21.6% in 2022. This trend is compounded by a significant increase in eating disorders, which rose by approximately seventy-nine percent between 2017 and 2021. Annual active-duty separations from the service for not meeting standards increased by 65% from 2019 to 2023 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2024).

The financial burden of this health crisis is substantial. The estimated cost burden is $1.35 billion annually which includes direct care costs and lost productivity (American Security Project, 2024). The impact on operational readiness is equally concerning, with 658,000 workdays lost annually due to overweight and obesity among active-duty personnel, resulting in $103 million in annual productivity losses (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2024).

Within the Army specifically, current statistics indicate an obesity rate of twenty percent, with overweight soldiers comprising approximately forty to fifty percent of the force. Across all services, obesity rates have shown a steady increase from sixteen percent in 2015 to nineteen percent in 2020, indicating a concerning trend that requires immediate intervention.

Proposed Actions

State-Sponsored Fitness Infrastructure:

Establish and fund comprehensive partnerships with Texas-based fitness facilities to provide state-funded gym memberships for all Texas Military Forces personnel. This program would ensure access to certified fitness professionals and training specialists while implementing a performance-based incentive structure that rewards exceptional physical fitness achievements. The program would provide consistent training

opportunities regardless of member location or duty status and include specialized equipment and facilities supporting military-specific fitness requirements.

Digital Health Integration Platform:

Develop and implement a comprehensive digital fitness ecosystem that delivers personalized training resources and performance tracking capabilities. This platform would feature real-time health monitoring and assessment tools, along with customized training plans aligned with military fitness standards. The system will incorporate injury prevention guidance, early intervention protocols, integrated nutrition planning, and mental resilience tools. All data will be securely integrated with existing military health systems to ensure comprehensive health management.

Comprehensive Wellness Support Services:

Establish an integrated health and resilience program that provides professional injury rehabilitation services, mental health support, and dietary counseling. This program would include performance coaching, lifestyle management guidance, and preventive health services. The comprehensive approach will extend to family wellness support and education, recognizing the vital role of family health in service member readiness. The program would also incorporate stress management and resilience training to address the full spectrum of health challenges facing military personnel.

Performance Recognition Framework:

Implement an annual fitness excellence program that provides monetary incentives for achieving and maintaining superior fitness standards. This framework would create enhanced career advancement opportunities for high performers and offer specialized training and certification opportunities. The program would recognize achievement at both individual and unit levels, featuring annual ceremonies and public recognition events. Additional paid training days would be provided for exceptional performers to further develop their capabilities and serve as mentors within their units.

The Texas Military Department would need to provide quarterly reports to the legislature detailing program participation rates, changes in force-wide fitness and health indicators, and impact on readiness and deployment statistics. These reports need to include comprehensive cost-benefit analyses and return on investment calculations, along with recommendations for program optimization and expansion.

Investing in Training, Equipment, and Operational Readiness

The modernization of training infrastructure, equipment, and force structure for the Texas National Guard represents a critical strategic imperative for maintaining combat effectiveness and ensuring rapid response capabilities. This comprehensive investment strategy focuses on three key areas essential for force readiness and operational success.

Modernizing and Expanding Texas Military National Guard Facilities to Meet Current and Future Operational Requirements

The Texas Military Department faces an unprecedented infrastructure crisis threatening its operational capabilities, with 96% of readiness centers rated as deficient or failing. This severe deterioration, combined with a two-million-square-foot space shortfall, directly compromises the Texas National Guard's ability to execute both state emergency response and federal military missions (Texas Military Department, 2024a).

Current facility assessments paint a stark picture of the department's ten-million-square-foot infrastructure portfolio. U.S. Army BUILDER evaluations reveal that 57% of facilities are rated deficient-poor and 39%

deficient-failing. While the State of Texas Revitalization Program has successfully modernized 21 facilities since 2014, 42 Readiness Centers and one Armed Forces Reserve Center remain non-compliant with basic Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection requirements. The U.S. Army Installation Status Report System confirms that 54% of Texas Army National Guard units operate in spaces significantly below their authorized requirements (Texas Military Department, 2024a)

The Texas Legislature must prioritize comprehensive infrastructure modernization and strategic expansion of Texas Military Department facilities. This investment would address critical space shortfalls, ensure compliance with force protection standards, and provide the resilient infrastructure needed to support current and future operational requirements. Modernizing these essential facilities is fundamental to maintaining the Texas National Guard's capability to respond to state emergencies while supporting federal missions effectively (Hawkins, 2019).

Establishing A State Combat Training Center for Modern Warfare Readiness

The Texas National Guard requires a dedicated Combat Training Center to maintain combat readiness and effectively prepare for evolving multi-domain threats. As a critical combat operational reserve force, Texas National Guard units must achieve and maintain the same readiness levels as active-duty forces, yet currently face limited access to comprehensive training facilities.

The proposed state-controlled Combat Training Center would replicate the proven training models of the Joint Readiness Training Center and National Training Center while incorporating Texas-specific mission requirements (JRTC Operations Group, n.d.). This center would enable integrated training across air, land, sea, space, and cyber domains, ensuring Guard forces can execute both federal warfighting missions and state homeland defense operations. The center will incorporate a dedicated Opposing Force (OPFOR) unit from the Texas State Guard and the state's vast veteran population, ensuring continuous relevance to emerging global threats.

The Department of Defense must support establishment of this essential training facility through funding, technical expertise, and equipment allocation. The center would address critical gaps in the Readiness, Recovery, and Modernization Model by providing year-round access to realistic training environments. This investment would enhance Texas Guard capabilities across its full mission set, from homeland security and border operations to overseas deployments, while ensuring forces maintain the advanced skills required for modern multi-domain warfare.

Additional training capacity within Texas would reduce costs, increase training opportunities, and ensure Guard forces maintain the highest levels of readiness for both state and federal missions. The Department of Defense should prioritize this initiative to strengthen Total Force readiness and enhance domestic security capabilities.

Enhanced Training Infrastructure

Texas must expand its state-controlled military training facilities to reduce dependence on federal installations and ensure consistent access to critical training resources. This expansion should prioritize the development of sophisticated training centers that address modern warfare requirements. These facilities should include advanced urban warfare and Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) complexes, specialized cyber and electronic warfare training facilities, dedicated Air National Guard air defense and UAV training sites, and state-owned helicopter gunnery ranges for aviation units.

Integrated Training Programs

Expanding joint training opportunities with Texas law enforcement agencies represents a crucial component of this modernization strategy. Enhanced interoperability with Texas Department of Public Safety, county sheriff departments, and emergency response teams will improve coordination during disaster response and domestic security operations. This integrated approach ensures seamless cooperation during critical incidents while maximizing the effectiveness of state emergency response capabilities.

Establishing A State Training Aids and Simulation Program

The Texas Military Forces require dedicated control over Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations (TADSS) to maintain readiness for modern warfare and state-specific missions. Current dependence on Active Component TADSS resources creates critical training gaps through limited access and scheduling conflicts, while failing to address Texas's unique operational requirements.

A state-controlled TADSS program would provide consistent access to advanced training technologies specifically tailored to Texas Military Forces' needs. This comprehensive program would incorporate virtual and augmented reality platforms, technical training devices, and sophisticated simulation capabilities supporting joint operations across air, land, sea, space, and cyber domains. The system would enable realistic training for Texas-specific missions including border security, counter-cartel operations, and disaster response, while maintaining compatibility with federal systems for joint exercises.

The Texas Military Department must establish a dedicated management office to oversee program implementation, including procurement of state-of-the-art training assets, creation of maintenance facilities, and development of partnerships with academia and industry. This investment would reduce dependence on federal resources while ensuring the Texas Military Forces maintains the advanced capabilities required for both state and federal missions. The program would integrate seamlessly with the proposed Texas Combat Training Center, creating a comprehensive training ecosystem that enhances force readiness across all operational domains.

By establishing state control over these essential training resources, Texas would gain the ability to prioritize Guard training requirements while reducing costs associated with accessing federal systems. This forward-looking program would serve as a model for other states while ensuring the Texas National Guard maintains the highest levels of readiness for its unique dual mission set.

Strategic Equipment Modernization

To enhance operational effectiveness, Texas should implement a state-funded equipment modernization program focusing on critical capabilities. This initiative should prioritize the acquisition of advanced protective gear, modern communications systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, and sophisticated night vision equipment. These investments will ensure Texas National Guard units maintain technological parity with active-duty forces while addressing state-specific operational requirements.

NATIONAL RESOLUTIONS

As the Texas Military Department works to maintain readiness and modernize its forces, several key NGAUS legislative initiatives demand our immediate attention and support (National Guard Association of the United States, 2024). These resolutions directly impact the Texas Army and Air National Guard's

ability to execute their dual-role missions effectively. The following priorities represent areas where coordinated state-level advocacy can significantly enhance our force capabilities and ensure Texas maintains its position as a leader in national defense. By understanding and supporting these specific legislative items, Texas can better align its resources and political capital to achieve meaningful improvements in force structure, equipment modernization, and training capabilities.

A top priority for Texas is securing full funding for National Guard equipment modernization (Government Accountability Office, 2024a). The NGAUS resolutions emphasize the urgent need to upgrade aging fleets across both the Texas Army and Air National Guard. This includes replacing High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), modernizing rotary-wing aircraft, and acquiring next-generation communication systems. On the air side, priority investments include recapitalization of legacy fighter aircraft, procurement of additional C-130J Super Hercules aircraft for airlift capability, and continued funding for the KC-135 tanker modernization program. Without these critical upgrades, Texas Guard units risk operational degradation, limiting their ability to execute state and federal missions effectively (Government Accountability Office, 2024b).

Equally important is addressing personnel benefits and incentives to attract and retain a highly capable force. Current disparities between National Guard service members and their active-duty counterparts in pay, healthcare, and retirement benefits create unnecessary retention challenges. Legislative efforts aimed at tuition assistance expansion, mental health resources, and increased TRICARE access will directly improve force sustainability. Additionally, efforts to ensure full funding for pilot retention bonuses and flight training programs are critical for maintaining readiness in the Texas Air National Guard, where pilot shortages remain a national concern. By advocating for these measures, Texas can ensure both its Army and Air Guard remain well-supported and prepared for evolving threats.

Additionally, investment in training infrastructure and readiness centers is essential to maintaining operational effectiveness. The Texas Army National Guard requires modernized ranges, simulation centers, and sustainment hubs, while the Texas Air National Guard needs investment in flight training facilities, aircraft maintenance infrastructure, and cyber operations centers. Given Texas' unique strategic role in national security and disaster response, prioritizing these investments ensures the Guard remains a reliable force for both state emergencies and national defense operations.

Finally, the rapidly evolving threat landscape demands greater emphasis on cybersecurity and emerging threats. The NGAUS resolutions highlight the need for increased funding for cyber defense infrastructure, training programs, and digital warfare capabilities. As the Texas Air National Guard plays a key role in cyber operations, electronic warfare, and space-based communications, securing legislative support for these initiatives is essential. Expanding Texas-based Air Guard cyber units and ensuring access to the latest cybersecurity tools will allow the Guard to counter cyber threats, safeguard critical systems, and operate effectively in an increasingly technology-driven battlespace.

By championing these legislative initiatives, Texas can secure the necessary funding and policy reforms that directly impact its Army and Air National Guard. A strategic and coordinated advocacy approach will be essential in ensuring these priorities receive the attention and support they deserve. Through proactive engagement with state and federal lawmakers, Texas can continue leading the way in National Guard modernization, readiness, and operational excellence.

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